PVH Corpv.Ian Charles Parrish

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 1, 2020

91235467 (T.T.A.B. Sep. 1, 2020)

Mailed: September 1, 2020

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____

PVH Corp.

v.

Ian Charles Parrish
_____

Opposition No. 91235467
_____

Edward E. Vassallo, Kristen S. Ruisi of Venable LLP
for PVH Corp.

Ronisha A. Moore of The Moore Law Firm, P.C.,
for Ian Charles Parrish.
_____

Before Wolfson, Coggins, and Johnson,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Wolfson, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Applicant, Ian Charles Parrish, seeks registration on the Principal Register of the
composite mark (shown below) for “Leather clothing, namely, shirts, vests, sweaters,
shoes, caps, bandannas, shorts, sweat shirts, pants, belts for clothing, socks,
THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE
TTAB
Opposition No. 91235467
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swimwear, jackets, rainwear, blouses, dresses, footwear, hosiery, scarves, hats, head
bands, pajamas and sleepwear” in International Class 25.1

PVH Corp. (“Opposer”) opposed registration of Applicant’s mark under Section
2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground that the mark so
resembles Opposer’s previously used and registered marks EAGLE for “woven
dress-shirts” and “shirts and neckties”2 and the mark EAGLE and design (shown
below) for “shirts and sweaters,”3 as to be likely to cause confusion, mistake, or
deception among relevant consumers. 1 TTABVUE.4

1 Application Serial No. 86974267, filed April 13, 2016, based upon Applicant’s allegation of
first use and use in commerce on January 13, 2016, under Section 1(a) of the Trademark Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1051(a). The description of the mark reads: “The mark consists of [‘]EAGLE
BRAND GENUINE LEATHERS’ with an eagle design, and a belt design with the wording
‘PREMIUM QUALITY’.” Color is not claimed as a feature of the mark. “BRAND GENUINE
LEATHERS” and “PREMIUM QUALITY” are disclaimed.
2 Reg. No. 110603 for the mark EAGLE (typed) for “woven dress-shirts” issued June 6, 1916;
renewed. Reg. No. 986469 for the mark EAGLE (typed) for “shirts and neckties” issued June
18, 1974; renewed. Prior to November 2, 2003, “standard character” drawings were known as
“typed” drawings.
3 Reg. No. 988980 for the mark EAGLE and design for “shirts and sweaters”; issued July 23,
1974, renewed. No claim is made to the exclusive right to use “SHIRTMAKERS SINCE 1867.”
4 Citations to the record are to the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) page
in the prosecution history of Applicant’s application, and to TTABVUE, the docket history
system for the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.
Opposition No. 91235467
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Applicant denied the salient allegations in the Notice of Opposition. Answer, 4
TTABVUE.
Opposer filed a brief on the last day of its trial period. 28 TTABVUE 20.5
Applicant did not file a brief or submit any evidence. Nonetheless, the burden of
proof remains with Opposer, which must establish its case by a preponderance of
the evidence. Sock It to Me v. Aiping Fan, 2020 USPQ2d 10611, *6 (TTAB 2020)
(citing B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Inds., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 113 USPQ2d 2045,
2049 (2015) (“The party opposing registration bears the burden of proof, see [37
C.F.R.] § 2.116(b), and if that burden cannot be met, the opposed mark must be
registered, see 15 U.S.C. § 1063(b).”)).
We sustain the opposition.
I. THE RECORD
The record includes the pleadings, and, by operation of Trademark Rule 2.122(b),
37 C.F.R. § 2.122(b), the file of the subject application. The record also includes the

5 Opposer’s brief is timely. As the Board explained in ShutEmDown Sports, Inc. v. Lacy, 102
USPQ2d 1036, 1037 n.3 (TTAB 2012), “The Rule does not set an ‘opening’ date for the filing
of the plaintiff’s brief. While it is not the usual circumstance that the plaintiff’s brief is filed
during its testimony period, the Rule does not preclude this. Accordingly, petitioner’s brief
was timely filed.” See also Trademark Rule 2.128, 37 C.F.R. § 2.128 (a plaintiff’s main brief
is due “not later than 60 days after the date set for the close of rebuttal testimony”);
TRADEMARK BOARD MANUAL OF PROCEDURE (TBMP) § 801.02(a) (2020).
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registration certificates for Opposer’s three pleaded registrations, introduced under
Notice of Reliance (26 TTABVUE 5-19), and showing status and title in Opposer.6
We also consider the declaration of David Sirkin, Opposer’s dress-shirts division
president, and accompanying Exhibits 1-4, which although attached to the early brief
were nonetheless filed during Opposer’s trial period. See Ayoub, Inc. v. ACS Ayoub
Carpet Serv., 118 USPQ2d 1392, 1394 n.8 (TTAB 2016) (“On the last day of their
testimony period, Opposers filed their brief on the case concurrently with their
declaration testimony and exhibits. The Board accepted the early-filed trial brief [in
its order at] 46 TTABVUE.”7). However, the Board strongly discourages plaintiffs
from attaching evidence to their briefs, where it may inadvertently be overlooked.
If Opposer’s brief had been filed after the close of its testimony period, the affidavit
(with exhibits) attached to the brief would have been untimely. Unlike the transcript
of an oral testimony deposition, which may be filed at any time prior to the submission
of the case for final decision, see TBMP § 703.01(k), testimony submitted in the form
of an affidavit or declaration, together with any accompanying exhibits, “shall be . . .
submitted to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board during the assigned testimony
period.” Trademark Rule 2.125(a), 37 C.F.R. § 2.125(a).8

6 Exhibit A attached to Applicant’s Answer, consisting of photographs alleged to be of
Applicant’s products, is not evidence on behalf of Applicant. With an exception for pleaded
registrations not applicable here, “an exhibit attached to a pleading is not evidence on behalf
of the party to whose pleading the exhibit is attached, and must be identified and introduced
in evidence as an exhibit during the period for the taking of testimony.” Trademark Rule
2.122(c); 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(c); TBMP § 704.05(a).
7 In the Ayoub case, the Board accepted Opposers’ brief without mentioning the evidence
attached thereto. However, in the final decision, the Board considered the evidence.
8 Opposer provided proof of service on Applicant of a copy of the Sirkin declaration, with
exhibits, on the same day as it filed its brief. 28 TTABVUE 50.
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II. ENTITLEMENT TO BRING ACTION9 AND PRIORITY
Opposer properly made its pleaded registrations of record by filing status and title
copies under a Notice of Reliance.10 See Trademark Rule 2.122(d)(1), 37 C.F.R.
§ 2.122(d)(1). The registrations establish Opposer’s real interest in the proceeding
and a reasonable belief of damage, and therefore its entitlement to bring a statutory
cause of action under Section 13 of the Trademark Act. Australian Therapeutic
Supplies Pty. Ltd. v. Naked TM, LLC, 965 F.3d 1370, 2020 USPQ2d 10837 at *3 (Fed.
Cir. 2020); Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar Co., 753 F.3d 1270, 111
USPQ2d 1058 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 55
USPQ2d 1842, 1844 (Fed. Cir. 2000). In addition, because Applicant has not
counterclaimed to cancel any of Opposer’s pleaded registrations, priority is not at
issue as to the marks and goods covered thereby. King Candy Co. v. Eunice King’s
Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 182 USPQ 108, 110 (CCPA 1974).
III. LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Our determination of the issue of likelihood of confusion is based on an analysis
of all the probative facts in evidence that are relevant to the factors set forth in In re
E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973)
(“DuPont”). See also In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201

9 Board decisions have previously analyzed the requirement of Section 13 of the Trademark
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1063, under the rubric of “standing.” Mindful of the Supreme Court’s
direction in Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 125-26
(2014), we now refer to this inquiry as entitlement to a statutory cause of action. Despite the
change in nomenclature, our prior decisions and those of the Federal Circuit interpreting
Section 13 remain equally applicable.
10 Exhibits 1-3 of the Sirkin declaration appear to be identical copies of Opposer’s
registrations. As Opposer’s registrations were properly made of record under Notice of
Reliance, they need not have been resubmitted with the Sirkin declaration.
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(Fed. Cir. 2003). We make that determination on a case-by-case basis, On-Line
Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1474 (Fed. Cir.
2000), aided by the application of the factors set out in DuPont, and we consider each
DuPont factor for which there is evidence and argument. See In re Guild Mortg. Co.,
912 F.3d 1376, 129 USPQ2d 1160, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2019); In re Country Oven, Inc.,
2019 USPQ2d 443903, *2 (TTAB 2019).
Varying weights may be assigned to each DuPont factor depending on the
evidence presented. See Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp. Inc., 637 F.3d 1344,
98 USPQ2d 1253, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 26
USPQ2d 1687, 1688 (Fed. Cir. 1993). In any likelihood of confusion analysis, two key
considerations are the similarities between the marks and the similarities between
the goods. In re Chatam Int’l Inc., 380 F.3d 1340, 71 USPQ2d 1944, 1945 (Fed. Cir.
2004); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24,
29 (CCPA 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the
cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and
differences in the marks.”).
Because the design element and other wording in Opposer’s composite mark
EAGLE SHIRTMAKERS SINCE 1867 and design (Registration No. 988980) contain
additional points of difference with Applicant’s mark, we confine our analysis to the
issue of likelihood of confusion between Applicant’s mark and Registration
No. 986469 for the typed mark EAGLE for “shirts and neckties.”11 If confusion is

11 The goods in this registration for the EAGLE mark are closer to those in Applicant’s
application than are the goods in Opposer’s other EAGLE mark registration (i.e., “woven
dress-shirts”).
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likely between those marks, there is no need for us to consider the likelihood of
confusion with Opposer’s other marks, while if there is no likelihood of confusion
between Applicant’s mark and Opposer’s EAGLE mark for “shirts and neckties,” then
there would be no likelihood of confusion with Opposer’s other EAGLE word mark or
its composite EAGLE and design mark. See, e.g., The N. Face Apparel Corp. v.
Sanyang Indus. Co., 116 USPQ2d 1217, 1225 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Max Capital
Grp. Ltd., 93 USPQ2d 1243, 1245 (TTAB 2010)).
A. The Goods
We turn first to the second DuPont factor, which requires us to determine the
similarity or dissimilarity of the goods as identified in Applicant’s application and
Opposer’s registration. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746
F.3d 1317, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1161-62 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“the question of registrability
of an applicant’s mark must be decided on the basis of the identification of goods set
forth in the application”). See also Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Houston Comput. Servs. Inc.,
918 F.2d 937, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Hewlett-Packard Co., 281 F.3d
1261, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
It is unnecessary for Opposer to demonstrate that all of the goods in Applicant’s
application are related to Opposer’s “shirts” or “neckties”; it is sufficient if Applicant’s
mark for any of its identified goods is likely to cause confusion with Opposer’s mark
for any of its identified goods. “Likelihood of confusion may be found based on any
item that comes within the identification of goods in the involved application and
registration.” In re La Peregrina Ltd., 80 USPQ2d 1645, 1646 (TTAB 2008). See also
SquirtCo v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 216 USPQ 937, 938-39 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
Opposition No. 91235467
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(holding that a single good from among several may sustain a finding of likelihood of
confusion); Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 648 F.2d 1335, 209 USPQ
986, 988 (CCPA 1981).
Applicant’s goods include “leather clothing, namely, shirts.” Opposer’s EAGLE
registration covers “shirts.” There are no restrictions on the kinds of shirts Opposer
may offer; the identification is sufficiently broad enough to include shirts made of
leather. “It is well established that the Board may not read limitations into an
unrestricted registration or application.” Country Oven, 2019 USPQ2d 443903 at *5
(citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). See also In
re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018) (where the goods
in an application or registration are broadly described, they are deemed to encompass
all the goods of the nature and type described therein). Based on the identifications
alone, we may conclude that the goods are in-part legally identical.
The second DuPont factor, the similarity and nature of the goods, weighs in favor
of likely confusion.
B. Trade Channels and Classes of Purchasers
The third DuPont factor considers “the similarity or dissimilarity of established,
likely-to-continue trade channels.” DuPont, 177 USPQ at 567. Because Opposer’s
shirts are legally identical to Applicant’s shirts, we may presume that the trade
channels and classes of consumers for these overlapping goods are identical. In re
Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (even though
there was no evidence regarding channels of trade and classes of consumers, the
Board was entitled to rely on this legal presumption in determining likelihood of
Opposition No. 91235467
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confusion). See also Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1743 (TTAB
2014); L. & J.G. Stickley, Inc. v. Cosser, 81 USPQ2d 1956, 1971 (TTAB 2007)
(“Because the goods of both parties are at least overlapping, we must presume that
the purchasers and channels of trade would at least overlap.”).
The third DuPont factor, the similarity of trade channels, weighs in favor of likely
confusion.
C. Strength of Opposer’s Mark
We consider the strength of Opposer’s EAGLE mark, measured both by its
conceptual, or inherent, strength and its commercial, or marketplace, strength to
determine the scope of protection to which it is accorded. In re Chippendales USA,
Inc., 622 F.3d 1346, 96 USPQ2d 1681, 1686 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
“In order to determine the conceptual strength of the cited mark, we evaluate its
intrinsic nature, that is, where it lies along the generic-descriptive-suggestive-
arbitrary (or fanciful) continuum of words.” In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1815
(TTAB 2014). Opposer’s mark is an arbitrary term in connection with clothing and
has been registered without a claim to acquired distinctiveness on the Principal
Register. Accordingly, the mark is entitled to a presumption of validity under Section
7(b) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b), and “moreover, in the absence of a
Section 2(f) claim in the registration, that the mark is inherently distinctive for the
goods.” Tea Bd. of India v. Republic of Tea Inc., 80 USPQ2d 1881, 1899 (TTAB 2006).
Commercial strength is the extent to which the relevant public recognizes a mark
as denoting a single source. Tea Bd., 80 USPQ2d at 1899. In the context of a likelihood
of confusion analysis, the commercial strength of a mark is not a binary factor, but
Opposition No. 91235467
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“varies along a spectrum from very strong to very weak.” Joseph Phelps Vineyards,
LLC v. Fairmont Holdings, LLC, 857 F.3d 1323, 122 USPQ2d 1733, 1734 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (quoting Palm Bay Imps. Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En
1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1694 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
Opposer argues that its marks are strong, based on its “use dating back to 1868,
substantial sales and advertising over many years.” 28 TTABVUE 17. The date of
first use stated in Opposer’s registration for the EAGLE mark is October, 1868. 26
TTABVUE 11-14. However, “[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in
a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant;
a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence.” Trademark Rule
2.122(b)(2), 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(b)(2)). Opposer presented no evidence in support of its
claim of first use dating back to 1868.
The earliest date upon which Opposer may rely is October 20, 1972, the filing date
of the application out of which its EAGLE registration issued. Acad. Chair Renting
Co. v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 169 USPQ 571, 571, (TTAB 1971) (“It has been
consistently held that where an opposer takes no testimony and offers no evidence
other than a copy of its pleaded registration, the earliest date of use upon which it
may rely is the filing date of the application out of which its registration issued.”).
Opposer may thus claim use of its EAGLE mark on shirts since 1972.
The Sirkin declaration addresses Opposer’s alleged use of its mark from 2010
through the first three quarters of 2019. Sirkin states that sales per year during this
nearly 10-year period have “always exceeded five million dollars a year, and in some
years have exceeded ten million dollars.” 28 TTABVUE 20. He also states that
Opposition No. 91235467
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“annual advertising support for EAGLE shirts over this 10-year period have ranged
from nearly $100,000 to nearly $400,000.” 28 TTABVUE 21. An advertisement from
1970 that ran in Esquire magazine shows Opposer’s EAGLE mark used in connection
with dress shirts. 28 TTABVUE 42-43, Exhibit 6. Copies of pages from the Macy’s,
Belk and Amazon websites show examples of Opposer’s EAGLE shirts currently
offered for sale. 28 TTABVUE 46-50, Exhibit 7.
Based on the evidence, we find that Opposer’s mark is inherently and
commercially strong in connection with men’s shirts.
D. Similarity of the Marks
Under the first DuPont factor, we determine the similarity or dissimilarity of
Opposer’s and Applicant’s marks “by focusing on the marks in their entireties as to
appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.” Stone Lion, 110
USPQ2d at 1160 (internal citations omitted). See also In re Viterra, 101 USPQ2d at
1908; In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1048 (Fed. Cir.
2018). “The proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead
‘whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression’
such that persons who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection
between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, 901 F.3d 1367, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs. Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356,
101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). Where, as here, the parties’ marks appear
on legally identical goods, “the degree of similarity necessary to support a conclusion
of likely confusion declines” with respect to those goods. Century 21 Real Estate Corp.
v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Opposition No. 91235467
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Because the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks is determined based on the
marks in their entireties, “our analysis cannot be predicated on dissecting the marks
into their various components; that is, the decision must be based on a comparison of
the entire marks, not just part of the marks.” In re Ox Paperboard, LLC, 2020
USPQ2d 10878, *4 (TTAB 2020) (citing Stone Lion, 110 USPQ2d at 1161). On the
other hand, “in articulating reasons for reaching a conclusion on the issue of
confusion, there is nothing improper in stating that, for rational reasons, more or less
weight has been given to a particular feature of a mark, provided the ultimate
conclusion rests on a consideration of the marks in their entireties.” In re Nat’l Data
Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
The shared term EAGLE is the dominant part of Applicant’s mark. As the first
term in the mark, it is visually prominent and “most likely to be impressed upon the
mind of a purchaser and remembered.” TiVo Brands LLC v. Tivoli, LLC, 129 USPQ2d
1097, 1115 (TTAB 2018) (quoting Presto Prods. Inc. v. Nice-Pak Prods., Inc., 9
USPQ2d 1895, 1897 (TTAB 1988)). The remaining wording in Applicant’s mark,
“brand genuine leathers” and “premium quality,” are at a minimum descriptive of
the goods and have been disclaimed. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Laser Golf, 55 USPQ2d
at 1846 (“Regarding descriptive terms, this court has noted that the ‘descriptive
component of a mark may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood
of confusion.’”) (quoting In re Nat’l Data Corp., 224 USPQ at 751). To the extent the
words EAGLE BRAND will be perceived as a single phrase, consumers will
understand the term “brand” simply refers to “EAGLE” as Applicant’s trademark.
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The eagle design in Applicant’s mark does not draw the consumer’s attention
away from the prominence of the word EAGLE; if anything, it reinforces it. “When a
mark consists of a literal portion and a design portion, the literal portion is usually
more likely to be impressed upon a purchaser’s memory and to be used in calling for
the goods []; therefore, the literal portion is normally accorded greater weight in
determining whether marks are confusingly similar.” Ox Paperboard, 2020 USPQ2d
10878 at *4. See also In re Viterra, 101 USPQ2d at 1911; Joel Gott Wines, LLC v.
Rehoboth Von Gott, Inc., 107 USPQ2d 1424, 1431 (TTAB 2013). The principle is
especially true here, where the eagle design “merely emphasize[s], in a pictorial way,
the main word portion of [Applicant’s] mark.” In re Wine Society of Am., 12 USPQ2d
1139, 1142 (TTAB 1989). Likewise, the belt design is subordinate to the wording; it
is smaller than and underneath the design of the eagle. Consumers are likely to
perceive the belt design simply as a background carrier for the words “premium
quality.”
As to the script in which the wording in Applicant’s mark is displayed, because
the cited mark is registered in standard characters, it is not limited to any particular
font style, size, or color. Trademark Rule 2.52(a), 37 C.F.R. § 2.52(a). Registrant may
display its mark in a script similar to any of those used by Applicant. See, e.g., In re
Viterra, 101 USPQ2d at 1908 (holding that the specific font style of a mark cannot
serve as the basis to distinguish it from a mark in standard character form); In re
Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1186 (TTAB 2018) (“[T]he rights
associated with a standard character mark reside in the wording per se and not in
any particular font style, size, or color.”) (citing Citigroup, 98 USPQ2d at 1259).
Opposition No. 91235467
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Further, likelihood of confusion has frequently been found where one mark
incorporates the entirety of another mark. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of
Memphis, Tennessee, Inc. v. Joseph E. Seagram and Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 188
USPQ 105, 106 (CCPA 1975) (BENGAL for gin and BENGAL LANCER and design
for nonalcoholic beverages found confusingly similar); In re U.S. Shoe Corp., 229
USPQ 707, 709 (TTAB 1985) (finding CREST CAREER IMAGES for uniforms and
CAREER IMAGE for women’s clothing confusingly similar). Applicant’s mark
incorporates Opposer’s mark in its entirety.
In sum, we find that the design component and additional wording of Applicant’s
mark visually distinguish it only slightly from the registered mark. Moreover, and
more importantly, we find the sight, sound, connotation, and overall commercial
impression of the two marks considered as a whole to be more similar than dissimilar.
The first DuPont factor favors a finding of likelihood of confusion.
IV. CONCLUSION
The marks at issue are similar in appearance, sound, connotation and overall
commercial impression. The goods are in-part legally identical and would travel in
overlapping trade channels to the same classes of purchasers. Opposer’s mark is
inherently distinctive and commercially strong. Accordingly, we find that Applicant’s
mark, when used in connection with Applicant’s goods, so closely resembles Opposer’s
mark EAGLE as to be likely to cause confusion, mistake or deception.
Decision: The opposition is sustained under Trademark Act Section 2(d).