Prize Central Networks, Inc.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 3, 2001

No. 75509370 (T.T.A.B. Oct. 3, 2001)

10/3/01 Paper No. 13

GDH/gdh

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
________

In re Prize Central Networks, Inc.
________

Serial No. 75/509,370
_______

Bradley M. Gantz, Esq. for Prize Central Networks, Inc.

Carol A. Spils, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 101
(Jerry Price, Managing Attorney).
_______

Before Hanak, Hohein and Walters, Administrative Trademark
Judges.

Opinion by Hohein, Administrative Trademark Judge:

Prize Central Networks, Inc. has filed an application
to register the mark "VIRTUAL LAS VEGAS" for "entertainment
services, namely providing on-line computer games."1
Registration has been finally refused under Section
2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1), on the

1 Ser. No. 75/509,370, filed on June 26, 1998, which alleges a date of
first anywhere and first use in commerce of July 24, 1996. The word
"VIRTUAL" is disclaimed.
THIS DISPOSITION
IS NOT CITABLE AS PRECEDENT
OF THE T.T.A.B.
Ser. No. 75/509,370
2
basis that, when used in connection with applicant's services,
the mark "VIRTUAL LAS VEGAS" is merely descriptive of them.
Applicant has appealed. Briefs have been filed, but
an oral hearing was not requested. We reverse the refusal to
register.
Noting that it is the owner of a registration, which
"was duly examined and found worthy of registration on the
Principal Register ... without any requirement of proof of
acquired distinctiveness," for the mark "VIRTUAL VEGAS" for,
inter alia, "interactive multimedia computer programs, computer
software, and digital media, namely, CD-ROMs, for use in the
field of entertainment featuring virtual casino gambling
scenarios, shopping expeditions, music and detective stories;
[and] prerecorded video tapes and video discs featuring a
virtual entertainment environment" in International Class 9,2
applicant argues that, "for the same reasons that VIRTUAL VEGAS
was deemed distinctive enough to be entitled to registration, so

2 Reg. No. 1,987,449, issued on July 16, 1996, which for each of the
three classes thereof sets forth a date of first use anywhere of
August 8, 1994 and a date of first use in commerce of September 15,
1994; combined affidavit §§8 and 15. Besides containing a disclaimer
of the word "VIRTUAL," the registration also covers "interactive
multimedia computer game programs and computer game software, computer
game tapes, electronic and video game programs, [and] computer and
video game cartridges" in International Class 28 and "leasing access
time to an electronic bulletin board in the field of virtual
entertainment" in International Class 42.

Ser. No. 75/509,370
3
should VIRTUAL LAS VEGAS." In particular, applicant contends
that in this case:
The ... Examining Attorney principally
relies on a LEXIS-NEXIS search showing that
there is a style of game called "Vegas
Style". The Examining Attorney believes
that the term "VIRTUAL" merely describes an
online nature of the game style. Applicant
has submitted evidence showing that in
present-day usage LAS VEGAS is not primarily
and merely a style of game but can be used
to characterize a great number of things
including blinking lights, glamour, themed
megaresorts and palaces, art centers,
showmanship, headliners, illusion, razzle
dazzle and Hollywood glitz. ....

Applicant maintains, in view thereof, that (italics in
original):
The Examining Attorney considers the
mark VIRTUAL LAS VEGAS merely descriptive of
the nature of computer games, namely that
games are Vegas-style casino games offered
online. The evidence of record amply
establishes that the mark VIRTUAL LAS VEGAS
does not merely convey the nature of
Applicant's online entertainment services or
characteristics, functions, uses or other
aspects of such services: The notion of Las
Vegas floating in cyberspace is an absurd or
incongruous notion or otherwise a notion
that gives consumers a mental pause.
Accordingly, the refusal to register on the
Principal Register should be withdrawn.

Applicant argues, moreover, that even if the components of its
mark are separately regarded as merely descriptive of its on-
line computer game services, it is well settled that "[a]
composite mark composed of descriptive parts may be more than
Ser. No. 75/509,370
4
the mere sum of its parts, and non-descriptive as a whole"
(citations omitted). Applicant insists that "[t]he mark VIRTUAL
LAS VEGAS is a composite mark" and that:
The mark in its entirety easily conveys
an image of Las Vegas' neon-strewn streets
and towering casinos and all the many other
things LAS VEGAS represents embodied in the
ether of cyberspace. Of course, it is
impossible to digitize physically Las Vegas
to make this fantasy image a reality. This
is the absurdity or incongruity of the
VIRTUAL LAS VEGAS mark that causes consumers
to mentally pause and ponder.

In support of its position, applicant points to the
declaration of Phil Jungwirth, who according to applicant "is an
authority on the industry for online computer games, casino-
style games, and Las Vegas culture." The relevant portions of
such declaration, applicant insists,3 indicate that Mr. Jungwirth

3 Although applicant states in its initial brief that the Jungwirth
declaration was "submitted with Applicant's February 9, 2001 Response
to Final Office Action" dated August 25, 2000, the record does not
contain a copy of such response other than a copy of applicant's
timely filed notice of appeal. It appears, instead, that in light of
the reference in the declaration to "the term 'VR Vegas,'" the
declaration may have been submitted solely in connection with "[a]
related mark of Applicant, Serial No. 75/459,251 for VR VEGAS," which
as applicant also notes in its initial brief, "is the subject of an
appeal filed February 9, 2001 that involves issues similar to this
appeal" and which likewise was in response to a final refusal issued
on August 25, 2000. The apparent failure to file a copy of such
declaration in this case would appear to be confirmed by the fact that
there is no indication in the file history that the Board followed its
usual practice, which it would have done if it had received a copy of
applicant's response in its entirety and not just a copy of its timely
filed notice of appeal, of suspending the appeal pending a remand of
the response, including the Jungwirth declaration, to the Examining
Attorney for consideration thereof. Nevertheless, inasmuch as the
Examining Attorney has discussed in her brief the same portions of the
Jungwirth declaration which applicant in its initial brief emphasized
Ser. No. 75/509,370
5
has "never used nor heard anyone else ever using the term 'VR
Vegas' or 'Virtual Las Vegas' to describe online services for,
or relating to, casino-style games, either directly or
indirectly in terms of a characteristic, function, use or other
aspect of such services."4 Applicant also relies upon, as

as being relevant, we have treated such portions of the Jungwirth
declaration as being of record herein and thus have considered the
evidence to the extent of its probative value. See, In re Nuclear
Research Corp., 16 USPQ2d 1316, 1317 (TTAB 1990) at n. 2.

4 While the remaining portions of the Jungwirth declaration state
various opinions held by the declarant, including among other things
his beliefs that "the most dominant meaning conveyed by 'Las Vegas' to
me and to the trade (including business and consumers) is Las Vegas as
a city and cultural center--a geographical and physical place or
location and associated cultural activities--not as a style of any one
particular thing in the city," that "the dominant connotation of a
physical place or location and associated activities carries over to
the composite term 'Virtual Las Vegas'" and that "[a]ccordingly, the
most immediate and obvious connotation of 'Virtual Las Vegas' ... is
the imagery of physical Las Vegas city floating in cyberspace with its
associated activities," such opinions essentially are of no probative
value. As pointed out in the analogous case of Plyboo America Inc. v.
Smith & Fong Co., 51 USPQ2d 1633, 1640-41 (TTAB 1999):

[T]he opinion of an asserted expert ... is simply not
dispositive since, as stated in Tanners' Council of
America, Inc. v. Scott Paper Co., 185 USPQ 630, 637 (TTAB
1975):

[I]t is well established that the
expressions of opinion by witnesses, including
persons considered to be experts in a particular
field on any question before the Board, is not
binding upon the Board for "if such testimony
were adopted without considering other aspects of
the case, the effect would be to substitute the
opinion of the witnesses for the ultimate
decision to be reached by the Court and would
therefore be improper." The Quaker Oats Company
v. St. Joe Processing Company, Inc., [232 F.2d
653,] 109 USPQ 390 at 391 (CCPA, 1956) ....

See also Ferro Corp. v. Nicofibers, Inc., 196 USPQ 41, 45
(TTAB 1977) [purchasers' "understanding of the marks must
Ser. No. 75/509,370
6
mentioned earlier, the results which it made of record from a
search of the "LEXIS/NEXIS" database for the term "vegas style."
Such search retrieved, inter alia, stories referring to "Las
Vegas-style gambling," "Las Vegas-style casinos," "Las Vegas-
style entertainment," "Las Vegas-style casino games," "Las
Vegas-style glamour," "Las Vegas-style marriage," "Las Vegas-
style slot machines," "Vegas-style blackjack," "Las Vegas-style
resort gambling," "Las Vegas-style stage show," "Vegas-style
production values," "Las Vegas-style showmanship," "Vegas-style
showrooms," "Las Vegas-style razzle-dazzle," "Vegas-style
gambling," "Las Vegas-style tourism," "Las Vegas-style gambling
machines," "Las Vegas-style slots and table games," "Las Vegas-
style casino gambling," "Las Vegas-style celebration," "Las
Vegas-style resort," "Las Vegas-style pageantry," "Las Vegas-
style games," "Las Vegas-style restaurant and bar," "Vegas-style
games," "Las Vegas-style production shows," "Las Vegas-style
themed resort," "Las Vegas-style gaming," "Las Vegas-style
sports betting," "Las Vegas-style sign," "Las Vegas-style casino

be determined in light of the relevant purchasing sector
and not that of linguistic experts or those familiar with
the meaning or derivation of words"]. Consequently, the
opinion offered by Dr. Moody as to the descriptiveness of
"plyboo" as a "blend word," as opposed to any testimony as
to factual matters within her area of linguistic expertise
or personal knowledge, is essentially of no probative value
in this case. See Mennen Co. v. Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical
Co., Ltd., 203 USPQ 302, 305 (TTAB 1979) at n.4.

Ser. No. 75/509,370
7
games," "Las Vegas-style shows," "Vegas-style blinking lights,"
"Las Vegas-style nightclub act," "Las Vegas-style arts center,"
"Las Vegas-style megaresorts," "Las Vegas-style billboards,"
"Las Vegas-style themed palaces," "Las Vegas-style jackpot," and
"Las Vegas-style showgirls." All of such references, however,
are from stories appearing in Las Vegas Review-Journal, a
periodical published in Las Vegas, Nevada which, in light of its
hyping of virtually everything as "Las Vegas-style,"5 appears to
be directed to promoting the city and its attractions to
tourists.
Applicant concludes, based upon consideration of all
of the evidence of record, including that offered by the
Examining Attorney (discussed below), that:
The Examining Attorney has not in any
way contradicted the fact that the mark
VIRTUAL LAS VEGAS is susceptible to the
interpretation propounded by Applicant.
Instead, she relies on an alternative[,]
less dominant interpretation, almost
entirely founded in speculation and
impermissible dissection of the mark. While
the Examining Attorney cites references to
the term VEGAS [STYLE] or LAS VEGAS STYLE,
the focus on this terminology does not
consider the mark VIRTUAL LAS VEGAS in its
entirety. Instead, the Examining Attorney's
interpretation is strictly based on a

5 In addition to the above, examples include references to "Las Vegas-
style golf merchandise," "Las Vegas-style development," "Vegas-style
enterprises," "Vegas-style salvation," "Las Vegas-style restaurant and
bar," "Las Vegas-style respectability," "bank headquarters Las Vegas-
style," "Blood Drive Las Vegas-style" and "Las Vegas-style crisscross
driving."

Ser. No. 75/509,370
8
dissection of the mark into its individual
components. Notably, the LEXIS-NEXIS
reports that are of record ... did not turn
up any reference to "VIRTUAL LAS VEGAS" or
any similar phrase in any context. This
confirms Mr. Jungwirth's assessment that
there are no others using such terminology
and that others would not need to use such
terminology to describe [the services of
providing] online games.

The Examining Attorney, on the other hand, contends
that the mark "VIRTUAL LAS VEGAS" is merely descriptive of
applicant's entertainment services of providing on-line computer
games because the mark "describes ... services which are virtual
computer games which feature LAS VEGAS or VEGAS-style games."
In this regard, the Examining Attorney asserts that the evidence
of record shows that the term "Las Vegas has descriptive meaning
for certain goods and services, and is not simply a geographical
term." The Examining Attorney also points out that "new case
law now indicates the descriptive nature of VIRTUAL in the
rapidly and continually evolving language of the computer,"
citing the recent case of In re Styleclick.com Inc., 58 USPQ2d
1523, 1526 (TTAB 2001), which found the term "VIRTUAL FASHION"
to be merely descriptive of, inter alia, computer software for
providing fashion, beauty and shopping advice and electronic
retailing services featuring apparel, fashion accessories,
personal care items, jewelry and cosmetics.
Ser. No. 75/509,370
9
As to the argument which applicant bases upon its
ownership of a registration for the mark "VIRTUAL VEGAS," the
Examining Attorney, citing In re Scholastic Testing Service,
Inc., 196 USPQ 517, 519 (TTAB 1977), correctly notes that each
case must be considered on its own merits and that a mark which
is merely descriptive is not made registrable simply because the
register already contains a similar mark or marks. Moreover,
citing In re National Shooting Sports Foundation, Inc., 219 USPQ
1018, 1020 (TTAB 1983), the Examining Attorney properly observes
that the fact that, on this record, applicant is apparently the
first and only user of the mark "VIRTUAL LAS VEGAS" does not
justify registration thereof if such mark is merely descriptive
of applicant's services.
The evidence of record offered in support of the
Examining Attorney's position includes a definition from the
electronic version of The American Heritage Dictionary of the
English Language (3rd ed. 1992) which defines "Las Vegas" as
"[a] city of southeast Nevada near the California and Arizona
borders. It is a major tourist center known for it casinos."
In addition, from her Internet search of the term "virtualvegas"
using the "GOOGLE" search engine, the Examining Attorney has
made of record a list of web-pages found at applicant's
www.virtualvegas.com website, which in two instances include the
following subject matter description: "Play the best Las Vegas
Ser. No. 75/509,370
10
casino style Java gambling games on the Internet and win free
prizes in Virtual Vegas."
The Examining Attorney also has made of record the
results from searches of the "LEXIS/NEXIS" database, using the
search strategies "VEGAS STYLE W/10 (GAMBLING OR CASINO OR
BLACKJACK OR CRAPS OR ROULETTE OR POKER)," "VEGAS STYLE
BLACKJACK," "VEGAS STYLE SLOTS" and "VEGAS STYLE GAMES." Such
search retrieved various stories referring to "Las Vegas-style
games," "Las Vegas-style poker game," "Las Vegas-style poker,
blackjack and dice games," "Las Vegas-style casinos," "Las
Vegas-style casino night," "Las Vegas-style gambling," "Vegas-
style gambling," "Las Vegas-style gaming machines," "Las Vegas-
style poker table," "Las Vegas-style poker and Black Jack," "Las
Vegas-style poker," "Las Vegas-style poker machines," "Vegas-
style blackjack tables," "Vegas-style blackjack," "Las Vegas-
style blackjack," "Las Vegas-style blackjack, roulette, craps
and various card games," "Las Vegas-style blackjack game," "Las
Vegas-style slots," "Las Vegas-style slot machines," "Vegas-
style slots" and "Vegas-style slot machines."
We observe, however, that in addition to two
references made of record by applicant, the record contains only
three other specific mentions of either "Las Vegas-style games"
or "Vegas-style games," which plainly are the most pertinent
excerpts for the purpose of determining whether applicant's mark
Ser. No. 75/509,370
11
is merely descriptive of its services.6 These five excerpts are
reproduced below:
"... play slot machines, blackjack and
other Vegas-style games." -- San Jose
Mercury News, July 10, 2000;

"Racingcasino.com opened Nov. 23 to
those who want to play Las Vegas-style games
for fun." -- Indianapolis Business Journal,
November 19, 1999;

"The Independent Entertainment Software
Rating Board ... evaluates and rates games
by their objectionable content. But that's
not always sufficient: Hoyle Casino, with
350 Las Vegas-style games, is rated
appropriate for all ages, but few parents
want to give their 6-year-old a realistic
gambling simulation." -- USA Today, November
24, 1999;

"...roulette and most other Vegas-style
games are illegal." -- Las Vegas Review-
Journal, June 30, 1998; and

"... opened included Las Vegas-style
games such as slot machines." -- Las Vegas
Review-Journal, March 9, 1998;

Furthermore, while no definition of the term "virtual"
is of record, the Examining Attorney in her brief refers to the
Board's opinion in In re Styleclick.com Inc., supra at 1525,

6 We have not considered in this regard, due to their limited probative
value, the several excerpts mentioning such terms which are from wire
services. The reason therefore is that there is no evidence that the
stories appearing in wire service articles have been printed in
publications of general circulation and, thus, it cannot be assumed
that the excerpts therefrom have had any material impact on consumer
perception or attitude as to the meaning of either "Las Vegas-style
games" or "Vegas-style games". See, e.g., In re Appetito Provisions
Co. Inc., 3 USPQ2d 1553, 1555 (TTAB 1987) at n. 6 and In re Men's
Int'l Professional Tennis Council, 1 USPQ2d 1917, 1918-19 (TTAB 1986).
Ser. No. 75/509,370
12
which sets forth the following definitions (italics in
original):
The dictionary evidence shows the term
"virtual" defined as follows: "Not real.
The term virtual is popular among computer
scientists and is used in a wide variety of
situations. In general, it distinguishes
something that is merely conceptual from
something that has physical reality." PC
Webopaedia (1998). We take judicial notice
of these other listings for the term: "Not
physical. Exists in the software only or in
the imagination of the machine." net.speak-
-the internet dictionary (1994); "Used
generally to describe something without a
physical presence or is not what it appears
to be. Virtual reality, for example, is
made up of computer-generated images and
sounds rather than actual objects." The
Computing Dictionary (1996); and "conceptual
rather than actual, but possessing the
essential characteristics of a real
function." The Illustrated Dictionary of
Microcomputers (3rd ed. 1990).

Likewise, we judicially notice that The Computer Glossary (9th
ed. 2001) defines "virtual" as "[a]n adjective applied to almost
anything today that expresses a condition without boundaries or
constraints," while The Dictionary of Computing & Digital Media
(1999) lists such term as an adjective which (italics in
original) "[d]escribes an object, an entity, or a relationship
that exists in software rather than in a tangible, physical
condition. .... Virtual is a commonly used term for anything
that exists but that has no concrete manifestation."

Ser. No. 75/509,370
13
It is well settled that a term is considered to be
merely descriptive of goods or services, within the meaning of
Section 2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act, if it forthwith conveys
information concerning any significant ingredient, quality,
characteristic, feature, function, purpose or use of the goods
or services. See, e.g., In re Gyulay, 820 F.2d 1216, 3 USPQ2d
1009 (Fed. Cir. 1987) and In re Abcor Development Corp., 588
F.2d 811, 200 USPQ 215, 217-18 (CCPA 1978). It is not necessary
that a term describe all of the properties or functions of the
goods or services in order for it to be considered to be merely
descriptive thereof; rather, it is sufficient if the term
describes a significant attribute or idea about them. Moreover,
whether a term is merely descriptive is determined not in the
abstract but in relation to the goods or services for which
registration is sought, the context in which it is being used on
or in connection with those goods or services and the possible
significance that the term would have to the average purchaser
of the goods or services because of the manner of its use. See
In re Bright-Crest, Ltd., 204 USPQ 591, 593 (TTAB 1979). Thus,
"[w]hether consumers could guess what the product [or service]
is from consideration of the mark alone is not the test." In re
American Greetings Corp., 226 USPQ 365, 366 (TTAB 1985).
However, a mark is suggestive if, when the goods or
services are encountered under the mark, a multi-stage reasoning
Ser. No. 75/509,370
14
process, or the utilization of imagination, thought or
perception, is required in order to determine what attributes of
the goods or services the mark indicates. See, e.g., In re
Abcor Development Corp., supra at 218, and In re Mayer-Beaton
Corp., 223 USPQ 1347, 1349 (TTAB 1984). As has often been
stated, there is a thin line of demarcation between a suggestive
mark and a merely descriptive one, with the determination of
which category a mark falls into frequently being a difficult
matter involving a good measure of subjective judgment. See,
e.g., In re Atavio, 25 USPQ2d 1361 (TTAB 1992) and In re TMS
Corp. of the Americas, 200 USPQ 57, 58 (TTAB 1978). The
distinction, furthermore, is often made on an intuitive basis
rather than as a result of precisely logical analysis
susceptible of articulation. See In re George Weston Ltd., 228
USPQ 57, 58 (TTAB 1985).
In the present case, we agree with applicant that,
when considered in its entirety, the mark "VIRTUAL LAS VEGAS" is
suggestive rather than merely descriptive of applicant's
"entertainment services, namely providing on-line computer
games." Even assuming, despite the relatively small number of
excerpts retrieved from searches of the vast "LEXIS/NEXIS"
database and which refer specifically to "Las Vegas-style games"
or its "Vegas-style games" equivalent, that such terms encompass
the far more commonly used expressions of "Las Vegas-style
Ser. No. 75/509,370
15
slots," "Las Vegas-style blackjack," "Las Vegas-style poker,"
"Las Vegas-style gambling," and the like, it is significant that
applicant's mark is "VIRTUAL LAS VEGAS" instead of "VIRTUAL LAS
VEGAS-STYLE." This distinction, although perhaps subtle,
nevertheless serves to slow or delay recognition of one
plausible meaning conveyed by applicant's mark, which is that
its on-line entertainment services feature Las Vegas-style
games. Just as plausible, if not immediately more so due to the
absence from applicant's "VIRTUAL LAS VEGAS" mark of the suffix
"-STYLE," is the connotation urged by applicant, which is that
its mark is evocative, in a conceptual sense, of the casinos,
resort hotels, neon lights, theme shows, and glitzy
entertainment which individually as well as collectively
symbolize the city of Las Vegas and its associated attractions.
As applicant, in its reply brief, aptly asserts, "[i]t is
axiomatic that a fantasy place cannot be descriptive of
reality."
Stated otherwise, the amalgam formed by joining the
word "VIRTUAL" and the name "LAS VEGAS" is more than simply a
combination of two arguably descriptive terms which lose none of
their descriptiveness when combined. The mark "VIRTUAL LAS
VEGAS," instead, creates just enough of an initial ambiguity, or
perhaps even an incongruity, when utilized in association with
providing on-line computer game entertainment services, as to
Ser. No. 75/509,370
16
require a modicum of imagination, perception or thought in order
for ordinary consumers to comprehend or conclude that such
services are a virtual form of Las Vegas-style games. This is
because the games offered by applicant under its "VIRTUAL LAS
VEGAS" mark are nonetheless real in the sense that they
replicate the actual kinds of games of chance typically found in
Las Vegas casinos and are not real (that is, virtual) only in
the sense that they are provided on-line rather than in the
physical confines of a casino. Applicant's mark, therefore, is
no more than highly suggestive of its services. Taken as a
whole, such mark projects a new and different commercial
impression when used in the context of applicant's entertainment
services of providing on-line computer games and thus it is not
merely descriptive thereof within the meaning of the statute.
See, e.g., In re Colonial Stores Inc., 394 F.2d 549, 157 USPQ
382, 385 (CCPA 1968) [mark "SUGAR & SPICE" held suggestive of
various bakery products since, while individual words of mark
are descriptive, the "immediate impression evoked by the mark,"
in light of well known nursery rhyme, "may well be to stimulate
an association of 'sugar and spice' with 'everything nice'";
"[a]s such, ... the mark, along with the favorable suggestion
which it may evoke, seems to us clearly to function in the
trademark sense and not as a term merely descriptive of goods"].
Ser. No. 75/509,370
17
Furthermore, combining the word "VIRTUAL" with the
name "LAS VEGAS" so as to form the mark "VIRTUAL LAS VEGAS" does
not result in a term which directly imparts, with any degree of
particularity, information about the nature, purpose, function,
use, characteristics, features or other significant aspects of
applicant's on-line computer game entertainment services. As to
the precedent upon which the Examining Attorney principally
relies, applicant in its reply brief persuasively points out
that "In re Styleclick.com admonishes that each case is
determined on its own facts" and "does not stand for the
proposition that VIRTUAL cannot be combined with a descriptive
term to form a non-descriptive composite mark." Such case,
moreover, is distinguishable since, as noted by applicant its
reply brief:
In any event, the mark VIRTUAL FASHION
from In re Styleclick.com ... is
significantly different from [the mark]
VIRTUAL LAS VEGAS. In In re Styleclick.com,
the component FASHION directly described the
applied-for services, which related to
fashion information or shopping for fashion
online. .... Carrying this into the
present case, the Examining Attorney's
position on descriptiveness would be correct
if Applicant's mark were, for example,
VIRTUAL GAMING or VIRTUAL BLACK JACK. In
such cases, the [term] VIRTUAL is combined
with a word that directly describes the very
nature of what is being offered as service,
without creating anything incongruous [or
ambiguous]. In contrast, the component LAS
VEGAS does not directly describe Applicant's
services, although it may suggest them.
Ser. No. 75/509,370
18
Accordingly, when it is combines with [the
term] VIRTUAL there results an overall
distinctive mark ....

At the very least, and as a final consideration, we
have doubt that applicant's "VIRTUAL LAS VEGAS" mark immediately
conveys information about a significant characteristic or
feature of its entertainment services of providing on-line
computer games or their nature, purpose, function or use. In
view thereof, we resolve such doubt, in accordance with the
Board's practice, in favor of the publication of applicant's
mark for opposition. See, e.g., In re Conductive Systems, Inc.,
220 USPQ 84, 86 (TTAB 1983); In re Morton-Norwich Products,
Inc., 209 USPQ 791 (TTAB 1981); and In re Gourmet Bakers, Inc.,
173 USPQ 565 (TTAB 1972).
Decision: The refusal under Section 2(e)(1) is
reversed.