PALLATH, PAUL

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 16, 2020

14483411 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jan. 16, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/483,411 09/11/2014 PAUL PALLATH 22135-1206001/140482US01 3757
32864 7590 01/16/2020
FISH & RICHARDSON, P.C. (SAP)
PO BOX 1022
MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55440-1022
EXAMINER
LEE, TSU-CHANG
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2126
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/16/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
PATDOCTC@fr.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte PAUL PALLATH1
____________________

Appeal 2019-001218
Application 14/483,411
Technology Center 2100
____________________

Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, JAMES R. HUGHES and SCOTT E. BAIN,
Administrative Patent Judges.

NAPPI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1 through 3, 5 through 10, 12 through 17, 19 and 20. We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). According to Appellant, SAP SE. is the real party in interest.
Appeal Br. 3.
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INVENTION
The invention is directed to a technique for automated generation of
insights for events of interest from a data set of events, such as sports events,
and business scenarios. Spec. ¶¶ 1, 17, and 18. Claim 1 is reproduced
below.
1. A non-transitory computer-readable medium to store
instructions, which when executed by a computer, cause the
computer to perform operations comprising:
establish a connection from a data analytics application
to an in-memory database via an in-memory database service;
receive a dataset for an event of interest wherein the
dataset represents plurality of occurrences of events comprising
data corresponding to features, and the dataset is stored in the
in-memory database, and the dataset is a filtered dataset
retrieved from a time series data aggregated from disparate
databases:
determine plurality of event frame sizes to generate
insights on the dataset, wherein each event frame size
corresponds to aggregated data corresponding to the features
within the event frame size;
extract features from the plurality of occurrences of
events corresponding to the plurality of event frame sizes,
wherein the extracted features are represented as feature
abbreviations corresponding to a context, and the features and
feature abbreviations are stored in a dictionary table;
identify frequent feature abbreviations from among the
feature abbreviations corresponding to the context, wherein the
frequent feature abbreviations are based on frequency of
occurrence above a computed minimum support value;
generate rules based on the identified feature
abbreviations;
associate weights variably to the feature abbreviations,
wherein the association of weights is based on frequency of
occurrence of feature abbreviations in the rules; and
display the features corresponding to feature
abbreviations proportional to the weights of the feature
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abbreviations as insights on the dataset in graphical
representations in a user interface, wherein a displayed feature
corresponding to a feature abbreviation with a highest weight
corresponds to a probability of occurrence of the event of
interest.

EXAMINER’S REJECTION2
The Examiner rejected claims 1 through 3, 5 through 10, 12 through
17, 19 and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for being directed to patent-ineligible
subject matter. Non-Final Act. 3–6.

ANALYSIS
We have reviewed Appellant’s arguments in the Briefs, the
Examiner’s rejections, and the Examiner’s response to Appellant’s
arguments. Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded us of error in the
Examiner’s rejection claims 1 through 3, 5 through 10, 12 through 17, 19
and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. “Patent eligibility under [] § 101 is a
question of law that may contain underlying issues of fact.” Interval
Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing
Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). “We review
the district court’s ultimate conclusion on patent eligibility de novo.” Id.;
SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (“Whether a claim is drawn to patent-eligible subject matter is an
issue of law that we review de novo.”)

2 Throughout this Decision we refer to the Appeal Brief filed May 7, 2018
(“Appeal Br.”); Non-Final Office Action mailed November 13, 2017 (“Non-
Final Act.”); and the Examiner’s Answer mailed September 21, 2018
(“Ans.”)
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35 U.S.C. § 101 Rejection
PRINCIPLES OF LAW
Patent-eligible subject matter is defined in 35 U.S.C. § 101 of the
Patent Act, which recites:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor,
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.

There are, however, three judicially created exceptions to the broad
categories of patent-eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101: “[l]aws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.” Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75–77). In
accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim
is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims
before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use
of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561
U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the
basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”)
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and, thus, patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
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mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a
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patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The United States Patent and Trademark Office “USPTO” published
revised guidance on the application of § 101. USPTO’s 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(“Memorandum”). Under that guidance, we first determine whether the
claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th Ed., Rev.
08.2017, Jan. 2018)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
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(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See Memorandum.
DISCUSSION
The Examiner determines the claims are not patent eligible because
they are directed to a judicial exception without reciting significantly more.
Non-Final Act. 3–5. Specifically, the Examiner determines the claims are
directed to collecting a data set related to an event, analyzing it and
displaying insights about the dataset, which is similar to concepts found
abstract in Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir.
2016) and Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d
1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Non-Final Act. 3–4, Ans. 4–6. Further, the
Examiner finds that the additional limitations of the claims recite generic
computer components and functions that are well understood routine and
conventional and thus do not amount to significantly more than the abstract
idea. Non-Final Act. 4–5.
Appellant argues the claims are directed to an improvement in
existing computer technologies and are patent eligible. Appeal Br. 8–9, 12–
13 (citing Enfish, LLC v Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016),
and Trading Techs Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2019)).
Appellant asserts that the claims are an improvement to a computer
technology as they recite an improvement to: a) data analysis of time series
data, that can be as large as terabytes or petabytes of data, and displaying
insights; and b) because the invention addresses the data latency caused by
the dataset being retrieved from a time series data aggregated from disparate
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databases. Appeal Br. 9–10, 12. Further, Appellant argues that the claims
do not preempt all activity in the context of generating insights. Appeal Br.
10. Additionally, Appellant argues the claims are different from those at
issue in Electric Power Group as the claims recite “new techniques for
analyzing.” Appeal Br. 11. Similarly, Appellant asserts that the claims are
unlike the claims in Intellectual Ventures as the claims recite sufficient detail
as to how generation of insights is performed. Appeal Br. 10–11.
Additionally, Appellant argues the claims are different from CyberSource
Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011), as it is
impossible to aggregate terabytes or petabytes of data in the human mind
using pen and paper. Appeal Br. 12. Appellant argues the claims are like
those at issue in McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d
1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016), and are patent eligible as the recited rules “represent
part of solving a technical problem of taking ‘terabytes or petabytes’ that
‘appeared as overload is now transformed to a useful insight identifying a
new pattern of behavior.’” Appeal Br. 14.
The Judicial Exception
We are not persuaded of error by Appellant’s arguments and concur
with the Examiner that representative claim 1 sets forth a mental process of
collecting information, analyzing it and displaying the results.
Claim 1 recites computer implemented steps of receiving a dataset for
an event of interest (a data gathering or observation element), determining
an event frame size, extracting features from the plurality of occurrences
corresponding to the frame sizes, identifying frequent feature abbreviations,
generating rules based upon the feature aberrations and associating weights
to features (data analysis/organization or evaluation elements), and
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displaying the features corresponding to the feature abbreviations
proportional to the weights (steps to communicate the result of the analysis).
We consider these limitations to recite an abstract mental process. These
steps can be performed in the human mind as they are merely gathering data,
analyzing the data and displaying the results, a concept similar to that at
issue in Electric Power Group. See also Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v.
Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1067 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (claim to collecting and
comparing known information determined to be steps that can be practically
performed in the human mind); Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v.
Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“The
concept of data collection, recognition, and storage is undisputedly well-
known. Indeed, humans have always performed these functions.”). See also
October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility 7 (discussing Electric
Power Group and mental processes), available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
peg_oct_2019_update.pdf. The fact that the data comes from databases,
does not preclude a determination that the claim recites a mental process.
See, e.g., Voter Verified, Inc. v. Election Sys. & Software LLC, 887 F.3d
1376, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (explaining that the claimed steps of voting,
verifying the vote, and submitting the vote for tabulation are human
cognitive actions that humans have performed for hundreds of years despite
the fact that the steps in the claim were performed on a computer). We note
Appellant’s Specification ¶ 22, identifies that the determination of the frame
size can be performed by a user and thus a mental process.
The claims at issue in Electric Power Group recited several steps of
receiving data from various sources, detecting and analyzing the data and
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displaying the data. Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1351–52. The court
stated “we have treated collecting information, including when limited to
particular content (which does not change its character as information), as
within the realm of abstract ideas.” Id. at 1353. Here the claims do not
recite the content of the information by its subject, but rather in the form of
the dataset, representing a plurality of occurrences of events retrieved from
time series data. Thus, we concur with the Examiner and consider
representative claim 1 to recite an abstract concept.

Integration of the Judicial Exception into a Practical Application
The Examiner finds that the additional claim limitations do not recite
an improvement to a technical field or a technology. Non-Final Act. 4–5,
Ans. 4, 6–7. Further, the Examiner finds that “the additional elements
included, e.g., computer, memory, database, processor, display, etc., are
general purpose computing components for implementing the judiciary [sic]
exception on computers. There is no indication that the combination of
elements improves the functioning of a computer or improves any other
technology.” Ans. 4.
We are not persuaded of error by Appellant’s arguments. As
discussed above, we concur with the Examiner that representative claim 1
recites an abstract idea. Further, we do not consider the claim to be drawn to
a practical application of the abstract idea as we do not find that the claim
recites an improvement to the functioning of the computer or other
technology or otherwise tied to technology.
We are not persuaded of error by Appellant’s argument, which relies
upon Enfish and asserts the claim is directed to improving computer
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technology or other technology. Appellant’s Specification identifies the
invention is directed to a technique for automated generation of insights for
events of interest from a data set of events, such as sports events, and
business scenarios. Spec. ¶¶ 1, 17, and 18. The Specification does not
identify that the method changes the operation of a computer to improve the
function of the computer, but rather to improve the analysis of data to derive
useful insights. Id. ¶¶ 1, 42. Thus, the claim, when interpreted in light of
the Specification, merely recites use of a computer as a tool to implement a
concept of collecting information, analyzing it and displaying the results, a
mental process (an abstract idea). See, e.g., RecogniCorp LLC v. Nintendo
Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Unlike Enfish, [the claim] does
not claim a software method that improves the functioning of a computer . . .
[but] claims a ‘process that qualifies as an ‘abstract idea’ for which
computers are invoked merely as a tool.’”) (Citation omitted).
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the invention
involves data in the size range of terabytes or petabytes, and, cannot be
accomplished by the human mind using pen and paper. Appeal Br. 8.
Initially, we do not find that representative claim 1 is limited to only data in
this size range. Further, as stated by the Examiner:
the size does not make a claimed invention patent eligible, if the
method or process can be performed by human using paper and
pen. The method & process proposed in the invention claimed
can be performed by human, only possibly slower than
computer. Given enough time & man power, the task can be
completed by human, hence the invention claimed us directed
to an abstract idea.

Ans. 9. We concur, improved efficiency inherent with applying an
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abstract idea on a computer does not provide an inventive concept.
Intellectual Ventures 850 F.3d at 1367 (citing Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun
Life Assurance Co. of Can., 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) and
Alice).
Similarly, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that
representative claim 1 is directed to an improvement in a graphical user
interface. Ans. 12–13 (citing Trading Techs.). While representative claim 1
does recite an interface it only identifies it as being used to display features
as insights to the data set. Our reviewing court found claims including user
interfaces to be directed to abstract concepts in Intellectual Ventures I LLC
v. Capital One Bank, 792 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2015) and
FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Systems, Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1096 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (“[T]he use of generic computer elements like a microprocessor or
user interface do not alone transform an otherwise abstract idea into patent-
eligible subject matter.”) (Citing DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.,
773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). Further, the claims’ recitation of an
interface is unlike the claimed user interface in Core Wireless Licensing
S.A.R.L. v. LG Electronics Inc., 880 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018). In Core
Wireless the court held that claims which recited an interface were patent
eligible as the claims recited specific limitations of the interface such as: an
application summary that can be reached through a menu, the data being in a
list and being selectable to launch an application, and additional limitations
directed to the actual user interface displayed and how it functions. Core
Wireless, 880 F.3d at 1363. The court found that the claims were directed to
an improved user interface and not the abstract concept of an index as the
claim “limitations disclose a specific manner of displaying a limited set of
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information to the user, rather than using conventional user interface
methods to display a generic index on a computer.” Id. See also Trading
Techs. Int’l Inc. v. CQG, Inc., 675 F. App’x 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(nonprecedential) (holding that a user interface with a prescribed
functionality directly related the interface’s structure that is addressed to and
resolves a problem in the art is patent eligible). Furthermore, “merely
selecting information, by content or source, for collection, analysis, and
display” has been found not to provide significantly more for purposes of
finding patent eligibility. Electric Power Group, 830 F.3d at 1355.
Here the claim does not recite any specific manner of displaying the
data or functionality of the interface, rather the claim just recites displaying
data (features) proportional to the weight as insights (Appellant’s
Specification describes this as using different font sizes ¶ 32 and Figure 8).
Thus, Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded us that the claims recite an
improvement in the ability of the computer to display information and
interact with the user.
Appellant’s argument directed to the invention being rooted in
computer technology as it deals with latency issues is not persuasive of
error. Appeal Br. 13 (citing DDR). Initially, we note that the argument is
not based upon evidence, Appellant’s Specification does not discuss latency
and as such it is unclear how latency fits into the claimed invention. Further,
we do not find that the claim is necessarily rooted in computer technology as
were the claims in DDR Holdings. In DDR Holdings, the claimed invention
created a hybrid web page that combined advantageous elements from two
web pages, bypassing the expected manner of sending a visitor to another
party’s web page, in order to solve the internet-centric problem of retaining
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website visitors. DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257–59. Unlike DDR
Holdings, the claim does not overcome a problem specifically arising in the
realm of computer networks, here as discussed above the problem to be
solved is to improve the analysis of data to derive useful insights. Thus, the
problem addressed in claim 1 is not related to a computer or to another
technology, but instead to “the performance of some business practice
known from the pre-Internet world along with the requirement to perform it”
via computer and Internet which the DDR court distinguished as not
involving solutions necessarily rooted in computer technology. DDR
Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257.
Further, we are not persuaded that the claimed application of rules
based upon identified features recites significantly more and draws the claim
to patent eligible subject matter. In McRO, the court reviewed claims which
use “a combined order of specific rules that renders information into a
specific format that is then used and applied to create desired results: a
sequence of synchronized, animated characters.” McRO, 837 F.3d at 1315.
The court found that the claims did not “simply use a computer as a tool to
automate conventional activity,” but instead used the computer to “perform a
distinct process” that is carried out in a different way than the prior non-
computer method to improve the technology of (3-D animation techniques).
See McRO, 837 F.3d at 1314–16. Here claim 1 recites “generat[ing] rules
based on the identified feature abbreviations” the claim does not set forth the
rules applied, and Appellant’s Specification identifies that they are generated
using algorithms such as the Apriori algorithm, a known data mining
algorithm. Specification ¶¶ 26–27. Thus, the claim generically recites rules
and there is no evidence that the claim performs a distinct process that is
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carried out in a different way than the prior non-computer method. Thus, we
conclude representative claim 1 does not recite a practical application of the
judicial exception.

Significantly More than the Abstract Idea
Under the Memorandum, only if a claim: (1) recites a judicial
exception, and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical
application, do we then look to whether the claim adds a specific limitation
beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine,
conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or, simply appends
well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.
Representative claim 1 recites the additional elements of a computer,
establishing a connection between an application and an in-memory database
and a user interface. Appellant’s Specification describes the computer and
data sources in general terms and does not describe a particular computer or
specific source of data. Specification ¶¶ 44, 45. Further, the limitation of
“establishing a connection” (step of accessing data which is also
conventional to computer technology MPEP § 2106.05(d) II (iv)) and the
limitations of “display[ing] the features . . . in a user interface” as describe
above are conventional features of a computer system. Thus, we concur
with the Examiner that the additional elements recite well known elements.
Further, with regard to Appellant’s preemption argument, on page 10
of the Appeal Brief, our reviewing court has said “[w]here a patent’s claims
are deemed only to disclose patent ineligible subject matter under the Mayo
framework, . . . , preemption concerns are fully addressed and made moot.”
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Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2015). Thus, Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive of error in the
Examiner’s determination that the claims do not recite significantly more
than the abstract idea.
In summary, Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded us of error
in the Examiner’s determination that representative claim 1 recites an
abstract idea; a method of collecting/gathering information, analyzing it and
displaying the results (mental processes). Further, Appellant’s arguments
have not persuaded us that the Examiner erred in finding that the claim is
not: directed to an improvement in the functioning of the computer or to
other technology or other technical field; directed to a particular machine;
directed to performing or affecting a transformation of an article to a
different state or thing; directed to using a judicial exception in some
meaningful way beyond linking the exception to a particular technological
environment such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort to
monopolize the judicial exception. For these reasons, we are unpersuaded
that the claim recites additional elements that integrate the judicial exception
into a practical application. See Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, and claims 2,
3, 5 through 10, 12 through 17, 19 and 20 grouped with claim 1, under 35
U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea, that is not
integrated into a practical application, and does not include an inventive
concept.
CONCLUSION
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We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1 through 3, 5 through
10, 12 through 17, 19 and 20, under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
In summary:
Claim
Rejected
35 U.S.C. §  Reference(s)/
Basis
Affirmed Reversed
1–3, 5–10,
12–17, 19,
20
101 Eligibility 1–3, 5–10, 12–
17, 19, 20

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED