Polymer Prints LtdDownload PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsSep 10, 1986281 N.L.R.B. 431 (N.L.R.B. 1986) Copy Citation POLYMER PRINTS Polymer Prints Ltd. formerly known as Subliflex, Inc. and Knitgoods Workers Union, Local 155, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO and United Production Workers Union Local 17-18, Party in Interest Polymer Prints Ltd. and Knitgoods Workers Union, Local 155, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO and Joel Gervaes and Sam Stepensky. Cases 29-CA-10491, 29- CA-11183, 29-CA-11204, and 29-CA-11260 10 September 1986 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS JOHANSEN, BABSON, AND STEPHENS On 29 April 1985 Administrative Law Judge James F. Morton issued the attached decision. The General Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the Respondent filed an answering brief. The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge 's rulings, fmdings,1 and conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order. ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended Order of the administrative law judge and orders that the Respondent , Polymer Prints Ltd., Brooklyn, New York, its officers, agents, successors , and assigns , shall take the action set forth in the Order. 1 The General Counsel has excepted to some of the judge's credibility findings. The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administra- tive law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect . Standard Dry Wal/ Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F .2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for re- versing the findings. Although the outcome of the 23 June 1983 election is unaffected, we note that the revised tally of ballots, issued 4 October 1983, indicates that the original tally showed four votes cast for Local 155 , none for Local 17-18, three against both labor organizations, and three determinative challenged ballots. Because we agree with the judge that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(4) and (1) of the Act by reducing the work hours of Joel Gervaes and Maxo Toussaint for appearing as witnesses 22 February 1984 to give testimony under the Act and by constructively discharging Maxo Tous- saint 26 March 1984 for the same reason , we need not pass on whether the Respondent's conduct also violated Sec. 8(aX3). Elias Feuer, Esq., for the General Counsel. Chuck Ellman (Industrial Labor Relations Consultants), of East Orange, New Jersey , for the Respondent. Stanley L. Goodman, Esq. (Chaiken & Chaiken), New York, New York, for the Union. DECISION 431 STATEMENT OF THE CASE JAMES F . MORTON, Administrative Law Judge. The pleadings, as amended, in these consolidated . cases, present for resolution whether Polymer Prints Ltd. (Re- spondent) has violated the National Labor Relations Act (the Act). Specifically, the issues are whether Respond- ent: (1) In violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, unlawful- ly interrogated its employees about their support for Knitgoods Workers Union , Local 155 , International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO (Local 155) during April and May 1983 and in May 1984. (2) In violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, threat- ened its employees in April and May 1983 with more on- erous working conditions , with discharge , with plant clo- sure, and other reprisals, in order to discourage them from supporting Local 155. (3) In violation of Section 8(aXl) of the Act, promised benefits to its employees to induce them not to support Local 155. (4) In violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act, through alleged supervisor and agent, Mendel Weiss, so- licited its employees in May 1983 to sign authorization cards for Union Production Workers Union , Local 17-18 (Local 17-18). (5) In violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, discharged four employees to discourage support for Local 155. (6) In violation of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the Act, reduced the working hours of two employees in early 1984 and of a third employee in May 1984. (7) In violation of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the Act, constructively discharged an employee , on March 26, 1984. (8) In violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, unlawful- ly interrogated an employee about his support for Local 155 under the guise of questioning him in preparation for the hearing in this case. On the entire record,' including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after due consideration of the briefs filed by the General Counsel and Respondent, I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT I. JURISDICTION Respondent has been engaged at its plant in Brooklyn, New York, in the business of manufacturing custom prints used principally in the garment industry. Its oper- ations meet the Board 's nonretail jurisdiction standard. 1 The General Counsel's unopposed motion to substitute the correct document as G.C. Exh. 25, in lieu of the one listed through inadvertent error, is granted . Further , the document marked as G.C. Exh. 11-B is corrected so that it is in evidence as G.C. Exh. 7-B. Incidentally the transcript at p. 1270 , L. 17 does not reflect that the witness' answer to the question , at L. 14, begins with the sentence read- ing, "Let me explain." The letter A, for answer , should be inserted imme- diately in front of that sentence. 281 NLRB No. 68 432 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The pleadings, as amended, establish that Local 155 and Local 17- 18 are labor organizations as defined in Section 2(5) of the Act. II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Outline of the Case In April 1983 , Local 155 began an organizational effort among the approximately 12 employees then work- ing for Respondent. Respondent's name at the time was Subliflex, Inc. (Subliflex). A few days after Local 155 made its appearance, Mendel Weiss distributed Local 17- 18 authorization cards to his coworkers and urged them to support it as the "better union ." The General Counsel contends that Weiss was Respondent's agent and that Respondent thereby unlawfully assisted Local 17-18. Respondent as- serts that Weiss was then a nonsupervisory printing ma- chine operator and not its agent. The General Counsel alleges that acts of unlawful in- terrogation, threats , and promises of benefits by Re- spondent's officials occurred in the spring of 1983. The merits, or lack thereof, of those allegations depend on credibility resolutions on the conflicting testimony of- fered. The General Counsel further alleges that four employ- ees were laid off on May 20 , 1983, to discourage support for Local 155. Respondent asserts that those layoffs were brought about solely because of economic conditions. In addition , Respondent specifically disputes the General Counsel's contention that Sam Stepensky, one of the four employees laid off, had signed a Local 155 authorization card before his layoff or that he was otherwise acting for Local 155. Local 155 filed a petition (Case 29-RC-5934) for an election among Respondent's employees . Local 17-18 in- tervened . In the election held on June 23, 1983, four em- ployees voted for Local 155, none voted for Local 17- 18; and there were six challenged ballots, which were obviously determinative of the results . A revised tally of ballots was issued on October 4, 1983 ; it disclosed that three of the challenged ballots had been opened and counted and that all three of those ballots had been cast for Local 155. Thus, a majority of the valid votes were for Local 155 . Local 155 has since been certified as the bargaining representative of Respondent 's employees. The complaint in Case 29-CA- 10491 had issued on July 13, 1983. The hearing in that case opened before me on February 22, 1984, and adjourned several times for various reasons. Meanwhile, a complaint had issued in Cases 29-CA-11183 and 29-CA-11204 and a separate complaint had issued in Case 29-CA-11260. Those three cases ultimately were consolidated before me with the original case, Case 29-CA-10491. The pleadings in those three cases , Cases 29-CA-11183, 29-CA- 11204, and 29- CA-11260, presented for resolution the issues number heretofore as issues 6, 7, and 8.2 Y Other violations had been alleged but they were withdrawn when I granted the General Counsel 's unopposed motion thereon . One of the withdrawn allegations was that Joel Gervaes had been discnminatonly discharged in mid- 1984, one of the issues discussed in this decision in- The hearing in these four consolidated cases closed on November 5, 1984. B. Alleged Unlawful Interrogation, Threats, and Promises in 1983 The General Counsel called three witnesses who testi- fied concerning various alleged unlawful acts of Re- spondent committed in 1983 , separate from the matter of the layoff of four employees on May 20 of that year. The testimony respecting alleged interrogation, threats, and promises by each of those three witnesses is discussed below. 1. Alleged unlawful interrogation of Sam Stepensky The General Counsel 's first witness, Sam Stepensky, was asked on direct examination if Respondent's plant manager in 1983, Rizard (Rich) Petecki, had ever talked with him about Local 155 . Stepensky replied that he did not remember and that he knew that Petecki "talked with (two other employees) . . . but we did not talk." Stepensky continued his account by stating , "[a]fter two days, he asked me Sam, are you going to-I said no, I not sign." Petecki was not called as a witness . Respondent's counsel stated at the hearing that Petecki was out of the country. I am not persuaded by Stepensky 's confused , apparent- ly contradictory and conclusory account that he was ever asked by Petecki if he supported Local 155 or signed a Local 155 authorization card . It is well estab- lished that self-serving statements need not be treated as conclusive even if not contradicted by direct evidence. See David's, 271 NLRB 536 fn. 17 (1984). 2. Alleged unlawful interrogation of, and promises, threats, and other statements to Maxo Toussaint The General Counsel's witness, Maxo Toussaint, was called to testify respecting conversations he allegedly had with Plant Manager Petecki in 1983. Toussaint testified that Petecki asked him if he signed a card for Local 155 and that he told Petecki he did not. He testified also that three other employees (Stepensky, Joel Gervaes, and one named Michael) were present then and that they all informed Petecki that they did not bring in Local 155. Toussaint had great difficulty setting the date of that discussion and finally placed it in mid- May 1983. Stepensky and Gervaes testified for the Gen- eral Counsel but they did not corroborate Toussaint's testimony. The quality of Toussaint's account leaves much to be desired for purposes of credibility and the absence of corroborative evidence concerning his account, when it apparently was readily available, places a further cloud on it. I find that the General Counsel has not sustained the burden of persuading me that Petecki unlawfully in- terrogated Toussaint and other employees in May 1983. Toussaint testified about another conversation he alleg- edly had with Petecki. His account was very confused volved an alleged discriminatory reduction in his work hours several months before his discharge then POLYMER PRINTS and disjointed . It touches on areas of alleged unlawful in- terrogation, an unlawful promise of a wage increase, and a threat to discharge employees . Again, I am unable to find his account credible notwithstanding that Petecki did not appear as a witness to controvert it. In evaluat- ing Toussaint 's account, I have considered that he testi- fied through an interpreter and that may account for some of his difficulty but not all. For example, at one point, he related that he and another employee were talking with Petecki about Local 155 in Petecki's car; suddenly, he began testifying about a conversation he had with Mendel Weiss . It is not clear whether he was testifying that Weiss was in the car also but the tenor of the General Counsel's questions indicate that he was not. 3. Alleged coercive statements to Fritza Noel Noel was one of the four employees laid off in May 1983 for allegedly discriminatory reasons. She testified that about 2 or 3 weeks after she signed an authorization card for Local 155 in April 1983, Respondent's vice president, Manny Miller, asked her if she knew what a union is and told her that Respondent will be very strict with its employees if the Union came in. Miller testified for Respondent but did not controvert Noel's account ; he did respond in the negative when asked leading questions by Respondent's representative whether he ever threatened to impose stricter work rules and so on . I place no probative weight on such concluso- ry statements. Instead , he testified that on one occasion Noel told him that she would get vacation pay if Local 155 got in. In any event , I find Noel's account credible and I would be disinclined to accept denials thereof by Miller in view of the equivocal testimony he gave on other points. I also credit Noel's uncontroverted testimony that, in two other conversations, Miller (1) told her to go to Local 155 for help when she complained to him about a difficult work assignment he gave her and (2 ) asked her, when Local 155 representatives appeared at the plant to request recognition from Respondent, if she recognized any of those representatives from "her" union. C. Alleged Unlawful Assistance to Local 17-18 Several days after Local 155 began its organizational effort in April 1983, Mendel Weiss urged employees to join and support Local 17-18 as the "better" Union. The primary contention of the General Counsel is that Weiss then was a supervisor and that Respondent, by Weiss ' solicitation, unlawfully gave assistance to Local 17-18 . The General Counsel separately offered circum- stantial evidence in an effort to show that Respondent pressured employees into signing Local 17-18 cards. Thus, Sam Stepensky testified , at one point , that Weiss called him to the office and gave him a Local 17-18 card to sign in the presence of Respondent 's president and also its vice president. Respondent's witnesses denied af- fording any assistance to Local 17-18. I do not credit Stepensky's account as it was inconsistent and confused. For example, he testified that he signed a Local 17-18 card 2 days before his layoff; his Local 17-18 card was 433 dated over a month prior to his layoff . I turn now to whether Weiss solicited Local 17-18 cards as Respond- ent's agent. In April 1983 , Weiss operated Respondent 's printing machine with a helper . Stepensky testified for the Gener- al Counsel that Weiss then "was a worker." Weiss' helper, Gervaes, testified that he got his instructions from Weiss and that Weiss told him whenever there was overtime work for him to do . Another employee, Tous- saint (also an alleged discriminatee) testified that he con- sidered Weiss a "boss" in 1983 because Weiss gave "orders" to employees. Weiss testified that in 1983 he told his helper to work overtime on those occasions when the plant manager then ordered overtime work . Weiss denied that he pos- sessed any of the indicia of supervisory authority as set out in Section 2(11) of the Act. He had been in Respond- ent's employ then for 1 -1/2 years, was hourly paid, and punched a timecard as did the other approximately 12 employees . A full-time manager was present in the plant every day; Respondent 's vice president also spent 40 per- cent of his working time inside the plant. There is no probative evidence that in 1983 Weiss had authority to use independent judgment in assigning work to employees . At best, in his capacity as the operator of Respondent 's printing machine , Weiss routinely relayed orders given him by the plant manager . In the absence of any evidence , I find that he was not then a supervisor as defined in the Act and that there is no evidence that he had apparent or other authority to act on behalf of Re- spondent in soliciting Local 17-18 cards. See Soil Engi- neering Co., 269 NLRB 55 (1984), in which the Board ex- pressly recognized the nonsupervisory status of machine printers, such as Weiss, as it had been done in Southern Bleachery Works, 115 NLRB 787, 791 (1956). I therefore find that the General Counsel has not sustained the burden of demonstrating that Weiss was an agent of Re- spondent in 1983 and that Respondent did not render un- lawful assistance to Local 17-18. D. Alleged Discriminatory Layoff ofFour Employees 1. Their union activities and Respondent's knowledge thereof On May 20, 1983 , Respondent laid off Sam Stepensky, Joel Gervaes, Fritza Noel , and Maria Toussaint. The General Counsel asserts that they were laid off to dis- courage employee support of Local 155. Stepensky testified that he signed a Local 155 card on April 8, 1983, and, in particular, that he wrote that date on his card on that same day. During a voir dire exami- nation, he testified that maybe he changed the pen while filling out the card when he was asked to explain the fact that a different ink was used to write in the date. Re- spondent's handwriting expert testified that he compared Stepensky's handwriting with the disputed date and con- cluded that the date was not in Stepensky 's handwriting. The General Counsel called a Local 155 business rep- resentative, Ramonita Guzman , to corroborate Ste- pensky's testimony that he dated the card on April 8, 1983. Her testimony appeared to be contradictory about 434 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD where Stepensky signed his card . Initially , she testified that he signed it in her car and later she testified she did not remember where he signed it. Her account appeared to be contradictory on another matter , about when she first met Stepensky. I am not persuaded that Stepensky signed his Local 155 card prior to his layoff or that he was otherwise active for Local 155 before his layoff. The General Counsel's brief states that Respondent's witnesses con- ceded that Respondent knew before Stepensky 's layoff that he supported Local 155. The transcript references relied on by the General Counsel for this proposition do not support it. Another of the laid-off employees , Joel Gervaes, testi- fied he signed his Local 155 card on the date shown then, April 8, 1983 . There was no testimony that Re- spondent was aware of that fact. The third alleged discriminatee, Fritza Noel , signed a Local 155 authorization card on April 8. As noted previ- ously, Respondent's vice president had three discussions with her about Local 155; in the third one, he said that the Local 155 representatives were from "her" Union. The fourth laid-off employee , Maria Toussaint, was not active for Local 155 in any way. 2. The layoffs on May 20, related considerations, and recalls On May 20, Respondent laid off Sam Stepensky, Joel Gervaes, Fritza Noel, and Maria Toussaint. Stepensky was told by Respondent's president that he might be called back in 6 months and he was offered "a few dollars," as he put it, to enable him to find another job. The actual amount he received was $700. Another $300 would have been paid him but, as he conceded, he did not return to Respondent to accept that $300. He was recalled to work on March 27, 1984, when a job va- cancy occurred , as discussed in a separate section below. Joel Gervaes had been hired only about 6 weeks before May 20. He worked as a helper, performing cleaning work for the most part. When laid off, he was told by Respondent's plant manager that he would be given a good reference. Gervaes was also given a $50 "bonus" when laid off. He was rehired on July 20, having been sent back to Respondent by Local 155 when a job vacancy appeared. Fritza Noel worked as a samplemaker and Maria Toussaint helped her. They have not been recalled; Re- spondent asserts it discontinued its samplemaking depart- ment, which had been composed of those two employ- ees. The General Counsel asserts that two new employees were hired by Respondent after May 20. The first of those two employees replaced an employee who was skilled in mixing printing inks and, when that new em- ployee later quit , the second new employee replaced him. There is no contention that new employees were hired as replacements for the four laid off on May 20. As of the date of the hearing in this case , Respondent's work force had been reduced to five employees; in early 1983, Respondent had about 13 employees. The General Counsel states in his brief that Respondent 's payroll records show that its gross payroll did not diminish. As best as I can discern from the records in evidence, that statement is not accurate or it requires some explication to which the General Counsel may be privy but to which I am not. In the General Counsel's brief, there is the statement that, a Stipulation for Certification Upon Consent Elec- tion (in Case 29-RC-5934) was executed on May 20, 1983, by Respondent , Local 155 and Local 17-18 and that, within hours, "Respondent implemented a mass dis- charge," referring to the layoff of the four employees named above . There is nothing in the record before me to confirm that a Stipulation for Certification was signed on May 20; there is an exhibit showing that the petition in Case 29-RC-5934 had been filed on May 13 by Local 155. Although the Board may take official notice of its own records , I do not think it is fair to draw any infer- ences if the stipulation was signed on May 20 as there may have been explanations for any coincidences. In that regard, see Seafarers Pacific District (American Pacific), 252 NLRB 736 (1980). Respondent's plant manager in 1983, Rich Petecki, had hired Joel Gervaes in April, as earlier noted; he also had hired Maria Toussaint in March 1983 . He told Fritza Noel then that business was good and that there was going to be a lot of work. Up to May 20, employees fre- quently worked overtime. Respondent 's president testified that he left the active management of Respondent's affairs in 1980 when he moved his family to Israel . He returned in April or May 1983 to effect the changes discussed in the next subsec- tion. 3. Respondent's economic defense Respondent placed in evidence financial statements for the years 1978-1983 prepared by its accountants. These show: Year Approx. Profit (Loss) 1978 $ 30,000 1979 30,000 1980 30,000 1981 (227,000) 1982 (224,000) 1983 (300,000) Respondent 's president testified that, on his return in the spring of 1983, he decided to, and did , effect cost re- ductions by discontinuing samplemaking (thereby laying off its samplemakers , Fritza Noel and Maria Toussaint); by laying off its rewinding machine operator (Stepensky) who was disinclined to do other type work and whose rewinding function did not occupy him full time; by laying off a cleanup employee (Gervaes); by discontinu- ing automobile leases for management personnel and ef- fecting related economics (e.g., it bought cheaper pro- duction paper); and by moving away gradually from heat transfer printing to box printing, resulting in the elimina- tion of rewind costs and the elimination of expensive ink- color matching. I note that on one occasion, as Ste- pensky acknowledged , he had informed Respondent's plant manager that he would work on the printing ma- chine only in emergencies ; that testimony tends to cor- POLYMER PRINTS roborate the testimony of Respondent 's president that Stepensky was not inclined to do other than rewind work. Stepensky was recalled in 1984 under circumstances discussed separately below. Gervaes was reinstated in July 1983 after Local 155 referred him back to work. The General Counsel asserts that the financial state- ments placed in evidence by Respondent cannot be relied on as they were unaudited and suspect . The General Counsel's brief then states that Respondent's 1981 operat- ing statement "obscured entries which certified the $102,171 loss to show a $16,000 profit " and that the ex- planation proferred by Respondent's president "for the discrepancy was that the profit may have been created to secure a bank loan." There is no factual basis to support those assertions . Respondent's president testified that he had no idea who penciled the entries on the exhibit in question (G.C. Exh . 21), or what they refer to. He stated unequivocally that it was an "absolute lie" to state that those notations indicate "a nine thousand dollar profit." The General Counsel notes that Respondent claimed a 1982 tax loss of only half the $228,573 loss shown on its 1982 financial statement and further notes that Respond- ent "never explained this discrepancy ." I am not sure it is a discrepancy ; the reason why the full amount was not claimed as a loss may have to do with provisions of the tax code. In any event, for purposes of this case, half a loss ($114,000) is enough to demonstrate economic duress. Concerning the 1983 financial statement , the General Counsel observes that "[s]uspicion is immediately cast upon this claim" and proceeds to restructure the state- ment by pointing to other factors , such as entries on Re- spondent's ledger sheets. The General Counsel asserts that Respondent 's 1982 Federal income tax return shows that Respondent "claims it cost $574,000 to produce $509,000 in goods." That tax return shows gross receipts of $619,441, less returns and allowances of $111 ,366, for an adjusted gross of $508,075 . I do not find that suspi- cious. Even if it were, it is axiomatic that suspicions are no substitute for evidence. The General Counsel's brief lays out a series of con- tentions purporting to show that Respondent's 1983 tax return contains clear errors , requiring ready correction, including "one correction [which] reduces the claimed loss from $211 ,032 to $23,197." The evidence in the record before me is entirely inadequate to permit me to adopt that argument and to thereby "correct" Respond- ent's 1983 Federal income tax return .-Before I could begin to undertake such an audit , I would need guidance in the way of expert testimony on the significance of the entries on that tax return and how they relate to each other. I cannot accept the General Counsel's analysis in lieu of such testimony. The one point that is obvious is that the General Counsel has not demonstrated that Respondent 's claim, about its being in financial straits, is clearly a pretext. The General Counsel sought to establish that Re- spondent "created Polymer Rollers Ltd. [early ] in 1983" as stated in his brief and argues that its operations should be considered in evaluating Respondent 's economic de- 435 fense. Suffice it to say that there is no evidence that Re- spondent owns or controls Polymer Rollers. 4. Analysis The credited evidence discloses that, of the four em- ployees laid off on May 20 , only two had signed Local 155 cards prior to that date (Gervaes and Noel); that Re- spondent had knowledge that Noel supported Local 155, as is evident from her discussion with Respondent's vice president Miller; and that the timing of the layoffs was suspicious inasmuch as Local 155 had filed the petition in Case 2-RC-5934 only a week previously and at a time when the statement of Respondent's plant manager then (Petecki) indicated that business was expanding. Re- spondent's operations appear not to have been profitable for some time. In any event , the General Counsel has not satisfied me that Respondent was not losing money in its operations and that its reasons for reducing its work force was clearly pretextual . Further, Respondent's offer of $1000 to Stepensky to assist him while he searched for other employment negates any inferences of unlawful motivation on its part as does its recall of Gervaes at the first opening it had. Based on the credibility resolutions made above, I find that the General Counsel has not made out a prima facie case against Respondent in its having laid off these four employees on May 20 . Even were a prima facie case es- tablished, I would further find that Respondent has come forward with sufficient evidence to rebut any warranted inference of unlawful motivation that might be shown and that thus the General Counsel has failed to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the layoffs were discriminatorily motivated . Cf. Eagle Headers, 273 NLRB 1486 (1985). E. Alleged Discriminatory Reduction in Working Hours The General Counsel contends that , starting February 22, 1984, Respondent reduced the work hours of Joel Gervaes and Maxo Toussaint because they had been present to give testimony at the hearing in this case when it opened on that date. As noted earlier, Gervaes began working for Respond- ent in April 1983 , was laid off on May 20 , 1983, and was recalled to work in July 1983. On February 22, 1984, he and Maxo Toussaint (also in Respondent's employ, then) were present in the hearing room in the instant case, pur- suant to subpoenas served by the General Counsel. The hearing was recessed early that day as Respondent had but recently retained Ellman as its representative. Gervaes testified about other issues in this case but did not testify concerning the alleged discriminatory reduc- tion in his working hours . Maxo Toussaint did. His ac- count is as follows . He and Gervaes reported for work on the afternoon of February 22, after the hearing in this case had been adjourned . Respondent's plant manager then, Mendel Weiss, told both of them to go home. They left and returned the following day. They were assigned to operate the rewind machine-where Toussaint had been assigned previously . Two less senior employees were operating the rewind machine when Toussaint left 436 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD work on February 23. On Monday, February 28 Tous- saint and Gervaes worked until 4 p.m. when Weiss told them to go home. Again, two less senior employees were working on the rewind machine when Toussaint and Gervaes left work that day. On the following day, Weiss told Gervaes and then Toussaint to leave work at 4 p.m. Weiss told "us" that "[t]his is the union law," and told him that "the union law says that [he, Toussaint is] sup- posed to work thirty five hours." Toussaint told him that he is not in the Union yet but Weiss replied that he did not care, that is the union law. Toussaint then saw Re- spondent's president, Joe Reichman, and told him that he wanted to work 40 hours but that Weiss told him he could work only 35 hours. Reichman then told Weiss to leave Toussaint alone and let him work 40 hours. Reich- man also told Toussaint that he would not work over- time. Toussaint thereafter, and until he left Respondent's employ about a month later as discussed in a separate section below, did not work on any Sunday. Prior to February 22, Toussaint had worked "sometimes on Sunday." Other employees, with less seniority, worked on Sundays after February. The General Counsel placed in evidence Respondent's records concerning regular and overtime hours worked each week. These disclose that (excluding Weiss, a cleri- cal employee and the inkmixer), Respondent had four production employees for some months before February 22, 1984, and until late March 1984-namely, Toussaint, Gervaes, and two less senior employees, Pierre Auguste and Jean Bernardin. Even a casual look at those records reveals that overtime work was fairly evenly distributed among those employees up to February 22 but, thereaf- ter, there is a huge disparity between overtime worked by Auguste and Bernardin and that worked by Toussaint and Gervaes. For example, in the pay period ending Jan- uary 11, 1984, all four each worked about 8 hours over- time but, for the pay period ending February 22, 1984- Auguste worked 31-1/2 hours overtime; Bernardin, 30- 1/4 hours overtime; Toussaint had no overtime; and Ger- vaes had 8 hours overtime. Weiss, who had been promoted to production manager in January 1984, testified for Respondent that he never told Toussaint that union law limited him to a 35-hour workweek. He testified further that he assigned more overtime to Auguste and Bernardin because they were more cooperative. I credit Toussaint. His testimony respecting overtime rings true. It is unlikely that he fabricated his account as he did not impress me as being creative or as one who would exert his efforts to such end. More significantly, Respondent's payroll records show such a disparity in overtime assignments when those for pay periods before February 22 are compared with those after. Clearly those records support Toussaint's testimony. Weiss' ex- planation as to that disparity is simply that Auguste and Bernardin were more cooperative than Toussaint and Gervaes. The payroll records demonstrate that Weiss learned on February 22 that Gervaes and Toussaint were less "cooperative" and that was the first day of the hear- ing before me where they presented themselves as the General Counsel's witnesses. I am left with the clear in- ference that, had they not been before me as witnesses, they would have been considered to be cooperative and would have continued to enjoy a fair share of overtime works I find, therefore, that they were denied overtime because they were present in the hearing room in this case on February 22 as witnesses to be called by the General Counsel. F. Alleged Constructive Discharge of Toussaint Toussaint testified that he quit Respondent's employ on March 21, 1984, because he learned from taunts made to him by junior production workers, Auguste and Ber- nardin, that they were working overtime and he was not. He testified he complained to Respondent's president Reichman about their taunts who then would tell these two employees that, if they did not stop making such re- marks, they would be discharged. Toussaint testified that he would not have quit had he received overtime as did Auguste and Bernardin. Toussaint testified that he told Respondent's president, Joe Reichman, that he had responsibilities that he could not meet on the hours of work assigned to him and that he was quitting. He testified further that Reichman said he would give him some money and that, several days later, Respondent's vice president, Miller, gave him a paper to sign and gave him $4200 "as a gift." Toussaint related that he signed "papers" but did not read them as he does not understand English. The "papers" he signed were notarized and read as follows: On this date I herein resign my position as an em- ployee of Polymer Prints, Ltd. of my own free will and accord I have received four thousand dollars ($4,000.00) as severance pay which is in full settlement of any and all outstanding claims or debts I may have against Polymer Prints, Ltd., its stockholders, officers, di- rectors and agents. Polymer Prints, Ltd. has not promised, coerced, threatened or threatened me to resign my position. /s/Maxo Toussaint Maxo Toussaint Respondent's vice president, Miller, testified on other matters but did not refer to any discussion he had with Toussaint respecting the signing by Toussaint of the March 26 statement. In a very recent decision, J.R.R. Realty Co., 273 NLRB 1523 (1985), the Board declined to fmd that em- ployees voluntarily quit their employment by signing set- 8 As discussed in a later subsection of this decision, the General Coun- sel sought to establish that the work hours of a third employee, Sam Ste- pensky, were also discrumnatordy reduced later in 1984 . One of the fac- tors considered in resolving that issue was Stepensky 's apparent reluc- tance to do work other than rewinding . There is no evidence that Ger- vaes or Toussaint were unwilling to work on the printing machine or on any operation. Respondent contends that Gervaes unilaterally decided about February 16, 1984, to leave the plant on his own about 4 p.m. each day. I reject that contention . If an employee leaves work because his su- pervisor tells him he cannot work longer because of the Union, he hardly can be said to have acted unilaterally. POLYMER PRINTS Clement agreements4 whereby they purportedly gave up their jobs in exchange for cash payments . The Board adopted Administrative Law Judge Cohn 's opinion that those agreements "were not really voluntary since it was clear from the evidence that the employees desired con- tinued employment and were forced to take these amounts as an alternative ." I turn now to the merits of the General Counsel's claim , i.e., whether Toussaint was constructively discharged. As previously found , Respondent reduced Toussaint's weekly earnings because he had appeared at the hearing as the General Counsel 's witness . By his uncontroverted account, he informed Respondent that he could not dis- charge his family responsibilities if Respondent continued to withhold overtime from him. Respondent made no effort to redress its wrong but compounded it by seizing upon Toussaint's financial difficulties; it made an offer he could not refuse. As the Board observed in Algreco Sportswear Co., 271 NLRB 499 (1984), two elements must be proved to es- tablish a constructive discharge: First, the burdens imposed upon the employee must cause, and be intended to cause, a change in his working conditions so difficult or unpleasant as to force him to resign. Second, it must be shown that those burdens were imposed (for discriminatory rea- sons). The Board considered this very issue in the context of a factual situation which substantially parallels the facts found in the instant case concerning Toussaint . Heck's Properties, 264 NLRB 501, 505 (1982). See also Auto Fast Freight, 272 NLRB 561 (1984). Based on those holdings, I find that the material reduction in Toussaint's work hours and correspondingly in his earnings was intended by Respondent to force him to quit and that Respondent reduced his wages in retaliation against Toussaint's having appeared as a witness to testify in the hearing in this case. Therefore, Toussaint had been constructively discharged on March 26, 1984, because he appeared before me to give testimony under the Act. I do not, however, find merit to the General Counsel's separate al- legation that Respondent discriminated against Toussaint because of his activities on behalf of Local 155. In that regard, see Heck 's Properties, supra at 505 fn. 19. G. Alleged Unlawful Interrogation by Respondent's Representative During the cross-examination of Sam Stepensky at the outset of the hearing, he was asked by Respondent's trial representative , Ellman, whether he had told El man, prior to the hearing, that he had not signed a card for Local 155 before his alleged discriminatory layoff in 1983 , discussed above . The complaint was amended, during one of the lengthy recesses in this case , to allege, inter alia, that Respondent, by reasons of Ellman's pre- hearing discussion with Stepensky, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. In support thereof, Stepensky testified * Incidentally, the $4000 given Toussaint may well have been in satis- faction of an FLSA action, settled about the same time. 437 that Ellman asked him if he had told Respondent 's presi- dent that he signed a Local 155 authorization card after his layoff. Stepensky testified that he responded that that was not true. Ellman testified for Respondent that, on March 27, 1984, he interviewed Stepensky in preparation for the hearing in this case . Ellman testified that he told him the purpose of the interview, assured him that his coopera- tion was voluntary, that there would be no effect on his employment status about what he said or if he declined to cooperate . According to Ellman , Stepensky said he understood these comments and agreed to discuss the issues. Ellman related that he and Stepensky then dis- cussed the merits of the case . On cross-examination, Ellman was asked for and produced long-hand notes which he said he made in the course of his questioning of Stepensky . Those notes corroborate Ellman. The Gen- eral Counsel questioned Ellman about an apparent inden- tation on the page containing those notes . The General Counsel contends that that indentation reveals that Ellman wrote those notes long after the interview he had with Stepensky. I have not found Stepensky 's testimony on other issues to be reliable and see little basis to give his account any greater weight now. Moreover , it is unlikely that El man would have opened the door to this area , as he did in his cross-examination of Stepensky, if he had coercively questioned Stepensky in the first place . Respecting the indentation that the General Counsel asserts exists on the sheet containing Ellman 's purported notes of his inter- view with Stepensky , I observe more than one impres- sion on that page but am reluctant to take a quantum leap to a conclusion that Ellman made those notes after he cross-examined Stepensky , as the General Counsel as- serts. I find that the evidence is insufficient to enable me to accept Stepensky 's account as more probably true. Hence, I credit Ellman's. H. Alleged Reduction in Stepensky 's Work Hours Stepensky was recalled to work by Respondent on March 27, 1984, as Toussaint's replacement . Preliminar- ily, I note that the General Counsel does not concede, as it did with respect to Gervaes , that Stepensky was rein- stated to his former or equivalent position of employ- ment . As I have found that Stepensky had not been dis- criminatorily laid off on May 20 , 1983 , it is unnecessary to determine whether he was recalled to the same or equal job. The General Counsel separately alleges that Ste- pensky's work hours were reduced on and after April 30, 1984, because he testified on that date in this case. Stepensky testified before me on April 30. He was called again as the General Counsel's witness on August 9, 1984, to testify respecting the alleged unlawful reduc- tion in his work hours. He related that, when he was re- hired in March 1984, Respondent 's president talked to him about his being paid on a cash basis . His testimony is confused; it appears that there was some arrangement whereby Stepensky was paid certain sums of money for work and that no payroll records thereon were kept. It 438 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD also appears that Stepensky was asking to be paid by check, not in cash . In any event, it appears from his ac- count that, after April 30, 1984 , he worked only 20 hours to 30 hours a week or so, and that, prior to April 30, he had worked longer hours each week . Stepensky's ac- count is very disjointed . As best as I can surmise, he ap- pears to have testified that, in the week after he testified on March 30, 1984 , Respondent 's president gave him his paycheck and said if he wants this, he has it. In context the "it" seems to me to be a reference to the paycheck, as Stepensky had been asking to be paid by check and not in cash . Yet, the General Counsel 's brief offers a dif- ferent explanation for the remark made by Respondent's president. The General Counsel would have me infer that Respondent was really telling Stepensky that, be- cause he had testified against Respondent on August 9, he was in effect asking for trouble and Respondent was giving it to him by having reduced his work hours and, correspondingly, his paycheck. I am not persuaded, on the basis of the record before me, that such an inference should be drawn. Respondent's payroll records disclose that because he returned to work on March 27 , 1984, Stepensky's work hours were consistently lower than those of the other employees . A random survey of Respondent 's records discloses that, for that period ending April 4, 1984, Ste- pensky worked 33-1/2 hours and that Auguste worked 47-1/2 hours; for the period ending April 25, Auguste worked 16- 1/4 hours while Stepensky worked 6 ; for the period ending May 23 , Auguste worked 36 hours and Stepensky 26-3/4 ; for the period ending May 30, Au- guste worked 44 hours, Stepensky 20. Stepensky ac- knowledged that he, on one occasion, told Respondent's former plant manager that he would work on the print- ing machine only in an emergency. Respondent 's current plant manager , Weiss, testified that Stepensky 's work hours in 1984 corresponded to the hours that the rewinding machine was in operation. Re- spondent 's president testified that work on the rewinding machine became less and less because Respondent was changing its operations. The evidence indicates that Stepensky was hired on March 27, 1984, to replace Toussaint as the operator of the rewinding machine and that that assignment did not change . The reduction in Stepensky's work hours was at- tributable to the change effected in Respondent 's oper- ations, as its president testified, and not to the fact that Stepensky testified before me on April 30, 1984. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. Local 155 and Local 17-18 are labor organizations as defined in Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. (a) Respondent violated Section 8(aXl) of the Act by having, through its Vice President Manny Miller in April 1983, unlawfully interrogated Fritza Noel about Local 155, and threatened that stricter work rules would be imposed if the employees selected Local 155 as their representative. (b) The other complaint allegations that Respondent violated Section 8 (axl) by otherwise unlawfully interro- gating its employees , by threatening them with reprisals, by promising them benefits lack merit. 4. The complaint allegation that Respondent violated Section 8(aXl) and (2) of the Act by unlawfully assisting Local 17-18 lacks merit. 5. The complaint allegation that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(l) and (3) of the Act by laying off four em- ployees on May 20, 1983, to discourage support for Local 155 lacks merit. 6. Respondent violated Section 8(axl) and (4) of the Act by having reduced the work hours of Joel Gervaes and Maxo Toussaint on and after February 22 , 1984, be- cause they appeared as witnesses to give testimony under the Act and by having constructively discharged Maxo Toussaint on March 26, 1984, for that same reason. 7. The complaint allegation that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act by having discharged Maxo Toussaint to discourage membership in Local 155 lacks merit. 8. The complaint allegation that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the Act by having reduced the work hours of Sam Stepensky lack merit. 9. The violations of the Act as found above in para- graphs 3(a) and 6 are unfair labor practices having an effect on commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent engaged in certain unfair labor practices, it shall be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that Respondent constructively dis- charged Maxo Toussaint, it shall be recommended that Respondent offer him immediate reinstatement to his former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substan- tially equivalent position , without prejudice to his senior- ity or other rights and privileges, and make him whole for earnings lost by reason of the discrimination against him by payment of a sum of money equal to that which he normally would have earned from March 26, 1984, to the date of a valid offer of reinstatement, less net interim earnings during that period. Backpay shall be computed on a quarterly basis in the manner prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest as prescribed in Florida Steel Corp., 231 NLRB 651 (1977). See generally Isis Plumbing Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1982). Respondent further shall in a similar manner make Maxo Toussaint and Joel Gervaes whole for losses they suffered by reason of their work hours having been dis- criminatorily reduced on and after February 22, 1984. Respondent shall also be ordered (1) to remove from its records and files any and all references to Maxo Tous- saint's constructive discharge and to the unlawful reduc- tion in his work hours and those of Joel Gervaes, (2) not to use those unlawful acts as a basis for any future disci- plinary action, and (3) to notify Maxo Toussaint and Joel POLYMER PRINTS 439 Gervaes in writing that it has removed all such refer- ences and that they will not be so used. On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommend- ed5 ORDER The Respondent , Polymer Prints, Ltd., Brooklyn, New York, its officers, agents, successors , and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Interrogating employees about their interest in join- ing or supporting Local 155. (b) Threatening that stricter work rules would be im- posed if Local 155 was selected by employees as their bargaining representative. (c) Discriminating against employees by reducing their work hours and wages or by constructively discharging them because they appeared as witnesses to give testimo- ny under the Act. (d) In any like or related manner interfering with, co- ercing, or restraining employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Offer Maxo Toussaint immediate reinstatement to his former position or, if not available, to a substantially equivalent position , without loss of seniority or other benefits and privileges, and make him whole for any earnings lost by reason of the discrimination against him in the manner set forth in the section of this decision en- titled the remedy, and make him and Joel Gervaes whole in the same manner for all losses they incurred by reason of their work hours and wages having been discrimina- torily reduced. (b) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Board or its agents for examination and copying , all pay- roll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports , and all other records nec- essary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (c) Post at its facility in Brooklyn, New York , copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."e Copies of 5 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations , the findings , conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec . 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur- poses. 6 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 29, after being signed by the Respondent's authorized representative , shall be posted by the Re- spondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respond- ent to ensure that the notices are not altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Re- spondent has taken to comply. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that all complaint alle- gations found to lack merit are dismissed. the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT unlawfully question you as to your in- terest in supporting Knitgoods Workers Union, Local 155, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO. WE WILL NOT threaten to impose stricter work rules to discourage you from supporting Local 155. WE WILL NOT discriminate against you by reducing your work hours and wages or forcing you to quit be- cause you are to be a witness at a hearing held pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL offer Maxo Toussaint his job back and pay him for all moneys, with interest, he lost as a result of our having unlawfully forced him to quit our employ and WE WILL pay him and Joel Gervaes all moneys with interest they lost because we unlawfully reduced their work hours. POLYMER PRINT LTD. FORMERLY KNOWN AS SUBLIFLEX, INC. Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation