Orhan Bulan et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 31, 2019

13861553 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 31, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/861,553 04/12/2013 Orhan Bulan 20121601-US-NP 4865
144570 7590 07/31/2019
LOZA & LOZA, LLP / Conduent
305 North 2nd Avenue #127
Upland, CA 91786
EXAMINER
ALLEN, AKIBA KANELLE
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3628
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/31/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Conduent.PatentDocketing@conduent.com
docketing@lozaip.com
klopez@lozaip.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
________________

Ex parte ORHAN BULAN, PANYA CHANAWANGSA,
YAO RONG WANG, and ZHIGANG FAN
________________

Appeal 2017-011641
Application 13/861,5531
Technology Center 3600
________________

Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, CATHERINE SHIANG, and
JASON J. CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judges.

CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Final
Rejection of claims 1–20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
INVENTION
The invention relates to video-based parking occupancy detection
technology. Spec. ¶ 1. Claim 1 is illustrative of the invention and is
reproduced below:

1 According to Appellants, Conduent Business Services, LLC is the real
party in interest. App. Br. 2.
Appeal 2017-011641
Application 13/861,553

2
1. A method for automatically managing parking
payment and enforcement, said method comprising:
acquiring video of an FOV (Field of View) of a parking
zone utilizing a video-based occupancy detection system that
includes at least one processor operably coupled to at least one
digital camera for acquiring said video;
image processing said video of said FOV of said parking
zone utilizing said at least one digital camera and said at least one
processor comprising at least one image processor prior to
determining a number of-vehicles in said FOV of said parking
zone from real-time data acquired by said video-based
occupancy detection system including said at least one digital
camera;
automatically determining said number of vehicles in said
FOV of said parking zone from said real-time data acquired by
said video-based occupancy detection system regarding said
vehicles located in said parking zone, said real-time data
including said video of said FOV of said parking zone acquired
by said video-based occupancy detection system;
automatically calculating utilizing said at least one
processor a number of said vehicles in said FOV of said parking
zone that are paid to at least one parking meter associated with
said parking zone;
automatically calculating utilizing said at least one
processor a number of said vehicles in said FOV of said parking
zone that have an open account for payment;
automatically comparing utilizing said at least one
processor said number of said vehicles in said FOV of said
parking zone with said number of vehicles in said FOV of said
parking zone that are paid with respect to a current time to said
number of vehicles that have an open account for payment to
determine data indicative of unpaid violations if said number of
vehicles in said FOV of said parking zone exceeds said number
of vehicles that are paid, registered to pay, and having an
account to pay; and
displaying at least some of said data associated with said
FOV of said parking zone in a first display area of a graphical
user interface and at least some other of said data in a second
area of said graphic user interface including a display area for
Appeal 2017-011641
Application 13/861,553

3
graphically displaying a parking table derived from said data for
ease of display of said data in said graphical user interface.
App. Br. 20 (emphases added).

REJECTION AT ISSUE2
Claims 1–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to
patent ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 2–3.

ANALYSIS
I. Claims 1–20 Rejected Under 35 U.S.C. § 101
A. Legal Principles
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573

2 Claims 16–20 state “processor-readable medium.” We have decided the
Appeal before us, however, in the event of further prosecution, the Examiner
should evaluate claims 16–20 in light of In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed.
Cir. 2007); Subject Matter Eligibility of Computer Readable Media, 1351
Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 212 (Feb. 23, 2010). Specifically, the Examiner should
consider whether claims 16–20 should state “non-transitory.”
Appeal 2017-011641
Application 13/861,553

4
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
(15 How.) 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S.
at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 192 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
Appeal 2017-011641
Application 13/861,553

5
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101. USPTO’s January 7, 2019 Memorandum, 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance (“Memorandum”). Under that
guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:
Appeal 2017-011641
Application 13/861,553

6
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that are not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
See Memorandum.
B. The Examiner’s Conclusions and Appellants’ Arguments
The Examiner concludes the present claims recite mental processes
and are analogous to the claims in Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom
S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Ans. 3. The Examiner also
determines the present claims do not amount to significantly more than an
abstract idea itself because the Examiner determines the abstract idea is
implemented on generic components that are well-understood, routine, and
conventional, previously known to the industry. Final Act. 3; Ans. 2.
Appellants argue the Examiner oversimplifies the present claims and
does not consider them as a whole. App. Br. 12–13; Reply Br. 2.
Appellants argue the present claims are not directed to an abstract idea
because the claims cannot be performed in the human mind with pen and
paper. App. Br. 14. Appellants argue the present claims are not directed to
an abstract idea because the claims improve the underlying technology of
automatically managing parking payment and enforcement by determining
parking occupancy for certain vehicles, cross referencing that information
against a set of electronic accounts, and assessing associated parking fees.
Id. at 13, 17. Appellants argue, similar to McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco
Games America Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1308–14 (Fed. Cir. 2016), the present
Appeal 2017-011641
Application 13/861,553

7
claims recite a number of unique rules that must be implemented and
followed to process incoming images into usable form that can be leveraged
to evaluate parking occupancy. App. Br. 14. Appellants argue that the
present claims are unlike the claims in Electric Power because the claims in
Electric Power did not recite new techniques for equating parking zones and
payment accounts. Reply Br. 3–4.3 Appellants argue the present claims
provide improved rules because they do not have a prior art rejection. Id. at
4.4 Appellants argue the present claims do not preempt any abstract idea.
App. Br. 14, 17.
Appellants argue similar to BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v.
AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016), the present claims
recite a combination of non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of
known, conventional elements, which results in an inventive concept. App.
Br. 13, 15–17. We disagree with Appellants.
C. Discussion
1. Step 2A, Prong 1
We agree with the Examiner’s conclusion that the present claims
recite concepts performed in the human mind. Ans. 2. In particular, the
emphasized portions of claim 1,5 reproduced above (see supra at 2–3), recite

3 Appellants’ argument in the Reply Brief is not untimely because the
Examiner cited Electric Power for the first time in the Answer. Compare
Ans. 3–4 with Final Act.
4 Appellants’ argument in the Reply Brief is not untimely because the
Examiner concluded “[t]he present claims do not provide improved rules
and merely implement an old practice in a new environment” for the first
time in the Answer. Compare Ans. 6–7 with Final Act.
5 Claim 1, reproduced above with emphases, recites similar features as
independent claims 10 and 16. Appellants do not argue claims 2–20
Appeal 2017-011641
Application 13/861,553

8
concepts that may be performed in the human mind, including managing
parking payment and enforcement by acquiring video of an FOV or a
parking zone, determining parking occupancy for certain vehicles, cross
referencing that information against a set of accounts, assessing associated
parking fees, and displaying at least some of the data associated with the
FOV. According to the Memorandum, concepts performed in the human
mind fall into the category of mental processes. See Memorandum.
Moreover, those mental processes are a type of an abstract idea. See id.
We also conclude the present claims, recite commercial interactions,
including managing parking payment and enforcement by acquiring video of
an FOV or a parking zone, determining parking occupancy for certain
vehicles, cross referencing that information against a set of accounts,
assessing associated parking fees, and displaying at least some of the data
associated with the FOV. According to the Memorandum, commercial
interactions fall into the category of certain methods of organizing human
activity. See Memorandum. Moreover, those certain methods of organizing
human activity are a type of an abstract idea. See id.
We observe that the present claims are analogous to the claims found
to be abstract in Electric Power. In Electric Power, the court held that the
claims were drawn to “collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying
certain results of the collection and analysis,” which is a mental process (i.e.,
an abstract idea). Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1353. The present claims at
issue here are similar because they recite acquiring video of an FOV or a
parking zone, automatically determining parking occupancy for certain

separately with particularity. App. Br. 11–18. We, therefore, group claims
1–20 together and refer to claims 1–20 as the “present claims.”
Appeal 2017-011641
Application 13/861,553

9
vehicles, cross referencing that information against a set of electronic
accounts, assessing associated parking fees, and displaying at least some of
the data associated with the FOV.
We disagree with Appellants’ argument that the Examiner
oversimplifies the present claims and does not consider them as a whole
(App. Br. 12–13; Reply Br. 2) for at least the reasons discussed above. We
also disagree with Appellants’ argument that the present claims are not
mental processes (App. Br. 14) for at least the reasons discussed above.
Furthermore, by way of example, we interpret the present claims as
encompassing person watching video of a parking lot and determining which
cars have paid parking meters and which cars do not, then drawing the data
gathered as tables using pen and paper.
Because the present claims recite concepts performed in the human
mind, which fall into the category of mental processes (i.e., an abstract idea),
we proceed to prong 2.
2. Step 2A, Prong 2
The present claims do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical
application because they do not impose any meaningful limits on practicing
the abstract idea.
We disagree with Appellants’ argument that, similar to McRO, the
present claims recite a number of unique rules that must be implemented and
followed to process incoming images into usable form that can be leveraged
to evaluate parking occupancy. App. Br. 14. Instead, the present claims are
directed to an abstract idea as discussed supra, in § I.C.1. And, unlike the
claims of McRO, the present claims are not directed to rules for lip sync and
facial expression animation or an improvement in computer technology.
Appeal 2017-011641
Application 13/861,553

10
We disagree with Appellants’ argument that the present claims recite
improvements to the functioning of a computer or to any other technology or
technical field. App. Br. 13, 17. The alleged improvement is an
improvement to automatically managing parking payment and enforcement
by determining parking occupancy for certain vehicles, cross referencing
that information against a set of electronic accounts, and assessing
associated parking fees. However, the present claims are directed to an
abstract idea as discussed supra, in § I.C.1. or at best, improving an abstract
idea—not a technological improvement. The Specification indicates the
additional elements (i.e., “video-based occupancy detection system,” “digital
camera,” “processor,” “graphical user interface,” “data bus,”6 “computer-
useable medium,”7) recited in the present claims are merely tools used to
implement the abstract idea. Spec. ¶¶ 36, 37, 47, 51–56, 58–60.
Additionally, “a claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.”
Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir.
2016). “[U]nder the Mayo/Alice framework, a claim directed to a newly
discovered law of nature (or natural phenomenon or abstract idea) cannot
rely on the novelty of that discovery for the inventive concept necessary for
patent eligibility.” Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369,
1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Furthermore, although the present claims recite “automatically,” the
present claims amount to merely automating the abstract idea discussed
supra in § I.C.1. “Automation” or any increase in processing speed in the

6 Claims 1 and 16 do not recite “data bus,” whereas claim 10 does.
7 Claims 1 and 16 do not recite “computer-useable medium,” whereas claim
10 does.
Appeal 2017-011641
Application 13/861,553

11
claimed method (as compared to without using computers) comes from the
capabilities of the generic computer components, and not the recited process
itself. See FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1095
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co.,
687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he fact that the required
calculations could be performed more efficiently via a computer does not
materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter.”)); see
also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indemnity Co., 711 F.App’x 1012,
1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (“Though the claims purport to
accelerate the process of finding errant files and to reduce error, we have
held that speed and accuracy increases stemming from the ordinary
capabilities of a general-purpose computer ‘do[ ] not materially alter the
patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter.’”).
We disagree with Appellants’ argument that the present claims are
unlike the claims in Electric Power because the claims in Electric Power did
not recite new techniques for equating parking zones and payment accounts.
Reply Br. 3–4. As discussed supra in §§ I.C.1., I.C.2., the present claims are
directed to an abstract idea. Moreover, we conclude the present claims
recite acquiring video of an FOV or a parking zone, automatically
determining parking occupancy for certain vehicles, cross referencing that
information against a set of electronic accounts, assessing associated parking
fees, and displaying at least some of the data associated with the FOV,
which is similar to the claims in Electric Power that were drawn to
“collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the
collection and analysis,” which is a mental process (i.e., an abstract idea).
Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1353.
Appeal 2017-011641
Application 13/861,553

12
We disagree with Appellants’ argument that the present claims
provide improved rules because they do not have a prior art rejection. Reply
Br. 4. Appellants improperly conflate the requirements for eligible subject
matter (§ 101) with the independent requirements of novelty (§ 102) and
non-obviousness (§ 103). “The ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a
process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining
whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of
possibly patentable subject matter.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188–89; see also
Genetic Techs., 818 F.3d at 1376 (stating that, “under the Mayo/Alice
framework, a claim directed to a newly discovered law of nature (or natural
phenomenon or abstract idea) cannot rely on the novelty of that discovery
for the inventive concept necessary for patent eligibility”).
Additionally, we disagree with Appellants’ argument that the present
claims are patent eligible because they do not preempt any abstract idea.
App. Br. 14, 17. Although preemption may denote patent ineligibility, its
absence does not demonstrate patent eligibility. See FairWarning, IP, LLC
v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d at 1098. For claims covering a patent-ineligible
concept, preemption concerns “are fully addressed and made moot” by an
analysis under the Mayo/Alice framework. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v.
Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Because the present claims recite an abstract idea that is not integrated
into a practical application, we proceed to Step 2B.
3. Step 2B
We agree with the Examiner’s determination that the abstract idea is
implemented on generic components that are well-understood, routine, and
conventional. Final Act. 3; Ans. 2. The Specification supports the
Appeal 2017-011641
Application 13/861,553

13
Examiners determination in this regard because it explains that “video-based
occupancy detection system,” “digital camera,” “processor,” “graphical user
interface,” “data bus,” “computer-useable medium,” are generic
components. Spec. ¶¶ 36, 37, 47, 51–56, 58–60. Appellants’ Specification
indicates these elements were well-understood, routine, and conventional
components because it describes them at a high level of generality and in a
manner that indicates that they are sufficiently well-known. Id.
We disagree with Appellants’ argument that the present claims recite
a combination of non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known,
conventional elements, which results in an inventive concept. App. Br. 15.
Instead, the present claims are directed to an abstract idea using generic
components as discussed supra, in §§ I.C.1. and I.C.2. or at best, improving
an abstract idea—not an inventive concept.
Appellants do not argue claims 2–20 separately, but assert the § 101
rejection of those claims should be withdrawn for at least the same reasons
as argued for claim 1. App. Br. 11–18. Based on our review of the claims
2–20, these claims do not recite any additional features that would transform
the abstract idea embodied in claim 1 into an inventive concept.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of: (1) independent claims
1, 10, and 16; and (2) dependent claims 2–9, 11–15, and 17–20 under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
We have only considered those arguments that Appellants actually
raised in the Briefs. Arguments Appellants could have made, but chose not
to make, in the Briefs have not been considered and are deemed to be
waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

Appeal 2017-011641
Application 13/861,553

14
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–20 under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED