Pomeroy's Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 19, 1977

232 N.L.R.B. 95 (N.L.R.B. 1977)

POMEROY'S INC.
Transportation Lease Service, Inc. and Allied Stores
of Penn-Ohio, d/b/a Pomeroy's Inc. and Edwin L.
Anderson. Case 4-CA-8063
September 19, 1977
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS
PENELLO AND MURPHY
On May 31, 1977, Administrative Law Judge Peter
E. Donnelly issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondents filed exceptions
and a supporting brief, and General Counsel filed an
answer to Respondents' exceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find-
ings,t and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge, to modify his remedy, 2 and to adopt his
recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the Respondents, Transportation
Lease Service, Inc., and Allied Stores of Penn-Ohio,
d/b/a Pomeroy's Inc., Willingboro, New Jersey,
their officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
take the action set forth in the said recommended
Order.
I Respondents have excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to
credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence
convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products.
Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951). We have
carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
z In accordance with our decision in Florida Steel Corporation, 231
NLRB 651 (1977), we shall apply the current 7-percent rate for periods pnor
to August 25, 1977. in which the "adjusted pnme interest rate" as used by
the Internal Revenue Service in calculating interest on tax payments was at
least 7 percent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
PETER E. DONNELLY, Administrative Law Judge: The
original charge herein was filed on June 28, 1976, by Edwin
L. Anderson, an individual. An amended charge was filed
on August 12, 1976, and a complaint thereon was issued by
the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations
Board on August 30, 1976, alleging that Transportation
Lease Service, Inc., and Allied Stores of Penn-Ohio, d/b/a
Pomeroy's Inc., herein called respectively TLS and Pomer-
oy, or collectively Respondents, discharged Anderson in
violation of Section 8(aXl I) of the Act. Answers were timely
filed by TLS and Pomeroy and pursuant to notice a
hearing was held before the Administrative Law Judge at
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on October 20, 21, and 22 and
December 6, all in 1976. Briefs, timely filed by General
Counsel and Respondents, have been duly considered.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. EMPLOYERS' BUSINESSES
Pomeroy is a corporation operating retail department
stores in several States including the department store
involved in this case at Willingboro, New Jersey. During
the past 12 months the Willingboro store had gross volume
of business in excess of $500,000 and received goods valued
in excess of $50,000 directly from sources located outside
the State of New Jersey. Based upon these facts, I conclude
that Pomeroy is an employer within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
TLS is a Pennsylvania corporation with headquarters at
North Wales, Pennsylvania, where it is engaged in the
interstate and intrastate business of leasing labor to various
firms. During the past 12 months TLS had a gross volume
of business in excess of $250,000 and, during the same
period, received more than $50,000 for services performed
outside Pennsylvania. TLS contends that the Board is
without jurisdiction as to it, since it leases labor to retail
stores and does not meet the Board's retail jurisdictional
standard, i.e., $500,000 gross volume of business. However,
I conclude that the jurisdictional facts, which are conced-
ed, are sufficient for the Board to assert jurisdiction and
that TLS is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
1. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The complaint alleges that on or about April 30, 1976,1
Respondents discharged Anderson because he engaged in
concerted protected activity by protesting working condi-
tions on behalf of himself and another employee of
Respondents in violation of Section 8(aX)(l) of the Act. 2
i All dates refer to 1976 unless otherwise indicated.
2 At the hearing General Counsel amended the complaint to allege that
Respondents, through Eugene A. Fink, president of TLS, interrogated an
employee about an investigation being conducted by the Board and implied
that said employee could lose his job if he gave testimony unfavorable to
Respondents, all in violation of Sec. 8(aX 1) of the Act.
232 NLRB No. 21
95
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
A. Facts
1. Joint employers
TLS furnishes drivers and helpers to Pomeroy under a
contract lease agreement (G.C. Exh. 4). These employees
are hired and paid by TLS who also has the authority to
discipline and discharge them. Pomeroy has the contrac-
tual right to reject employees furnished by TLS but, once
employed, their day-to-day activities are under the control
and supervision of Pomeroy and there is little further
contact with TLS. They report directly to Pomeroy each
day for work and while employed they wear Pomeroy
uniforms and work with trucks bearing the Pomeroy name.
Occasionally, they perform work which is normally done
by Pomeroy employees. They are furnished employee
discount cards to make discount purchases at Pomeroy.
The extent of Pomeroy's control over the work of these
employees is set out in section 7 of the contract which
provides:
Private Carrier [Pomeroy] at all times will solely and
exclusively be responsible for maintaining operational
control, direction, and supervision over said drivers,
such control, direction, and supervision including, but
not being limited to scheduling and dispatching of the
drivers, routing instructions, loading and unloading
procedures, and all other matters relating to the day-to-
day private carriage operation of Private Carrier.
In addition, Pomeroy is also required by the contract to
maintain certain insurance coverage on the vehicles,
assume responsibility for the employees' compliance with
Federal and state regulations, and maintain work records
as required by Federal and state authorities.
2. Anderson's discharge 3
Anderson was hired in September 1974 as a truckdriver
helper by Fink and assigned directly to Pomeroy where he
reported to work on a daily basis. His immediate
supervisor was Scott Freeman, warehouse manager for
Pomeroy. For the last 8 months of his employment, except
for the final 3 days, he worked as a helper on the truck
driven by John Juniewicz. For the last 3 days of his
employment, his driver was Paul Cronmiller. The work
involved making deliveries of home furnishings to Pomeroy
customers and sometimes delivering merchandise between
Pomeroy stores.
Pomeroy utilized two trucks for the drivers and helpers
leased from TLS. These trucks usually alternated workdays
since the work was insufficient to utilize two trucks. The
trucks sometimes worked overtime on a daily basis, but
were not paid overtime except after 40 hours per week. This
I There is conflicting testimony regarding the discharge allegation and
the alleged coercion. In resolving these conflicts, I have taken into
consideration the apparent interests of the witnesses. In addition, I have
considered the inherent probabilities; the probabilities in light of other
events; corroboration or lack of it; and consistencies or inconsistencies
within the testimony of each witness, and between the testimony of each and
that of other witnesses with similar apparent interests. In evaluating the
testimony of each witness, I rely specifically upon his or her demeanor and
have made my findings accordingly. And while apart from considerations of
demeanor, I have taken into account the above-noted credibility consider-
system did not recognize any job seniority factor as to the
driver-helper crews on the two trucks. Anderson became
dissatisfied with this arrangement. He felt that the more
senior crew should work every day to provide a full 40-
hour workweek and an opportunity to acquire overtime
over the 40 hours per week.
In late 1975, Juniewicz and Anderson discussed this
matter and they agreed that some effort should be made to
bring this proposal to the attention of management. They
decided to approach Fink with the proposal. Anderson
called Fink about December 1975 and presented his
proposal. Fink referred him to Pomeroy saying that it was
not his decision. 4 Fink recalls being called by Anderson,
but testified that after explaining the difficulties in
Anderson's proposal, he turned him down. For the reasons
noted above concerning credibility resolutions, I credit
Anderson to the effect that he was referred to Pomeroy.
Anderson made several more calls to Fink in late 1975
and early 1976. On at least one occasion Juniewicz was
present when Anderson called Fink. Anderson also made
his proposal several times to Freeman, who responded that
he did not have full authority to make such a decision and
that he would speak to his supervisor, Brown, the assistant
store manager. Anderson kept Juniewicz informed of these
conversations.
As to the call-in system for calling in sick, the record
discloses that the normal starting time for the truck crews is
8:30 a.m. In the past, if an employee was sick on a
workday, he was allowed to call in sick on the same
morning he was to report to work. This made it difficult for
Fink to secure a replacement in timely fashion, which
created delivery problems. To obviate this problem, a new
procedure was begun in 1976, "possibly March," according
to Anderson. 5
Fink testified that Anderson was remiss in abiding by the
new reporting procedures. Fink testified that he kept a
record of Anderson's latenesses and absences. (Resp. Exh.
I) These disclose that for the year of 1976, prior to his
discharge, Anderson was absent 3 days and late twice. The
latenesses were not, however, so lengthy as to require a
replacement. As to the absences, Fink testified that they
were without notice to him as required by the new
procedures. However, it is undisputed that, as to his final
absence, proper notice was provided to Fink.
With respect to the discharge incident, it appears that
Anderson worked on the truck driven by Cronmiller for the
last 3 days of his employment. On Thursday afternoon,
April 29, Anderson was assigned to work on Saturday,
May i, by Freeman. Anderson objected to this assignment
on the grounds that since he had changed trucks and
drivers, i.e., from Juniewicz to Cronmiller, he was entitled
to work on Friday rather than Saturday, even though he
had worked on Thursday. In other words, despite the
ations, my failure to detail each of these is not to be deemed a failure on my
part to have fully considered it. Bishop and Malco, Inc., d/b/a Walker's, 159
NLRB 1159, 1161(1966).
4 This would appear to conform to the contract provision recited above
giving scheduling authority to Pomeroy.
5 Fink testified that the new procedures were begun in the fall of 1975
and that it was Freeman who notified Pomeroy lease employees of the
change at that time. Freeman did not testify and so obviously he did not
corroborate this, and I credit the March 1976 date, as testified to by
Anderson, as the same time he learned of the charge.
96
POMEROY'S INC.
system of alternating days with the trucks, he was still
entitled to work on Friday with Saturday as his day off.
Cronmiller agreed with Anderson and both expressed their
dissatisfaction to Freeman, whereupon Freeman told
Anderson that if he did not like it, he could "go somewhere
else to work." This response prompted both Anderson and
Cronmiller to go to Freeman's superior, Mr. Brown.
Anderson did the talking, complaining to Brown about the
incident and the way Freeman had spoken to him earlier.
Brown opined that Freeman's reaction may have been due
to the new responsibilities Brown had given to him.6
However, the schedule was not changed and Anderson did
not work on Friday.
On Friday, April 30, about 6 p.m., Anderson called the
delivery office at Pomeroy to report sick with the flu. He
spoke to secretary Katherine Crum, telling her that he
would not be in for work on Saturday. Crum asked if he
wanted her to get Freeman who was in the warehouse and
Anderson said, "No, that's okay; just relay the message to
him." Crum's testimony corroborates Anderson as to the
time and substance of the call.
On Monday, May 3, Anderson received a certified letter
from Fink dated and mailed April 30. The body of the
letter reads:
We regret to inform you, your services are no longer
required with our company.
Effective May 3, 1976, you will no longer report to the
place of your assignment. [G.C. Exh. 3 and Resp. Exhs.
2(a)(b)(c) l
Anderson's next regular workday was Tuesday, May 4.
After reading the letter, Anderson called Fink to inquire
about his employment status. Fink told him that he was not
supposed to complain to the customer (Pomeroy); that he
was supposed to bring any complaints to him (Fink); and
that Anderson could cost him his contract by complaining
to the customers.
Fink also testified concerning the discharge incident. He
stated that a couple of days before Anderson was
discharged on April 30 he was called by Freeman who told
him that Anderson had told Freeman that if he had to take
Friday off, he was also going to take Saturday off.
However, Fink testified that he took no action until Friday,
April 30, after Anderson had called in sick.
About 3 p.m. on Friday, Cronmiller called Fink at Fink's
request. According to Cronmiller, Fink inquired about the
meeting the previous day in Brown's office, and during this
telephone conversation Cronmiller told Fink that Ander-
son had said that he did not want to work on Saturday
because of plans that he had made.
At 4:30 p.m., "give or take 10 minutes," on April 30,
according to Fink, his secretary, Betty Haas, received a call
from Pomeroy that Anderson would be absent for work on
Saturday, May 1.7 Haas reported this to Fink who then
sent the termination letter of April 30 to Anderson. Fink is
certain that the call was received before 5 p.m. because the
post office closes at 5 p.m. and the certified letter was
mailed on April 30. However, as to the time that Anderson
called Pomeroy, I credit Anderson's testimony corrobo-
rated by Crum, that he called Pomeroy about 5:30 p.m. In
these circumstances, it would have been impossible for
Fink to have known that Anderson had called in sick at
Pomeroy before he sent the May 30 letter discharging him,
and I so find.
3. 8(a)(1) allegations of coercion
Juniewicz testified that about 3 weeks before the hearing
in the instant case he was told by Cronmiller to call Fink.
He did so and was asked by Fink if he had seen anyone
from the National Labor Relations Board. Juniewicz
denied this, although it was the truth. Fink told Juniewicz
that he had heard Juniewicz had seen a Board agent, and
further stated that Pomeroy did not like the "situation" and
that TLS only had a 30-day contract with Pomeroy which
could be terminated. In a later conversation, Fink asked
Cronmiller to speak to their lawyer about the case and he
agreed.
Fink recalls a telephone conversation with Juniewicz
concerning the pending Board matter, wherein Juniewicz
expressed his concern about the security of his job. Fink
testified that he told Juniewicz not to argue with the
accounts and that if they had problems to go to him
because the accounts had a 30-day option to cancel that
contract without a reason and that they wanted the drivers
to have their jobs. When asked if this matter would put the
jobs of the drivers in jeopardy Fink replied that he did not
know and that anythi.ig could happen. The extent that
these accounts vary, I credit Juniewicz for the reasons
noted above.
B. Discussions and Analysis
1. Joint employers
Respondents contend that TLS and Pomeroy are not
joint employers, "inasmuch as governmental regulations
require Pomeroy to have complete control over the
activities of the employee with respect to his operation of
the vehicles in question and his activities in transporta-
tion." Such assertions even if correct, do not negate a joint
employer finding as to TLS where, as here, TLS retains the
basic elements of the employer-employee relationship,
notably the authority to hire, fire, and discipline. The
record also supports the joint employer status of Pomeroy
since the facts show it especially by the exclusive control
that Pomeroy exercises as to the employees' daily work
activity. Floyd Epperson (United Dairy Farmers, Inc.), 202
NLRB 23 (1973); Manpower, Inc., of Shelby County, 164
NLRB 287 (1967). Accordingly, I conclude that TLS and
Pomeroy are joint employers of the lease drivers and
helpers, including Anderson.
2. Anderson's discharge
The General Counsel contends that Anderson was
discharged for having engaged in protected concerted
6 Brown did not testify.
97
7 Haas did not testify.
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
activity; to wit, protesting working conditions on behalf of
himself and another employee.
Respondents, on the other hand, contend that Ander-
son's discharge was the result of several absences without
advance notice sufficient to enable TLS to obtain a
replacement. The only documentary support for this
contention is a paper reporting to reflect Anderson's
latenesses and absences beginning in April 1975, and
ending with the date of his discharge. This document does
not, on its face, disclose that the absences were without
adequate notice to Fink, although Fink claims that this was
the case. Indeed Fink concedes that the documents would
not reflect to everyone that Anderson was an unsatisfacto-
ry employee. Nothing in Fink's testimony or the entire
record herein satisfies me that his record of absenteeism
was unsatisfactory. Anderson's testimony which I credit
was that he always called in when he was to be absent, in
conformity with existing policy. In these circumstances, I
cannot conclude that Anderson was discharged for failing
to give TLS timely notice of his absences. Indeed, even in
conceding the accuracy of Fink's records, and that
Anderson was aware of the new reporting procedures in
early 1976, as testified to by Fink, my conclusion would be
the same, since it strains credulity to believe that Anderson
would have been discharged some 2-1/2 months after his
last failure to give proper notice in circumstances where it
is undisputed that he did, in fact, provide timely notice
with the respect to his last absence.
Moreover, as I have noted above, Anderson did not call
in sick until after the decision to discharge him had been
made and the discharge letter sent. This supports the
conclusion which I adopt that the matter of absenteeism
was not the cause of Anderson's discharge.
In evaluating the entire record herein, it is clear to me
that Anderson was engaged in protected concerted activity.
The dispute was essentially a matter of Anderson's desire
to establish a system of crew seniority between the two
lease crews. The result of this would have been to provide
the senior crew with a full workweek and an opportunity
for overtime in excess of the 40-hour workweek. These are
matters directly related to the working conditions of
employees and efforts to promote them are protected
activity. It is equally clear to me that Anderson's actions
were concerted. The crew seniority concept was the
product of discussions between him and Juniewicz.
Although it was primarily Anderson who confronted
management with the proposals, it was done after consulta-
tion with and the agreement of Juniewicz who was kept
advised by Anderson of the discussions with management.
Such activities are concerted as well as protected. Also in
protesting the application of existing scheduling procedures
just prior to his discharge, Anderson was likewise engaged
in protected concerted activity on behalf of himself and
Cronmiller. Direct personal authorization from other
employees is not necessary to a finding that activity is
concerted. Carbet Corporation, 191 NLRB 892 (1971);
Diagnostic Center Hospital Corp., of Texas, 228 NLRB 1215
(1977).
Respondents contend, however, that Anderson was not
engaged in a protected concerted activity. Fink alludes to
the existence of an unwritten TLS policy which provides
that all complaints be brought to the attention of TLS,
rather than brought directly by the lease employee to the
customer. Respondents contend, as another reason for his
discharge, that Anderson was discharged for failing to
conform to this rule and thus was not engaged in protected
activity.
First, as noted above, TLS and Pomeroy are joint
employers of Anderson. Thus, Anderson, in making his
protestation to Pomeroy was only protesting to his own
employer. He was not protesting to Pomeroy as a third
party, as Respondents appear to contend.
Further, as noted above, Anderson was engaged in
protected concerted activity. Obviously, any TLS policy
inhibiting Anderson's freedom to engage in such protected
concerted activity is proscribed by the Act. Accordingly, it
can be no defense by Respondents in this case to recite a
violation by Anderson when such a policy or regulation is
itself invalid.
In these circumstances, I conclude that Anderson was
engaged in protected concerted activity and that he was
discharged for exercising that right in violation of Section
8(a)(l) of the Act.
3. 8(a)(1) allegation of coercion
Viewed in its entirety, I am satisfied that Fink's
conversation with Juniewicz constituted unlawful interro-
gation and an implied threat of discharge for cooperating
in the Board investigation. Thus, Fink, for no apparent
reason, asked Juniewicz if he had seen any Board agent
and when Juniewicz denied it, Fink told him that he had
heard that he had done so. This was followed by remarks
implying that Pomeroy did not like this situation, referring
to the matter pending with the Board, and noting that
Pomeroy could cancel the contract which action would
cost Juniewicz' his job. Such statements voiced by one of
the joint employers herein constitutes coercion within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondents set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with Respondents' opera-
tions described in section I, above, have a close and
intimate relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce
among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes
burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of
commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondents have engaged in and are
engaging in certain unfair labor practices, I shall recom-
mend that they cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the
Act. I have found that Respondents discharged Edwin L.
Anderson for reasons which offended the provisions of
Section 8(a)( ) of the Act. I shall therefore recommend that
Respondents make him whole for any loss of pay which he
may have suffered as a result of the discrimination
practiced against him. The backpay provided for him shall
be computed in accordance with the Board formula set
98
POMEROY'S INC.
forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950),
with interest thereon at the rate of 6 percent per annum
computed as described in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138
NLRB 716 (1962).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondents TLS and Pomeroy are joint employers
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7
of the Act, Respondents have engaged in and are engaging
in unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 8(a)(l) of
the Act.
3. By unlawfully discharging Edwin L. Anderson on
April 30, 1976, Respondents engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(I) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, I hereby
issue the following recommended:
ORDER 8
The Respondents, Transportation Lease Service, Inc.,
and Allied Stores of Penn Ohio, d/b/a Pomeroy's Inc.,
their officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
I. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against any
employee for engaging in protected concerted activity.
(b) Interrogating or threatening employees in order to
interfere with the rights guaranteed them to engage in
protected concerted activity for their mutual aid or
protection.
(c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of their rights under
Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which I find is
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer to Edwin L. Anderson immediate and full
reinstatement to his former job or, if it no longer exists, to a
substantially equivalent job, and make him whole for any
loss of pay which he may have suffered as a result of the
discrimination practiced against him in the manner set
forth in the section of this Decision entitled "The
Remedy."
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security records and reports and all
other records necessary to analyze the amounts of backpay
due herein.
(c) Post at their respective premises in North Wales,
Pennsylvania, and Willingboro, New Jersey, copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix." 9 Copies of said
notice on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 4, after being duly signed by Respondents'
authorized representatives, shall be posted by them
immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by
them for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 4, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps have
been taken to comply herewith.
8 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings.
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
9 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals. the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT discharge or discriminate against any
employees for engaging in protected concerted activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT interrogate or threaten employees in
order to interfere with their rights to engage in
protected concerted activities for their mutual aid or
protection.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner, interfere with,
restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended.
WE WILL make Edwin L. Anderson whole for any
loss of pay he may have suffered as a result of our
discrimination practiced against him, and WE WILL
reinstate him.
TRANSPORTATION LEASE
SERVICE, INC.
ALLIED STORES OF PENN-
OHIO, D/B/A, POMEROY'S
INC.
99