PHILIPS LIGHTING HOLDING B.V.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 31, 2020

2019005976 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 31, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/324,367 01/06/2017 HAIMIN TAO 2014P00529WOUS 2956
138325 7590 08/31/2020
Signify Holding B.V.
465 Columbus Avenue
Suite 330
Valhalla, NY 10595
EXAMINER
YANG, AMY X
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2844
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/31/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Gigi.Miller@signify.com
jo.cangelosi@signify.com
kim.larocca@signify.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte HAIMIN TAO

Appeal 2019-005976
Application 15/324,367
Technology Center 2800
____________

Before JOHN A. EVANS, JOHN P. PINKERTON, and
MICHAEL M. BARRY, Administrative Patent Judges.

EVANS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject Claims 1–14, which are all of the claims
pending in this application. Appeal Br. 3, see also Claims App. 14–18. We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.2

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “Applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Philips
Lighting Holding B.V. Appeal Br. 3.
2 Rather than reiterate the arguments of Appellant and the Examiner, we
refer to the Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.”) and Claims Appendix (Claims
App.), filed November 26, 2018, the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.”), mailed
April 2, 2019, the Final Office Action (“Final”), mailed June 29, 2018, and
the Specification (“Spec.”), filed January 6, 2017, for their respective details.

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Claimed Subject Matter
The claims relate to a tube LED (“TLED”) for retrofit replacement of
a dimmable fluorescent tube lamp. Spec. 3:14–16. In one embodiment, the
TLED includes a safety switch arranged between a driver circuit
arrangement and an LED arrangement within the tube for disconnecting the
connectors of the TLED and electrically connecting them only when it is
safe to do so. Id. at 3:27–30, 4:4–6. Use of the safety switch prevents any
significant leakage current from passing between a connected end of the
lamp to an exposed end. Id. at 4:6–8.
Claims
Claims 1 and 13 are independent. An understanding of the invention
can be derived from a reading of illustrative Claim 1, which is reproduced
below with some formatting added:
1. A tube LED lamp realised to replace a fluorescent
tube lamp, which tube LED lamp comprises a tube containing an
LED arrangement with a number of LEDs;
a connector arrangement with connectors realized for
insertion into sockets of a socket arrangement of a tube lamp
housing incorporating a dimming ballast;
a driver circuit arrangement for driving the LED
arrangement, which driver circuit arrangement is realized to
output an LED current on the basis of an input current provided
by the dimming ballast;
a safety switch arranged within the tube to electrically
isolate connectors of the connector arrangement, wherein the
safety switch is arranged between the driver circuit arrangement
and the LED arrangement; and
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a switch control circuit configured to control the safety
switch, wherein the switch control circuit receives a high-
frequency signal from the dimming ballast.
Appeal Br. 14 (Claims App.).
References
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Hartikka et al.
(Hartikka) US 2011/0260614 A1 Oct. 27, 2011
Hausman, JR.
(Hausman) US 2012/0286681 A1 Nov. 15, 2012
Sumitani et al.
(Sumitani) US 2012/0326616 A1 Dec. 27, 2012
Sadwick et al.
(Sadwick) US 2014/0265900 A1 Sept. 18, 2014
Boora et al. (Boora) US 2015/0137783 A1 May 21, 2015

Rejections on Appeal
Claims 1–7, 9, and 12–14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Hartikka and Sadwick. Final 3–6.
Claim 8 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable
over Hartikka, Sadwick, and Boora. Id. at 6.
Claim 10 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable
over Hartikka, Sadwick, and Hausman. Id. at 6–7.
Claim 11 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable
over Hartikka, Sadwick, and Sumitani. Id. at 7.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the rejections of Claims 1–14 in light of
Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner erred. We have considered in this
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decision only those arguments Appellant actually raised in the Briefs. Any
other arguments which Appellant could have made but chose not to make in
the Briefs are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). We
adopt as our own the findings and reasons set forth in the Examiner’s
Answer and in the rejection on Appeal for these claims, to the extent
consistent with our analysis below. We provide the following explanation to
highlight and address specific arguments and findings primarily for
emphasis. We consider Appellant’s arguments seriatim, as they are
presented in the Appeal Brief, pages 7–13.
CLAIMS 1–14:
OBVIOUSNESS BASED ON AT LEAST HARTIKKA AND SADWICK
Appellant presents arguments for the § 103(a) rejection of Claim 1
and relies on those same arguments as a basis for disputing the § 103
rejections of Claims 2–14. Appeal Br. 7–13. Therefore, we analyze these
claims on the basis of representative Claim 1, and refer to the rejected claims
collectively herein as “the claims.” See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv); In re
Marco Guldenaar Holding B.V., 911 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Input Current
Claim 1 recites, among other limitations, “a driver circuit arrangement
. . . realized to output an LED current on the basis of an input current
provided by the dimming ballast.” The Examiner finds the combination of
Hartikka and Sadwick teaches this limitation. Final 3–4 (citing Hartikka
¶ 51; Sadwick ¶ 122). The Examiner explains that “Hartikka disclose[s] the
input current is provided to a ballast but does not disclose a dimming
ballast,” while “Sadwick discloses wherein the ballast is a dimming ballast.”
Ans. 4 (citing Sadwick ¶ 122). The Examiner reasons that “it would have
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been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to modify the lighting system
of Hartikka include a dimming ballast as disclosed in Sadwick to allow
retrofitting with different systems and better light control.” Id., see also
Final 4.
Appellant argues that “[a]lthough Hartikka discloses a driver circuit,
its driver circuit is configured to convert mains voltage not ‘an input current
provided by the dimming ballast.’” Appeal Br. 9. This argument is not
persuasive because it attacks Hartikka individually, whereas the Examiner
relies on the combined teachings of Hartikka and Sadwick for teaching or
suggesting the disputed limitation. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA
1981).
As the Examiner finds, Hartikka’s current supply components within
an LED tube teach or at least suggest “a driver circuit arrangement . . .
realized to output an LED current . . . on the basis of an input current
provided by the . . . ballast.” See Final 3–4 (citing Hartikka ¶ 51); Ans. 3–4.
The current supply components “convert the alternating voltage (e.g. 230
VAC) of the mains to direct voltage (dc) and to regulate the dc current.”
Hartikka ¶ 51, see also id., Figs. 3A–3C (item 33), Fig. 3D (item 33’).
Hartikka also teaches an electronic ballast connected between the mains and
an LED tube that provides a continuous electric current to the tube. See,
e.g., Hartikka ¶¶ 4, 54, 56, Figs. 1C, 5A (item 12). Hartikka therefore
teaches or at least suggests an input current provided by an electronic ballast
because power has been received by the current supply components within
the tube from the mains through an electronic ballast. Even though
“Hartikka does not explicitly state the ballast is a dimming ballast,” the
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Examiner finds (Final 4), and we agree, that Sadwick teaches this claim
element with the following disclosure:
the LED Fluorescent Lamp Replacement also work with
dimming fluorescent lamps ballasts including, but not limited,
to DMX, DALI, RS 232, RS422, RS485, universal serial bus
(USB), 0 to 10 V (or any other range of voltages including but
not limited to O to 1 V, 0 to 3 V, 0 to 5 V, 1 to 6 V, 1 to 8 V,
etc.), Triac and other phase angle/phase cut dimmers (including
both forward and reverse phase cut dimmers), PLC and/or any
other type of analog and or digital wired, wireless and/or PLC
dimmable fluorescent lamp ballast or related (i.e., HID) ballast.
Sadwick ¶ 122. We also find reasonable the Examiner’s rationale to
combine the cited teachings of Hartikka and Sadwick—“it would have been
obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to modify the lighting system of
Hartikka include a dimming ballast as disclosed in Sadwick to allow
retrofitting with different systems and better light control.” Ans. 4.
Appellant argues further that “by responding only the mains input,
Hartikka’s LEDs would not be dimmable even if a dimmable ballast was
swapped in to replace Hartikka’s ballast.” Appeal Br. 9. First, this
argument mischaracterizes the cited teachings of Hartikka, which, as
discussed above, show that Hartikka’s LEDs respond not only to the mains
input, but also to an electronic ballast that provides a continuous electric
current from the mains input to the LED tube. Second, to the extent
Appellant is arguing that the dimming ballast of Sadwick must be bodily
incorporated or physically integrated into Hartikka’s LED tube and lamp
arrangement, “the criterion [is] not whether the references could be
physically combined but whether the claimed inventions are rendered
obvious by the teachings of the prior art as a whole.” In re Etter, 756 F.2d
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852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Moreover, Appellant’s argument does not
include any persuasive evidence to suggest that integrating Sadwick’s
dimming ballast into Hartikka’s lamp arrangement would have been
“uniquely challenging or difficult” to a person of ordinary skill, who is “a
person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v.
Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007); KSR Int’l Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007).
Safety Switch Arrangement
Claim 1 also recites a “safety switch . . . arranged between the driver
circuit arrangement and the LED arrangement.” The Examiner finds
Hartikka discloses a safety switch arranged within the tube along the LED
circuitry to electrically isolate connectors of the connector arrangement.
Final 4 (citing Hartikka ¶¶ 57–60). But, according to the Examiner,
“Hartikka’s embodiments . . . do not show wherein the safety switch is
arranged between the driver arrangement and the LED arrangement.” Id.
(citing Hartikka Figs. 2, 3A–3C, 4A–B, 5B–C). The Examiner explains,
however, that in Hartikka, “‘circuit-breaking switches S1 and S2 may
alternatively reside at any point of the LED circuitry as long as they break
the current path.’” Id. (quoting Hartikka ¶ 68). The Examiner therefore
reasons that
the teaching of Hartikka along with the knowledge of that of
ordinary skill in the art at the time of filing would make it
obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to change the location
of the safety switch as suggested by Hartikka since Hartikka
states that the modification would work since protection of the
circuit would be achieved no matter where along the [LED]
tube the switch was located.”
Id. at 2, see also id. at 4.
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Appellant argues that even though Hartikka’s circuit-breaking
switches could reside at any point along the LED circuitry, “this would not
lead a person of ordinary skill in the art to modify Hartikka” to arrange one
of its switches between the current supply components and the LED
components. Appeal Br. 10. According to Appellant, such a modification
would impermissibly “ignore [Hartikka’s] teachings of a preferred location”
away from the LEDs and close to the ends of the tube. Id. at 9–10.
This argument is not persuasive. In view of Hartikka’s disclosure that
“the circuit-breaking switches . . . may . . . reside at any point of the LED
circuitry as long as they break the current path,” arranging the switch
between the current supply components and the LED components would
have been obvious to try for a person of ordinary skill in the art. “When a
work is available in one field of endeavor, design incentives and other
market forces can prompt variations of it, either in the same field or a
different one. If a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable
variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. Also,
[w]hen there is a design need or market pressure to solve a
problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable
solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue
the known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads
to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of
innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense.
Id. at 421.3

3 See also Perfect Web Tech., Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1329
(Fed. Cir. 2009); Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1238 (Fed. Cir.
2010).
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Here, there are only a finite number of places to position the switch
within the LED tube, such as towards the ends of the tube (e.g., outside the
current supply and LED components) or toward the middle of the tube (e.g.,
between the current supply and LED components). Given Hartikka’s
disclosure that the circuit-breaking switches may reside at any point of the
LED circuitry, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had good
reason to pursue other arrangements, which would be within their technical
grasp. In other words, arranging the safety switch between the driver circuit
arrangement and the LED arrangement is no more than a predictable
variation or arrangement that would have been obvious.
The fact that Hartikka states, “it is more advantageous to have the
circuit-breaking switches . . . as close as possible to the ends of the LED
tube lighting fixture,” does not change our position. See Hartikka ¶ 68. “A
reference does not teach away . . . if it merely expresses a general preference
for an alternative invention but does not ‘criticize, discredit, or otherwise
discourage’ investigation into the invention claimed.” DePuy Spine, Inc. v.
Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(citing In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Appellant does
not identify any passage in Hartikka that discredits or discourages arranging
a circuit-breaking switch between the current supply components and the
LED components, and the cited statement does no more than articulate a
preference for switches towards the end of the tube. That stated preference
is insufficient to teach away from the claimed invention. See id.
Appellant argues as well that “[t]he cited art fails to appreciate the
advantage” of “the claimed arrangement of the safety switch,” which
“simplifies lamp construction and design, since it is only necessary to block
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a DC current when the switch is open.” Appeal Br. 10. According to
Appellant, “[t]his further confirms non-obviousness because the claims are
directed to an arrangement that was not only discouraged by the prior art but
which has benefits not appreciated by the prior art.” Id.
This argument too is not persuasive. “As long as some motivation or
suggestion to combine the references is provided by the prior art taken as a
whole, the law does not require that the references be combined for the
reasons contemplated by the inventor.” In re Beattie, 974 F.2d 1309, 1312
(Fed. Cir. 1992). Accordingly, “[i]n determining whether the subject matter
of a patent claim is obvious, neither the particular motivation nor the avowed
purpose of the patentee controls.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 419. Rather, “any need
or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and
addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in
the manner claimed.” Id. at 420. The Examiner’s articulated rationale for
combining the teachings of Hartikka and Sadwick is adequate, as it is drawn
directly from the Hartikka reference and the knowledge of one of ordinary
skill in the art. And, as discussed above, the claimed arrangement of the
safety switch, even if not the most advantageous, was not discouraged by
Hartikka.
We also note for emphasis that the purported advantage of Appellant’s
invention is not commensurate with the scope of claim 1. It appears that
Appellant is assuming that its LED circuit includes an element for
converting alternating current (AC) from the mains input to direct current
(DC), to be used by the LED lamp. According to Appellant’s Specification,
prior art switches arranged between the lamp terminals and the LED driver
“must be able to conduct an AC current when on, and to block an AC
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current when off, and their implementation is relatively complex and
expensive.” Spec. 3:11–12. But claim 1 is not so limiting—it does not
specify the use of AC, nor does it preclude the exclusive use of DC or
specify a difference between the input current and the LED current.
Accordingly, given its broadest reasonable interpretation, claim 1 could be
performed using only DC, which would negate Appellant’s purported
advantage, as only a DC current would need to be blocked regardless of the
safety’s switch’s position within the circuit. And, in fact, this is consistent
with Appellant’s admitted prior art, which suggests that DC may be used
exclusively in the lighting fixture instead of AC. See Spec. 3:9–11 (citing
WIPO International Publication No. WO 2013/150417 A1 (published Oct.
10, 2013, “Tao”)); Tao at 12:32–34 (“Furthermore, although the lamp
devices 1 includes rectifiers 9, 10 they may be omitted in case the lamp
device 1 is used in a lighting fixture providing a DC voltage.”).
High Frequency Signal
Claim 1 further recites “wherein the switch control circuit receives a
high-frequency signal from the dimming ballast.” The Examiner finds “[t]he
combination of Hartikka and Sadwick disclose[s] . . . [this] limitation[] since
Hartikka discloses the switching control circuit receiving high frequency
signals from a ballast and Sadwick discloses dimming ballasts.” Final 3
(Response to Arguments). In particular, the Examiner submits that Hartikka
discloses “the detection circuits 42 and 43 receive an input current/ voltage
from the ballast” and “high-frequency ballasts,” and that Sadwick discloses
“a switch control circuit configured to control the safety switch, wherein the
switch control circuit receives a signal from the dimming ballast.” Final 4
(citing Hartikka ¶¶ 4, 9, 24, 54), id. at 2 (citing Sadwick ¶ 19). The
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Examiner also submits that “[t]he signal disclosed by the ballast of Sadwick
would be high frequency since the ballast has ‘a high frequency diode
bridge.’” Ans. 7 (citing Sadwick ¶ 19).
Appellant argues that “Hartikka does not teach, show, or suggest, a
switch control that receives this high frequency signal,” but instead its
switch control detects only a heating voltage, which is a low voltage.
Appeal Br. 11. Appellant argues further that “Sadwick’s ‘high frequency
diode bridge’ does not provide a signal that is received by the switch control
circuit.” Id. at 12.
As an initial matter, Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive because
they attack Hartikka and Sadwick individually, whereas the Examiner relies
on the combined teachings of Hartikka and Sadwick for teaching or
suggesting the disputed limitation. Keller, 642 F.2d at 425. Moreover, for
the following reasons, we are not convinced the Examiner erred in finding
the combined teachings of Hartikka and Sadwick at least suggest a switch
control circuit that receives a high frequency signal from a dimming ballast.
First, consistent with the Examiner’s findings, Hartikka discloses
voltage detectors, each of which is connected to contact pins at one of the
ends of the LED tube and detects or measures a heating voltage, mains
voltage, or some other supply voltage between the pins. See, e.g., Hartikka
¶¶ 57, 61. Hartikka further discloses that the electronic ballast may supply a
high frequency voltage to the pins of the LED tube. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 4, 9, 54,
61, Claim 15. These disclosures at least suggest a switch control circuit that
receives a high-frequency signal from an electronic ballast. That Hartikka’s
voltage detectors may receive a low voltage signal is of no moment because
a low voltage signal does not necessarily correspond to and, thus, is not
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persuasive evidence of a non-high frequency. Second, the Examiner’s
findings also show that Sadwick teaches an LED fluorescent lamp
replacement device that works with a dimmer ballast such as DMX, DALI,
RS232, RS422, and RS485, and with a high frequency ballast connected to a
high frequency diode bridge. See, e.g., Sadwick ¶¶ 19, 101, 109–10, 112,
122. Third, we find the Examiner’s rationale to combine the cited teachings
of Hartikka and Sadwick—to “allow retrofitting with different systems and
better light control”—to be reasonable. See Final 4. And fourth, Appellant
does not present any persuasive evidence that combining the above
teachings of Hartikka and Sadwick would not have suggested the disputed
limitation, or that the combination would require more than a routine
exercise of combining familiar elements according to known methods or
applying known techniques to achieve predictable results. See KSR, 550
U.S. at 416–17 (explaining as examples of combinations likely to be obvious
“[t]he combination of familiar elements according to known methods . . .
when it does no more than yield predictable results” and “the mere
application of a known technique to a piece of prior art ready for the
improvement”).
We therefore sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of Claims 1–14.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of Claims 1–14 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).

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In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C.
§
Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–7, 9, 12–14 103 Hartikka,
Sadwick
1–7, 9, 12–14
8 103 Hartikka,
Sadwick,
Boora
8
10 103 Hartikka,
Sadwick,
Hausman
10
11 103 Hartikka,
Sadwick,
Sumitani
11
Overall
Outcome
1–14

AFFIRMED