PALO ALTO RESEARCH CENTER INCORPORATEDDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardAug 11, 202013774873 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 11, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/774,873 02/22/2013 Ying Zhang PARC-20120526-US-NP 4996 35699 7590 08/11/2020 PVF -- PARC c/o PARK, VAUGHAN, FLEMING & DOWLER LLP 2820 FIFTH STREET DAVIS, CA 95618-7759 EXAMINER SANTOS-DIAZ, MARIA C ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3689 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/11/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): jenny@parklegal.com sy_incoming@parklegal.com tia@parklegal.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte YING ZHANG, JUAN J. LIU, and HODA M. A. ELDARDIRY ____________ Appeal 2019-001527 Application 13/774,873 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before ANTON W. FETTING, MICHAEL C. ASTORINO, and AMEE A. SHAH, Administrative Patent Judges. FETTING, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 Ying Zhang, Juan J. Liu, and Hoda M. A. Eldardiry (Appellant2) seeks review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of a final rejection of claims 1–7 and 1 Our decision will make reference to the Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed March 26, 2018) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed December 3, 2018), and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed October 1, 2018), and Final Action (“Final Act.,” mailed October 31, 2017). Appeal 2019-001527 Application 13/774,873 2 11–24, the only claims pending in the application on appeal. We have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). The Appellant invented a way of generating fraud-detection score that is weighed based on an inverse frequency for the fraud type. Specification para. 1. An understanding of the invention can be derived from a reading of exemplary claim 1, which is reproduced below (bracketed matter and some paragraphing added). 1. A computer-implemented method for detecting fraudulent entities, comprising: [1] generating, by an organizational server associated with an organization, a first fraud warning based on a first transaction associated with the organization; [2] obtaining, by a fraud-detection server, a plurality of fraud warnings including the first fraud warning, across a population of entities, and for a plurality of fraud types, wherein a respective entity specifies a person or an organization, and wherein a respective fraud warning is based on a respective transaction, which is associated with a respective fraud type; [3] computing, by the fraud-detection server, for a first fraud type, a fraud weight based on a number of entities having transactions in the plurality of fraud warnings associated with the first fraud type across the population of entities, wherein the fraud weight increases with decreasing number of entities across the population of entities 2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Palo Alto Research Center Incorporated (Appeal Br. 4). Appeal 2019-001527 Application 13/774,873 3 having fraud warnings associated with the first fraud type; [4] computing, for a respective entity, a fraud-detection score based on a number or cost of fraudulent transactions from the respective entity associated with the first fraud type and based on the computed fraud weight; and [5] in response to the respective entity's computed fraud- detection score not fitting within a normal decay pattern of scores among the population of entities, labeling the respective entity as anomalous and generating a fraudulent entity report for the respective entity, wherein the report instructs an investigating organization to investigate the respective entity Claims 1–7 and 11–24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. ISSUES The issues of eligible subject matter turn primarily on whether the claims recite more than abstract conceptual advice of results desired. Appeal 2019-001527 Application 13/774,873 4 ANALYSIS STEP 13 Claim 1, as a method claim, nominally recites one of the enumerated categories of eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101. The issue before us is whether it is directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. STEP 2 The Supreme Court set forth a framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts. First, . . . determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts. If so, we then ask, “[w]hat else is there in the claims before us? To answer that question, . . . consider the elements of each claim both individually and “as an ordered combination” to determine whether the additional elements “transform the nature of the claim” into a patent- eligible application. [The Court] described step two of this analysis as a search for an “‘inventive concept’”—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is “sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.” Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–18 (2014) (citations omitted) (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012)). To perform this test, we must first determine what the claims are directed to. This begins by determining whether the claims recite one of the judicial exceptions (a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea). Then, if the claims recite a judicial exception, determining 3 For continuity of analysis, we adopt the steps nomenclature from 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Revised Guidance”). Appeal 2019-001527 Application 13/774,873 5 whether the claims at issue are directed to the recited judicial exception, or whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception, i.e., that the claims “apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. If the claims are directed to a judicial exception, then finally determining whether the claims provide an inventive concept because the additional elements recited in the claims provide significantly more than the recited judicial exception. STEP 2A Prong 1 At a high level, and for our preliminary analysis, we note that method claim 1 recites generating and obtaining fraud warning data, computing fraud weight data and fraud detection score data, and in response to the score meeting criteria, labeling data and generating report data. Obtaining data is data reception. Computing data is mathematical algorithmic analysis. Determining each of a response and whether data meet criteria are data analysis. Thus, claim 1 recites generating, receiving, and analyzing data. None of the limitations recite technological implementation details for any of these steps, but instead recite only results desired by any and all possible means. From this we see that claim 1 does not recite the judicial exceptions of either natural phenomena or laws of nature. Under Supreme Court precedent, claims directed purely to an abstract idea are patent in-eligible. As set forth in the Revised Guidance, which extracts and synthesizes key concepts identified by the courts, abstract ideas Appeal 2019-001527 Application 13/774,873 6 include (1) mathematical concepts4, (2) certain methods of organizing human activity5, and (3) mental processes6. Among those certain methods of organizing human activity listed in the Revised Guidance are commercial or legal interactions. Like those concepts, claim 1 recites the concept of managing response to commercial fraud. Specifically, claim 1 recites operations that would ordinarily take place in advising one to report entities having anomalous scores based on fraudulent transactions flagged by fraud warnings. The advice to report entities having anomalous scores based on fraudulent transactions flagged by fraud warnings involves detecting fraudulent entities, which is an economic act, and obtaining fraud warnings, which is an act ordinarily performed in the stream of commerce. For example, claim 1 recites “detecting fraudulent entities,” which is an activity that would take place whenever one is protecting against commercial fraud. Similarly, claim 1 recites “obtaining . . . a plurality of fraud warnings,” which is also characteristic of commercial fraud prevention. 4 See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010); Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939); SAP America, Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 5 See, e.g., Bilski, 561 U.S. at 628; Alice, 573 U.S. at 219-20; Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed Cir. 2014); Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2017); In re Marco Guldenaar Holding B.V., 911 F.3d 1157, 1160–61 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 6 See, e.g., Benson, 409 U.S. at 67; CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Appeal 2019-001527 Application 13/774,873 7 The Examiner determines the claims to be directed to calculating a fraud detection score and reporting an abnormal or anomalous entity based on the calculated fraud detection score. Final Act. 3. The preamble to claim 1 recites that it is a method for detecting fraudulent entities. The steps in claim 1 result in managing response to commercial fraud by reporting entities having anomalous scores based on fraudulent transactions flagged by fraud warnings absent any technological mechanism other than a conventional computer for doing so. As to the specific limitations, limitations 1–5 recite generic and conventional generating, receiving, and analyzing of commercial transaction data, which advise one to apply generic functions to get to these results. The limitations thus recite advice for reporting entities having anomalous scores based on fraudulent transactions flagged by fraud warnings. To advocate reporting entities having anomalous scores based on fraudulent transactions flagged by fraud warnings is conceptual advice for results desired and not technological operations. The Specification at paragraph 1 describes the invention as relating to generating a fraud-detection score that is weighted7 based on an inverse frequency for the fraud type. Thus, all this intrinsic evidence shows that claim 1 recites managing response to commercial fraud. This is consistent with the Examiner’s determination. This in turn is an example of commercial or legal interactions as a certain method of organizing human activity because managing response to 7 The Specification uses the word “weighed,” but this is an obvious typographic error as the remainder of the Specification uses words with “weight” as the root and “weighted” is more semantically correct in this context. Appeal 2019-001527 Application 13/774,873 8 commercial fraud is how commercial interactions protect against improper transactions. The concept of managing response to commercial fraud by reporting entities having anomalous scores based on fraudulent transactions flagged by fraud warnings is one idea for such management. The steps recited in claim 1 are part of how this might conceptually be premised. Our reviewing court has found claims to be directed to abstract ideas when they recited similar subject matter. FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (detecting fraud and analyzing records of human activity to detect suspicious behavior); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (tracking financial transactions); Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333–34 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (processing financial transactions through a clearing house); Content Extraction and Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (2014) (recognizing data within a collection); CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375 (claims linked only to a general purpose computer of detecting fraud based on past transactions). Alternately, this is an example of concepts performed in the human mind as mental processes because the steps of generating, receiving, and analyzing data mimic human thought processes of observation, evaluation, judgment, and opinion, perhaps with paper and pencil, where the data interpretation is perceptible only in the human mind. See In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016); FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1093–94. Claim 1, unlike the claims found non- abstract in prior cases, uses generic computer technology to generate a fraud-detection score that is weighted based on an inverse frequency for the fraud type and does not recite an improvement to a particular computer Appeal 2019-001527 Application 13/774,873 9 technology. See, e.g., McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314–15 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding claims not abstract because they “focused on a specific asserted improvement in computer animation”). As such, claim 1 recites generating, receiving, and analyzing data, and not a technological implementation or application of that idea. From this we conclude that at least to this degree, claim 1 recites managing responses to commercial fraud by reporting entities having anomalous scores based on fraudulent transactions flagged by fraud warnings, which is a commercial and legal interaction, one of certain methods of organizing human activity identified in the Revised Guidance, and, thus, an abstract idea. STEP 2A Prong 2 The next issue is whether claim 1 not only recites, but is more precisely directed to this concept itself or whether it is instead directed to some technological implementation or application of, or improvement to, this concept i.e. integrated into a practical application.8 At the same time, we tread carefully in construing this exclusionary principle lest it swallow all of patent law. At some level, “all inventions ... embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.” Thus, an invention is not rendered ineligible for patent simply because it involves an abstract concept. “[A]pplication[s]” of such concepts “ ‘to a new and useful end,’ ” we have said, remain eligible for patent protection. Accordingly, in applying the § 101 exception, we must distinguish between patents that claim the “ ‘buildin[g] block[s]’ ” of human ingenuity and those that integrate the building blocks into something more. 8 See, e.g., Alice, 573 U.S. at 223, discussing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). Appeal 2019-001527 Application 13/774,873 10 Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (citations omitted). Taking the claim elements separately, the operation performed by the computer at each step of the process is expressed purely in terms of results, devoid of implementation details. Steps 1 and 2 are data gathering steps. Limitations describing the nature of the data do not alter this. Step 5 is insignificant post solution activity, such as storing, transmitting, or displaying the results. Steps 3 and 4 recite generic computer processing expressed in terms of mathematical algorithm results desired by any and all possible means and so present no more than conceptual advice and abstract mathematical algorithms. All purported inventive aspects reside in how the data is interpreted and the results desired, and not in how the process physically enforces such a data interpretation or in how the processing technologically achieves those results. Viewed as a whole, Appellant’s claim 1 simply recites the concept of managing response to commercial fraud by reporting entities having anomalous scores based on fraudulent transactions flagged by fraud warnings as performed by a generic computer. This is no more than conceptual advice on the parameters for this concept and the generic computer processes necessary to process those parameters, and do not recite any particular implementation. Claim 1 does not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself. Nor does it effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field. The 17+ pages of specification do not bulge Appeal 2019-001527 Application 13/774,873 11 with disclosure, but only spell out different generic equipment9 and parameters that might be applied using this concept and the particular steps such conventional processing would entail based on the concept of managing response to commercial fraud by reporting entities having anomalous scores based on fraudulent transactions flagged by fraud warnings under different scenarios. They do not describe any particular improvement in the manner a computer functions. Instead, claim 1 at issue amounts to nothing significantly more than an instruction to apply managing response to commercial fraud by reporting entities having anomalous scores based on fraudulent transactions flagged by fraud warnings using some unspecified, generic computer. Under our precedents, that is not enough to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 225–26. None of the limitations reflect an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to other technology or technical field, applies or uses a judicial exception to effect a particular treatment or prophylaxis for a disease or medical condition, implements a judicial exception with, or uses a judicial exception in conjunction with, a particular machine or manufacture that is integral to the claim, effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing, or applies or uses the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. 9 The Specification describes using a computer with a processor, memory, and a storage device. Spec. para. 52. Appeal 2019-001527 Application 13/774,873 12 We conclude that claim 1 is directed to achieving the result of managing response to commercial fraud by advising one to report entities having anomalous scores based on fraudulent transactions flagged by fraud warnings, as distinguished from a technological improvement for achieving or applying that result. This amounts to commercial or legal interactions, which fall within certain methods of organizing human activity that constitute abstract ideas. The claim does not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. STEP 2B The next issue is whether claim 1 provides an inventive concept because the additional elements recited in the claim provide significantly more than the recited judicial exception. The introduction of a computer into the claims does not generally alter the analysis at Mayo step two. the mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Stating an abstract idea “while adding the words ‘apply it’” is not enough for patent eligibility. Nor is limiting the use of an abstract idea “‘to a particular technological environment.’” Stating an abstract idea while adding the words “apply it with a computer” simply combines those two steps, with the same deficient result. Thus, if a patent’s recitation of a computer amounts to a mere instruction to “implement[t]” an abstract idea “on . . . a computer,” that addition cannot impart patent eligibility. This conclusion accords with the preemption concern that undergirds our § 101 jurisprudence. Given the ubiquity of computers, wholly generic computer implementation is not generally the sort of “additional feature[e]” that provides any “practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.” Appeal 2019-001527 Application 13/774,873 13 Alice, 573 U.S. at 223–24 (citations omitted). “[T]he relevant question is whether the claims here do more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea [] on a generic computer.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225. They do not. Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the computer at each step of the process is purely conventional. Using a computer for generating, receiving, and analyzing data amounts to electronic data query and retrieval—one of the most basic functions of a computer. All of these computer functions are generic, routine, conventional computer activities that are performed only for their conventional uses. See Elec. Power Grp. LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See also In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Absent a possible narrower construction of the terms ‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ . . . those functions can be achieved by any general purpose computer without special programming”). None of these activities is used in some unconventional manner nor does any produce some unexpected result. Appellant does not contend it invented any of these activities. In short, each step does no more than require a generic computer to perform generic computer functions. As to the data operated upon, “even if a process of collecting and analyzing information is ‘limited to particular content’ or a particular ‘source,’ that limitation does not make the collection and analysis other than abstract.” SAP America, 898 F.3d at 1168. Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of Appellant’s claim 1 add nothing that is not already present when the steps are considered separately. The sequence of data generation-reception- analysis is equally generic and conventional. See Ultramercial, 772 F.3d Appeal 2019-001527 Application 13/774,873 14 at 715 (sequence of receiving, selecting, offering for exchange, display, allowing access, and receiving payment recited an abstraction), Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (sequence of data retrieval, analysis, modification, generation, display, and transmission), Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Communications, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (sequence of processing, routing, controlling, and monitoring). The ordering of the steps is therefore ordinary and conventional. We conclude that claim 1 does not provide an inventive concept because the additional elements recited in the claim do not provide significantly more than the recited judicial exception. REMAINING CLAIMS Claim 1 is representative. The remaining method claims merely describe process parameters. We conclude that the method claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept itself, and not to the practical application of that concept. As to the structural claims, they are no different from the method claims in substance. The method claims recite the abstract idea implemented on a generic computer; the system claims recite a handful of generic computer components configured to implement the same idea. This Court has long “warn[ed] ... against” interpreting § 101“in ways that make patent eligibility ‘depend simply on the draftsman’s art.’ Alice, 573 U.S. at 226. As a corollary, the claims are not directed to any particular machine. Appeal 2019-001527 Application 13/774,873 15 LEGAL CONCLUSION From these determinations we further determine that the claims do not recite an improvement to the functioning of the computer itself or to any other technology or technical field, a particular machine, a particular transformation, or other meaningful limitations. From this we conclude the claims are directed to the judicial exception of the abstract idea of certain methods of organizing human activity as exemplified by the commercial and legal interaction of managing response to commercial fraud by advising one to report entities having anomalous scores based on fraudulent transactions flagged by fraud warnings, without significantly more. APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS As to Appellant’s Appeal Brief arguments, we adopt the Examiner’s determinations and analysis from Final Action 2–7 and Answer 3–12 and reach similar legal conclusions. We now turn to the Reply Brief. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the claims are analogous to those in Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Reply Br. 9–11. The claims differ from those found patent eligible in Enfish, where the claims were “specifically directed to a self- referential table for a computer database.” 822 F.3d 1327, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The claims thus were “directed to a specific improvement to the way computers operate” rather than an abstract idea implemented on a computer. Id. at 1336. Here, by contrast, the claims are not directed to an improvement in the way computers operate. Though the claims purport to accelerate and improve the accuracy of the process of fraud detection, our reviewing court has held that speed and accuracy increases stemming from the ordinary capabilities of a general purpose computer Appeal 2019-001527 Application 13/774,873 16 “do[] not materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter.” Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Instead, the claims are more analogous to those in FairWarning, supra, wherein claims reciting “a few possible rules to analyze audit log data” were found directed an abstract idea because they asked “the same questions (though perhaps phrased with different words) that humans in analogous situations detecting fraud have asked for decades.” 839 F.3d at 1094, 1095. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the claims use electronic rather than paper and pencil data. Reply Br. 9. This simply argues context, which cannot confer eligibility. “The Supreme Court and this court have repeatedly made clear that merely limiting the field of use of the abstract idea to a particular existing technological environment does not render the claims any less abstract.” Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. DirecTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Appellant also attempts to analogize the claims to those involved in McRO. Reply Br. 12–13. In McRO, the court held that, although the processes were previously performed by humans, “the traditional process and newly claimed method . . . produced . . . results in fundamentally different ways.” FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1094 (differentiating the claims at issue from those in McRO). In McRO, “it was the incorporation of the claimed rules not the use of the computer, that improved the existing technology process,” because the prior process performed by humans “was driven by subjective determinations rather than specific, limited mathematical rules.” 837 F.3d at 1314 (internal quotation marks, citation, and alterations omitted). In contrast, the claims of the instant Appeal 2019-001527 Application 13/774,873 17 application merely implement an old practice of using decision criteria in making fraud detection decisions in a new environment. Appellant has not argued that the claimed processes of selecting transactions apply rules of selection in a manner technologically different from those which humans used, albeit with less efficiency, before the invention was claimed. Merely pigeon holing the objects of decision making in tiers to aid decision making is both old and itself abstract. The claims in McRO were not directed to an abstract idea, but instead were directed to “a specific asserted improvement in computer animation, i.e., the automatic use of rules of a particular type.” We explained that “the claimed improvement [was] allowing computers to produce ‘accurate and realistic lip synchronization and facial expressions in animated characters’ that previously could only be produced by human animators.” The claimed rules in McRO transformed a traditionally subjective process performed by human artists into a mathematically automated process executed on computers. FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1094 (differentiating the claims at issue from those in McRO). We are not persuaded by Appellant's argument that “[n]ot only does the report instruct an investigating entity to investigate the respective entity, but the report is only generated as a result of the significant, concrete, and tangible steps of the instant claims.” Reply Br. 14. Instructing someone is basic human communication, among the most abstract of operations. The content of the instruction is non-functional information, and so no more than conceptual ideas. The purported “significant, concrete, and tangible steps of the instant claims” are data generation, reception, and analysis. These operations are determined to be conventional and generic operations of any conventional computer under Step 2B supra. Appeal 2019-001527 Application 13/774,873 18 We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the claims contain an inventive concept that is also found in the specific ordered combination of the limitations, similar to the Federal Circuit's findings in BASCOM (BASCOM Global Internet v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Reply Br. 14. Initially, we remind Appellant that BASCOM did not find claims eligible on the substance, but rather that the Appellees did not provide sufficient evidence to support a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss in which facts are presumed in the non-movant’s favor. The key fact in BASCOM was the presence of a structural change in “installation of a filtering tool at a specific location, remote from the end- users, with customizable filtering features specific to each end user. This design gives the filtering tool both the benefits of a filter on a local computer and the benefits of a filter on the ISP server.” BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1350. The instant claims have no analogous structural benefit. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that using a fraud server reduces resources at the organizational server. Reply Br. 15. Merely reciting a server does not confer eligibility. The use and arrangement of conventional and generic computer components recited in the claims—such as a database, user terminal, and server— do not transform the claim, as a whole, into “significantly more” than a claim to the abstract idea itself. “We have repeatedly held that such invocations of computers and networks that are not even arguably inventive are ‘insufficient to pass the test of an inventive concept in the application’ of an abstract idea.” Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). Beyond that, Appellant argues no more than the benefits of the conceptual idea to use conventional distributed processing. Appeal 2019-001527 Application 13/774,873 19 We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that “system can use received fraud warnings to generate the fraud-detection scores and the fraudulent entity report without having to process sensitive information from the entities under investigation.” Reply Br. 15. This only argues that the information is improved, not the technology. “The claims are focused on providing information to traders in a way that helps them process information more quickly, not on improving computers or technology. . . . The “tool for presentation” here . . . is simply a generic computer.” Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1378, 1384–85 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The rejection of claims 1–7 and 11–24 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial exception without significantly more is proper. CONCLUSION The rejection of claims 1–7 and 11–24 is affirmed. In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–7, 11–24 101 Eligibility 1–7, 11–24 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2011). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation