Pacific Bell

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 30, 1999

330 N.L.R.B. 271 (N.L.R.B. 1999)

PACIFIC BELL 271
Pacific Bell, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Pacific
Telesis, a wholly-owned subsidiary of South-
western Bell Communications and Telecommu-
nications International Union, California Local
103 IFPTE, AFL–CIO. Case 32–CA–16810
November 30, 1999
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN TRUESDALE AND MEMBERS FOX
AND HURTGEN
On June 11, 1999, Administrative Law Judge Clifford
H. Anderson issued the attached decision. The Respon-
dent filed exceptions, a supporting brief, and a motion to
reopen the record. The General Counsel filed a brief in
opposition to the Respondent’s motion to reopen the re-
cord. The Respondent filed a reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record1
in light of the exceptions and briefs2 and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,3 and conclusions and
to adopt the recommended Order.4
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, Pacific Bell, a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Pacific Telesis, a wholly-owned subsidiary
of Southwestern Bell Communications, San Jose, Cali-
fornia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
take the action set forth in the Order.

MEMBER HURTGEN, dissenting in part.
Contrary to the judge, I do not find that either mailing
the notice or transmitting it to employees by electronic
means is warranted in the circumstances of this case.

1 We deny the Respondent’s motion to reopen the record. The mo-
tion involves evidence of events occurring after the close of the hear-
ing. Furthermore, we find that the evidence would not require a differ-
ent result in this case. See Modern Drop Forge Co., 326 NLRB 1335
at 1 fn. 1 (1998); WXRK, 300 NLRB 633 fn. 1 (1990); Contemporary
Guidance Services, 291 NLRB 50 fn. 2 (1988).
2 The Respondent has requested oral argument. The request is de-
nied as the record, exceptions, and briefs adequately present the issues
and the positions of the parties.
3 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
4 Although the Respondent has excepted to the judge’s conclusion
that it violated Sec. 8(a)(5), it does not separately except to the judge’s
recommended remedy for that violation, nor does it otherwise argue
that such remedy is inappropriate in the circumstances of this case. The
Board has the discretionary authority to modify the remedy here but,
absent exceptions, we find no need to do so or to address the broad
remedial issue discussed in the dissent.
As an initial matter, I note that the Board has broad
discretionary authority to fashion remedies that will best
effectuate the purposes of the Act. NLRB v. J. H. Rutter-
Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U.S. 258, 260–263 (1969). Further, it
is “firmly established that remedial matters are tradition-
ally within the Board’s province and may be addressed
by the Board in the absence of exceptions.” Indian Hills
Care Center, 321 NLRB 144 fn. 3 (1996), and cited
cases.1
As an initial matter, I note that notice posting is the
Board’s traditional means of notifying employees of their
rights and of a respondent’s unfair labor practices. See,
e.g., Page Aircraft Maintenance, 123 NLRB 159 (1959).
The Board does not additionally require that notices be
mailed to employees unless a traditional posting is insuf-
ficient to apprise employees of their rights and of the
unlawful conduct. Peoples Gas System, Inc., 253 NLRB
1180, 1181 (1981).
Here, there is no evidence or claim that notice posting
is inadequate. Although unit employees work at several
facilities, there are bulletin boards at each, and these bul-
letin boards are traditionally used by the Respondent and
incumbent Union to communicate with employees. Fur-
ther, the General Counsel concedes the sufficiency of the
Board’s traditional remedy by expressly seeking it and
opposing the Charging Party’s request that the Respon-
dent be required to mail the notices.
Significantly, the Charging Party does not argue that
the traditional notice posting remedy is inadequate.
Rather, it contends that, because of the asserted egre-
giousness of the violations, additional remedies are re-
quired, e.g., as mailing the notices. I find no support for
requiring notice mailing on this basis. Nor did the judge.
Rather, the judge’s recommendation that the Respondent
be required to mail or electronically communicate the
notice to unit employees was based on generalized refer-
ences to “changing times” and the “electronic age” in
which we live. However, I find that such generalized
notions, standing alone, are insufficient to support a
change in well-established Board remedial principles. In
any event, before the Board embarks on such an en-
deavor, the Board should first receive full briefing by the
private parties, the General Counsel, and perhaps amici
as well.2 Accordingly, I would not grant this additional
1 I therefore disagree with my colleagues’ conclusion that the propri-
ety of the judge’s remedial provisions need not be considered here
because the Respondent (although excepting to having violated the Act)
did not specifically except to the resultant remedy imposed. It is well
settled that the Board’s authority and obligation to fashion appropriate
remedies exists irrespective of whether exceptions have been filed.
Further, I find that this case is one that clearly calls for the Board’s
exercise of its remedial authority. And, contrary to my colleagues’
intimation, it is the judge’s recommended remedy which raises the
“broad remedial issue” that they decline to address.
2 No party argued before the judge or the Board that regular or elec-
tronic mailing is appropriate in a case where, as here, the violation is
not egregious and regular notice posting is adequate.
330 NLRB No. 31
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 272
remedy, and require only that the notice be posted at all
facilities where unit employees work.3

Judith J. Chang and Valerie Hardy-Mahoney, Esqs., for the
General Counsel.
William Gaus, Esq. (Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro), of San Fran-
cisco, California, for the Respondent.
James Eggleston, Esq. and Noreen Farrell, Esq., with him on
brief, of Oakland, California, for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
CLIFFORD H. ANDERSON, Administrative Law Judge. I heard
this case in trial on January 29, 1999, in Oakland, California,
pursuant to a complaint and notice of hearing issued by the
Regional Director for Region 32 of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board on September 30, 1998. The complaint is based on
a charge filed on June 9, 1998, by the Telecommunications
International Union, California Local 103 IFPTE, AFL–CIO
(the Charging Party or the Union) against Pacific Bell, a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Pacific Telesis, a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Southwestern Bell Communications (the Respon-
dent).
The complaint, as amended at the hearing, alleges that the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National
Labor Relations Act (the Act) by failing and refusing to provide
the Union with requested information relevant to the Union’s
bargaining for a successor collective-bargaining agreement
with the Respondent during the period May 14 through late
August 1998 and by failing and refusing to recognize the Union
and/or bargain with it for a new collective-bargaining agree-
ment from June 3 until on or about August 12, 1998. The Re-
spondent does not so much contest the factual allegations but
rather interposes that its refusals occurred in a situation and at a
time when there was confusion and ambiguity over the identity
of the Union which represented its employees and therefore
argues its actions were justified under the circumstances and
not violative of the Act.
Upon the entire record1 here, including helpful briefs from
the parties I make the following2

3 Because I would not require that the notices be mailed to unit em-
ployees, I would likewise not require Respondent to provide the Board
with proof that such transmission has occurred, as specified in Sec. 2(a)
of the Order.
1 On May 6, 1999, the Respondent moved for and, on May 18, 1999,
the General Counsel opposed the introduction into evidence of two
exhibits: (1) the record of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California granting the Communications Workers of Amer-
ica, AFL–CIO’s motion to Compel Arbitration and, (2) the opposition
of the Charging Party to that District Court motion. The Respondent
offers the exhibits, which came into existence after the close of the
hearing, to show “that there was, and is, a bona fide dispute over the
rights of the parties to represent the bargaining unit.” The General
Counsel opposes the receipt into evidence of the proffered exhibits
because they are neither “newly discovered” nor “previously unavail-
able.”
In the General Counsel’s cited case, Machinists Lodge 91 (United
Technologies), 298 NLRB 325 (1990), the Board asserts at 325 fn. 1:
We agree with the General Counsel that the proffered evi-
dence is neither “newly discovered” nor “previously unavailable
evidence” because it did not exist at the time of the hearing. Se-
der Foods Corp., 286 NLRB 215 (1987). Rather, the proffered
evidence involves events allegedly occurring subsequent to the
close of the hearing and the issuance of the judge’s decision and
order. The Respondent has failed to demonstrate that the circum-
stances arising after the close of the hearing would alter the result
in this case. See National Labor Relations Board Rules and
Regulations, Section 102.48(d)(1); Presbyterian Hospital, 285
NLRB 935 fn. 1 (1987). Accordingly, we deny the Respondent’s
motion.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
At all times material the Respondent, a corporation, with an
office and place of business in San Jose, California, is engaged
in providing telephone services throughout California and the
western United States. The Respondent, in the course and con-
duct of its business operations, derives annually gross revenues
in excess of $100,000 and, purchases and receives within the
State of California goods and services valued in excess of
$50,000 which originated outside the State. Based on these
facts there is no dispute and I find that the Respondent is, and
has been at all times material, an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the
Act.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION
The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
The Respondent for many years has provided phone services
in the State of California. As part of its provision of services,
the Respondent has maintained a number of northern California
offices. Since at least 1980 the Respondent has recognized the
Union as the exclusive representative of employees in the fol-
lowing unit (the unit):

All full time and regular part-time employees employed in the
following job classifications: Cashier, Collection Representa-
tive, Customer Associate, Office Associate, Reports Associ-
ate, Service Representative, Staff Associate excluding all
other employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the
Act.

The uncontradicted testimony of the Charging Party’s presi-
dent, Alicia Ribeiro, was that the unit is comprised primarily
of service representatives. She also testified that the Commu-
nications Workers of America, a separate labor organization
which represents certain of the Respondent’s employees, also
represents a bargaining unit which contains service representa-
tives and others job classifications in the unit. Indeed some of
those employees are employed at the same facilities where unit
employees are employed.
The Union has had a series of collective-bargaining agree-
ments with the Respondent covering the unit employees. These
contracts have been similar to and in many respects identical in
content and duration with contracts between the Respondent

On similar grounds, I deny the instant motion. Opportunity Homes,
Inc., 315 NLRB 1210 fn. 5 (1994).
2 As a result of the pleadings and the stipulations of counsel at the
trial, there were few disputes of fact regarding collateral matters.
Where not otherwise noted, the findings here are based on the plead-
ings, the stipulations of counsel, or unchallenged credible evidence.
PACIFIC BELL 273
and the Communications Workers of America covering service
representatives and other job titles within the unit.
B. Events
1. The merger agreement
On May 30, 1997, the Charging Party and the Communica-
tions Workers of America (CWA) entered into a memorandum
of understanding (the MOU) which contemplated a merger.
The agreement contains various provisions and procedures
including:

2. The members of [the Charging Party] shall give the
right to ratify the TIU/CWA merger provided in this MOU
by two (2) secret ballot votes as follows: (a) the first rati-
fication vote will occur promptly upon execution of this
agreement; and (b) the second ratification vote will occur
on or about July 31, 1998 or as soon as practicable after a
CWA determination that acceding to a Pacific Bell request
for early bargaining is in the best interests of Union mem-
bers. The CWA temporary charter and transitional proce-
dures provided in the MOU shall immediately effective
upon TIU membership approval of this MOU in the first
ratification vote and presentation by TIU to CWA of the
waiver of jurisdiction described in paragraph 1 of this
MOU. The remaining provisions of the MOU regarding
completion of the merger and dissolution of TIU shall be
subject to final approval of the TIU membership in the
second ratification vote.
3. Upon TIU membership approval in the first ratifica-
tion vote, CWA will issue a temporary charter to TIU au-
thorizing TIU to operate as an affiliate of CWA in accor-
dance with the terms of this MOU. The terms of the tem-
porary charter will extend through the August 31, 1998
expiration date of the current TIU collective bargaining
agreement with Pacific Bell or through the date of the sec-
ond ratification votes of TIU members in the event such
membership vote rejects the final terms of CWA/TIU
merger, whichever occurs earlier.
4. During the term of the CWA temporary charter,
TIU/CWA will remain the exclusive representative of the
former TIU unit employees, working under the TIU/CWA
Pacific Bell collective bargaining agreement, with
TIU/CWA existing and operating as an affiliated provi-
sional, autonomous Local Union of CWA in accordance
with the following provisions:

. . . .
(C) TIU shall be solely responsible for representing
TIU bargaining unit employees as collective bar-
gaining representative for TIU bargaining unit em-
ployees in collective bargaining maters. CWA is
not authorized to serve as collective bargaining
representative for TIU bargaining unit employees
during the term of the temporary charter and will
not enter any agreement or take any action under
color of such authority without the express written
agreement of TIU.
(D) TIU shall be solely responsible for performance
and satisfaction of the duty of fair representation to
TIU bargaining unit employees during the term of
the temporary charter and shall assume all liability
arising from any claim of breach of this duty.
. . . .

6. In the event the TIU membership rejects completion
of the TIU/CWA merger in the second ratification vote,
the merger shall be of no force or effect. TIU shall then
remain in and continue its status as the exclusive bargain-
ing representative for the TIU bargaining unit; the IFPTE
waiver of jurisdiction shall expire and TIU shall revert to
the status as an affiliated Local Union of the International
Federation of Professional and Technical Employees,
AFL-CIO.
. . . .
8. Any dispute regarding the application, interpretation
or enforcement of the terms of this MOU shall be submit-
ted by the parties to neutral, binding arbitration in accor-
dance with the rules and procedures of the American Arbi-
tration Association. The arbitrator shall have no authority
to add to, subtract from, or otherwise alter or vary the
terms of this MOU.

In June 1997 a first vote consistent with the terms of the
memorandum of understanding took place and the Charging
Party’s membership voted its approval of the interim process.
Charging Party President Alicia Ribeiro testified that in Febru-
ary 1998 difficulties arose between CWA and the Charging
Party over positions and decisions concerning bargaining with
the Respondent. The Charging Party and the CWA did not
resolve these differences and the merger was not consummated
with no second vote ever having been conducted.3
2. The Respondent’s role
The Respondent’s labor relations staff was aware of the
agreement between the two Unions soon after its consumma-
tion. Susan Crutcher, the Respondent’s executive director of
labor relations, testified that the Respondent did not alter the
way it dealt with the two organizations respecting the current
contracts but began, on the Unions’ initiative, to meet jointly
with the two respecting a new agreement. Crutcher testified
that she was aware in December 1997 that the two Unions were
attending meetings and became aware that friction between the
organizations had arisen. Crutcher testified that in late Febru-
ary she asked Ribeiro if the merger was going to go through
and was told by Ribeiro that she would campaign against it.
The Charging Party through Ribeiro, sent a preliminary letter
respecting arrangements for 1998 negotiations to Michael Rod-
riguez, the Respondent’s vice president of labor relations, dated
May 14, 1998, seeking various categories of information in aid
of bargaining. Crutcher responded by letter dated June 3, 1998.
The letter asserted:

I have received your request for bargaining dated May
14, 1998. I have also received the Memorandum of Un-
derstanding dated May 30, 1997 between TIU and CWA
regarding a possible merger of the two unions.
The memorandum calls for two votes to be taken prior
to final agreement on a 1998 contract. One vote, if favor-
able, would establish TIU as a local of CWA, and a second
vote, if favorable, would establish CWA as the bargaining
representative of the employees in the bargaining unit.
Our understanding is that the first vote has been taken and
that this vote was decisively in favor of merger.

3 The two labor organizations did not necessarily view the circum-
stances in the same way. See further discussion above.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 274
The May 30, 1997 agreement thus clearly contem-
plates that the issue of representation would be resolved by
a second vote of the TIU membership prior to final agree-
ment of a 1998 contract. Of the basis of what we now
know, we believe there is clearly a question concerning
representation that must be resolved. It would be inappro-
priate to begin bargaining with TIU while this question
concerning representation is pending. We believe this
matter must be resolved without delay and if there is no
immediate prospect of its being resolved by the two un-
ions, we believe it should be resolved by the National la-
bor Relations Board.
If there has been a superseding agreement between
TIU and CWA, a vote of the TIU membership or any other
event that, in you view, makes the May 30, 1997 Memo-
randum of Understanding inoperative, please furnish that
information to me. If we do not receive any such informa-
tion before the close of business on June 4, 1998, we will
assume that the May 30, 1997 Memorandum is still in ef-
fect and we will file a petition with the National Labor Re-
lations Board to resolve the question concerning represen-
tation.

President Ribeiro responded by letter of June 5, 1998, inter
alia, renewing the Charging Party’s demand that bargaining for
a new agreement commence, protesting the Respondent’s prior
letter as an unfair labor practice and assuring the Respondent
the agreement between the two unions was “no longer valid and
has no effect.” That same day the instant charge was filed.
Crutcher testified at about this time she asked an official of the
Communications Workers of America if there was to be a sec-
ond vote under the terms of the MOU and was told that “[s]teps
were being taken to secure the second vote.”
On June 5, 1998, the Respondent filed a petition, Case 32–
RM–753, respecting the unit at issue here. The petition was
ultimately found to be without merit. On or about August 7,
1998, the Respondent resumed bargaining with the Charging
Party and in late August supplied the requested information.
C. Analysis and Conclusion
1. The issues narrowed—the arguments of the parties
The issues in this case are quite narrow and it is well to ini-
tially set forth what is and is not at issue. Thus, the history of
bargaining, the appropriateness of the unit, and the Union’s
representative status until May 1998 are not disputed. There is
essentially no doubt or contest that the Charging Party, on or
about May 14, 1998, requested of the Respondent information
relevant to collective bargaining for a successor collective-
bargaining agreement. There is no doubt that the Respondent
failed and refused to provide the Charging Party with the re-
quested information and refused to agree to commence bargain-
ing for a new contract until August 12, 1998. On and after
August 12, 1988, the Respondent resumed bargaining and in
late August 1998 provided the requested information so that, as
of that date, there is again no dispute or contention that the
Respondent was violating the Act.
The General Counsel and the Charging Party argue from
these essentially unchallenged facts supported by citation of
authority on brief that a prima facie case of a violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act has been made out both as to the
information request and bargaining allegations of the com-
plaint.
The Respondent defends its actions as described above on
narrow grounds. Again it is well to look closely at the Respon-
dent’s position to understand what is and is not at issue. The
Respondent argues that the memorandum of understanding
between the Charging Party and the CWA, insofar as it be-
lieved the situation existed in June through August 1998, raised
in its mind a reasonable doubt as to who, if anyone, represented
its employees. This argument, in turn, requires consideration of
the terms of the MOU and the state of affairs during the rele-
vant period. The MOU provided a multiple step process: an
initial vote, an interim transition stage, a second vote and, fi-
nally, depending on the outcome of the second vote, a merger
or restoration of the status quo ante before the agreement was
entered into.
The Respondent is not heard to argue that the Charging Party
either lost its status as labor organization or its status as the
exclusive representative of unit employees when it entered into
the MOU. Nor does the Respondent contend that the Charging
Party during the initial interim stage after the first vote, lost its
status as labor organization or its status as the exclusive repre-
sentative of unit employees. Narrowly, the Respondent con-
tends that, when the “second” vote called for under the MOU
should have been held or at least scheduled,4 and when the two
labor organizations were in apparent disagreement and giving
the Respondent conflicting information respecting whether or
not a second election would be held at all, the Respondent had a
reasonable and good-faith doubt respecting what labor organi-
zation, if any, represented its unit employees.
The General Counsel challenges the Respondent asserted de-
fense on brief at 11:

The General Counsel advances the following two separate
and distinct theories in support of a finding that the Act has
been violated: (1) the Respondent failed to provide any cog-
nizable legal justification for its unlawful actions; and (2) the
MOU and [the Charging Party’s decision not to abide by the
terms of the MOU did not substantially alter the organiza-
tional structure of [the Charging Party] such that a [question
concerning representation] was raised.

The Charging Party emphasizes that the MOU had conse-
quences relevant to the Charging Party’s bargaining relation-
ship with the Respondent only upon a second vote in which a
majority of the Charging Party member voters approved the
merger. Thus, argues the Charging Party, the second vote was
a condition precedent rather than a condition subsequent to any
relevant change in the Charging Party’s circumstances. Thus,
when the merger agreement was abandoned, argues the Charg-
ing Party, and in all events unless and until a second vote favor-
ing merger was conducted and the results communicated to the
Respondent, the Respondent was without any possible basis5
for challenging the Charging Party’s status as representative of
unit employees. Finally, the Charging Party argues the Re-

4 The Respondent argues on Br. at 12:
While the MOU provides that [the Charging Party] remains
the representative under a temporary CWA charter until the sec-
ond vote, the MOU also provides that, if the first vote is favor-
able, the second vote has to occur before 1998 bargaining. . . .
The temporary charter, by its terms, lasted only until the second
vote.
5 The Charging Party adds that the mere filing of an RM petition
does not demonstrate good faith citing Hydro Conduit Corp., 278
NLRB 1124 (1986).
PACIFIC BELL 275
spondent’s conduct rises to the level of egregious bad faith
infected with unlawful motives and requires that the Charging
Party receive its costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in the NLRB
proceedings.
2. Analysis
The General Counsel argues on brief that the Respondent’s
agents testified that they interpreted the MOU as limiting the
bargaining representative authority of the Charging Party only
to the life of the 1995–1998 contract. Counsel for the General
Counsel then asserts: “The Respondent provided no legal sup-
port for this assertion, and it appears that its agents totally mis-
construed its legal obligations under the Act.” (G.C. Br. at 16.)
The Respondent argues on brief that the MOU expressly does
not disturb the Charging Party’s bargaining rights respecting
the 1995 contract unless and until there was a second vote.
The Respondent argues further that the MOU clearly contem-
plates a second vote prior to 1998 bargaining and therefore the
Respondent was entitled to question the Charging Party’s status
for bargaining a new contract when the situation respecting the
vote was confused and statements regarding it were conflicting.
I resolve this fundamental difference in interpretation of and
approach to the MOU in favor of the General Counsel and the
Charging Party. Regardless of what the situation that might be
or have been, had a second vote been conducted—a situation I
do not reach nor consider—the Respondent was not privileged
to withdraw recognition, fail to bargain or refuse to provide
relevant information to the Charging Party because a second
vote had not been held, had not been scheduled or, because
there were conflicting reports respecting the status of the MOU.
In essence I find the MOU’s second vote was an explicit condi-
tion precedent to any change in the Charging Party’s status and,
the condition precedent not having occurred, the Respondent
may not rely on the MOU to support any presecond vote claim
of doubt respecting the Charging Party’s status as the exclusive
representative of unit employees. The Respondent was obli-
gated, at the very least, to bide its time and take appropriate
action if, and when, a second vote was taken and the merger
approved.
Having found that the Respondent could not rely on the
MOU or any pre-second election circumstances to support its
actions, I find that the Respondent has not met its burden of
establishing a valid reason for (1) failing to timely supply the
information requested by the Charging Party and (2) refusing to
bargain for a new agreement during the June to August period
noted above. I further find that the Respondent in so failing
and refusing to bargain with the Charging Party during the
period indicated violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act as
alleged in the complaint.6
REMEDY
Having found Respondent engaged in certain unfair labor
practices, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and
desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action necessary
to effectuate the purposes and policies of the Act including the
posting of a remedial notice consistent with the Board’s deci-
sion in Indian Hills Care Center, 321 NLRB 144 (1996).
Given that in August 1998 the requested information was sup-
plied, bargaining resumed, and in due course a new contract
was reached, I shall not include the normal direction that the
respecting a new collective-bargaining agreement for unit em- 6 The Charging Party’s request for extraordinary remedies will be
discussed infra in the remedy section of this decision.
Respondent provide the requested information or that the Re-
spondent resume bargaining.
The Charging Party argues that the Respondent’s conduct
was informed by its hostility to the demands and positions of
the Charging Party respecting actions and policies of the Re-
spondent and, further, that the violations of the Act engaged in
by the Respondent were egregious in nature. From these asser-
tions the Charging Party urges that an award of costs and attor-
ney’s fees be included in the directed remedy. I disagree that
the violations found, even assuming that they were so driven by
hostility to the Charging Party and favoritism to the CWA,
support such an award. I therefore decline to include the re-
quested remedy herein.
The Charging Party seeks the mailing of a notice to each unit
employee. The General Counsel seeks normal posting. We live
in changing times. The Board’s traditional notice posting as a
means of communication with employees is increasingly less
effective in an electronic age in which the physical posting of
notices in common areas generally is not the sole or even the
most common means of providing information to employees. It
is evident from the record that the unit employees involved
herein are scattered at numerous locations and that the Respon-
dent communicated with its employees respecting this matter
via electronically transmitted memoranda7 directed to “All
employees Covered by the 1995 TIU Contract.” I find that the
Respondent shall be required, in addition to the normal posting
requirements, to send each unit employee a copy of the notice
herein by the method generally used to communicate to em-
ployees regarding matters of importance. Thus, the Respondent
will be required to either mail or transmit a copy of the notice
herein to each unit employee by the means of electronic trans-
mission currently used by the Respondent for the dissemination
of important information to employees at the time the notice is
posted, for example by E-mail if such is the current means of
inter-company communications.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Telecommunications International Union, California
Local 103 IFPTE, AFL–CIO is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The Union represents the Respondent’s employees in the
following unit (the unit) which is appropriate for bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9 of the Act:

All full time and regular part-time employees em-
ployed in the following job classifications: Cashier, Col-
lection Representative, Customer Associate, Office Asso-
ciate, Reports Associate, Service Representative, Staff As-
sociate excluding all other employees, guards and supervi-
sors as defined in the Act.

4. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act during the period of May 14 through August 1998 by
wrongfully refusing to supply the Union with requested infor-
mation relevant and necessary to the Union’s role as collective-
bargaining agent of unit employees.
5. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act during the period of June 3 through August 7, 1998, by
failing and refusing to meet and bargain with the Union
7 Memoranda were sent by facsimile transmission.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 276
specting a new collective-bargaining agreement for unit em-
ployees.
6. The unfair labor practices described above are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended8
ORDER
The Respondent, Pacific Bell, a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Pacific Telesis, a wholly owned subsidiary of Southwestern
Bell Communications, San Jose, California, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing and refusing to supply the Union with requested
information relevant and necessary to fulfill its function as the
unit employees collective-bargaining representative in bargain-
ing for a new collective-bargaining agreement.
(b) Failing and refusing to engage in collective bargaining
with the Union for a new collective-bargaining agreement for
unit employees.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Board or
its agents for examination and copying, records necessary to
insure that the terms of this Order have been fully complied
with, including hard copy exemplars of any electronic commu-
nication sent to employees.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cilities at which unit employees are regularly employed copies
of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”9 Copies of the no-
tice, on forms provided by the Regional Director, in English
and such other languages as the Regional Director determines
are necessary to fully communicate with employees, after being
signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be
posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive
days in conspicuous places, including all places where notices
to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondent to ensure the notices are not altered,
defaced or covered by other material. Further, the Respondent
shall mail or disseminate by means of electronic communica-
tion—consistent with the provisions of the section of this deci-
sion entitled Remedy—a copy or image of the notice to each

8 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections shall be waived for all purposes.
9 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of the United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted By Order of the
National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a
Judgement of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board.”
and every unit employee. In the event that, during the pend-
ency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of
business or closed the facilities involved in these proceedings,
the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all current unit employees and former unit
employees employed by the Respondent at any time during the
period May through August 1998.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.

APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the
National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide
by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected con-
certed activities.

Our employees in the following unit are represented by the
Telecommunications International Union, California Local 103
IFPTE, AFL–CIO in the following unit of employees (the unit):

All full time and regular part-time employees employed in the
following job classifications: Cashier, Collection Representa-
tive, Customer Associate, Office Associate, Reports Associ-
ate, Service Representative, Staff Associate excluding all
other employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the
Act.

WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to supply the Union with re-
quested information relevant and necessary to fulfill its func-
tion as the unit employees’ collective-bargaining representative
in bargaining for a new collective-bargaining agreement.
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to engage in collective bargain-
ing with the Union for a new collective-bargaining agreement
for unit employees.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed them by Section 7 of the Act.

PACIFIC BELL, A WHOLLY-OWNED SUBSIDIARY OF
PACIFIC TELESIS, A WHOLLY-OWNED SUBSIDIARY OF
SOUTHWESTERN BELL COMMUNICATIONS