Qing Li et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 29, 2020

15122962 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jan. 29, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/122,962 09/01/2016 QING LI 2014P00079WOUS01 9110
24737 7590 01/29/2020
PHILIPS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & STANDARDS
465 Columbus Avenue
Suite 340
Valhalla, NY 10595
EXAMINER
BECKER, DREW E
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
1792
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/29/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
katelyn.mulroy@philips.com
marianne.fox@philips.com
patti.demichele@Philips.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte QING LI, BIN YIN, DECLAN PATRICK KELLY,
KORAY KARAKAYA and WEI LI

Appeal 2019-002488
Application 15/122,962
Technology Center 1700
____________

Before JEFFREY T. SMITH, CHRISTOPHER C. KENNEDY, and
MICHAEL G. McMANUS, Administrative Patent Judges.

SMITH Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–15. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Koninklijke
Philips N.V. Appeal Br. 3.
Appeal 2019-002488
Application 15/122,962
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s invention relates generally to a method, apparatus, and
computer program product for a cooking process control based on detection
of the initial status of food. (Spec. 1.)
Claim 1 illustrates the subject matter on appeal and is reproduced
below:
1. A method of controlling a cooking process of a food,
the method comprising steps of:
detecting (S101) a weight change of a first vaporizable
component in the food over a first period of time, wherein the
step of detecting (S101) the weight change of the first
vaporizable component in the food includes at least one step of:
detecting a weight change of the food during the first
period of time; and
detecting an amount of the first vaporizable component
that evaporates from the food during the first period of time;
determining (S102) an initial status of the food at least
partially based on the detected weight change of the first
vaporizable component in the food; and
controlling (S103) the cooking process at least partially
based on the determined initial status of the food.
Appeal Br. 23, Claims Appendix.

The following rejection is presented for our review:2
Claims 1–15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Tiesinga (US 2006/0257536 A1, published Nov. 16, 2006) in view of
Kasai (US 4,874,928, issued Oct. 17, 1989).

2 The complete statement of the rejection on appeal appears in the Final
Office Action. (Final Act. 2–3.)
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Application 15/122,962
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OPINION
Upon consideration of the evidence of record and each of Appellant’s
contentions as set forth in the Appeal Brief, as well as the Reply Brief, we
determine that Appellant has not demonstrated reversible error in the
Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–15. In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365–66
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (explaining the Board’s long-held practice of requiring
Appellant(s) to identify the alleged error in the Examiner’s rejection). We
sustain the rejections of these claims generally for the reasons expressed by
the Examiner in the Final Office Action and the Answer. (Ans. 5–6; Final
Act. 2–3.) We have reviewed each of Appellant’s arguments for
patentability. We add the following primarily for emphasis.
We limit our discussion to the independent claim 1 as argued by
Appellant. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Appellant has presented groupings
of the claims under separate headings identified as paragraphs 7. B–H
(Appeal Br. 18–21.) Addressing each of these groups Appellant asserts the
claims are patentable for the reasons set forth in Section 7.A. We do not
consider these conclusory remarks to be a substantive argument as Appellant
has failed to present substantive arguments and supporting evidence
persuasive of Examiner error regarding the separately identified groups of
claims. See In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“we hold
that the Board reasonably interpreted Rule 41.37 to require more substantive
arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and
a naked assertion that the corresponding elements were not found in the
prior art.”); see also Hyatt v. Dudas, 551 F.3d 1307, 1314 (Fed. Cir 2008)
(Arguments not made are considered waived). Accordingly, claims 2–15
stand or fall with independent claim 1.

Appeal 2019-002488
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4
The Examiner rejected claims 1–15 as obvious over the combination
of Tiesinga and Kasai. The Examiner finds Tiesinga discloses a method and
apparatus for cooking food comprising sampling/detecting weight change of
a food due to water evaporation during first and second periods of time
during cooking, determining an initial status of the food, and controlling the
cooking process as required by the independent claims. (Final Act. 2;
Tiesinga ¶¶ 74–76, 79.) The Examiner determines Tiesinga does not recite
determining an initial status of the food based upon the weight change as
required by the independent claims 1 and 8. (Final Act. 3.) The Examiner
finds Kasai teaches a method and apparatus for cooking food comprising
detecting a change of humidity in a cooking environment for determining an
initial status of the food based on the sensed humidity and controlling the
cooking process (initiating and ending) based upon the sensed humidity, and
a microcomputer which stores the programmed steps. (Final Act. 3.) The
Examiner determines it would have been obvious to incorporate humidity
monitoring and determining the initial status based upon weight change into
the methods of cooking food as disclosed by Tiesinga. The Examiner
specifically states:
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to
incorporate the claimed humidity monitoring and determining the
initial status based upon weight change into the invention of Tiesinga,
in view of Kasai, since both are directed to methods of cooking food,
since Tiesinga already included sampling/detecting weight change of
a food due water evaporation during first and second periods of time
during cooking (paragraph 0074, 0079) and determining an initial
status of the food (paragraph 0075), since cooking methods commonly
used humidity detection/monitoring to determine a food initial status
as shown by Kasai (Figure 11, #13, 8; Figure 10a; column 5, lines 25-
36), since also monitoring the humidity would assure the user that the
change in weight was indeed due to moisture evaporating from the
food rather than some other cause, and since humidity detection
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would also verify the initial status of the food as frozen or cool and
thus ensure proper cooking conditions of the food of Tiesinga.
(Final Act. 3.)

Appellant argues Tiesinga is directed to controlling a cooking process
based on a ready state of food determined from performing measurements
during the preparation process including (1) the initial water content, (2) the
final water content of the food, (3) the quantity of the food, and (4) the
quantity of released water. (Appeal Br. 16.) Appellant argues “Kasai
directed to a directed to controlling a cooking process based a kind and
condition of the food” utilizing “a gas sensor for detecting gas or steam
generated from the food and a weight sensor for detecting the weight of the
food.” (Appeal Br. 17.) Appellant argues the incorporation of the teachings
of Kasai into the cooking process of Tiesinga would change the principle of
operation of Tiesinga. Appellant specifically states:
[T]he operating principle of Tiesinga may be property characterized
as a final status based cooking process and the operating principle of
Kasia [sic] may be properly characterized as an initial status based
cooking process. Thus, the Appellant respectfully asserts that Kasai
fails to teach a modification of Tiesinga to incorporate the
aforementioned limitations of independent claims 1-15, because such
a modification would improperly change the operating principle of
Tiesinga. For this reason, the Appellant respectfully asserts that
Tiesinga in view of Kasai fails to render obvious the aforementioned
limitations of independent claims 1-15.
(Appeal Br. 17.)

It has been established that the predictable use of known prior art
elements performing the same functions they have been known to perform is
normally obvious, and the combination of familiar elements is likely to be
obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results. KSR Int’l Co.
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Application 15/122,962
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v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007); see also KSR, 550 U.S. at 418
(“the [obviousness] analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to
the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take
account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in
the art would employ.”); see also In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1264–65 Fed.
Cir. 1992) (a reference stands for all of the specific teachings thereof as well
as the inferences one of ordinary skill in the art would have reasonably been
expected to draw therefrom).
Appellant’s argument that the incorporation of the teachings of Kasai
into the cooking process of Tiesinga would change the principle of operation
of Tiesinga is without persuasive merit. “The test for obviousness is not
whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated
into the structure of the primary reference . . . Rather, the test is what the
combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of
ordinary skill in the art.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981).
Appellant does not dispute that controlling a cooking process based on the
initial status of the food was known to persons of ordinary skill in the art.
(Kasai.) Appellant does not dispute that controlling a cooking process of a
food comprising monitoring the weight change of the product based upon a
vaporizable component was known to persons of ordinary skill in the art.
(Tiesinga and Kasai.) The determination of the status and weight of a
product to be cooked based upon the combination of weight change and
degree of evaporation during an initial period was known to persons of
ordinary skill in the art as established by Tiesinga and Kasai. A person of
ordinary skill in the art would have reasonably expected that the known
methods for determining the initial status of a food product could have been
combined for accuracy purposes. “Obviousness does not require absolute
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predictability of success . . . all that is required is a reasonable expectation
of success.” In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1359–60 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing In
re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903–04 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). Appellant has not
adequately explained why the teachings of Tiesinga and Kasai would have
been expected to have been incompatible. Thus, Appellant has not shown
reversible error in the Examiner’s obviousness determination of claims 1–
15.

CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–15 103 Tiesinga, Kasai 1–15

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED