Piccionielli, Gregory A.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 1, 2020

13815739 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Apr. 1, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/815,739 03/15/2013 Gregory A. Piccionielli GAP12003USU 6484
116438 7590 04/01/2020
Apogee Law Group
26895 Aliso Creek Road
Suite 104
Aliso Viejo, CA 92656
EXAMINER
STOLTENBERG, DAVID J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3682
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/01/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@goapogee.com
jcwilk@goapogee.com
mara@goapogee.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte GREGORY A. PICCIONELLI
____________

Appeal 2019-002857
Application 13/815,739
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before KALYAN K. DESHPANDE, CHARLES J. BOUDREAU, and
SHARON FENICK, Administrative Patent Judges.

BOUDREAU, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–10. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the inventor, Gregory A. Piccionelli,
as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 3.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant’s invention relates to “on-line tracking of speculation
regarding the probable occurrence of selected behaviors transmitted via live
on-line means” and “encouraging and rewarding such occurrences.”
Spec. 1.
Claims 1 and 8 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below, is
illustrative of the subject matter on appeal:
1. A method for producing a transmission of a live performance
of a selected behavior, the method comprising the steps of:
capturing an image with an image capture device of a
participant in a live performance, where the participant is not
viewing a website and the participant does not control the image
capture device,
posting the image of the participant on a website hosted by
a computer,
associating the image with at least one behavior described
in the website,
accepting at the computer from at least one on-line viewer
of the website a contribution to a pool of contributions to a
reward from which the reward is displayed in the website and is
to be provided upon the live performance of at least one behavior
specified in response to the reward and at least one behavior
described in the website,
capturing a live view of the live performance of the
participant with a image device,
transmitting to the website the live view, and
providing to the participant at least a portion of the reward
in response to the live performance of at least one behavior
specified and at least one behavior described in the website.
Appeal Br. 19 (Claims App.).
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REJECTIONS
Claims 1–10 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to
non-statutory subject matter. Final Act. 2–7.
Claims 1–7 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) or pre-AIA
35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written
description requirement. Final Act. 7–8; Ans. 3.2
Claims 1–6 and 8–10 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Cassella3 in view of Patchen4 and Von Kohorn.5
Final Act. 10–19.
Claim 7 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Cassella in view of Patchen, Von Kohorn, and Hughes.6
Final Act. 20.
OPINION
Rejection Under 35 U.S.C. § 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or [a] new and useful
improvement thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the U.S. Supreme Court
has long interpreted § 101 to “contain[] an important implicit exception:

2 The Examiner withdrew an additional rejection of claim 3 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(a) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph as failing to comply
with the written description requirement. See Ans. 10.
3 Cassella, US 2004/0187148 A1 (pub. Sept. 23, 2004).
4 Patchen, US 2002/0198050 A1 (pub. Dec. 26, 2002).
5 Von Kohorn, US 2003/0003990 A1 (pub. Jan. 2, 2003).
6 Hughes et al., US 2007/0226062 A1 (pub. Sept. 27, 2007).
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Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.”
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quoting Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)).
In Alice, the Supreme Court reiterated the two-step framework
previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012) “for distinguishing patents that claim laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-
eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. The first
step in this analysis is to “determine whether the claims at issue are directed
to one of those patent-ineligible concepts,” e.g., to an abstract idea. Id.
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas include certain methods of
organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (id.
at 219–20; Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)); mathematical
formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental
processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). If it is determined
that the claims are directed to a patent-ineligible concept, the second step of
the analysis requires consideration of the elements of the claims
“individually and ‘as an ordered combination’” to determine whether there
are additional elements that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a
patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S.
at 78, 79). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional
features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. at 221 (alterations in original) (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). In other words, the claims must contain an
“inventive concept,” or some element or combination of elements “sufficient
to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a
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patent upon the [abstract idea] itself.” Id. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo, 566
U.S. at 72–73). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
at 221.
In January 2019, the PTO published revised guidance on the
application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Revised Guidance”).7 “All
USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected
to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51; see also October 2019 Update at 1.
Under that guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as fundamental economic
practices, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong 1”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)
(9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong 2”).8
See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.

7 In October 2019, in response to received public comments, the PTO issued
a further memorandum clarifying the Revised Guidance. USPTO
Memorandum, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (Oct. 17,
2019), available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
peg_oct_2019_update.pdf (“October 2019 Update”).
8 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (Section
III.A.2).
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Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then (under
“Step 2B”) look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, and conventional” in the field
(see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
The Examiner determines that independent claim 1 is “directed to the
abstract idea of rewarding participants for performing viewer suggested
behaviors recorded and posted to a website and viewed by remotely located
viewers via a website, the participant’s reward determined by at least one
viewer contributing to a contribution pool.” Final Act. 3; Ans. 3–4; see also
Final Act. 5 (Examiner making a similar determination with respect to
independent claim 8). According to the Examiner, the claimed subject
matter is comparable to concepts found to be abstract ideas by the courts,
including “basic economic practices or theories such as advertising and
marketing.” Final Act. 3, 5. The Examiner further determines that the
claims do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to
significantly more than the abstract idea. Id. at 3, 6; Ans. 5. Specifically,
the Examiner finds that the claim limitations “are mere instructions to
implement the abstract idea on a computer” and “represent[] insignificant
data gathering and data processing steps requiring no more than a generic
computer to perform generic computer functions that are well-understood,
routine and conventional activities previously known to the industry.” Final
Act. 3–4, 6; see Ans. 5.
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Appellant argues that the claims are not directed to an abstract idea,
but rather to “live streaming for the performance to a computer, accepting at
the computer from at least one on-line viewer of the website a contribution
to a pool of contributions to a reward.” Appeal Br. 11. Appellant further
argues that the claim limitations are “incorporated into a practical
application” because they recite a user’s “interaction with the transmitted
broadcast,” “an image . . . being associated with a behavior or category on a
website,” and “[a] user . . . able to contribute to a pool for the associated
behavior and the combined pool displayed.” Reply Br. 4 (citing Ans. 4).
According to Appellant, the claims recite “an improvement in . . . computer
capabilities” in that “live images are received at the computer from an
imaging device not controlled by the participant (no selfies) and the
computer is simultaneously collecting rewards and upon completion of the
acts, issues the rewards.” Appeal Br. 10–11.
Step 2A, Prong 1
We agree with the Examiner that, based on the Revised Guidance, the
claims recite a judicial exception, i.e., an abstract idea. See Final Act. 3, 5.
Specifically, we determine that the claims recite managing personal
behavior, which is one of the “certain methods of organizing human
activity” identified in the Revised Guidance as a judicial exception, in the
form of encouraging and rewarding certain behavior. See Spec. 1 (“The
present invention relates to systems and methods for encouraging and
rewarding” the “occurrence of selected behaviors transmitted via live on-line
means.”).
For example, independent claim 1 recites “a reward . . . to be provided
upon the live performance of at least one behavior specified in response to
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the reward and at least one behavior described in the website” and
“providing to the participant at least a portion of the reward in response to
the live performance of at least one behavior specified and at least one
behavior described in the website.” These limitations relate to encouraging
and rewarding certain behavior (as do corresponding limitations in
independent claim 8, including “a portion of the reward is to be provided to
the at least one viewer”), which is a form of managing personal behavior.
Indeed, independent claims 1 and 8 as a whole recite managing personal
behavior in that the claimed invention “relates to systems and methods for
encouraging and rewarding” the “occurrence of selected behaviors
transmitted via live on-line means.” Spec. 1. Similarly, the Specification
states that “[i]t is to be understood that the embodiments set forth herein
should not be viewed or interpreted as limiting,” and that “[t]he ‘How far
will you go?’ concept set forth in this application is applicable to virtually
any type of human behavior that can be incentivized by monetary or other
means.” Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, the claims recite one of the certain methods of
organizing human activity identified in the Revised Guidance, and, thus, an
abstract idea.
Step 2A, Prong 2
Because the claims recite an abstract idea, we next look to whether the
claims recite additional elements that integrate the abstract idea into a
practical application. Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. Claim
limitations that indicate integration into a practical application include
additional elements that reflect an improvement in the functioning of a
computer, or an improvement to other technology or technical field. Id.
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at 55. When a claim recites a judicial exception and fails to integrate the
judicial exception into a practical application, the claim is “directed to” the
judicial exception. Id. at 51.
We determine that the additional limitations recited in the claims on
appeal do not integrate the recited judicial exception into a practical
application. For example, claim 1 additionally recites “capturing an image
with an image capture device of a participant in a live performance, where
the participant is not viewing a website and the participant does not control
the image capture device,” “posting the image of the participant on a website
hosted by a computer,” “associating the image with at least one behavior
described in the website,” “capturing a live view of the live performance of
the participant with a image device,” and “transmitting to the website the
live view.” These limitations are recited at a high level of generality (i.e., as
general means of gathering image data related to the rewarded behavior and
displaying it) and amount to insignificant extra-solution activity. Claim 1
further recites “accepting at the computer from at least one on-line viewer of
the website a contribution to a pool of contributions to a reward” and that
“the reward is displayed in the website.” Notwithstanding Appellant’s
contention that these limitations state an “application . . . similar to [the
example of] organizing icons as explained in ‘Example 37 – Relocation of
Icons on a Graphical User Interface’” of the Revised Guidance (Reply Br.
4), we find that these limitations also are recited at a high level of generality
(i.e., as general means of collecting reward contributions and displaying the
reward information), and thus also amount to insignificant extra-solution
activity. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55; MPEP § 2106.05(g).
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We agree with the Examiner that the claims otherwise merely recite
generic computer components that similarly fail to integrate the recited
abstract idea into a practical application. See Final Act. 4, 6; Ans. 5. For
example, independent claim 1 recites a “website hosted by a computer.” As
the Examiner points out, this limitation is recited at a high level of
generality, i.e., as generic components performing generic computer
functions of computer processing and displaying data, including the extra-
solution steps of gathering and displaying image data, accepting
contributions to the reward, and displaying the reward. See id. Although
Appellant argues that “all the structure has been abstracted out of the claims
and ignored” (Appeal Br. 10) and that the claims recite “specific actions that
[are] supported by the computer” (id. at 11), the claims merely apply the
abstract idea using generic computer components and indicate a field of use
or technological environment (i.e., the Internet) for the encouraging and
rewarding of certain behavior. See Final Act. 22; Revised Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 55; MPEP § 2106.05(f), (h). The claim limitations do not include
any particular machine that is integral to the claim. See Revised Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 55; MPEP § 2106.05(b).
Appellant argues that the claims recite “an improvement in . . .
computer capabilities” in that “live images are received at the computer from
an imaging device not controlled by the participant (no selfies) and the
computer is simultaneously collecting rewards and upon completion of the
acts, issues the rewards.” Appeal Br. 10–11. We are unpersuaded by
Appellant’s argument and agree with the Examiner that the claims do not
recite a technological improvement in addition to the abstract idea. See
Final Act. 22, Ans. 4–5. As discussed above, the recited “website” and
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“computer” are merely generic computer components performing generic
functions of computer processing and displaying data. We are unpersuaded
that “simultaneously collecting rewards” or “upon completion of the acts,
issu[ing] the rewards” (Appeal Br. 11) reflects a technological improvement
because the claims “do not require an arguably inventive set of components
or methods, such as measurement devices or techniques, that would generate
new data. They do not invoke any assertedly inventive programming.”
Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
2016). Thus, the claims do not reflect an improvement in computer
functionality or to any other technology or technical field. See Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55; MPEP § 2106.05(a).
Even in combination, the additional limitations do not integrate the
abstract idea into a practical application because they do not impose any
meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea. Accordingly, we agree
with the Examiner that the claims are directed to an abstract idea.
Step 2B
Turning to Step 2B of the Revised Guidance, we agree with the
Examiner that there are no specific limitations beyond the judicial exception,
i.e., the abstract idea, that are not “well-understood, routine, and
conventional” in the field. See Final Act. 3–4, 6; Ans. 5 (citing Spec. 39);
MPEP § 2106.05(d). For example, the additionally recited “website hosted
by a computer” is a mere recitation of generic computer components

9 The Final Action at pages 4 and 6 and the Answer at page 5 cite
“paragraph [16],” referring to the paragraph numbering in corresponding
patent application publication US 2014/0025476 A1; we have revised the
citation to refer to the page numbers of the Specification as originally filed.
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performing generic computer functions that are well-understood, routine,
and conventional, and thus do not amount to significantly more than the
abstract idea. See Spec. 3 (generally describing a “website, for display to
viewers of the website”). As discussed above, those additional elements
amount to no more than mere instructions to apply the abstract idea using
generic computer components. Mere instructions to apply an abstract idea
on a generic computer do not provide an inventive concept. Alice, 573 U.S.
at 223–24.
Reevaluating the extra-solution activity of “capturing an image with
an image capture device of a participant in a live performance, where the
participant is not viewing a website and the participant does not control the
image capture device,” “posting the image of the participant on a website
hosted by a computer,” “associating the image with at least one behavior
described in the website,” “capturing a live view of the live performance of
the participant with a image device,” and “transmitting to the website the
live view” (see Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56 (stating that a
conclusion under Step 2A that an additional element is insignificant extra-
solution activity should be reevaluated in Step 2B)), we find nothing
unconventional in these steps of gathering image data related to the
rewarded behavior and displaying it on a website. Further reevaluating the
extra-solution activity of “accepting at the computer from at least one on-
line viewer of the website a contribution to a pool of contributions to a
reward” and “the reward is displayed in the website,” we find nothing
unconventional in these steps of collecting reward contributions online and
displaying the reward information on a website.
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Appellant argues that “the claims have been drafted to limit the scope
of the claims.” Appeal Br. 10. However, Appellant has not shown that the
claims on appeal add any specific limitation beyond the judicial exception
that is not well-understood, routine, and conventional in the field. Appellant
also provides no evidence of how the ordered combination is unconventional
or amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea to which the claims
are otherwise directed.
Accordingly, considering the claim elements individually and as an
ordered combination, we agree with the Examiner that there are no
meaningful claim limitations that represent sufficiently inventive concepts to
transform the nature of the claims into a patent-eligible application of the
abstract idea.
For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 1–10 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Rejection Under 35 U.S.C. § 112
The Examiner determines that claims 1–7 lack written description
support for the limitation of “capturing an image with an image capture
device of a participant in a live performance, where the participant is not
viewing a website and the participant does not control the image capture
device,” as recited in independent claim 1 (emphasis added). Final Act. 7–8;
Ans. 3. Specifically, the Examiner finds that the Specification discloses “the
capture of the image of a participant using a camera or other device but does
not disclose or specify what a participant is or is not viewing.” Final Act. 8
Appellant argues that the Specification’s disclosure that “the potential
participant is in a public place and may be freely photographed or
videographed,” and that “on-line viewers can engage in speculation whether
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the finder or jockey can . . . entice or encourage the potential participant to
engage in a particular behavior,” indicates that “the participant at this point
is a potential participant and does not have actual knowledge of being
videographed.” Appeal Br. 13 (citing Spec. 410).
We agree with the Examiner that the Specification, including those
portions cited by Appellant, is silent and not indicative as to whether the
participant is viewing a website. See Final Act. 23; Ans. 6–7. Moreover,
Appellant does not explain how being “in a public place and . . . freely
photograph[able] or videograph[able]” in any way precludes a participant
from “viewing a website.” Thus, we agree with the Examiner that the
Specification does not provide sufficient written description support for the
limitation “where the participant is not viewing a website.”
Rejection Under 35 U.S.C. § 103
The Examiner relies on Cassella for the limitation “capturing an
image with an image capture device of a participant in a live performance,
where the participant is not viewing a website and the participant does not
control the image capture device,” as recited in independent claim 1
(emphasis added). Final Act. 10–11 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 22, 45, 47, 56, 58);
Ans. 8 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 20–22). Cassella teaches a broadcaster choosing
viewers to appear on and participate in a broadcast from their home or
another remote location. Cassella ¶ 20. “[T]he digital image and voice, or
video, of at least one viewer appears on the television or cable program via

10 Although Appellant cites “paragraph [0018] of the specification,”
apparently referring to the paragraph numbering in corresponding patent
application publication US 2014/0025476 A1, our citation is to the page
number of the Specification as originally filed.
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internet carrier and . . . the viewer is able to participate and give immediate
direct input and reactions to the program.” Id.
Appellant argues that Cassella fails to teach or suggest the limitation
“where the participant is not viewing a website” because the candidates
chosen to appear and participate in the broadcast are “people who have
watched and are viewing the show,” whereas “[a]n active viewer is not
selected” in the claimed invention. Appeal Br. 14–15, 17 (citing Cassella
¶¶ 21, 22, 47, 58). Appellant also argues that Cassella’s disclosure of a
“network provider” and “video hardware” indicates that the participating
viewers view the broadcast via a website. Id. at 17 (citing Cassella ¶ 58).
Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive. While Cassella’s chosen
participants are viewing the broadcast, Cassella expressly teaches television
broadcasts. See, e.g., Cassella ¶¶ 20 (“viewer appears on the television or
cable program”), 56 (“television broadcasts”), 58 (“televisions” in hotels).
Although Cassella describes embodiments in which a user participates via a
website, Cassella also describes other embodiments in which television
broadcasts or closed circuit television are employed. E.g., id. ¶ 56. It would
have been obvious that the users of Cassella’s system would not be viewing
a website while viewing a television broadcast or closed circuit television
system. And indeed, although Cassella states that a closed circuit television
system “could be readily adapted for use over the web” (id. ¶ 57 (emphasis
added)), we agree with the Examiner that, even if communications between
a television show and participating viewers might thus be “accomplished via
internet broadband communications link, such a communications method
does not equate to the viewing of a website” (Ans. 9 (citing Cassella ¶¶ 20–
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22)). Thus, we find no error in the Examiner’s reliance on Cassella for the
limitation “where the participant is not viewing a website.”
Appellant further argues that Cassella fails to teach or suggest the
limitation “the participant does not control the image capture device”
because the “viewer’s equipment is used to transmit the images and video
for the show,” whereas “the viewer’s hardware is not being used” in the
claimed invention. Appeal Br. 15 (citing Cassella ¶ 22). Appellant also
argues that Cassella’s participant “can ask to be chosen or decline” to be
chosen for broadcast, and has knowledge of being videotaped, and thus
controls the image capture device. Id. at 15–17 (citing Cassella ¶ 58).
We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s arguments. The Examiner finds
that Cassella teaches or suggests that “participants are chosen by a network
or program provider upon [the viewer’s] entry to be considered for
participation,” that the network or program provider chooses participants
based on, e.g., the viewer’s hardware performance, and that “a viewer’s
video equipment is only activated when the equipment meets technical
requirements, and the control of the activation of the image capture device is
not under the command of the viewer and is instead under the control of the
performance organizer.” Ans. 9 (citing Cassella ¶¶ 22, 45, 47, 58). We
agree with the Examiner’s findings and determine that the broadest
reasonable interpretation of “the participant does not control the image
capture device” encompasses Cassella’s teaching or suggestion of the
network controlling whether a viewer’s image capture device may be
activated to transmit video data. See Cassella ¶ 45 (network administrator
checks viewers’ hardware performance, “only allowing conforming viewers
to be chosen”). Furthermore, we agree with the Examiner that Appellant’s
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argument regarding the participant’s knowledge of being videotaped is not
commensurate with the claim language. See Final Act. 25. Thus, we find no
error in the Examiner’s reliance on Cassella for the limitation “the
participant does not control the image capture device.”
For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of independent claim 1, independent claim 8, which is
not argued separately, and dependent claims 2–6, 9, and 10, which also are
not argued separately.
Appellant does not provide any arguments with respect to the
Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of dependent claim 7.
Accordingly, we summarily sustain the 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of claim
7.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–10 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101.
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–7 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112.
We affirm the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–10 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103.

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DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED
Claims
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–10 101 Eligibility 1–10
1–7 112 Written Description 1–7
1–6, 8–10 103(a) Cassella, Patchen,
Von Kohorn
1–6, 8–10
7 103(a) Cassella, Patchen,
Von Kohorn, Hughes
7
Overall
Outcome
1–10