Panshin, Stephen D. et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardJan 13, 202012994445 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jan. 13, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 12/994,445 11/23/2010 Stephen D. Panshin 82572482 3379 22879 7590 01/13/2020 HP Inc. 3390 E. Harmony Road Mail Stop 35 FORT COLLINS, CO 80528-9544 EXAMINER WORKU, NEGUSSIE ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2677 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 01/13/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): barbl@hp.com ipa.mail@hp.com yvonne.bailey@hp.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte STEPHEN D. PANSHIN, JACOB GRUNDTVIG REFSTRUP, and JEFFERSON P. WARD Appeal 2019-000937 Application 12/994,445 Technology Center 2600 Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, KRISTEN L. DROESCH, and JOYCE CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judges. CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–3, 5–11, 13–15, 21, 23, and 24.2 See Non-Final Act. 1. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Hewlett-Packard Development Company, LP. Appeal Br. 2. 2 Claims 4, 12, 16–20, and 22 were canceled previously. Appeal Br. 4. Appeal 2019-000937 Application 12/994,445 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The claims are directed to a replaceable printer component including memory that stores data defined by tags and sub-tags. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A memory device to store data for a replaceable printing device component comprising: a non-volatile memory divided into a plurality of portions for storing data, each portion defined by a tag stored in the memory, wherein, within a first portion of the memory defined by a first tag, data is stored in a plurality of sub-portions of the first portion, each sub-portion defined by a sub-tag stored in the memory; and an interface to provide communication between the memory device and a printing device controller when the memory device is installed in a printing system; wherein each sub-tag indicates a type of the data and a length of the data stored in the sub-portion defined by the sub-tag: and wherein at least one sub-tag includes data indicating an unused sub-portion. REJECTIONS Claims 1–3, 5–7, 9, 10, 14, 15, and 21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combination of Helterline et al. (US 6,264,301 B1; issued July 24, 2001) (“Helterline”) and Bergantino et al. (US 6,128,303; issued Oct. 3, 2000) (“Bergantino”). Final Act. 6–11.3 Claims 8, 11, 13, 23, and 24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Helterline. Final Act. 11–13. 3 The Examiner’s rejection headings do not agree with the actual claims rejected thereunder. See Final Act. 6, 11. We have made appropriate corrections above. Appeal 2019-000937 Application 12/994,445 3 ANALYSIS We disagree with Appellant’s contentions regarding the Examiner’s rejections of the claims. We adopt as our own: (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken, and (2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Answer in response to arguments made in Appellant’s Appeal Brief. We highlight and address specific findings and arguments below. Regarding claim 1, Appellant contends that the cited references do not teach or suggest the limitation “each sub-tag indicates a type of the data and a length of the data stored in the sub-portion defined by the sub-tag.” Appeal Br. 9. Appellant also argues that the Specification defines a “tag” as an element that “identifies a predefined number and order of data fields following the tag and the predefined length and meaning of each of the data fields.” Id. at 9–10 (citing Spec. ¶ 20). In response, the Examiner explained that “TAG_ID-A” in Figure 2 of Appellant’s application corresponds to a first tag stored in memory and any of the values (such as VALUE_A1, VALUE_A2) correspond to “a plurality of sub-portions of the first portion, each sub-portion defined by a sub-tag stored in the memory,” as recited in claim 1. Ans. 5. The Examiner further explained that Figure 7 of Helterline is the same figure as Applicant’s Figure 2, but with different tag names. Thus, we understand the Examiner’s mapping as reading the “first tag” of claim 1 on TAG ID1 of Helterline Figure 7, and reading the “sub-tag[(s)]” on VALUE 1 and VALUE 2. Id. We are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s factual findings. The Examiner has shown that Helterline discloses the recited “memory” and “portions” of the memory, and that each portion of memory is defined by a Appeal 2019-000937 Application 12/994,445 4 tag that is stored in the memory. Non-Final Act. 6–7 (citing Helterline Fig. 4, col 4:33–36). The Examiner interprets the claim term “sub-tag” as encompassing VALUE 1 and VALUE 2 of Figure 7 of Helterline. Ans. 3. Appellant has not persuasively shown this interpretation is overly broad, unreasonable, or inconsistent with the Specification. Appellant’s reliance on paragraph 20 of the Specification as defining the term “tag” does not alter our conclusion. See Helmsderfer v. Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc., 527 F.3d 1379, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“A patentee may act as its own lexicographer and assign to a term a unique definition that is different from its ordinary and customary meaning; however, a patentee must clearly express that intent in the written description.”). Absent an express intent to impart a novel meaning to a claim term, the words take on the ordinary and customary meanings attributed to them by those of ordinary skill in the art. Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 334 F.3d 1294, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Here, the sentence of paragraph 20 cited by Appellant describes the purpose of each tag in one embodiment of Appellant’s invention. The plain language of claim 1 does not recite or require that the recited “tag” identify a predefined number and order of data fields following the tag and the predefined length and meaning of each of the data fields, as Appellant argues. Thus, Appellant has not persuasively rebutted the Examiner’s factual findings regarding the term “tag,” as recited in claim 1. Appellant’s remaining arguments rely on distinguishing a sub-tag from a data value stored in memory, but we do not find such distinction persuasive. The informational content of the data stored in the memory of claim 1, and the particular arrangement of the data among the recited “first Appeal 2019-000937 Application 12/994,445 5 portion” and “plurality of sub-portions” (as defined by the recited “first tag” and “sub-tag[(s)]” respectively), are not positively recited as actually used to change or affect any function(s) performed by the “memory,” “memory device,” or “printing device component.”4 The data contained in the non-volatile memory is not positively recited as actually being read, transferred, or otherwise communicated to the “printing device component” to perform, change, or affect any “memory device” or “printing device component” function, within the scope of claim 1, under a broad but reasonable interpretation.5,6 Therefore, the claimed arrangement and informational content of the data to be stored in the “memory" does not distinguish the “memory device” of claim 1 from the prior art component that is the same except for the contents of the data stored in memory. The PTAB has provided guidance in decisions on the appropriate handling of claims that differ from the prior art only based on “non- 4 We explained this in our decision in an earlier appeal (2014-007614) involving Appellant’s application. Appellant’s subsequent amendment(s) to claim 1 do not alter our analysis in this regard. 5 The recited “replaceable printing device component” is completely outside the scope of the recited “memory device” of claim 1; therefore, the storage of data in the “memory device” for the “replaceable printing device component” appears to be merely an intended use of the claimed “memory device.” “An intended use or purpose usually will not limit the scope of the claim because such statements usually do no more than define a context in which the invention operates.”' Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 320 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 6 Because “applicants may amend claims to narrow their scope, a broad construction during prosecution creates no unfairness to the applicant or patentee.” In re ICON Health and Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Appeal 2019-000937 Application 12/994,445 6 functional descriptive material [(NFDM)].” See Ex parte Nehls, 88 USPQ2d 1883, 1889 (BPAI 2008) (precedential) (“[T]he nature of the information being manipulated does not lend patentability to an otherwise unpatentable computer-implemented product or process.”). See also MPEP § 2111.05 (9th ed., Mar. 2014).7 For these reasons, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in finding that the combination of Helterline and Bergantino teaches or suggests the disputed limitations of claim 1. Accordingly, we sustain the 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of independent claim 1, as well as the 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of independent claim 9, not argued separately with particularity. See Appeal Br. 12. We also sustain the Examiner’s § 103(a) rejection(s) of dependent claims 2, 3, 5–8, 10, 11, 13–15, 21, 23, and 24, not argued separately. Appeal Br. 11–12, 13. CONCLUSION We affirm the decision of the Examiner rejecting claims 1–3, 5–11, 13–15, 21, 23, and 24. 7 In our analysis herein, we consider the extrinsic MPEP descriptions regarding NFDM as underlying subsidiary facts that inform our claim construction for all claims before us on appeal. Appeal 2019-000937 Application 12/994,445 7 DECISION SUMMARY Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–3, 5–7, 9, 10, 14, 15, 21 103(a) Helterline, Bergantino 1–3, 5–7, 9, 10, 14, 15, 21 8, 11, 13, 23, 24 103(a) Helterline 8, 11, 13, 23, 24 Overall Outcome: 1–3, 5–11, 13–15, 21, 23, 24 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). 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