Pure Storage, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 19, 2021

2019005369 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 19, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/417,696 01/27/2017 JOHN COLGROVE 3090US01 4839
130608 7590 01/19/2021
Pure Storage, Inc.
c/o Kennedy Lenart Spraggins LLP
301 Congress Avenue
Suite 1350
Austin, TX 78701
EXAMINER
KO, CHAE M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2114
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/19/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
eofficeaction@appcoll.com
kate@klspatents.com
office@klspatents.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JOHN COLGROVE and SERGEY ZHURAVLEV
Appeal 2019-005369
Application 15/417,696
Technology Center 2100

Before IRVIN E. BRANCH, DAVID J. CUTITTA II, and
PHILLIP A. BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges.

CUTITTA, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 2, 4–8, 10–16, and 18–20, all of the
claims under consideration.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Pure
Storage. Appeal Br. 2.
2 Appellant cancelled claims 3, 9, and 17. Appeal Br. 13, 15, 16.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Summary
Appellant’s claimed subject matter relates to “dynamically adjusting
an amount of log data generated for a storage system.” Spec. ¶ 2.3 In
particular, Appellant explains that adjusting a “logging level for a
component . . . can also include detecting (1004) that one or more operating
characteristics of the storage system (902) matches a predetermined
operating characteristic fingerprint” where “[a] predetermined operating
characteristic fingerprint may include information that describes the error-
related characteristics, performance-related characteristics, state-related
characteristics, or any combination of such characteristics that are exhibited
by storage systems that are exhibiting a particular behavior.” Id. ¶ 90.
Accordingly, “[w]hen the storage system is performing at undesirable levels,
additional logging data may be useful as a diagnostic input.” Id.
Exemplary Claim
Claims 1, 7, and 13 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below with
limitation at issue italicized, exemplifies the claimed subject matter:
1. A method of dynamically adjusting an amount of
log data generated for a storage system that includes a plurality
of storage devices, the method comprising:
setting, for a component within the storage system, a
logging level for the component, the logging level specifying
the extent to which log data should be generated for a particular

3 We refer to: (1) the originally filed Specification filed January 27, 2017
(“Spec.”); (2) the Non-Final Office Action mailed December 14, 2018
(“Non-Final Act.”); (3) the Appeal Brief filed April 10, 2019 (“Appeal
Br.”); (4) the Examiner’s Answer mailed June 6, 2019 (“Ans.”); and (5) the
Reply Brief filed July 8, 2019 (“Reply Br.”).
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component, wherein the component comprises a hardware
component;
determining, in dependence upon one or more measured
operating characteristics of the storage system, whether the
logging level for the component should be changed including
detecting that one or more operating characteristics of the
storage system matches a predetermined operating
characteristic fingerprint; and
responsive to determining that the logging level for the
component should be changed, changing the logging level
associated with the component.
Appeal Br. 13.
REFERENCES AND REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejects claims 1, 2, 4, 6–8, 10, 12–16, 18, and 20 under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Doi et al. (US
2017/0168917 A1, published June 15, 2017) (“Doi”) and Lancaster et al.
(US 2014/0095699 A1, published Apr. 3, 2014) (“Lancaster”). Non-Final
Act. 2–7. The Examiner rejects claims 5, 11, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as obvious over the combined teachings of Doi, Lancaster, and Srivastava
et al. (US 2011/0067008 A1, published Mar. 17, 2011) (“Srivastava”). Id.
at 7–9.
OPINION
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant and in light of Appellant’s arguments and evidence.
Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).
Arguments not made are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2018).
Appellant does not persuade us that the Examiner errs, and we adopt as our
own the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner to the extent
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consistent with our analysis herein. Non-Final Act. 2–4; Ans. 3–6. We add
the following primarily for emphasis.
Appellant argues the claims as a group. Appeal Br. 11. We, thus,
select independent claim 1 as exemplary of the group. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2018). Claim 1 recites “detecting that one or more
operating characteristics of the storage system matches a predetermined
operating characteristic fingerprint.”
Appellant argues that the cited portions of Doi do not teach or suggest
“detecting that one or more operating characteristics of the storage system
matches a predetermined operating characteristic fingerprint” as claimed,
because “Doi’s message logging level is merely a value for indicating a
severity of a message –– not an operating characteristic of a storage system.
In fact, Doi does not describe anything related to operating characteristics of
a storage system.” Reply Br. 11.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument. We agree with the
Examiner’s finding that “[w]hile Doi does not specifically state that the trace
logging is for a storage system, the teaching is for dynamically adjusting
trace logging level in a system, and Doi also states that Doi’s teachings can
be used on a cloud computing service where the computing resources can be
storage.” Ans. 4 (citing Doi ¶ 66). Appellant responds that “Doi at
paragraph 66 is a general description of cloud computing” and “[b]eyond
this description, Doi’s other mentions of ‘cloud’ (including the above cited
portion of paragraph 66) are generally concerned with providing an
explanation of ‘cloud computing.’” Reply Br. 12 (citing Doi ¶¶ 65–68, 72–
84, 87–88).
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We are unpersuaded. Doi’s trace logging system determines whether
to change a logging level of a particular received error message in a module
based on the severity, e.g., the frequency of occurrence, of an error. Doi
¶¶ 42, 44. Doi also teaches that the logged module is part of a cloud
computing system. Doi ¶ 66; see Doi ¶ 65 (“although this disclosure
includes a detailed description on cloud computing, implementation of the
teachings recited herein are not limited to a cloud computing environment”).
Appellant fails to demonstrate error in the Examiner’s finding that Doi’s
detecting of a message logging level in a cloud computing system teaches or
suggests the claimed operating characteristic of a storage system. Ans. 4.
Next, Appellant argues that “Doi also cannot teach or suggest the
limitation at issue because Doi does not describe, much less teach or
suggest, a predetermined operating characteristic fingerprint.” Appeal
Br. 10. According to Appellant, “Doi’s level indicated by the preconfigured
trace configuration is a threshold amount for message severity, which has
nothing to do with operating characteristics of known system behavior,
much less a predetermined operating characteristic fingerprint of known
system behavior. In fact, the word ‘fingerprint’ does [sic] [recte not] even
appear in Doi.” Id.
Appellant fails to persuade us that the Examiner’s interpretation of
“predetermined operating characteristic fingerprint,” as recited in claim 1, is
not the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with Appellant’s
Specification. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed.
Cir. 2004). As the Examiner notes, the Specification discloses that a
“‘predetermined operating characteristic fingerprint may include information
that describes the error-related characteristics, performance-related
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characteristics, state-related characteristics, or any combination of such
characteristics that are exhibited by storage systems that are exhibiting a
particular behavior.’” Ans. 4–5 (citing Spec. ¶ 90). Accordingly, we
determine that the Examiner’s interpretation of a “predetermined operating
characteristic fingerprint” as any information that describes “a state-related
characteristic” (Ans. 5), is an interpretation that is “consistent with the
specification.” In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
In addition, we agree with the Examiner’s finding that the “severity
level in Doi could be considered a state-related characteristic.” Ans. 5. Doi
discloses that a severity level of an error corresponds to a frequency of
occurrence of a particular error in a module or program. See Doi ¶ 24
(“Typically, program errors that repeatedly occur may be classified as higher
severity and require more immediate attention to solve.”). Thus a severity
level may indicate a state of frequent error vs. infrequent error in a program
or module. Appellant, therefore, fails to demonstrate that the Examiner’s
interpretation of claim 1’s “‘predetermined operating characteristic
fingerprint,’” as encompassing the “severity level in Doi” (Ans. 5) is
inconsistent with Appellant’s Specification or is otherwise unreasonable. In
re Smith Int’l, Inc., 871 F.3d 1375, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Appellant next argues that the “cited portions of Lancaster do not cure
the deficiencies of Doi.” Appeal Br. 10; Reply Br. 10–13. We do not reach
this argument because we agree with the Examiner’s findings that Doi
teaches the limitation at issue.
For the reasons discussed, Appellant does not persuade us of error in
the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claim 1. We,
therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of that claim, as well as the
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rejections of claims 2, 4–8, 10–16, and 18–20, which Appellant does not
argue separately with particularity. Appeal Br. 11.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 2, 4–8, 10–16,
and 18–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 2, 4, 6–
8, 10, 12–
16, 18, 20
103 Doi, Lancaster 1, 2, 4, 6–
8, 10, 12–
16, 18, 20

5, 11, 19 103 Doi, Lancaster,
Srivastava
5, 11, 19
Overall
Outcome
1, 2, 4–8,
10–16, 18–
20

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED