Peggy L. Pearson, Complainant,v.Michael Chertoff, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, (Federal Emergency Management Agency), Agency.<1>

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJul 13, 2005
01a41408 (E.E.O.C. Jul. 13, 2005)

01a41408

07-13-2005

Peggy L. Pearson, Complainant, v. Michael Chertoff, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, (Federal Emergency Management Agency), Agency.


Peggy L. Pearson v. Department of Homeland Security

01A41408

July 13, 2005

.

Peggy L. Pearson,

Complainant,

v.

Michael Chertoff,

Secretary,

Department of Homeland Security,

(Federal Emergency Management Agency),

Agency.<1>

Appeal No. 01A41408

Agency No. OSH-010-02

Hearing No. 120-2003-00177X

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final order

concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.

and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended,

29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �

1614.405.

During the relevant time, complainant was employed as an Administrative

Assistant, GS-06, at the agency's Office of Emergency Preparedness,

Office of Public Health and Science in Rockville, Maryland. On April 18,

2002, complainant filed a formal EEO complaint. Therein, complainant

claimed that she was discriminated against on the bases of race

(African-American), age (D.O.B. 6/10/51), and in reprisal for prior EEO

activity when:

(a) on January 18, 2002, she was again denied a career ladder promotion

to the GS-7 level;

(b) on January 18, 2002, she was denied a 2001 performance evaluation;

(c) on March 29, 2002, she learned that she was not approved for a

GSA training class;

(d) on April 8, 2002, she was told to sign a calendar year 2002

performance plan for a warehouse position consisting of duties of which

she had no knowledge;

(e) since September 2001, she has not been selected for three

Administrative Assistant positions:

(1) Vacancy Announcement Number OS-01-163 opened September 21, 2001

and closed October 11, 2001; (2) Vacancy Announcement No. OS-01-207,

opened December 3, 2001 and closed December 24, 2001; and (3) Vacancy

Announcement No. OS-02-060, opened March 21, 2002 and closed April

12, 2002;

(f) in July 2001, she was transferred to the OEP warehouse with lesser

duties and poor working conditions;

(g) from March 1, 2001 to February 5, 2002, the agency hired independent

contractors to perform administrative work instead of allowing

complainant's work skills to be utilized; and

(h) on June 6, 2002, she learned that she was not selected for the

position of Program Analyst, GS-343-7/9, under Vacancy Announcement

Number OS-02-081 in April 2002.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy

of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC

Administrative Judge (AJ). The agency thereafter filed a motion for

summary judgment or in the alternative, an Agency's Motion for a Decision

Without a Hearing.<2>

On September 5, 2003, the AJ granted the agency's Motion for a Decision

Without a Hearing. The AJ adopted and incorporated the agency's Motion,

finding no discrimination. The AJ further found that complainant

failed to establish a prima facie case of race, sex, age and reprisal

discrimination. The AJ also found that even if complainant established

a prima facie case of reprisal discrimination, the agency articulated

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. The AJ concluded

that complainant did not establish that more likely than not, management's

articulated reasons were a pretext to mask unlawful retaliation.

Further, the AJ noted that in her response to the agency's motion,

complainant made a reference to disability as a basis of discrimination

(depression; anxiety; knee pain; damage to biological clock; environmental

sensitivities; and a variety of other symptoms). The AJ further noted

that there was nothing in the record that indicated that the agency

accepted disability as a basis, or that complainant requested that

her complaint be amended to include disability as a basis. The AJ,

however, concluded that complainant failed to establish a prima facie

case of disability discrimination. Specifically, the AJ noted that

complainant does not provide any evidence that supports a finding that

she is substantially limited in a major life activity; that she did

not establish that the agency was aware of her having a disability; and

that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees

who are not members of her protected group.<3>

In a final order dated December 2, 2003., the agency implemented the

AJ's decision finding no discrimination.

The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a

hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material

fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the

summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment

is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive

legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists

no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,

a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine

whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of

the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and

all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.

Id. at 255. An issue of fact is �genuine� if the evidence is such that

a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323 (1986); Oliver v. Digital

Equipment Corporation, 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is

�material� if it has the potential to affect the outcome of a case.

If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, summary

judgment is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative

proceeding, an AJ may properly consider summary judgment only upon a

determination that the record has been adequately developed for summary

disposition.

A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis

first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). For complainant to prevail, he must first establish a prima

facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,

reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that

a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment

action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction

Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to

the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

its actions. See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,

450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency has met its burden, the

complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder

by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of

a prohibited reason. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502

(1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the

first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima

facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel

action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third

step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether

complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the

agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. See U.S. Postal

Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);

Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159

(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,

EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of

the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

Claim (a)

The record contains an affidavit from complainant's supervisor wherein

the Supervisor stated that on July 30, 2001, complainant asked him to

promote her to the GS-7 level. The Supervisor stated that he informed

complainant that he could not promote her because she had only been under

his supervision for two weeks. The Supervisor stated that he advised

complainant to see her previous supervisor because he could recommend

her for a promotion. With respect to complainant's argument that a

Director of the Division of Emergency Readiness and Operations told

her supervisor not to sign anything promoting her to the GS-7 level,

the Supervisor stated that the Director "did not tell me not to sign

anything promoting her."

The record also contains an affidavit from the Director of Administration

and Support (Director). Therein, the Director stated that two

supervisors asked for her advice on complainant's career ladder promotion.

Specifically, the Director stated that the two supervisors wanted to

know whether they had to promote an employee in a career ladder position

to the next level automatically. The Director stated that he informed

them that promotion was not automatic and that the employee needed to

be working at that grade level to receive a promotion. The Director

stated that a review of complainant's e-mails indicated poor writing.

The Director stated that while she does not supervise complainant, she

would not promote complainant to the GS-7 level "based on her work that

I have seen." Furthermore, the Director stated that complainant's race,

age, sex and prior protected activity were not part of her discussions

with the supervisors concerning the career ladder promotion.

Claim (b)

The Supervisor stated that he did not deny complainant's 2001 performance

evaluation. The Supervisor further stated that all employee 2001

performance evaluations were not timely completed, including complainant's

performance evaluation. The Supervisor stated that the reason for the

incomplete evaluations was "due to the work we do here as an emergency

response unit, we had a mission in New York World Trade Center that

we had been working on 12 hours a day - 7 days a week." Furthermore,

the Supervisor stated that on April 11, 2002, complainant received a

"Fully Successful" on her 2001 performance evaluation.

The Director stated "none of us got our performance evaluations on time."

The Director further stated that complainant was not singled out because

of her age, race, sex or prior protected activity when she did not

receive her 2001 performance evaluation on time.

Claim (c)

The Supervisor stated that after complainant showed him a training

booklet, he instructed complainant to fill out an application.

The Supervisor stated, however, that he never received complainant's

training requests. The Supervisor further stated that at one point,

he was informed by a named agency official that complainant requested to

go to training and needed a credit card (for purposes of paying for the

training). The Supervisor stated that he went to a named agency official

to get an application for a credit card in order to provide complainant

with training, and that she referred him to another agency official.

The Supervisor stated that he received complainant's application from

a named agency official and returned it to complainant. The Supervisor

stated "that is the last I heard of the applications. If she submitted an

application it never came through me." Furthermore, the Supervisor stated

that the Director of the Division of Emergency Readiness and Operations

never instructed him not to sign anything for complainant's training.

Claim (d)

The Supervisor stated that it was April 11, 2002, not April 8, 2002,

when complainant received and signed the 2002 performance plan.

The Supervisor further stated that he explained to complainant that �

these duties are regular administrative duties that she was doing at the

Twinbrook office." The Supervisor stated that he and complainant had a

discussion reflecting that complainant's duties would probably change

"because the Warehouse would probably be a little different but that

they would still be administrative duties." The Supervisor stated

that he revised complainant's work plan stating that "the duties on

her work-plan were the duties she had been assigned and that she had

been doing for the last 6 months, as the administrative technician at

the Warehouse." Furthermore, the Supervisor stated that complainant

did not sign something that she had no knowledge of because "she had

been doing all of these duties before."

Claim (e)

A fair reading of the record reflects that claims (e)(1) and (e)(3)

address the same position that was initially announced, and then

subsequently re-posted. Regarding claims (e)(1) and (e)(3), the Acting

Director stated that he had to fill the position, and re-advertised the

vacancy announcement two or three times because there were no applicants

on the list at the level that he required. The Acting Director further

stated that he was looking for someone "who was a very good writer and

for someone who had done this work before.� The Acting Director stated

that he chose the selectee for the subject position because she was more

qualified than the other candidates. The Acting Director stated that

"the basic difference between [Selectee] and the other applicants is

that she has been a secretary to high level positions in the past."

Furthermore, the Acting Director stated that complainant's race, sex,

age and prior protected activity were not factors in his determination

to select selectee for the subject position.

Regarding claim (e)(2), the record reflects that no one was selected

for the position of Administrative Assistant, Vacancy Announcement

No. OS-01-207.

Claim (f)

The Director stated that she was the Executive Officer responsible for

making sure that complainant's transfer to the warehouse took place.

The Director further stated that the Director of Office of Emergency

Preparedness (OEP Director) had complainant transferred to the warehouse.

Specifically, the Director stated that the OEP Director found that

complainant was to be transferred "because of National Security and when

she was notified of her proposal to remove her from service, she went

up and down this suite yelling profanities." The Director stated that

complainant was issued a Proposal to Remove for viewing and downloading

material of a sexual nature. The Director stated that as a result of

complainant's misconduct, the OEP Director "refused to bring her back into

this suite, but rather than continue on with the 'Proposal to Remove,'

she was given the option of going to the warehouse.� The Director stated

that complainant agreed to be transferred to the warehouse and signed

an agreement.

Further, the record reflects that on July 11, 2001, complainant signed an

Alternative Discipline Agreement in which she agreed in lieu of removal

from agency employment that she would not repeat the misconduct and be

transferred to the warehouse.

Claim (g)

The Director stated that while she was not responsible for making

decisions of hiring independent contractors, her division does the

paperwork to bring independent contractors on board. The Director stated

that " people from different divisions let us know that they have a need

for a temp and as I stated we process the paperwork." The Director stated

that no one made a request for complainant to do any administrative work.

The Director stated that she was not in a position to recommend or not

recommend complainant. The Director stated "I do not believe they would

have taken [Complainant] back because they felt she was not capable of

doing the job." Furthermore, the Director stated that she was told that

other employees would do their own administrative work because complainant

"made too many mistakes."

Claim (h)

The Recommending Official (RO) stated that she recommended the selectee

for the position of Program Analyst because she was the most qualified

candidate. RO further stated that the primary responsibility of the

subject position was to coordinate the National Disaster Medical System

(NDMS) annual conference. RO stated that the selectee provided support

to the conference for three consecutive years, and attended the conference

and participated in on-site management and coordination of the conference.

RO stated that the selectee was also detailed to her branch to work on

the NDMS conference from February 2002 through June 2002. RO stated

that during the detail, the selectee also "did the minutes, agendas and

developed materials for the monthly NDMS Directorate Staff meeting that is

chaired by the OER Director." RO stated that the selectee had "excellent

writing skills." RO stated that she did not recommend complainant for

the subject position because she did not have direct experience with

planning the NDMS conference or performing NDMS Branch duties. RO stated

that complainant was also a "poor writer." Furthermore, RO stated that

complainant's race, sex, age and prior protected activity were not factors

in her determination to recommend the selectee for the subject position.

As reflected above in our discussion of claims (a) - (h), the

Commission finds that there is sufficient evidence of record supporting a

determination that the agency articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for its actions. Moreover, complainant has not shown that the

agency's articulated reasons were a pretext for discrimination.

Accordingly, the agency's final order implementing the AJ's decision

finding no discrimination was proper and is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

July 13, 2005

__________________

Date

1The record reflects that on March 1, 2003, the Federal Emergency

Management Agency (FEMA) became part of the Department of Homeland

Security. The record further reflects that complainant, an employee of

the Operations Branch of the Department of Health and Human Services,

became a FEMA employee when the Operations Branch was transferred

to FEMA.

2The record does not contain the agency's Motion for a Decision Without

a Hearing.

3The Commission presumes for purposes of analysis only, and without so

finding, that complainant is an individual with a disability.