Peter Nagurny, Complainant,v.John Ashcroft, Attorney General, Department of Justice, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJun 10, 2004
01A41463 (E.E.O.C. Jun. 10, 2004)

01A41463

06-10-2004

Peter Nagurny, Complainant, v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General, Department of Justice, Agency.


Peter Nagurny v. Department of Justice

01A41463

June 10, 2004

.

Peter Nagurny,

Complainant,

v.

John Ashcroft,

Attorney General,

Department of Justice,

Agency.

Appeal No.01A41463

Agency Nos. M-99-0065; M-01-0002

Hearing Nos. 150-A2-8187X; 150-A2-8188X

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final order

concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq. The appeal

is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the following reasons,

the Commission affirms the agency's final order.

The record reveals that complainant, the Chief Deputy at the U.S. Marshall

Service District of Kansas facility, filed a formal EEO complaint on

September 2, 1999 and an amendment to the complaint on October 10, 2000.

He alleged that the agency had discriminated against him on the basis

of his race (White) and sex (male) when (1) he was reassigned pending

an investigation by the Internal Affairs office into a sexual affair;

(2) he was ordered to relinquish his keys, and directed not to talk

to other employees; (3) allegations surrounding the sexual affair were

referred to Internal Affairs for an investigation; (4) complainant was

removed from a Supervisory Training class; and (5) complainant was not

considered for the position of Assistant Director, Prisoner Services

under Vacancy Announcement 98-SES-51.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy

of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC

Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ dismissed complainant's hearing

request as untimely filed and remanded the matter to the agency for a

final agency decision.<1>

The agency concluded that the decisions made by the Deputy Director

(S) and the Director, U.S. Marshall Service (S2) surrounding the

investigation of allegations of sexual harassment on the part of

complainant were not discriminatory. More specifically, the agency

found it was undisputed that complainant and a subordinate had a sexual

affair and that the subordinate reported the affair to complainant's

supervisor, S. The subordinate employee wrote a letter, stating that

she tried to end the affair but felt threatened by complainant and that

complainant might cause her and another female employee in whom she had

confided, physical harm. As a result, S recommended that complainant

be reassigned to another office, that complainant relinquish his keys to

the office, and that he not have contact with other potential witnesses.

S2 stated that complainant was reassigned because of the high level of

his position and because such high level managers were held to a higher

standard of conduct. S2 further determined that the matter should be

referred to the Office of Inspector General which in turn referred the

matter to Internal Affairs for investigation.

The agency concluded that with respect to the Supervisory Training,

complainant requested that his training request be rescinded and

that another employee be assigned to attend in his place. The agency

concluded that complainant was not singled out for different treatment

in these instances because of his gender or his race, but because of

his position in management and because the subordinate employee's

claims were substantiated by another employee who reported similar

safety concerns. In addition, such complaints are usually referred to

the Inspector General's office which then determines whether they should

be investigated by Internal Affairs.

Additionally, the agency concluded that complainant was not discriminated

against when his application was not referred for consideration for the

position of Assistant Director for Prisoner Transportation Services,

but because he was not rated as highly as the other applicants for

the position.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, complainant must

satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court

in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Complainant

must initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that he or

she was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances

that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction

Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will

vary depending on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas,

411 U.S. at 804 n. 14. The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department

of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately

prevail, complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,

that the agency's explanation is a pretext. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's Honor

Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Pavelka v. Department of the

Navy, EEOC Request No. 05950351 (December 14, 1995).

Applying these principles, the Commission concludes that complainant

failed to establish that any of the agency's reasons for taking the

actions in question were a pretext to hide discrimination. There was

no showing that the agency's decision to separate complainant from the

subordinate employee and a contract employee who had corroborated the

harassment claim, was based on his protected class and not because the

agency was carrying out its duties under its anti-harassment policy.

In addition, complainant failed to demonstrate that his qualifications

were demonstrably superior to those applicants referred for consideration

for the position of Assistant Director, Prisoner Transportation Services.

Consequently, complainant failed to establish by a preponderance of the

evidence that he was subjected to discrimination based on his gender

and his race.

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the agency's final order.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

June 10, 2004

__________________

Date

1The AJ also dismissed the amended complaint

for untimely counselor contact, but because the matter was consolidated

with the original complaint, she remanded the matter to the agency for

a final decision. Complainant did not appeal the AJ's decision regarding

his hearing request.