Peggy A. Wilmore, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 7, 2007
0120072829 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 7, 2007)

0120072829

09-07-2007

Peggy A. Wilmore, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Peggy A. Wilmore,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120072829

Hearing No. 530-2006-00165X

Agency No. 1A-079-0001-06

DECISION

On May 31, 2007, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's May 2,

2007 final action concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO)

complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. �

2000e et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the

agency's final action.

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant worked

as a Transfer Clerk, PS-06, at the agency's air mail facility at the

Newark International Airport in Newark, New Jersey. On January 26,

2006, complainant filed a formal EEO complaint wherein she claimed

that she was discriminated against on the bases of race (Black) and in

reprisal for prior protected EEO activity under Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 when she was not offered overtime on October 9, 16,

and 23, 2005.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a

copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request

a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely

requested a hearing and the AJ held a hearing on April 17, 2007, and

issued a decision on April 30, 2007. At the hearing, in addition to

the aforementioned bases, the AJ addressed the bases of sex (female) and

age (dob 9/10/47) discrimination. The AJ found that complainant was not

discriminated against on the alleged bases. The AJ found that complainant

failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under each of

the alleged bases. The AJ based his finding as to each basis except for

reprisal on the fact that complainant failed to identify a similarly

situated comparison outside her protected groups who was permitted to

work overtime on the dates at issue. According to the AJ, none of the

employees that worked for the Supervisor, Distribution Operations,

during the month of October 2005, worked overtime. With respect to

complainant's claim of reprisal, the AJ found that complainant failed

to establish that the Supervisor, Distribution Operations, had knowledge

of her prior EEO activity. The AJ further found that complainant failed

to establish that the Supervisor denied her overtime under the orders of

the Plant Manager in reprisal for her prior EEO activity. Additionally,

the AJ found that complainant failed to establish that there was a need

for overtime on the dates at issue.

The agency subsequently issued a final action implementing the AJ's

finding that complainant failed to prove that she was subjected to

discrimination as alleged. Thereafter, complainant filed the instant

appeal.

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by

an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Universal

Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)

(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory

intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,

456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a

de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held.

An AJ's credibility determination based on the demeanor of a witness or

on the tone of voice of a witness will be accepted unless documents or

other objective evidence so contradicts the testimony or the testimony so

lacks in credibility that a reasonable fact finder would not credit it.

See EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.B. (November 9, 1999).

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, complainant

must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme

Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). He

must generally establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that

he was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances

that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction

Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). The prima facie inquiry may be

dispensed with in this case, however, since the agency has articulated

legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct. See United

States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,

713-17 (1983); Holley v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request

No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997). To ultimately prevail, complainant must

prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's explanation

is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,

Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Center

v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Texas Department of Community

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); Holley v. Department of

Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997); Pavelka

v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05950351 (December 14, 1995).

We shall assume arguendo, that complainant has established a prima facie

case under the alleged bases. The agency stated that complainant was

not issued overtime on the dates at issue because there was sufficient

manpower to run the operation on those dates. According to the

Supervisor, none of the nine employees he supervised in October 2005,

worked overtime during that month. We find that the agency articulated

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not granting complainant

overtime.

Complainant attempted to show pretext by establishing that the Supervisor

performed some of her job duties on the dates at issue. Complainant

contended that other employees told her they had seen the Supervisor

performing her duties on her rest days. Complainant testified that the

Supervisor admitted to her that he had performed her duties on October 9,

2005. Complainant maintained that there was overtime available for other

employees, but not for her. We observe that the Supervisor testified

that he did not perform complainant's job duties on the dates at issue.

According to the Supervisor, he would perform complainant's duties only

in the event of an emergency and otherwise complainant's job duties on her

rest days would have been assigned to another craft employee. Upon review

of the record, we find no evidence that other employees received overtime

on the dates in question. Even if the Supervisor performed some of

complainant's duties on these days, that is not persuasive evidence that

discriminatory intent was involved. Further, complainant acknowledged

that she did not directly ask the Supervisor whether she could work

overtime on October 16 and 23, 2005. Upon review of the record,

the Commission finds that the AJ's decision finding no race, sex,

age or reprisal discrimination is supported by substantial evidence.

The Commission agrees with the AJ's finding that complainant failed to

establish by a preponderance of the evidence that her not being offered

overtime on the relevant dates was due to discriminatory motivation.

The agency's decision finding no discrimination is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous

interpretation of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact

on the policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your

time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil

action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph

above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

September 7, 2007

__________________

Date

3

2

01200728

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P. O. Box 19848

Washington, D.C. 20036

5

0120072829