Priscilla F.v.Dep't of the Navy

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionFeb 22, 2017
EEOC Appeal No. 0120170656 (E.E.O.C. Feb. 22, 2017)

EEOC Appeal No. 0120170656

02-22-2017

Priscilla F. v. Dep't of the Navy


U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

Priscilla F.,1

Complainant,

v.

Sean J. Stackley,

Acting Secretary,

Department of the Navy,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120170656

Agency No. DON 16-60169-03483

DECISION

On December 7, 2016, Complainant filed a timely appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission) from a final Agency decision (FAD) dated November 21, 2016, dismissing her complaint alleging unlawful employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.2

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked for a staffing firm serving the Agency as an Aviation Electrician at its Marine Corps Air Station in Beaufort, South Carolina. She was employed with the staffing firm from June 27, 2016 to August 19, 2016, the same duration she served the Agency.

On November 7, 2016, Complainant filed a formal complaint alleging that her staffing firm discriminated against her based on her sex (female) when:

1. she was terminated on August 19, 2016, and

2. it contested her application for unemployment insurance, resulting in its denial.

The Agency dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. It reasoned that the staffing firm employed Complainant, not the Agency.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

The matter before us is whether the Agency properly dismissed Complainant's complaint for failure to state a claim on the basis that she was not its employee. EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.103(c) provides that within the covered departments, agencies and units, Part 1614 applies to all employees and applicants for employment therewith.

In Serita B. v. Department of the Army, EEOC Appeal No. 0120150846 (November 10, 2016), the Commission recently reaffirmed its long-standing position on "joint employers" and noted it is found in numerous sources. See, e.g., EEOC Compliance Manual Section 2, "Threshold Issues," Section 2-III(B)(1)(a)(iii)(b) (May 12, 2000) (Compliance Manual)3; EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Application of EEO Laws to Contingent Workers Placed by Temporary Employment Agencies and Other Staffing Firms (Dec. 3, 1997) (Enforcement Guidance), "Coverage Issues," Question 2; Ma v. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., EEOC Appeal Nos. 01962389 & 01962390 (May 29, 1998). We reiterate the analysis set forth in those decisions and guidance documents in this decision.

The term "joint employer" refers to two or more employers that each exercises sufficient control of an individual to qualify as the worker's employer. Compliance Manual, Section 2-III(B)(1)(a)(iii)(b). To determine whether the Agency has the right to exercise sufficient control, EEOC considers factors derived from common law principles of agency. See Enforcement Guidance, "Coverage Issues," at Question 2. EEOC considers, inter alia, the Agency's right to control when, where, and how the worker performs the job; the right to assign additional projects to the worker; whether the work is performed on Agency premises; whether the Agency provides the tools, material, and equipment to perform the job; the duration of the relationship between the Agency and the worker whether the Agency controls the worker's schedule; and whether the Agency can discharge the worker. EEOC Compliance Manual, Section 2-III(A)(1) (citing Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1992)); EEOC v. Skanska USA Bldg., Inc., 550 F.App'x 253, 256 (6th Cir. 2013) ("Entities are joint employers if they 'share or co-determine those matters governing essential terms and conditions of employment'") (quoting Carrier Corp. v. NLRB, 768 F.2d 778, 781 (6th Cir. 1985); see also Ma, EEOC Appeal Nos. 01962389 & 01962390.

The language of the contract between the agency and the staffing firm is not dispositive as to whether a joint-employment situation exists. In determining a worker's status, EEOC looks to what actually occurs in the workplace, even if it contradicts the language in the contract between the staffing firm and the agency. Baker v. Dep't of the Army, EEOC Appeal No. 01A45313 (Mar. 16, 2006) (while contract between staffing firm and agency provided that contract personnel were employees of staffing firm under its administrative supervision and control, agency actually retained supervisory authority over the contract workers).

On the factor of the right to control when, where, and how the worker performs the job and to assign additional projects, complete agency control is not required. Rather, the control may be partial or joint and still point to joint employment. Shorter v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., EEOC Appeal No. 0120131148 (June 11, 2013) (where both staffing firm and agency made assignments, this pointed to joint employment); Complainant v. Dep't of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 0120143162 (May 20, 2015), request for reconsideration denied, EEOC Request No. 0520150430 (Mar. 11, 2016) (where staffing firm wrote and issued complainant's appraisal with input from agency, this pointed toward joint employment). Likewise, where both the agency and staffing firm provided tools, material, and equipment to perform the job, this pointed to joint employment. Elkin v. Dep't of the Army, EEOC Appeal No. 0120122211, 2012 WL 5818075 (Nov. 8, 2012). The EEOC considers an entity's right to control the terms and conditions of employment, whether or not it exercises that right, as relevant to joint employer status. Enforcement Guidance, "Coverage Issues," at Question 2, Example 5 (where an entity reserves the right to direct the means and manner of an individual's work, but does not generally exercise that right, the entity may still be found to be a joint employer).

In assessing the right to control, EEOC does not consider any one factor to be decisive and emphasizes that it is not necessary to satisfy a majority of the factors. In particular, the fact that an individual performs work pursuant to a contract between the federal government and an outside organization and is paid and provided with benefits by that organization, on its own, is not enough to show that joint employment does not exist. Rather, the analysis is holistic; all the circumstances in the individual's relationship with the agency should be considered to determine if the agency should be deemed the worker's joint employer. Enforcement Guidance, "Coverage Issues," at Qs. 1 and 2. In sum, a federal agency will qualify as a joint employer of an individual if it has the requisite right to control the means and manner of the individual's work, regardless of whether the individual is paid by an outside organization or is on the federal payroll. See id., at Q. 2.

Complainant worked on maintaining F/A - 18 aircraft. It is uncontested that she was assigned her tasks by her onsite staffing firm supervisor who supervised her everyday work. Complainant's staffing firm set her schedule (which could be on any of three shifts), she submitted her leave requests to her staffing firm supervisor for approval, and she was expected to let him know in advance when she would be away from work.

Complainant's allegations supporting her claim that her removal was discriminatory all point to staffing firm control - that it was discriminatory for the staffing firm to use the incidents it recited in its letter of discharge either because she was disparately treated by her staffing firm supervisor regarding them, incident(s) did not occur, or the staffing firm did not give her progressive discipline in violation of its policy. This included her staffing firm supervisor sending her home for showing up to work without safety shoes, accusing her once of not accounting for tools,4 and him and the staffing firm viewing her absence from work on August 18, 2016 (for a number of hours) as a significant violation of policy even though, as was common practice, she gave notice the same day before the absence started and notice again shortly before it continued longer than expected. While Complainant's EEO complaint was against the Agency, all her communications to the EEO counselor and writings were directed at things her staffing firm allegedly caused and did, with no mention of Agency involvement.

Complainant's wages and benefits were paid by the staffing firm and it also provided workers' compensation insurance.

While Complainant worked on Agency premises using Agency tools, we find that the weight of the evidence shows the Agency had insufficient control over her employment to be deemed her joint employer. Accordingly, the FAD is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0416)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 � VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The requests may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)

If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant's Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden's signature

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

February 22, 2017

__________________

Date

1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant's name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission's website.

2 The address in the FAD for filing an appeal with this office is nearly 10 years out of date. Our current address is in the header of this decision.

3 The EEOC Compliance Manual and other guidance documents, as well as federal-sector appellate decisions, are available online at www.eeoc.gov.

4 The staffing firm President wrote that this was serious because if an unaccounted tool is misplaced and becomes foreign object debris (FOB), it could be ingested by an engine causing a catastrophic event resulting in the loss of an aircraft or life.

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