Prudential Insurance Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 14, 1981

254 N.L.R.B. 247 (N.L.R.B. 1981)

PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY
Prudential Insurance Company of America and
Marie Spencer. Case 7-CA-16314
January 14, 1981
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, PENELLO, AND
TRUESDALE
On August 27, 1980, Administrative Law Judge
William F. Jacobs issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed ex-
ceptions and a supporting brief, and Insurance
Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, filed a
brief in support of the Administrative Law Judge's
Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find-
ings,l and conclusions 2 of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order,3 as
modified herein. 4
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modi-
fied below, and hereby orders that the Respondent,
Prudential Insurance Company of America, Oak
Park, Michigan, its officers, agents, successors, and
i Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credi-
bility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence con-
vinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products.
Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have
carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
2 In adopting the Administrative Law Judge's conclusion that the
Union did not, through the collective-bargaining agreement with Respon-
dent, waive the right of unit employees to insist on the presence of a rep-
resentaive at an investigatory interview that could, or which the em-
ployee reasonably believes would, result in disciplinary action, we rely
on the reasoning set forth in Prudential Insurance Company of America,
251 NLRB 1591 (1980).
3 In ordering Respondent to remove from Charging Party Marie Spen-
cer's personnel file all references to the incident which occurred on Feb-
ruary 2, 1979, we agree with the Administrative Law Judge's finding that
District Manager Mullins' description of the event as described in the
memo is utterly preposterous and that the memo was written by Mullins
to protect himself from any future charges. See fn. 15 of the attached De-
cision. Moreover, we find that Respondent has not met its burden of
proving that the decision to write the memo was not based on informa-
tion obtained at the unlawful interview. Kraft Foods Inc., 251 NLRB 598
(1980). Member Jenkins does not rely on Kraft Foods. Inc.. supra, in
which he dissented.
4 The Administrative Law Judge omitted from his recommended
Order an appropriate provision requiring Respondent to cease and desist
from in any like or related manner infringing on the employees' Section 7
rights. We shall modify the recommended Order accordingly.
254 NLRB No. 20
assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said
recommended Order, as so modified:
1. Substitute the following for paragraph I:
"1. Cease and desist from:
"(a) Requiring any employee to take part in an
interview or meeting without union representation
if such representation has been requested by the
employee and if the employee has reasonable
grounds to believe that the matter to be discussed
at such interview or meeting may result in his
being subject to disciplinary action.
"(b) In any like or related manner interfering
with, restraining, or coercing employees in the ex-
ercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7
of the Act."
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a full hearing at which all sides had the op-
portunity to present their evidence, the National
Labor Relations Board has found that we have vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act, and has or-
dered us to post this notice. We will carry out the
Order of the Board, and comply with the follow-
ing:
WE WILL NOT require that any employee
take part in an interview or meeting with us
without union representation if the employee
requests such representation and if the employ-
ee has reasonable grounds to believe that the
matter to be discussed at such interview or
meeting may result in his being subject to dis-
ciplinary action.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by
Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL remove from Marie Spencer's per-
sonnel file all references to the incident which
occurred on February 2, 1979.
PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY
OF AMERICA
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
WILLIAM F. JACOBS, Administrative Law Judge: This
case was heard in Detroit, Michigan, on January 16 and
17, and February 14 and 15, 1980, pursuant to a charge
247
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
filed on April 26, 1979,' by Marie Spencer, an individ-
ual.
The complaint which issued June 20, 1979, alleges that
Prudential Insurance Company of America, hereinafter
called Respondent, denied the requests of Marie Spencer
to be represented by the Insurance Workers International
Union, hereinafter called the Union, during an interview
in which she had reasonable cause to believe that disci-
pline or other threats to her job status might result and
carried on such interview, notwithstanding the denial of
her request, thus violating Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. Re-
spondent filed an answer denying the substantive allega-
tions of unlawful conduct set forth in the complaint.
Upon the entire record 2 including my observation of
the witnesses, and after consideration of the briefs of the
parties, I hereby make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Respondent is an insurance company engaged in the
sale of insurance contracts throughout the United States,
with offices in Oak Park, Michigan, the location of the
unfair labor practice alleged herein. Jurisdiction is not in
issue. The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I
find that at all times material herein Respondent has been
and is an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The Union has represented Respondent's insurance
agents for purposes of collective bargaining for a period
in excess of 20 years. The most recent collective-bargain-
ing agreement relevant to the instant case was effective
September 26, 1977, through September 24, 1979.
Marie Spencer, an insurance agent, employed by Re-
spondent in the Detroit (Woodward) office, attended a
conference in Minneapolis on January 31 and February
1, 1979. While in Minneapolis, Spencer inquired as to
whether or not her personal file contained authorization
for her to sell property and casualty insurance since she
believed at the time that she had met all of the necessary
requirements to be so authorized and had in fact sold
several policies in that category, but had been denied
commissions on her sales. She was told that the neces-
sary authorization form was not in her file.
That afternoon, a message was sent to Spencer's home
office, which was received by District Manager Lewis
Mullins through his secretary, to the effect that Spencer
had been asking questions while in Minneapolis, and that
he should speak with Spencer and straighten out any
questions she might have.
Spencer returned to work at the Detroit office on Feb-
ruary 2.3 About 11 a.m., after the usual Friday morning
meeting of the district agents, Mullins asked her to come
I Hereinafter, all dates are in 1979 unless specified otherwise.
2 The General Counsel's and Respondent's unopposed motions to cor-
rect the record are hereby granted.
3 Mullins testified that this incident occurred on February 5. not Feb-
ruary 2, that February 2 was a Friday and Friday mornings are too busy
to hold such meetings. I credit Spencer. Notes she took were all dated
and I believe them to be accurate as to both date and content.
into his office. According to the credited testimony of
Spencer, when she did so Mullins asked her what ques-
tions she had asked Linda concerning district agents.
There is no indication in the record that Spencer asked
anyone anything about district agents when she was in
Minneapolis so she did not know what Mullins was talk-
ing about. 4 At least momentarily, she did not even know
who Mullins was talking about when he mentioned the
name "Linda." 5 Mullins repeated his question but Spen-
cer still did not understand to which questions Mullins
was referring since she had not asked Linda anything
about district agents. 6 Mullins became angry, quite ap-
parently feeling that Spencer was trying to hide some-
thing, had been inquiring into matters which he felt
should not concern her, or was simply being obstinately
uncooperative. According to notes which Spencer wrote
immediately after the interview, and upon which I rely
in partial support of her testimony, Mullins stated, "Any-
thing you want to know about the agents 7 or the run-
ning of this district, you direct your questions to me. I
run this district. I am the district manager." Spencer tes-
tified that after Mullins asked her several times about her
questions concerning district agents and after she contin-
ued to insist that she could not answer his inquiry unless
he were more specific about what questions he was
asking about, Mullins stated that Spencer's attitude was
affecting her job, and that with that kind of an attitude
she was not going to get too far in the business. At this
point, Spencer asked Mullins to excuse her while she
went to get a union representative with whom she would
then return.8 Mullins did not reply to this statement and
Spencer left Mullins' office to seek out her union repre-
sentative without interference from Mullins.9
4 Apparently in the transmission of the message from Minneapolis
through his secretary to Mullins, the message was somehow garbled.
I Subsequently Mullins explained that he was referring to Linda
Nelson, an administrative assistant in Minneapolis, to whom Spencer had
briefly spoken the day before.
6 I feel that if Mullins had simply asked Spencer what she wanted to
know about her right to sell property and casualty insurance or even
what she had asked Linda about this subject, the problem would perhaps
never have developed as it has. At the time, however, Mullins thought
that Spencer had been asking questions concerning district agents, a
matter which he felt did not concern her but was solely within his own
area of responsibility.
7 Mullins admitted interrogating Spencer concerning questions she had
asked at the home office regarding district agents or agencies.
8 Mullins testified that during this interview Spencer did, in fact, ask
that a union representative be present and described how he tried to talk
her out of it. He denied, however, that when she left she stated that she
was going to get a union representative. I credit Spencer where her testi-
mony differs from that of Mullins.
9 In addition to asking Spencer what questions she had asked at the
home office about district agents, Mullins testified that he asked her what
questions she had asked about PRUPAC. If Mullins had done so, howev-
er, I feel certain that Spencer could and would have answered that ques-
tion for she had, in fact, asked Linda Nelson about that subject. But
Spencer nowhere testified that PRUPAC was mentioned during the inter-
view. Nor is the subject of property and casualty insurance anywhere
mentioned in her notes of that day or in her affidavit to the Board. In the
note placed in Spencer's personnel folder by Mullins on February 6,
which purports to cover this interview, there is no indication that either
PRUPAC, as such, or property and casualty were mentioned during the
discussion between Spencer and Mullins on the morning in question.
During the discussion that occurred later in Chapman's office, discussed
infra, Chapman did not testify that PRUPAC was the subject of Mullins'
Continued
248
PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY
After Spencer left Mullins' office, she tried to find her
unit chairman, Chuck Furlotte, to have him represent
her in her confrontation with Mullins, but was told he
had momentarily stepped out.t 0 While she was waiting
for Furlotte's return, she sat down at her desk and began
to jot down notes concerning her meeting with Mullins.
At this point, however, Henry Chapman, sales manager
and Spencer's immediate supervisor, asked to see her in
his office for a few minutes. He did this at Mullins'
behest.
According to Mullins," after Spencer left his office,
he went to Chapman's office and gave him his version of
what had occurred during his meeting with Spencer. He
asked Chapman to call Spencer into Chapman's office so
that they could both talk with her. Chapman then did so.
When Spencer entered Chapman's office, Mullins 12
announced that he was charging her with insubordina-
tion and wanted her resignation. Spencer then asked
Mullins to excuse her while she went to get her union
representative. Mullins, at this point, placed himself be-
tween Spencer and the door and refused to let her out.
She tried to get hold of the doorknob but he continued
to prevent her departure. He stated that he had a right to
speak to her without the presence of a union representa-
tive. He then asked Spencer the same question that he
had asked her during the previous discussion that had
occurred in his office; namely, what questions she had
been asking at the north central home office pertaining
to district agents. Spencer, apparently ignoring his ques-
tion because she still did not understand what he was
talking about, again asked Mullins to excuse her so she
could go out and get a union representative.' Mullins
refused to move away from the door. He again asked for
her resignation. He requested a pencil and a piece of
paper from Chapman upon which he asked Spencer to
write her name to be used as her resignation. Spencer re-
fused to accept the pencil and paper or to resign.
Mullins then reminded Spencer that she had been
given the special privilege of reporting late on Tuesdays
and Fridays, 4 and stated that he was rescinding that
questions directed to Spencer. In my opinion, Mullins testified that he
asked Spencer about PRUPAC when in fact he had not done so, in order
to make her appear obstinate and uncooperative and to make his position
appear to be more reasonable. In short, I credit Spencer's description of
this interview, and where Mullins' testimony is at variance with it, I do
not credit him.
O0 Furlotte may already have left for vacation at this time since he tes-
tified that he left for vacation February 2 and did not return to work
until February 12.
" Chapman's testimony on this point supports Mullins'.
12 According to Spencer's affidavit, after Chapman invited her into his
office, she stopped momentarily to talk with two other employees. At
this point Mullins came out and requested that she come into Chapman's
office. At the hearing she could not recall that this occurred. There was
also another apparent minor inconsistency in regard to whether Mullins
was already in Chapman's office or came in a little later. These discrep-
ancies I do not consider of controlling importance and do not affect my
judgment of Spencer's overall credibility.
II Mullins initially denied that Spencer made this statement or that she
at anytime requested the presence of a union representative. Later, under
cross-examination, Mullins admitted that Spencer said that she did not
have to talk to Chapman or himself without union representation.
14 The privilege had been extended to Spencer upon her request in
order to enable her to see her children off to school. After February 2,
according to Spencer, she reported at the scheduled hour on these days
as did all of the other agents.
have to go over his head in order to keep that privilege.
He challenged her "to just try and see what would
happen." As he had during the earlier discussion, Mullins
spoke once again about Spencer's attitude, how it was af-
fecting her job and how she would not get very far with
that attitude. Spencer complained that Mullins should
not talk to her in that fashion. Mullins, apparently in an
effort to be sarcastic, told her to write down on the pre-
viously offered piece of paper the way that she wanted
him to talk to her. Spencer declined the invitation.
After Mullins once again interrogated Spencer about
the questions she had asked in Minneapolis concerning
district agents, and after he reminded her that her special
privileges had been rescinded and mentioned her attitude
once again, he permitted her to leave and she did so.' s
'i The description of the meeting in Chapman's office is in accordance
with Spencer's fully credited testimony. Mullins' description of what oc-
curred differs markedly from Spencer's credited testimony. As was the
case with regard to the earlier Mullins-Spencer confrontation, Mullins
testified that he asked Spencer if she had any questions that he might be
able to answer for her that she asked at the home office pertaining to P
and C. According to Mullins, Spencer replied, "I don't have any ques-
tions, and I am not going to answer any questions." Chapman at this
point interrupted in order to remind Spencer that Mullins was a manager
who was "trying to get to the bottom of the situation" and admonished
her to be cooperative. Spencer replied that she did not have to talk to
either Chapman or Mullins. Despite the fact that Spencer had already in-
dicated that she did not have any questions, Chapman, again according to
Mullins, stated, "All he wants to know is whether or not you have any
questions. Why don't you be cooperative?" Spencer then said that she
was leaving and would not talk to either one of them. Mullins testified
that at this point he advised Spencer that she was "being a little bit insub-
ordinate" and warned, "If you continue to act that way, maybe you
should think about resigning." Spencer then walked out of the office.
Mullins denied that he made any effort to physically prevent Spencer
from leaving Chapman's office; that he ever gave her a blank piece of
paper upon which she was asked to sign her resignation; as noted, that
she ever requested union representation; that he rescinded the privilege
which he had bestowed earlier permitting her to report to work late on
Tuesdays and Fridays; or that the meeting was emotional or heated.
Though Mullins denied, in his testimony, that Spencer's actions or behav-
ior was heated, and affirmatively stated that neither she nor the other
participants raised their voices during that meeting in Chapman's office,
on February 6 Mullins placed a memo in Spencer's personnel file describ-
ing this incident which included the statement, "Spencer got very loud.
Enough to disturb the other agents in the office." Even more interesting
is the fact that, although Mullins explicitly denied in his testimony that he
physically prevented Spencer from leaving Chapman's office, in the
memo which he placed in her personnel file on February 6, he stated that
during this incident Spencer was "saying we had no right to hold her in
the S/M's office. Point being no one was holding her or attempting to
stop her from leaving." Since no one, as of February 6, had filed a griev-
ance over the incident or charged Mullins with preventing Spencer from
leaving Chapman's office, Mullins' denial was premature. It proves first
that Spencer did not make up the story of her "imprisonment" at some
later date merely to support a case based on a fiction and it proves
second that one of two things occurred-either the incident occurred
precisely as Spencer described it or as Mullins reported in his memo;
namely, that Spencer, though free to leave at any time, loudly com-
plained that she was being detained against her will. I find Mullins' de-
scription of events as contained in his memo utterly preposterous. I be-
lieve that, after the incident occurred as Spencer described, he was wor-
ried that someone in the outer office may have heard Spencer's loud pro-
tests and, to cover himself against any future charges, he wrote the memo
and placed it in Spencer's file. I find Spencer a sane and rational individ-
ual, incapable of acting out the charade she is charged with by Mullins in
the February 6 memo. I find Mullins totally incredible.
249
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Spencer testified credibly that while all of this was
transpiring Chapman' 6 said virtually nothing, other than
to ask what was going on.
After Spencer left Chapman's office she went to her
desk, sat down, and began once again to note down what
had occurred. Mullins, in the meantime, left Chapman's
office and returned to his own. Shortly thereafter, Chap-
man came out of his office and called Spencer back in.
Once in the office Chapman asked Spencer what it was
all about. Spencer said that she did not know. He asked
her what had occurred at the home office and Spencer
replied that to her knowledge nothing had occurred.
Chapman asked her why Mullins was asking her all
those questions and again Spencer replied that she did
not know. Chapman asked her why she was so upset and
Spencer replied that it was because she did not know
what was happening. Chapman told Spencer not to
worry and once again she left. 7 Subsequently, Spencer
filed both a grievance and the charge in the instant case.
Analysis
The course of events on February 2 clearly reflects a
Weingarten situation. 18 Mullins' reprimand of Spencer
for asking questions in Minneapolis about district agents,
his insistent interrogation of her about these questions,
and his threat directed at her that her attitude was affect-
ing her job and that she was not going to get far in the
business provided a sufficient basis for Spencer to
demand union representation if the interview were to
continue. Mullins was advised of her desire to be repre-
sented. Despite being placed on notice by Spencer that
' Chapman testified that, when all three were ensconced in Chap-
man's office, Mullins for the second time told Chapman that he had just
asked Spencer about "some questions" which she had raised at the home
office and she had walked out of the office. He then suggested that
maybe the two of them together could find out "why she walked out of
the office and what her problem is." Mullins, according to Chapman,
then asked, "Marie, I will ask you again, what was the question that you
raised at the home office, that they wanted me to answer for you?" Spen-
cer then said, "I don't have to answer your question. I don't know what
you are talking about." Mullins then insisted that Spencer tell him what
questions she had asked. Spencer then stated, according to Chapman, "I
don't have to talk to you and I don't have to talk to Mr. Chapman. and I
don't have to answer your questions." Chapman said, "This is a district
manager. At least you can answer his questions." Spencer said she did
not have to, whereupon Mullins said, "Marie you are being a little insub-
ordinate. So, if you can't cooperate, maybe you should think about giving
your resignation." After sitting there a couple of minutes she got up and
walked out.
In his description of this meeting Chapman did not at any time mention
that the terms "PRUPAC" or "property and casualty" were the subject
of Mullins' questions about what had occurred in Minneapolis. Chapman
testified that Mullins asked about questions in general.
Chapman, like Mullins, denied that Spencer said anything about union
representation; that Mullins at any time physically blocked the door or
did anything to prevent Spencer from leaving the office; that Mullins
asked him to offer Spencer a pencil and paper so that she could submit
her resignation; that special privileges were discussed; or that Spencer's
attitude was discussed.
In my opinion Chapman's testimony was designed solely to support
Mullins' testimony. Where it differs from that of Spencer, I credit Spen-
cer and decline to credit Chapman. Mullins is Chapman's immediate su-
perior.
17 This conversation between Spencer and Chapman appears as de-
scribed by both. Neither mentioned PRUPAC nor property and casualty
insurance. Clearly, neither Chapman nor Spencer knew what Mullins was
talking about.
Ia N.L.R.B. v. J. Weingarten. Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
she did not want to continue the interview without rep-
resentation, after a brief hiatus, she was called into Chap-
man's office where, without the requested representation,
Mullins forced the interview to continue. While in Chap-
man's office, Mullins accused Spencer of insubordination
and asked her to resign. By making these statements,
Mullins afforded Spencer an objective basis for believing
that the interview was going to result in disciplinary
action. She once again requested that she be permitted to
obtain representation. Instead of permitting Spencer to
obtain the representation to which she was entitled
before continuing the interview or, in the alternative, dis-
continuing the interview, Mullins interfered with Spen-
cer's Section 7 rights by denying her representation by
deliberately and forcefully blocking the door so that she
could not leave to obtain such representation. He then
stated that he had a right to speak with her without the
presence of a union representative, and proceeded to
continue the interview begun earlier in his own office.
As more fully described supra, he interrogated her, again
demanded her resignation, told her that he was rescind-
ing certain privileges which he had granted her earlier,
criticized her attitude, and again threatened her by stat-
ing that she would not get very far. He again denied
Spencer her right to representation and all the while
continued to physically block the door so she could not
get out, until he had completed the interview. I can
scarcely imagine a more classic example of a Weingarten
violation. I find Respondent in violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
The Contract
Respondent contends that the Union, by virtue of the
collective bargaining agreement, has waived its right to
be present during employee interviews so that employees
of Respondent do not have Weingarten rights. The con-
tract provision in question, article XIX, is as follows:
The Union further agrees that neither the Union
nor its members shall interfere with the right of the
Employer:
b. To interview any Agent with respect to any
phase of his work without the grievance committee
being present.
The key words in this provision are "with respect to
any phase of his work." To determine the literal meaning
of this provision one should ask, "What is the business of
Respondent?" The obvious answer to this question is:
Respondent's business is to sell insurance. The next ques-
tion is, "Why does respondent employ agents?" or
"What is the work of the agent?" The answer again is
obvious: The agent's work consists of selling insurance
policies. Quite clearly then, what the parties have agreed
by the inclusion of this provision in the contract is for
the Union to refrain from interfering in any interviews of
agents by management concerning the agents' work; i.e.,
the selling of insurance and related matters.
250
PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY
The next question to be asked is, "What is the business
of the Union?" The equaily obvious answer is: The busi-
ness of the Union is to represent Respondent's employees
with regard to wages, hours, and working conditions.
The cited contract provision does not state that the
Union has abdicated as the bargaining representative of
Respondent's employees or that it has agreed no longer
to represent them. Nor does the cited provision in any
way indicate that Respondent's employees have surren-
dered their rights to representation. There is, therefore,
no express waiver.
If an analysis of the provision itself reveals no inten-
tion on the part of the parties to waive the Union's Wein-
garten rights, certainly the history of bargaining can
hardly be said to support Respondent's contention that
the Union has waived them. Thus, not only was the pro-
vision negotiated into the contract long before Weingar-
ten, but it has remained unchanged ever since its incep-
tion. Clearly the parties could not have had Weingarten
in mind when the provision was first inserted in the con-
tract. Moreover, ever since the Weingarten decision the
Union has tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to negotiate
changes in the provision which would spell out its rights
under Weingarten. It cannot therefore be said that it con-
sciously yielded up or clearly and unmistakably waived
the statutorily protected rights of employees to have
union representation at any employee interview from
which the employee might reasonably conclude that his
job security might be in jeopardy. 19 There is, therefore,
no implied waiver.
It is quite evident that the circumstances which gave
rise to the incident here involved were clearly not such
as to fall within the exclusive business of Respondent so
that the cited contract provision might legitimately be in-
voked, but were rather such as to fall within the prov-
ince of the Union requiring it to fulfill its obligation to
Respondent's employees to represent them when request-
ed to do so while concomitantly permitting said employ-
ees to avail themselves of the right to representation by
the Union; in the instant case, in accordance with the Su-
preme Court's holding in Weingarten. It might aptly be
enjoined: Render therefore unto Prudential the things
which are Prudential's; and unto the Union the things
that are the Union's. There is no waiver.
For reasons stated, I find and conclude that, by deny-
ing Spencer's request for union representation under the
circumstances herein found, Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, and the entire
record in the case, I state the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the
Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By denying Spencer's request for union representa-
tion at an interview conducted by Respondent under cir-
cumstances from which Spencer could reasonably con-
clude that her job security was in jeopardy, Respondent
19 VeH' York Telephone Company, 219 NLRB 679 (1975).
interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in
the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of
the Act, and thereby engaged in, and is engaging in,
unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent engaged in unfair labor
practices, I shall recommend that it be required to cease
and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative
action designed and found necessary to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and the entire record in the case, and pursuant to
Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following
recommended:
ORDER 20
The Respondent, Prudential Insurance Company of
America, Oak Park, Michigan, its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from requiring any employee to
take part in an interview or meeting without union repre-
sentation, if such representation has been requested by
the employee and if the employee has reasonable
grounds to believe that the matters to be discussed at
such interview may result in his being subject to disci-
plinary action.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed and
found necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Remove from Marie Spencer's personnel file all
references to the incident which occurred on February 2,
1979.
(b) Post at its office in Oak Park, Michigan, copies of
the attached noticed marked "Appendix." 2 1 Copies of
the said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Di-
rector for Region 7, after being duly signed by an autho-
rized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent
immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by
it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not al-
tered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 7, in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps it has taken to comply herewith.
20 In the event that no exceptions are filed as provided in Sec. 102.46
of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided
in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto
shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
21 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant to a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of the National l.abor Relations Board."
251