Pablo Fourez

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 22, 2020

12544009 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jan. 22, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/544,009 08/19/2009 Pablo Fourez 0076412-000002 8495
21839 7590 01/22/2020
BUCHANAN, INGERSOLL & ROONEY PC
POST OFFICE BOX 1404
ALEXANDRIA, VA 22313-1404
EXAMINER
CHAKRAVARTI, ARUNAVA
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3693
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/22/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ADIPDOC1@BIPC.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte PABLO FOUREZ
____________

Appeal 2018-003313
Application 12/544,009
Technology Center 3600
_________

Before ANTON W. FETTING, JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, and
MICHAEL W. KIM, Administrative Patent Judges.

FETTING, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
Pablo Fourez (Appellant2) seeks review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of a
final rejection of claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 12–16, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 32–39 and
41–46, the only claims pending in the application on appeal. We have

1 Our decision will make reference to the Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal
Br.,” filed September 1, 2017) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed February
6, 2018), and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed December 7, 2017),
and Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed April 4, 2017).
2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as
MasterCard International Incorporated (Appeal Br. 2).
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jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). This is the second
time this application has been appealed. In the prior appeal all rejections
were over prior art and were affirmed. See Ex parte Fourez, Appeal 2013-
002892 (PTAB July 31, 2015). The claims have been substantially amended
since then, and the prior art applied in this appeal differs from that in the
prior appeal.
The Appellant invented a way of controlling payment card
transactions based on a mobile device being substantially co-located with the
location where a payment card transaction is initiated, and the ability for
selective controls to be placed on the payment card by the cardholder or
issuing bank. Specification 1:4–8.
An understanding of the invention can be derived from a reading of
exemplary claim 21, which is reproduced below.
21. A computer-implemented financial transaction method
comprising:
(i) receiving, in a managing computer system including a
computer processor and a memory device configured to store
identification information of mobile devices in association with
respective payment card accounts, an electronic request from a
point-of-sale (POS) device of a merchant for authorization of a
payment card transaction, the authorization request including
information identifying a payment card account of the customer
and identifying a country of origin of the request for
authorization, wherein said managing computer system is an
intermediary system configured to communicate data between
the POS device of the merchant and a processing device of a
card issuer, via a payment card network;
(ii) receiving, in the managing computer system, information
communicated by a mobile device regarding a country in which
said mobile device is located and identity of the mobile device
as determined by the mobile device, wherein the mobile device
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has electronics capable of enabling a determination of a country
location of the mobile device;
(iii) storing, in the memory device of the managing computer
system, said country location until an updated country location
is received from the mobile device upon the mobile device
entering a new country location;
(iv) setting authorization locks associated with said payment
card account of said customer for enabling and disabling card
transactions based on country location of said mobile device;
(v) identifying, in the memory device of the managing
computer system, at least one mobile device based on said
payment card account information included in said
authorization request;
(vi) determining, upon receiving said authorization request
from said POS device of the merchant, whether an authorization
lock is set for transactions in said country identified in said
authorization request; and
(vii) one of: (1) enabling the payment card transaction to be
processed for authorization when said authorization lock is not
set for transactions in said country identified in said
authorization request, and (2) taking action to permit denying
the authorization request for the transaction when said
authorization lock is set for transactions in said country
identified in said authorization request,
wherein (a) after the receiving of the authorization request by
the managing system, via the financial network, from the POS
device of the merchant, and (b) when taking action, by the
managing computer system to permit denying the transaction,
transmitting, by the managing system, an electronic alert to
both (1) a computing device of the customer alerting the
customer to indicate whether the transaction is to be authorized
or denied and (2) the processing device of said card issuer
indicating that the transaction should be denied.
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The Examiner relies upon the following prior art:
Name Reference Date
Stevens US 7,487,170 B2 Feb. 3, 2009
Rados US 7,600,676 B1 Oct. 13, 2009

Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 12–16, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 32–39 and 41–463
stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial exception
without significantly more.
Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 12–16, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 32–39 and 41–464
stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Stevens and
Rados.
ISSUES
The issues of eligible subject matter turn primarily on whether the
claims recite more than abstract conceptual advice of results desired.
The issues of obviousness turn primarily on whether it was predictable
to use a server to monitor transactions, and, if so, whether it was predictable
for the server to inform the processes relying on it of its outcomes.

3 Page 2 of the final rejection does not list claim 46 as rejected here. The
Appellant acknowledges claim 46 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101. App.
Br. 2.
4 Page 5 of the final rejection does not list claim 46 as rejected here. Pages
14–15 of the final rejection provide a substantive analysis of claim 46 under
35 U.S.C. § 103. The Appellant also acknowledges that claim 46 is rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 103. App. Br. 2.
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FACTS PERTINENT TO THE ISSUES
The following enumerated Findings of Fact (FF) are believed to be
supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
Facts Related to the Prior Art
Stevens
01. Stevens is directed to the use of location based information in
communications networks. Stevens 1:25–27.
02. Stevens describes being configured to receive a set of data
identifying the location of a Mobile Communications Device
(“Device”). A receiver may be coupled with the Device in any
suitable manner known in the art. The location based information
may comprise GPS coordinates. Stevens 6:44–67.
03. Stevens describes being configured to send data identifying the
Device with the location data. The Device and identifier are
associated with a user, a financial card number, a credit card
number, an account number, or other numbers or accounts. The
number of signals may be sent at different times. The
communications signal may be transmitted at different intervals.
For example, the intervals may be related to a specific query by a
Location Comparison Server, when each measurement takes
place, or at the end of each call or other two-way communication
session. Stevens 7:19–37.
04. Stevens describes an action request comprising a request to
allow access to resources of the server. A rule may comprise
granting, denying, or requiring additional information for the
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request for access. A rule may be associated with specific
geographic regions, wherein the specific rule to be applied (i.e.,
granting, denying, or requiring additional information for the
request for access) is based on the geographic region within which
the Device associated with the identifier is located. Stevens 10:3–
14.
05. Stevens describes action requests being addressed by
comparing the location of the Device with the location which
originates an action request. Stevens 10:40–42.
06. Stevens describes the Location Comparison Server determining
whether the action request requires location verification. If
location comparison is required, the Location Comparison Server
queries a Database and correlates an identifier, the Device
associated with the identifier, and action request in the Database.
Stevens 11:5–13.
Rados
07. Rados is directed to authenticating financial transactions using
at least two factors. Rados 1:6–9.
08. Rados describes a Merchant having a Merchant Point-Of-Sale
(POS) system. The Merchant may send a message to an Issuer
computer through a data network. Rados 5:14–18.
09. Rados describes a phone tower transmitting a text message to a
Purchaser phone. The Purchaser may respond to the text message
in at least two ways. First, the Purchaser may supply the text
message to the Merchant POS terminal. For example, the
Purchaser may type a four digit PIN into a keypad at the Merchant
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POS terminal. Second, the Purchaser may reply to the text
message by sending a new text message. For example, the
Purchaser may send the text message “yes” to an Issuer computer.
Rados 6:19–28.
10. Rados describes the process branching to steps for denial if the
initial analysis is unfavorable. If it is determined that the card
information is not valid, or some other portion of the initial
analysis is unfavorable, the Issuer denies approval. This denial
typically is promptly transmitted to the Merchant, and the
Merchant then refuses to complete the transaction with the
Purchaser. This denial is typically accompanied with codes
explaining the reason for the denial. Rados 7:16–27.
11. Rados describes a third party parent, and the Purchaser may be
a student attending the University of State1. The triggering
condition may be any transaction over $100, or any transaction
located in a state other than State1. The message may contain
substantial information about the transaction, such as the amount,
the name of the Merchant, and the location of the Merchant. The
Third Party, e.g., parent, might not approve a transaction for $450
at “Joe’s Hard Liquor Store” located in State2. Alternatively, the
Third Party might approve a transaction for $250 at “University
Bookstore” located in State1. Thus, these Third Party processes
may be used to prevent inappropriate actions by the Purchaser, in
addition to preventing criminal actions by a criminal. Rados
11:45–57.
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ANALYSIS
Initially we construe the claim 21 limitation of “storing, in the
memory device of the managing computer system, said country location
until an updated country location is received from the mobile device upon
the mobile device entering a new country location”. The claim does not
recite how this is implemented. The word “upon” might suggest that
somehow the data is updated at the time of entering a new country location
because of entering the new country location. But the Specification does not
support such an interpretation and does not even use the word “upon.” This
limitation was not in the Application as originally filed, but was made by
amendment filed November 10, 2011. We must therefore determine how to
otherwise construe this limitation.
The Appellant cites Specification 20:1–24 for support.5 App. Br. 5.
The pertinent part from this cited portion is “receiving in the managing
computer system 110 information communicated by the mobile device 160
regarding a current geographic location of the mobile device 160 as
determined by the mobile device 160, wherein the mobile device 160 has
electronics capable of determining a geographic location of the mobile
device 160.” Spec. 20:18–23. Although this portion fails to describe how
such a determination is made, the Specification goes on to state that
the mobile device 160 may be set up to periodically report its
location to the managing computer system 110. This means
that the location information might be received before the
managing computer system 110 receives the authorization
request, or at the same time or after the managing computer

5 Specification page 20 has only 23 lines.
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system 110 receives the authorization request, while the
authorization request is being processed. As an iteration of the
last-mentioned possibility, an alternative or additional feature
can be that receipt of an authorization can prompt the managing
computer system 110 to inquire of the linked mobile device 160
of its location. The system can be set up to require this location
be provided, or not, or other criteria applied to determine when
the updated location information is required before the process
can proceed (e.g., if the location has not been updated for an
extended period, or the pattern of location changes suggests that
the mobile device is likely not present at the transaction
origination site, such as a transaction occurring at a great
distance from the last reported mobile device location.
Generally, the last reported location mobile device would be
used in many instances.
Spec. 20:23–21:16. Thus, the Specification describes implementing the
determination by periodic transmissions, receipt of an authorization request,
length of time since last update, and location change pattern analysis. In
particular, conventional periodic updates is among the described manners of
implementation. Such an implementation is within the scope of the claim, as
the claim does not preclude additional transmissions of country location
data. None of the described manners of implementation suggest any
mechanism for determining that a new country location is entered at the time
it is entered. The Specification nowhere otherwise suggests this occurs.
Thus, the use of the word “upon” in the limitation means simply at the
timing of the next transmission of country location, and does not mean
immediately sensing that a country location border has just been crossed.
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Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 12–16, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 32–39 and 41–45 rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial exception without
significantly more
STEP 16
Claim 21, as a method claim, nominally recites one of the enumerated
categories of eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101. The issue before us
is whether it is directed to a judicial exception without significantly more.
STEP 2
The Supreme Court
set forth a framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws
of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that
claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts. First, . . .
determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of
those patent-ineligible concepts. If so, we then ask, “[w]hat
else is there in the claims before us? To answer that question, .
. . consider the elements of each claim both individually and “as
an ordered combination” to determine whether the additional
elements “transform the nature of the claim” into a patent-
eligible application. [The Court] described step two of this
analysis as a search for an “‘inventive concept’”—i.e., an
element or combination of elements that is “sufficient to ensure
that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a
patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.”
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–18 (2014) (citations
omitted) (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc.,
566 U.S. 66 (2012)). To perform this test, we must first determine what the
claims are directed to. This begins by determining whether the claims recite

6 For continuity of analysis, we adopt the steps nomenclature from 2019
Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7,
2019) (“Revised Guidance”).
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one of the judicial exceptions (a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an
abstract idea). Then, if the claims recite a judicial exception, determining
whether the claims at issue are directed to the recited judicial exception, or
whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application of that exception, i.e., that the claims “apply, rely on, or use the
judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the
judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed
to monopolize the judicial exception.” Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
54. If the claims are directed to a judicial exception, then finally
determining whether the claims provide an inventive concept because the
additional elements recited in the claims provide significantly more than the
recited judicial exception.
STEP 2A Prong 1
At a high level, and for our preliminary analysis, we note that method
claim 21 recites receiving request, country, and device identification data,
storing data, setting authorization locks data, identifying a device based on
data, determining whether authorization lock data is set, enabling a
transaction or permitting denial of authorization, and alerting transaction
parties. Setting data is updating data. Identifying data is rudimentary data
analysis. Determining the status of authorization lock data is rudimentary
data analysis. Enabling a transaction or permitting denial of authorization
are conventional data processing. Alerting parties is transmitting and
displaying data. Thus, claim 21 recites receiving, storing, updating,
analyzing, processing, transmitting, and displaying data. None of the
limitations recite technological implementation details for any of these steps,
but instead recite only results desired by any and all possible means.
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From this we see that claim 21 does not recite the judicial exceptions
of either natural phenomena or laws of nature.
Under Supreme Court precedent, claims directed purely to an abstract
idea are patent in-eligible. As set forth in the Revised Guidance, which
extracts and synthesizes key concepts identified by the courts, abstract ideas
include (1) mathematical concepts7, (2) certain methods of organizing
human activity8, and (3) mental processes9. Among those certain methods
of organizing human activity listed in the Revised Guidance are commercial
or legal interactions. Like those concepts, claim 21 recites the concept of
managing payment processing. Specifically, claim 21 recites operations that
would ordinarily take place in advising one to permit or deny payment
processing based on location and preset parameters. The advice to permit or
deny payment processing based on location and preset parameters involves a
financial transaction, which is an economic act, and enabling the payment
card transaction, which is an act ordinarily performed in the stream of
commerce. For example, claim 21 recites “financial transaction method,”
which is an activity that would take place whenever one is performing a

7 See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972); Bilski v.
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010); Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio
Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939); SAP America, Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC,
898 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
8 See, e.g., Bilski, 561 U.S. at 628; Alice, 573 U.S. at 219-20; Ultramercial,
Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed Cir. 2014); Smart Sys.
Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364, 1383 (Fed. Cir.
2017); In re Marco Guldenaar Holding B.V., 911 F.3d 1157, 1160–61 (Fed.
Cir. 2018).
9 See, e.g., Benson, 409 U.S. at 67; CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions,
Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Intellectual Ventures I LLC
v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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commercial transaction between people. Similarly, claim 1 recites “enabling
the payment card transaction,” which is also characteristic of commercial
payment processing.
The Examiner determines the claims to be directed to steps in a
payment transaction. Final Act. 2–3.
The preamble to claim 21 recites that it is a financial transaction
method. The steps in claim 21 result in permitting or denying payment
processing based on location and preset parameters.
As to the specific limitations, limitations i and ii recite receiving data.
Limitations iii – vii recite generic and conventional storing, updating,
analyzing, processing, transmitting, and displaying of payment transaction
data, which advise one to apply generic functions to get to these results. The
limitations thus recite advice for permitting or denying payment processing
based on location and preset parameters. To advocate permitting or denying
payment processing based on location and preset parameters is conceptual
advice for results desired from a commercial or legal interaction.
The Specification at 1:4–8 describes the invention as relating to
controlling payment card transactions based on a mobile device being
substantially co-located with the location, where a payment card transaction
is initiated, and the ability for selective controls to be placed on the payment
card by the cardholder or issuing bank. Thus, all this intrinsic evidence
shows that claim 21 recites managing payment processing. This is
consistent with the Examiner’s determination.
This in turn is an example of commercial or legal interactions as a
certain method of organizing human activity, because managing payment
processing is the way of ensuring commercial interactions are compensated.
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The concept of managing payment processing by permitting or denying
payment processing based on location and preset parameters is one idea for
managing protection against fraudulent activity in an international context.
The steps recited in claim 21 are part of how this might conceptually be
premised.
Our reviewing court has found claims to be abstract ideas when they
recited similar subject matter. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One
Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (tracking financial
transactions); Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333–34 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (processing financial transactions through a clearing house).
From this, we conclude that at least to this degree, claim 21 recites
managing payment processing by permitting or denying payment processing
based on location and preset parameters, which is a commercial and legal
interaction, one of certain methods of organizing human activity identified in
the Revised Guidance, and, thus, an abstract idea.
STEP 2A Prong 2
The next issue is whether claim 21 not only recites, but is more
precisely directed to this concept itself, or whether it is instead directed to
some technological implementation or application of, or improvement to,
this concept, i.e., integrated into a practical application.10
At the same time, we tread carefully in construing this
exclusionary principle lest it swallow all of patent law. At
some level, “all inventions ... embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or
apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.”
Thus, an invention is not rendered ineligible for patent simply
because it involves an abstract concept. “[A]pplication[s]” of

10 See, e.g., Alice, 573 U.S. at 223, discussing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175 (1981).
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such concepts “ ‘to a new and useful end,’ ” we have said,
remain eligible for patent protection. Accordingly, in applying
the § 101 exception, we must distinguish between patents that
claim the “ ‘buildin[g] block[s]’ ” of human ingenuity and those
that integrate the building blocks into something more.
Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (citations omitted).
Taking the claim elements separately, the operation performed by the
computer at each step of the process is expressed purely in terms of results,
devoid of implementation details. Steps i and ii are pure data gathering
steps. Limitations describing the nature of the data do not alter this. Steps
iii–iv recite basic conventional data operations, such as generating, updating,
and storing data. Steps v–vii recite generic computer processing expressed
in terms of results desired by any and all possible means, and so present no
more than conceptual advice. The recited use of an intermediary computer
to do so is no more than generic use of distributed processing, such as by
servers. All purported inventive aspects reside in how the data is interpreted
and the results desired, and not in how the process physically enforces such
a data interpretation, or in how the processing technologically achieves those
results.
Viewed as a whole, the Appellant’s claim 21 simply recites the
concept of managing payment processing by permitting or denying payment
processing based on location and preset parameters as performed by a
generic computer. This is no more than conceptual advice on the parameters
for this concept and the generic computer processes to process those
parameters, and do not recite any particular implementation.
Claim 21 does not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of
the computer itself. Nor does it affect an improvement in any other
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technology or technical field. The 22 pages of the Specification only spell
out different generic equipment11 and parameters that might be applied using
this concept, and the particular steps such general purpose computer
processing would entail, based on the concept of managing payment
processing by permitting or denying payment processing based on location
and preset parameters under different scenarios. They do not describe any
particular improvement in the manner a computer functions. Instead, claim
21 at issue amounts to nothing significantly more than an instruction to
apply managing payment processing by permitting or denying payment
processing based on location and preset parameters using some unspecified,
generic computer. Under our precedents, that is not enough to transform an
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 225–26.
None of the limitations reflect an improvement in the functioning of a
computer, or an improvement to other technology or technical field, applies
or uses a judicial exception to effect a particular treatment or prophylaxis for
a disease or medical condition, implements a judicial exception with, or uses
a judicial exception in conjunction with, a particular machine or manufacture
that is integral to the claim, effects a transformation or reduction of a
particular article to a different state or thing, or applies or uses the judicial
exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of
the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that

11 The Specification describes a wireless mobile devices such as cellular
telephones, wireless e-mail devices such as a Blackberry®, personal digital
assistants, laptops with a wireless communication card, or nearly any other
form of past or present or future mobile communication device that would
be associated with and likely carried by a customer when making or
initiating a payment card transaction Spec. 15:4–11.
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the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize
the exception.
We conclude that claim 21 is directed to achieving the result of
managing payment processing by advising one to permit or deny payment
processing based on location and preset parameters, as distinguished from a
technological improvement for achieving or applying that result. This
amounts to commercial or legal interactions, which fall within certain
methods of organizing human activity that constitute abstract ideas. The
claim does not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application.
STEP 2B
The next issue is whether claim 21 provides an inventive concept
because the additional elements recited in the claim provide significantly
more than the recited judicial exception.
The introduction of a computer into the claims does not generally alter
the analysis at Mayo step two.
the mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a
patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.
Stating an abstract idea “while adding the words ‘apply it’” is
not enough for patent eligibility. Nor is limiting the use of an
abstract idea “‘to a particular technological environment.’”
Stating an abstract idea while adding the words “apply it with a
computer” simply combines those two steps, with the same
deficient result. Thus, if a patent’s recitation of a computer
amounts to a mere instruction to “implement[t]” an abstract
idea “on . . . a computer,” that addition cannot impart patent
eligibility. This conclusion accords with the preemption
concern that undergirds our § 101 jurisprudence. Given the
ubiquity of computers, wholly generic computer
implementation is not generally the sort of “additional
feature[e]” that provides any “practical assurance that the
process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize
the [abstract idea] itself.”
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Alice, 573 U.S. at 223–24 (citations omitted).
“[T]he relevant question is whether the claims here do more than
simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea . . . on a
generic computer.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225. They do not.
Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the
computer at each step of the process is purely conventional. Using a
computer for receiving, storing, updating, analyzing, processing,
transmitting, and displaying data amounts to electronic data query and
retrieval—some of the most basic functions of a computer. All of these
computer functions are generic, routine, conventional computer activities
that are performed only for their conventional uses. See Elec. Power Grp.
LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See also In re
Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (“Absent a possible narrower construction of the terms
‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ . . . those functions can be achieved
by any general purpose computer without special programming”). None of
these activities is used in some unconventional manner, nor does any
produce some unexpected result. The Appellant does not contend it
invented any of these activities. In short, each step does no more than
require a generic computer to perform generic computer functions. Again,
the use of an intermediary computer is conventional distributed processing,
such as with a server. As to the data operated upon, “even if a process of
collecting and analyzing information is ‘limited to particular content’ or a
particular ‘source,’ that limitation does not make the collection and analysis
other than abstract.” SAP America, Inc. v. InvestPic LLC, 898 F.3d 1161,
1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of
the Appellant’s claim 21 add nothing that is not already present when the
steps are considered separately. The sequence of data reception-storage-
update-analysis-processing-transmission-display is equally generic and
conventional. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed.
Cir. 2014) (sequence of receiving, selecting, offering for exchange, display,
allowing access, and receiving payment recited an abstraction), Inventor
Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (sequence of data retrieval, analysis, modification, generation, display,
and transmission), Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Communications,
LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (sequence of processing, routing,
controlling, and monitoring). The ordering of the steps is therefore ordinary
and conventional.
We conclude that claim 21 does not provide an inventive concept
because the additional elements recited in the claim do not provide
significantly more than the recited judicial exception.
REMAINING CLAIMS
Claim 21 is representative. The other independent method claim 43 is
substantially similar at least as regards to this analysis. The remaining
method claims merely describe process parameters. We conclude that the
method claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept itself, and
not to the practical application of that concept.
As to the structural claims, they
are no different from the method claims in substance. The
method claims recite the abstract idea implemented on a generic
computer; the system claims recite a handful of generic
computer components configured to implement the same idea.
This Court has long “warn[ed] ... against” interpreting § 101“in
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ways that make patent eligibility ‘depend simply on the
draftsman’s art.’
Alice, 573 U.S. at 226. As a corollary, the claims are not directed to any
particular machine.
LEGAL CONCLUSION
From these determinations we further determine that the claims do not
recite an improvement to the functioning of the computer itself or to any
other technology or technical field, a particular machine, a particular
transformation, or other meaningful limitations. From this we conclude the
claims are directed to the judicial exception of the abstract idea of certain
methods of organizing human activity, as exemplified by the commercial
and legal interaction of managing payment processing by advising one to
permit or deny payment processing based on location and preset parameters,
without significantly more.
APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS
As to Appellant’s Appeal Brief arguments, we adopt the Examiner’s
determinations and analysis from the Final Act. 2–4, and Ans. 3–19, and
reach similar legal conclusions. We now turn to the Reply Brief.
We are not persuaded by the Appellant’s argument that the rejection
“did not consider these features in combination with the remaining features
of the claim.” Reply Br. 2. Such consideration is presented supra.
We are not persuaded by the Appellant’s argument that “incorporation
of the managing system at that specific location facilitates the authorization
process, assists in the prevention of fraud, and reduces unnecessary
communications to the issuer.” Reply Br. 3. The steps recited advise one to
permit or deny payment processing based on location and preset parameters.
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The location of the computer managing this does not affect this analysis. To
the extent the Appellant argues that using a third computer to do so improves
performance, this is no more than the expected result of any conventional
use of distributed processing in its intended fashion, such as by servers.
This is not a case like BASCOM (BASCOM Global Internet v. AT&T
Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). See also Reply Br. 7–8
(related arguments). Initially, we remind Appellant that BASCOM did not
find claims eligible on the substance, but rather that the Appellees did not
provide sufficient evidence to support a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss in which
facts are presumed in the non-movant’s favor.
The key fact in BASCOM was the presence of a structural change in
“installation of a filtering tool at a specific location, remote from the end-
users, with customizable filtering features specific to each end user. This
design gives the filtering tool both the benefits of a filter on a local computer
and the benefits of a filter on the ISP server.” BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1350.
It was not the idea of having user customizable filtering located separately
from the user that was inventive, but the manner of accomplishing it in that
context, as the relatively primitive internet architecture at that time did not
readily lend itself to such filtering. Filtering located separately from the user
was already performed. “To overcome some of the disadvantages of
installing filtering software on each local computer, another prior art system
relocated the filter to a local server.” Id. at 1344. But it was known that
allowing user customization there was desirable. “However, the one-size-
fits-all filter on the local server was not ideal.” Id.
“BASCOM explains that the inventive concept rests on taking advantage
of the ability of at least some ISPs to identify individual accounts that
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communicate with the ISP server, and to associate a request for Internet content
with a specific individual account.” Id. Thus, BASCOM solved the problem of
how to create the structural relationship known to be desired by finding a way to
relate a user to a centrally located filter at a time, when how to do so was unclear.
It was not the structural relation per se, but how it was accomplished that was
inventive. No analogous technological hurdle is described in the instant record.
Indeed, the whole point here appears to be to simply use existing distributed
processing technology to introduce fraud monitoring by monitoring transactions
for activity meeting predefined criteria indicative of potential fraud.
We are not persuaded by the Appellant’s argument that the claims
“enable the processing of a transaction (e.g., authorization or denial), in a
very specific way as recited in the claims, thereby providing a useful result,
and improving upon security surrounding transactions.” Reply Br. 4. The
way is specific only in the sense it is specified using words. Enabling or
disallowing processing is conventional decision branch processing in data
processing, and even generic programming (conventional IF . . . THEN . . .
ELSE programming statements). Such processing necessarily relies on data
for decision criteria, so the recited use of such criteria adds no inventive
feature.
We are not persuaded by the Appellant’s argument that the
instant claims improve upon such conventional technology, as
the mobile phone prompts the managing computer system with
its country location (e.g., upon entering/leaving a country), and
the managing computer system maintains that country location
information until it receives an updated country location from
the mobile device when the mobile device enters a new country
location. As such, the managing computer system does not
require communication (e.g., submission of requests) with
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cellular telephone service providers in order to obtain country
location information of mobile phones.
Reply Br. 5 (citations omitted). This is no more than using a database server
for its intended purpose, i.e., updating the database when the data alters, and
querying the database when the data is needed, using a server for the
efficiency of distributed processing. Indeed the whole point of using a
database is to have a repository to query, rather than having to recreate the
data constantly. Thus, such an arrangement is conventional and
rudimentary.
The Appellant also attempts to analogize the claims to those involved
in McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed.
Cir. 2016). Reply Br. 6. In McRO, the court held that, although the
processes were previously performed by humans, “the traditional process
and newly claimed method . . . produced . . . results in fundamentally
different ways.” FairWarning v. Iatric Systems, 839 F.3d 1089, 1094
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (differentiating the claims at issue from those in McRO).
In McRO, “it was the incorporation of the claimed rules not the use of the
computer, that improved the existing technology process,” because the
prior process performed by humans “was driven by subjective
determinations rather than specific, limited mathematical rules.” 837 F.3d
at 1314 (internal quotation marks, citation, and alterations omitted). In
contrast, the claims of the instant application merely implement an old
practice of using decision criteria in making payment processing decisions in
a new environment. The Appellant has not argued that the claimed processes
of selecting approval or denial apply rules of selection in a manner
technologically different from those which humans used, albeit with less
efficiency, before the invention was claimed. Merely pigeon holing the
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objects of decision making in tiers to aid decision making is both old and
itself abstract.
The claims in McRO were not directed to an abstract idea, but
instead were directed to “a specific asserted improvement in
computer animation, i.e., the automatic use of rules of a
particular type.” We explained that “the claimed improvement
[was] allowing computers to produce ‘accurate and realistic lip
synchronization and facial expressions in animated characters’
that previously could only be produced by human animators.”
The claimed rules in McRO transformed a traditionally
subjective process performed by human artists into a
mathematically automated process executed on computers.
FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1094.
The Appellant next contends the claims are analogous to those in
AmDocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir.
2016). The Appellant contends that the claims in Amdocs were related to
reducing congestion in a network, while still allowing the data to be
accessible from a central network. App. Br. 8. This is not quite accurate.
The Court’s analysis turned heavily on a prior construction.
Claim 1 requires “computer code for using the accounting
information with which the first network accounting record is
correlated to enhance the first network accounting record.” In
Amdocs I, we construed “enhance” as being dependent upon
the invention’s distributed architecture.
We construed “enhance” as meaning “to apply a number of
field enhancements in a distributed fashion.” We took care to
note how the district court explained that “[i]n this context,
‘distributed’ means that the network usage records are
processed close to their sources before being transmitted to a
centralized manager.” And we specifically approved of the
district court’s “reading the ‘in a distributed fashion’ and the
‘close to the source’ of network information requirements into
the term ‘enhance.’”
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AmDocs, 841 F.3d at 1300 (citations omitted). Thus, the Court read “to
apply a number of field enhancements in a distributed fashion” into “using
the accounting information with which the first network accounting record is
correlated to enhance the first network accounting record.” Appellant
admits as much. Reply Br. 8–9. This is substantially more than merely
being related to reducing congestion in a network, while still allowing the
data to be accessible from a central network. The claims at issue recite no
more than using an intermediate computer, and recite no technological
implementation details, as were imported into the Amdocs claims by the
District Court’s construction.
We are not persuaded by the Appellant’s argument that
Appellant's claims operate in a non-conventional and non-
generic manner to improve upon the way conventional
technology operates by providing a new and useful system and
method to greatly increase the accuracy of fraud detection and
prevention by imposing blocks and/or generating real-time
electronic alerts based on country location information received
from a mobile device.
Reply Br. 9–10. We determine and support findings that the claims use
conventional operations in conventional manners supra.
We are not persuaded by the Appellant’s argument that the claims
would not preempt the idea. Reply Br. 10. “Where a patent’s claims are
deemed only to disclose patent ineligible subject matter under the Mayo
[/Alice] framework, as they are in this case, preemption concerns are fully
addressed and made moot.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788
F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 12–16, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 32–39 and 41–45 rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Stevens and Rados
As to Appellant’s Appeal Brief arguments, we adopt the Examiner’s
determinations and analysis from the Final Office Action, pages 5–24, and
Answer, pages 19–24, and reach similar legal conclusions. We now turn to
the Reply Brief.
We are not persuaded by the Appellant’s argument that
Rados does not disclose an intermediary system. It discloses
only an issuer and a merchant, and neither the merchant nor the
card issuer transmits two alerts, as in the present claims, let
alone when taking action to permit denying an authorization
request when an authorization lock is set. Rather, in Rados, the
merchant transmits only a single request (i.e., authorization
request) to the issuer. And, the issuer transmits a single
message to the customer.
Reply Br. 11. As the Examiner determines,
this is merely a depiction of distributed computing. The use of
an intermediary computer between client and server or between
two servers is merely an example of distributed architecture.
Almost any two tiered client server architecture can be
converted to three-tier architecture by installing intermediary
servers to distribute load or separate application logic or for
security purposes. For example, it would have been obvious to
upgrade the two tier communication between merchant POS
and Issuer Computer into a three tier by installing a middle tier
broker to handle communication layer. The motivation would
have to take advantage of distributed architecture. Examiner
further notes that in real life, financial institutions and card
networks deploy hundreds of servers and client computers to
process a multitude of operations including data processing,
messaging, security, load balancing, reconciliation, and so on.
Thus, the diagrams in both Appellant's own disclosure as well
as in the cited prior art, are merely simplified representations of
the actual configuration. The managing computer system in the
claims is nothing but a simplified functional representation of a
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client middle tier which would be readily obvious to a person of
ordinary skills in the art.
Ans. 23–24. Such servers must logically inform the processes invoking their
services of the outcome. Thus, any use of a server must include some
signals to both the customer relying on the approval, and the issuer relying
on the server’s test of the criteria for providing approval. As the
Specification and claims do not define or even narrow the implementation of
such alerts, and the claims recite that the function of the alerts is to indicate
some condition, any signal indicative of such a condition, including that
within conventional program flow, would be within the scope of the recited
alerts.
We are not persuaded by the Appellant’s argument that
with respect to the Examiner’s assertion that [t]here is no reason
why an alert cannot be sent to the issuer, Appellant submits that
such an alert would be unnecessary as the issuer in Rados
determines the authorization or denial of the transaction.
Moreover, Appellant respectfully submits that the Examiner’s
assertion is not a legally adequate basis for rejecting this claim
feature.
Reply Br. 12. The Appellant does not respond to the Examiner’s
determination that it was predictable to use distributed computing to perform
the recited steps, which would add the recited alert signal, as we determined
supra.
We are not persuaded by the Appellant’s arguments that
with respect to the Examiner;s assertion that [t]here is no reason
why an alert cannot be sent to the issuer, Appellant submits that
the Examiner also responds to Appellant’s arguments that,
contrary to the present claims, neither message in Rados,
(authorization request sent to issuer or the message sent by the
issuer to customer) occurs once the issuer has begun to take
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action to deny the transaction (because an authorization lock is
set), as in Appellant’s claims,
Reply Br. 13, and that
contrary to the Appealed claims, in Rados, a first message (e.g.,
the authorization request) is sent from the merchant to the
issuer to initiate the transaction, and a second message is
transmitted from the issuer to the consumer for additional
authorization for the transaction. Regardless of whether a
message is sent to the consumer, it is (i) sent from the issuer
(not an intermediary computer system between the merchant
and the issuer) and (ii) it is not sent once the transaction is
already in the process of being declined. Moreover, because the
issuer in Rados awaits the consumer's decision as to whether to
authorize or deny the transaction in, it would not be until after
the messages are transmitted in Rados, and then a response
received from the consumer, that the issuer would take action
to deny the transaction, which is in stark contrast with
Appellant’s claim 1.
Reply Br. 14. Again, the intermediary computer is nothing more than the
conventional use of distributed computing. As to the timing of the messages
occurring “when taking action, by the managing computer system to permit
denying the transaction” (claim 1), the Specification and claims do not
define or limit the implementation of the initiation of this taking action, and
so all processing occurring after the test of the criteria indicates non-
approval falls within this scope. As any such signal must occur after such a
determination, the timing must follow.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that
Rados not only fails to disclose or suggest the recited three-
party system of the instant claims (i.e., merchant, intermediary
computer managing system, card issuer), but the document also
fails to disclose or suggest the defined conditional stipulations
that must be met prior to transmitting any alert messages.
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Reply Br. 14. Again, these would be the corollaries to use of conventional
distributed computing.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The rejection of claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 12–16, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 32–39
and 41–46 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial exception without
significantly more is proper.
The rejection of claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 12–16, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 32–39
and 41–46 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Stevens and Rados
is proper.

CONCLUSION
The rejection of claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 12–16, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 32–39
and 41–46 is affirmed.
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In summary:
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2011).

AFFIRMED

Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C.
§
Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 2, 4, 5, 12–16, 18, 19,
21, 22, 24, 25, 32–39,
41–46
101 Eligibility 1, 2, 4, 5, 12–16, 18, 19, 21,
22, 24, 25, 32–39, 41–46

1, 2, 4, 5, 12–16, 18, 19,
21, 22, 24, 25, 32–39,
41–46
103 Stevens,
Rados
1, 2, 4, 5, 12–16, 18, 19, 21,
22, 24, 25, 32–39, 41–46

Overall Outcome 1, 2, 4, 5, 12–16, 18, 19, 21,
22, 24, 25, 32–39, 41–46