Peter Stangel

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 26, 2019

14941503 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 26, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/941,503 11/13/2015 Peter Stangel 079731.010601 6744
145763 7590 07/26/2019
Kurtz Firm, PLLC
6361 Bordeaux Cir
Sanford, FL 32771
EXAMINER
RAPILLO, KRISTINE K
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3626
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/26/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
agoods@kurtzfirm.com
rkurtz@kurtzfirm.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte PETER STANGEL
____________

Appeal 2019-004480
Application 14/941,5031
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, CYNTHIA L. MURPHY, and
BRUCE T. WIEDER, Administrative Patent Judges.

WIEDER, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the
Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1–30. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is Dr. Peter Stangel.
(Appeal Br. 3.)
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant’s invention “relates in general to the field of medical
management systems.” (Spec. ¶ 3.)2
Claims 1, 19, 23, 28, and 30 are the independent claims on appeal.
Claim 1 is illustrative. It recites:
1. An electronic medical system comprising a machine, the
machine further comprising:
a) a data store including data representing a plurality of
clinical care plan findings groups associated with a
corresponding plurality of clinical care plans, each clinical care
plan findings group comprising a grouping of clinical findings as
a function of their response to interventions, each clinical care
plan findings group being clinical hierarchy formatted and each
clinical care plan comprising data representing a respective
plurality of medical interventions;
b) at least one biometric device for taking biometric
measurements from a specific patient and outputting biometric
outputs comprising data representing said biometric
measurements; and
c) a computer processor coupled to the data store and in
communication with said data representing said biometric
measurements and with data representing an electronic clinical
chart note having therein clinical findings for the specific patient,
a detailed clinical history of hospitalization for the patient,
surgeries that the patient has undergone, past illnesses of the
patient, and a review of the patient’s systems for additional
illnesses; the computer processor being programmed to:
determine that at least one reading from the
biometric device is needed to yield clinical details;
send a request to a user to take a biometric device
reading, said request including instructions as to how to
use the biometric device to take the biometric device
reading;

2 “Spec.” refers to the Substitute Specification filed February 2, 2016.
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receive said data representing said biometric
measurements and data representing said clinical findings;
perform natural language processing to analyze said
electronic clinical chart note to learn clinical terms;
use said clinical terms to organize said clinical
findings in the data representing the electronic clinical
chart note by clinical hierarchy to create clinical
hierarchy-formatted clinical findings data wherein each
finding comprises clinical parameter described by one or
more clinical findings belonging to a system belonging to
a clinical chart element, said organizing comprising
organizing the clinical findings into a clinical hierarchy by
nature of the clinical findings and their relationships to
body organ or organ systems;
group the clinical hierarchy-formatted clinical
findings data into a clinical status data set;
use said clinical status data set to search the data
store to identify at least one matching clinical care plan
findings group in the data representing a plurality of
clinical care plan findings groups;
transform said data representing said electronic
clinical chart note by adding a first plurality of medical
interventions in a first clinical care plan associated with
the matching clinical care plan findings group to the data
representing the electronic clinical chart note;
wherein said processor is further programmed to
cumulatively add medical interventions to clinical care
plans associated with matching clinical care plan findings
groups to further transform said electronic clinical chart
note over time so as to build a knowledge base that guides
patient care toward better outcomes by identifying
relationships between clinical care plan-findings groups,
clinical care plans, and the patient’s clinical findings.

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REJECTIONS
Claims 1–30 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a
judicial exception without significantly more.
Claims 1–7, 10–13, 19, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Carmeli (US 2013/0226612 A1, pub. Aug. 29, 2013),
Aghili (US 6,289,316 B1, iss. Sept. 11, 2001), Bharadwaj
(US 2009/0097623 A1, pub. Apr. 16, 2009), and Berdia (US 8,655,679 B2,
iss. Feb. 18, 2014).
Claims 8, 9, 14–18, 21, and 22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Carmeli, Aghili, Bharadwaj, Berdia, and Redlich
(US 8,468,244 B2, iss. June 18, 2013).
Claims 23–25 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Carmeli, Aghili, and Bharadwaj.
Claims 26 and 27 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Carmeli, Aghili, Bharadwaj, and Redlich.3
Claim 28 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Dail
(US 2013/0304507 A1, pub. Nov. 14, 2013) and Bharadwaj.
Claim 29 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Dail,
Bharadwaj, and Carmeli.
Claim 30 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Dail,
Bharadwaj, and Redlich.

3 In view of the discussion of claims 26 and 27 in the Final Action (see Final
Action 22–24), we treat the reference to claims 23–25 in the associated topic
heading (see id. at 22) as a typographical error.
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ANALYSIS
The § 101 rejection
Appellant does not separately argue the rejected claims. We select
claim 1 as representative. Claims 2–30 will stand or fall with claim 1. See
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. Section 101, however,
“‘contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.’” Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v.
CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quoting Assoc. for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)).
Alice applies a two-step framework, earlier set out in Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66
(2012), “for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible
applications of those concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217.
Under the two-step framework, it must first be determined if “the
claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept.” Id. at 218. If the
claims are determined to be directed to a patent-ineligible concept, e.g., an
abstract idea, then the second step of the framework is applied to determine
if “the elements of the claim . . . contain[] an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient
to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.”
Id. at 221 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73, 79).
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With regard to step one of the Alice framework, we apply a “directed
to” two prong test to: 1) evaluate whether the claim recites a judicial
exception, and 2) if the claim recites a judicial exception, evaluate whether
the claim “appl[ies], rel[ies] on, or use[s] the judicial exception in a manner
that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim
is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial
exception.” See USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 54 (Jan. 7, 2019) (hereinafter “2019 Guidance”).
Here, the Examiner determines that claim 1 is “directed to the abstract
idea of using medical artificial intelligent [sic] to determine healthcare
interventions with the goal of providing a better healthcare outcome.” (Final
Action 2.)
Appellant argues that claim 1 “is clearly not [directed to] a law of
nature or a natural phenomenon,” because “[t]he claim is directed to and
focused on non-abstract real-world physical devices and data sets.” (Appeal
Br. 24.) Appellant further argues that “[t]he claim further requires that the
recited machine be configured to perform the very non-abstract step of
transforming the data representing the electronic clinical chart note.” (Id.
(emphasis omitted).)
Under step one of the Alice framework, we “look at the ‘focus of the
claimed advance over the prior art’ to determine if the claim’s ‘character as a
whole’ is directed to excluded subject matter.” Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC
v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Elec.
Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
The “directed to” inquiry . . . cannot simply ask whether the
claims involve a patent-ineligible concept, because essentially
every routinely patent-eligible claim involving physical products
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and actions involves a law of nature and/or natural phenomenon
. . . . Rather, the “directed to” inquiry applies a stage-one filter
to claims, considered in light of the specification, based on
whether “their character as a whole is directed to excluded
subject matter.” Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc.,
790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In
other words, the first step of the Alice framework “asks whether the focus of
the claims is on the specific asserted improvement in [the relevant
technology] or, instead, on a process that qualifies as an ‘abstract idea’ for
which computers are invoked merely as a tool.” Id. at 1335–36; see also
2019 Guidance at 54–55. There is no requirement that the abstract idea be
recited in the claim ipsis verbis. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 218, 213 n.2.
The Specification provides evidence as to what the claimed invention
is directed. In this case, the Specification discloses that the invention
“relates in general to the field of medical management systems.” (Spec.
¶ 3.) Claim 1 provides further evidence. It recites “a data store,” “at least
one biometric device,” “a computer processor . . . being programed to:
determine that at least one reading from [a] biometric device is needed,”
“send a request to a user to take a biometric device reading,” “receive said
data,” “perform natural language processing,” “use said clinical terms to
organize said clinical findings in the data,” “group the clinical hierarchy-
formatted clinical findings data,” “use said clinical status data set to search
the data store to identify at least one matching clinical care plan findings
group,” “transform said data representing said electronic clinical chart note
by adding a first plurality of medical interventions in a first clinical care
plan,” and “cumulatively add medical interventions to clinical care plans
associated with matching clinical care plan findings groups.”
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In short, claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea of certain methods of
organizing human activity; in this case, managing personal behavior or
relationships or interactions between people (including teaching and
following rules or instructions), by obtaining data (from the biometric
device, clinical chart note, and data store), matching data, and
modifying/outputting data. See, e.g., Univ. of Florida Research Found., Inc.
v. General Elec. Co., 916 F.3d 1363, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“[T]he claims
are directed to the abstract idea of ‘collecting, analyzing, manipulating, and
displaying data.’”); see also Accenture Glob. Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire
Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“The abstract idea at
the heart of system claim 1 . . . is ‘generating tasks [based on] rules . . . to be
completed upon the occurrence of an event.’”). Thus, claim 1 recites an
abstract idea. (See 2019 Guidance.)
Although we and the Examiner describe, at different levels of
abstraction, to what the claims are directed, it is recognized that “[a]n
abstract idea can generally be described at different levels of abstraction.”
Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2016). That
need not and, in this case does not, “impact the patentability analysis.” See
id. at 1241.
Nor do we see how the recitation of a generic data store, biometric
device, and processor,4 even in conjunction with the recited functions,

4 “[T]he techniques may be carried out in a special purpose or general
purpose computer system or other data processing system in response to its
processor, such as a microprocessor, executing sequences of instructions
contained in a memory.” (Spec. ¶ 334; see also id. ¶ 339 (“[T]he techniques
are neither limited to any specific combination of hardware circuitry and
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“ensure[s] ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (brackets in original)
(quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77.)
Appellant argues that “the present claims are directed to an electronic
medical system that achieves other benefits over conventional medical
management systems, such as the ability to learn the clinical interventions
that produce better patient clinical outcomes and use them to create better
clinical care plans.” (Appeal Br. 31.) But, at best, this is an argument that
the asserted improvement is an improvement to the abstract idea. And “[n]o
matter how much of an advance in the . . . field the claims recite, the
advance lies entirely in the realm of abstract ideas, with no plausibly alleged
innovation in the non-abstract application realm.” SAP America, Inc. v.
InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Moreover, the limitations of claim 1 do not recite implementation
details. Claim 1 does “not claim a particular way of programming or
designing the software” to obtain data (from the biometric device, clinical
chart note, and data store), match data, and modify/output data, but instead
merely claims results that are to be achieved by any possible means. See
Apple, Inc., 842 F.3d at 1241.
Appellant seeks to analogize claim 1 to the claims in Finjan, Inc. v.
Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018). (Appeal Br. 22.)
Specifically, Appellant argues that “[i]n the present claims, as in those found
patent eligible in Finjan, specific limitations that overcome deficits in the

software nor to any particular source for the instructions executed by the
data processing system.”).)
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prior art are recited” and that “the presently claimed invention recites
specific steps to obtain a result, just as in Finjan.” (Id.)
We do not find this argument persuasive.5 The question in Finjan was
“whether [the claimed] behavior-based virus scan . . . constitutes an
improvement in computer functionality.” Finjan, Inc., 879 F.3d at 1304.
The court noted that “[i]n Enfish, for instance, the court determined that
claims related to database architecture that used a new, self-referential
logical table were non-abstract because they focused on ‘an improvement to
computer functionality itself, not on economic or other tasks for which a
computer is used in its ordinary capacity.’” Id. at 1304–05 (quoting Enfish,
LLC, 822 F.3d at 1336). Here, Appellant does not persuasively argue how
the claimed system improves computer functionality.
Appellant also seeks to analogize claim 1 to the claims in Data Engine
Technologies LLC v. Google LLC, 906 F.3d 999 (Fed. Cir. 2018) and Core
Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 880 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir.
2018). (Appeal Br. 22–23.) Specifically, Appellant argues that like the
claims in Data Engine, “[t]he present claims are . . . specific and patent-
eligible, and distinguishable from a broad abstract idea.” (Id. at 22.)
Appellant also argues that like the claims in Core Wireless, “[t]he present
claims are . . . directed to a particular manner of transforming data and are
patent-eligible.” (Id. at 23.)

5 We acknowledge that some of these considerations could instead be
evaluated under step two of the Alice framework. However, for purposes of
maintaining consistent treatment within the USPTO, we evaluate it under
step one. See 2019 Guidance.
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We do not find these arguments persuasive. “Representative claim 12
[in Data Engine] recites . . . [a] technical solution and improvement in
computer spreadsheet functionality.” Data Engine, 906 F.3d at 1008.
Similarly, the claims in Core Wireless claim “a specific manner of
displaying a limited set of information to the user, rather than using
conventional user interface methods.” Core Wireless, 880 F.3d at 1363.
Appellant does not persuasively argue how claim 1 improves
computer functionality or recites non-conventional user interface methods.
Rather, as noted above, Appellant argues that claim 1 is “directed to a
particular manner of transforming data.” (Appeal Br. 23.) This is simply
analyzing and modifying data, e.g., data representing the electronic clinical
chart note. But “even if a process of collecting and analyzing information is
‘limited to particular content’ or a particular ‘source,’” this, alone, “does not
make the collection and analysis other than abstract.” SAP America, 898
F.3d at 1168 (quoting Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353, 1355).
Appellant’s arguments rely on the ineligible concept itself to establish
that the claims recite an inventive concept. But “[i]t has been clear since
Alice that a claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it is
directed cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the invention
‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept.” BSG Tech LLC v.
BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018). The asserted
improvement is to methods of organizing human activity, rather than to an
improvement in, e.g., computer technology itself.
We do not find persuasive Appellant’s argument that “the present
claims are directed to an electronic medical system that achieves other
benefits over conventional medical management systems.” (Appeal Br. 31.)
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“Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself
satisfy the § 101 inquiry.” Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013).
We also do not find persuasive Appellant’s argument that “[t]he claim
is directed to and focused on non-abstract real-world physical devices and
data sets.” (Appeal Br. 24.) The recitation of generic computer components
does not change our analysis. Courts have “long ‘warn[ed] . . . against’
interpreting § 101 ‘in ways that make patent eligibility ‘depend simply on
the draftsman’s art.’” Alice, 573 U.S. 226 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72).
In view of the above, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 is
directed to an abstract idea.
Step two of the Alice framework has been described “as a search for
an ‘“inventive concept”’ –i.e., an element or combination of elements that is
‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more
than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. at 217–18 (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73).
Taking the claim elements separately, the functions performed by the
generic data store, biometric device, and processor are purely conventional.
Obtaining data, matching data, and modifying/outputting data are basic
computer functions, i.e., they are well-understood, routine, and conventional
functions previously known to the industry. See Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d
at 1356 (The claims “do not include any requirement for performing the
claimed functions of gathering, analyzing, and displaying in real time by use
of anything but entirely conventional, generic technology. The claims
therefore do not state an arguably inventive concept . . . .”); see also In re
Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed.
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Cir. 2011) (“Absent a possible narrower construction of the terms
‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ . . . those functions can be achieved
by any general purpose computer without special programming.”).
Considered as an ordered combination, the generic components of
Appellant’s system add nothing that is not already present when the
limitations are considered separately. For example, claim 1 does not, as
discussed above, purport to improve the functioning of the data store,
biometric device, or processor. Nor does it effect an improvement in any
other technology or technical field. Instead, claim 1 amounts to nothing
significantly more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using generic
computer components performing routine computer functions. That is not
enough to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. See
Alice, 573 U.S. at 225–26. Claims 2–30 are not separately argued. They fall
with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

The § 103 rejections
Claims 1–27
The Examiner finds that Carmeli teaches “each clinical care plan
findings group being clinical hierarchy formatted and each clinical care plan
comprising data representing a respective plurality of medical interventions
(paragraphs 44, 45, 48 and claim 6 where data is arranged in a hierarchical
structure of patient characteristics and decision point models).” (Final
Action 5.)
Appellant argues that “Carmeli fails even to disclose . . . each clinical
care plan findings group being clinical hierarchy formatted.” (Appeal
Br. 13.)
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As an initial matter, we construe the claim term “clinical hierarchy
formatted.” Claim 1 does not simply recite that certain data is hierarchically
formatted. Rather, claim 1 recites a specific type of format, i.e., a clinical
hierarchy format. We give claims their “broadest reasonable interpretation
consistent with the specification.” In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed.
Cir. 2000). Under this standard, “claim language should be read in light of
the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the
art.” In re Sneed, 710 F.2d 1544, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983). We are also
mindful that “[t]he general rule . . . is that the claims of a patent are not
limited to the preferred embodiment.” Karlin Tech., Inc. v. Surgical
Dynamics, Inc., 177 F.3d 968, 973 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Although claim 1 recites “said organizing comprising organizing the
clinical findings into a clinical hierarchy by nature of the clinical findings
and their relationships to body organ or organ systems,” it does not describe
the format of the clinical hierarchy. However, Appellant’s Specification,
under the topic heading of “DETAILED DESCRIPTION” (emphasis
omitted), does describe a clinical hierarchy format. Specifically, it discloses
that “M-AI’s [(Medical Artificial Intelligence)] Clinical Hierarchy is a non-
linear branching tree hierarchy and consists of 4 branching levels which,
from the top level to lowest level are: Clinical Element, Clinical System,
Clinical Parameter and Clinical Finding levels.” (Spec. ¶ 48; see also id.
¶ 9.)
In view of the above, we determine that the claim term “clinical
hierarchy formatted” includes data formatted in a non-linear branching tree
hierarchy consisting of 4 branching levels which, from the top level to
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lowest level are: Clinical Element, Clinical System, Clinical Parameter and
Clinical Finding levels. (See Spec. ¶ 48.)
In paragraph 44, Carmeli discloses that
the declarative data is arranged in a hierarchical structure of
patient dependent clinical characteristics, properties of patient
dependent clinical characteristics, and relations therebetween.
For example, the patient dependent clinical characteristic of
tumor size is categorized as a property of a tumor and
characterized by properties like aggressiveness and measurement
units.

(Carmeli ¶ 44.) In paragraph 45, Carmeli discloses that “[o]ptionally, the
KM [(knowledge management)] module 201 arranges the treatment options
in a declarative decision point model, optionally hierarchical, for example by
applying one or more ontologies, data learning rules and/or diffusion
processes.” (Id. ¶ 45.)
We do not see where, in the cited portions of Carmeli, there is a
disclosure of data in a clinical hierarchy format, as that term is properly
defined.
Therefore, we will reverse the rejections of claim 1 and claims 2–18
which depend from claim 1. Independent claims 19 and 23 contain similar
language and for similar reasons we will also reverse the rejections of claims
19 and 23, and dependent claims 20–22 and 24–27, which depend therefrom.

Claims 28–30
Claim 28 recites (bracketed matter added):
28. An electronic medical system comprising a machine, the
machine further comprising:
a) a data store including data representing a plurality of
sets of clinical data in narrative format;
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b) at least one biometric device for taking biometric
measurements from a specific patient and outputting biometric
outputs comprising data representing said biometric
measurements; and
c) a computer processor coupled to the data store and in
communication with said data representing said biometric
measurements and said data representing said clinical data in
narrative format, the computer processor being programmed to:
[d)] parse each of the plurality of sets of clinical data
in narrative format to identify and extract clinical terms
within the narrative format by using word indicators that
identify and enable transformation of data by placement of
said clinical terms into a four-level non-linear branching
tree clinical hierarchy.

The Examiner finds that Dail teaches limitation d) of claim 28.
Specifically, the Examiner finds that in
paragraphs 31 - 33, 46 and 53[,] . . . Dail discloses a narrative
template separated into an ordered hierarchy of components; Dail
fails to explicitly teach the claimed parsing the clinical data,
however, Dail discloses analyzing the clause pattern and
grouping into a hierarchy structure (see: paragraph 66). The
Examiner considers the analysis of the clause pattern to be
parsing of the clinical data[].

(Final Action 24.)
Appellant argues that
Dail fails to teach or suggest parsing each of a plurality of sets of
clinical data in narrative format to identify and extract clinical
terms within the narrative format by using word indicators that
identify and enable placement of the clinical terms into a four-
level non-linear branching tree clinical hierarchy.

(Appeal Br. 20.)
Dail discloses a user interface that
may include a narrative template 402 separated into an ordered
hierarchy of components, including, but not limited to (from
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highest to lowest in the hierarchy), paragraph templates 404,
sentence patterns 406, and clause patterns 410. The narrative
template 402 may include a further component, narrative parts
412, which are used to assemble the paragraph templates 404,
sentence patterns 406, and clause patterns 410 into the narrative.

(Dail ¶ 31 (emphasis added).) Dail also discloses that “[t]he narrative parts
412 may represent all possible pieces of narrative that may be composed into
a narrative regarding the patient measure. Each narrative part 412 may
include a snippet of text that will go into the narrative . . . . ” (Id. ¶ 32.)
“For each freeform-input element in the patient measure, a narrative part 412
may be included in the narrative template.” (Id.) Dail further discloses that
“after the narrative part selection rules have been used to select the narrative
parts that apply to the patient response data in block 210B, one or more
narrative combination rules may be applied to the selected parts in block
210C.” (Id. ¶ 53.) Additionally,
given the list of narrative parts returned in block 210C, each
narrative part’s paragraph template, sentence pattern, and
clause pattern is examined and grouped into a hierarchy
structure. In this hierarchy, paragraph groups form the root.
Each paragraph group includes an ordered list of all narrative
parts that belong to that paragraph, either a narrative part or
sentence group. Next in the hierarchy comes the sentence group,
which is an ordered list of narrative parts that all belong to the
same sentence (and implicitly in the same paragraph group)
selected from individual narrative parts and clause groups.
Following the sentence groups in the hierarchy are the clause
groups. Each clause group includes an ordered list of all
narrative parts that belong to the same clause (and implicitly in
the same sentence and paragraph).

(Id. ¶ 66 (emphasis added).)
Appellant does not persuasively argue why the Examiner erred in
finding that the disclosure in Dail of examining, i.e., analyzing, the clause
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pattern, and grouping into a hierarchy structure, is not a disclosure of parsing
clinical data. (See Final Action 24; see also Answer 9–10.) Nor does
Appellant persuasively argue why the Examiner erred in finding that the
disclosure in Dail of “a narrative template separated into an ordered
hierarchy of components” (Final Action 24), i.e., “separated into an ordered
hierarchy of components, including, but not limited to . . . , paragraph
templates 404, sentence patterns 406, and clause patterns 410” (Dail ¶ 31), is
not a disclosure that the parsing enables placement of the terms into a three
or more, e.g., four, level hierarchy.
Appellant also argues that
Dail further fails to teach or suggest a computer processor
coupled to a data store and in communication with data
representing biometric measurements and with data representing
an electronic clinical chart note, the computer processor being
programmed to determine that at least one reading from the
biometric device is needed to yield clinical details, send a request
to a user to take a biometric device reading, the request including
instructions as to how to use the biometric device to take the
biometric device reading, and to receive data representing the
biometric measurements and data representing the clinical
findings.

(Appeal Br. 20.)
Neither claim 28 nor claim 30 require a
computer processor being programmed to determine that at least
one reading from the biometric device is needed to yield clinical
details, send a request to a user to take a biometric device
reading, the request including instructions as to how to use the
biometric device to take the biometric device reading, and to
receive data representing the biometric measurements and data
representing the clinical findings.

Appeal 2019-004480
Application 14/941,503

19
(See id.; see also claims 28, 30.) Moreover, the Examiner relies on
Bharadwaj, not Dail, for teaching the recited biometric device. (See Final
Action 24–25.) Therefore, we do not find this argument persuasive of error.

DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–30 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is
affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–27 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 are
reversed.
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 28–30 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 are
affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED