Orange Bang, Inc.v.Olé Mexican Foods, Inc.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 10, 2015

No. 92048698 (T.T.A.B. Sep. 10, 2015)

Mailed: September 10, 2015

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
______

Orange Bang, Inc.
v.
Olé Mexican Foods, Inc.
_____

Opposition No. 91189001

Cancellation No. 92048698

Cancellation No. 92049127
_____

Aaron T. Borrowman of Kelly & Kelley LLP for Orange Bang, Inc.

Paul S. Owens of Paul Owens & Associatesfor Olé Mexican Foods, Inc.
______

Before Seeherman, Kuhlke and Wolfson,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Seeherman, Administrative Trademark Judge:

This is a consolidated proceeding1 involving an opposition and two
cancellation actions brought by Orange Bang, Inc. (hereafter “Plaintiff”)

1 The history of the consolidation of these proceedings is somewhat convoluted.
Cancellation No. 92048698 was filed on January 4, 2008; Cancellation No. 92049127
was filed on April 1, 2008; and the opposition was filed on February 25, 2009. On
June 19, 2008, Plaintiff filed a submission in both cancellation proceedings advising
This Opinion is a
Precedent of the TTAB
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
2
against, respectively, an application by Olé Mexican Foods, Inc. (hereafter
“Defendant”) to register OLÉ MEXICAN FOODS and design (shown below)

(hereafter OLÉ MEXICAN FOODS),2 and to partially cancel Defendant’s
Registration No. 3223608 for the mark OLÉ in standard characters3

the Board that there were six cancellation proceedings, including the two
proceedings listed above, that had similar marks and issues. In view thereof, on
December 19, 2008, the Board consolidated the six cancellation actions. 19
TTABVUE in Canc. No. 92048698, the then-parent file. Then, on July 20, 2009, the
parties stipulated that the cancellation actions that are part of the present
proceeding go forward, and that the other cancellation actions be held in suspension,
thereby, in effect, severing them from this proceeding. The Board ordered this on
September 20, 2009. 29, 30 TTABVUE in Canc. No. 92048698. On March 22, 2012,
the Board consolidated the three instant proceedings. 43 TTABVUE in the now-
parent file, Opp. 91189001. All references in this opinion to TTABVUE entry
numbers subsequent to March 22, 2012 are to entries in the opposition file.
2 Application Serial No. 77426608, filed March 19, 2008, based on Section 1(a) of the
Trademark Act, asserting first use and first in commerce on the goods in Class 29 in
December 2007. “The mark consists of a panel shaped design and a cross-shaped
background design that includes a bull; the left panel is green, the center panel is
white and the right panel is red, with the words “OLÉ MEXICAN FOODS”
superimposed on the panel; the cross-shaped background design is yellow, brown
and gold and the bull and wording are black.” The colors red, white, green, yellow,
gold, brown and black are claimed as a feature of the mark. The words MEXICAN
FOODS and EST. 1988 have been disclaimed. The application also includes
“tortillas” in Class 30.
3 Registration No. 3223608 issued April 3, 2007 from an application filed
November 2, 2004; Section 8 affidavit accepted.
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
3
(Cancellation No. 92048698) and Registration No. 3161729 for OLÉ and
design,4 shown below (Cancellation No. 92049127).

Plaintiff opposes registration of OLÉ MEXICAN FOODS only in Class 29,
for “dairy and fruit based non-alcoholic food beverages.”5 Plaintiff is seeking,
by its amended petitions filed August 30, 2012, to partially cancel both
registrations by removing the beverage items, namely, “yogurt-based
beverages” in Class 29 and “herbal teas” in Class 30.6 45 TTABVUE. Thus,
all three cases focus on the beverage items of Defendant.
In the Section 8 affidavit Defendant filed for Registration No. 3161729 on
August 9, 2012, it listed, inter alia, “yogurt-based beverages” and “herbal
teas” as goods to be deleted, while the Section 8 affidavit Defendant filed for
Registration No. 3223608 listed “herbal teas” as goods to be deleted.
Therefore, the registrations currently do not include these beverages. The
effect of these deletions is discussed infra.

4 Registration No. 3161729 issued October 24, 2006, from an application filed March
26, 2005; Section 8 affidavit accepted. “The mark consists of the word OLÉ in red
letters on a curved green background. Underneath on the left and right sides are
chevrons in red, white, and green. The foreign wording in the mark translates into
English as Bravo.”
5 The application also includes “tortillas” in Class 30.
6 Both registrations also include various “Mexican style food products.”
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
4
The Pleadings
The ground asserted by Plaintiff in these consolidated proceedings is
likelihood of confusion. Plaintiff has alleged that since 1981, prior to
Defendant’s use of its marks, Plaintiff has used the mark OLÉ in association
with beverages, namely fruit juice, fruit flavored, herbal flavored, and milk-
based beverages; and that it is the owner of Registration No. 3315078 for the
mark OLÉ for “rice and milk-based beverages, namely horchata,” and “non-
alcoholic and non-carbonated fruit juice beverages,” and of Application Serial
No. 78738452 for OLÉ for various beverages. In its amended petitions to
cancel the registrations, 45 TTABVUE, Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant’s
registrations have been cited as a bar against Plaintiff’s pending application
Serial No. 78738452.
In its answers to the amended pleadings, Defendant has admitted that
Plaintiff is the owner of Registration No. 3315078 for the mark OLÉ, and
that Defendant’s Registration Nos. 3223608 and 3161729 (the subjects of the
cancellation proceedings) were cited, along with four other registrations
owned by Defendant, against Plaintiff’s Application Serial No. 78738452. 50,
51 TTABVUE. Defendant had previously filed, with its earlier
answers/amended answers in the proceedings,7 counterclaims for partial
cancellation of Plaintiff’s pleaded Registration No. 3315078 to restrict the
identification of goods. Specifically, Defendant alleges that Plaintiff has never

7 12 TTABVUE in the opposition, 33 TTABVUE in Cancellation Action No. 92048698
(at that time consolidated with Cancellation No. 92049127).
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
5
used or has abandoned its mark on ready-to-drink beverages distributed
through retail food and grocery stores, supermarkets, mass retailers,
superstores, and Mexican sit-down restaurants or taquerias. Therefore,
Defendant seeks through its counterclaim8 to have the identification of goods
in Plaintiff’s registration, currently “rice and milk-based beverages, namely
horchata; and non-alcoholic and non-carbonated fruit juice beverages,”
restricted to limit the goods to concentrates used in the preparation of
fountain drinks sold through beverage dispensers, as follows (changes
highlighted):
concentrates for rice and milk-based beverages, namely
horchata; and concentrates for non-alcoholic and non-
carbonated fruit juice beverages, all for use in the
preparation of fountain drinks sold through
beverage dispensers.

Defendant also proposes that the yogurt beverages9 identified in its own
Registration Nos. 3223608 and 3161729 (the subjects of the cancellation
actions) be restricted to pre-mixed, ready-to-drink beverages sold off-the-
shelf, as follows:
Mexican style food products, namely, chorizo, queso and
cheese dips, canned peppers, dried peppers and
chicharrones; and pre-mixed, ready-to-drink yogurt-

8 Though filed in multiple proceedings, there is essentially only one counterclaim
and we shall refer to it in the singular.
9 The amended answer and counterclaim in the consolidated cancellation proceeding
was filed on January 12, 2010 (33 TTABVUE in then-parent Cancellation No.
92048698). At that time Defendant had not yet filed its Section 8 affidavit in
Registration No. 3161729, by which it deleted, inter alia, “yogurt-based beverages”
and “herbal teas” from its registration, or for Registration No. 3223608, by which it
deleted, inter alia, “herbal teas.”
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
6
based beverages sold off-the-shelf in individual or
multi-serving container[s], excluding sales of
concentrates for use in the preparation of fountain
drinks in Class 29.

The respective restrictions set out above constitute an effort by Defendant
to allow the Board, under Section 18 of the Trademark Act, to conclude that
the parties’ registrations, as restricted, could coexist on the register of marks
because there would be no likelihood of confusion. Defendant also proposes,
in the event the Board finds after trial that the above restrictions to
Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s registrations are not sufficient to avoid a
likelihood of confusion, that the identifications in Defendant’s registrations
with respect to the yogurt-based beverages be even further restricted to limit
the channels of trade (changes highlighted):
pre-mixed, ready-to-drink yogurt-based beverages sold off-the-
shelf in multi-serving containers for sale primarily through
retail food and grocery stores, supermarkets, mass
retailer, superstores, and Mexican sit-down restaurants
or taquerias, excluding the sales of concentrates for use in the
preparation of fountain drinks

and that Plaintiff’s Registration No. 3315078 be amended to further limit the
channels of trade:
excluding sale through retail food and grocery stores,
supermarkets, mass retailers, superstores, and Mexican sit-
down restaurants or taquerias.

The amended counterclaim for the then-consolidated cancellation proceedings
was accepted by the Board on March 29, 2010 (38 TTABVUE).
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
7
The above alternative efforts by Defendant to invoke and rely on Section
18 of the Trademark Act involve only the parties’ respective registrations. In
the opposition, because the goods in Defendant’s application include, as
beverages, fruit-based beverages and dairy-based beverages (as opposed to
only yogurt-based beverages), there is a slight difference in the set of
proposed restrictions that Defendant suggests in its amended answer and
counterclaim (12 TTABVUE in Op. No. 91189001). Although the proposed
restrictions to the form of the beverages and the contingent further
restriction to the channels of trade to Plaintiff’s Registration No. 3315078 are
the same, Defendant proposes that Class 29 in its application be amended to
(changes highlighted):
pre-mixed, ready-to-drink dairy and fruit-based non-alcoholic
food beverages sold off-the-shelf in individual or multi-
serving containers, excluding sales of concentrates for
use in the preparation of fountain drinks,

or if, after trial, this is found not to be sufficient, Defendant requests that its
application in Class 29 be further amended to (changes highlighted):
pre-mixed, ready-to-drink dairy and fruit-based non-alcoholic
food beverages sold off-the-shelf in individual or multi-serving
containers for sale primarily through retail food and
grocery stores, supermarkets, mass retailers, superstores,
and Mexican sit-down restaurants or taquerias, excluding
sales of concentrates for use in the preparation of fountain
drinks.

Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
8
The Board accepted the amended answer and counterclaim in the opposition
in its March 19, 2010 order (21 TTABVUE).10
Thus, the operative complaints can be found at 1 TTABVUE for the
opposition and 45 TTABVUE for the petitions for cancellation; the answer
and counterclaim can be found at 12 TTABVUE for the opposition and 50, 51
TTABVUE for the cancellation actions; and the answer to the counterclaim
can be found at 22 TTABVUE (all in parent file 91189001) and in 24
TTABVUE in the then-parent file in the then-consolidated cancellation
proceedings.
In summary, this proceeding revolves around the issue of likelihood of
confusion regarding the Class 29 beverage items in the parties’ registrations
and application, and Defendant’s attempt to obviate any likelihood of
confusion by restrictions to the nature of the parties’ beverages and, if
necessary, to the respective channels of trade.
Objections
Both parties have filed a large number of objections. Defendant’s can be
found at 86 TTABVUE. We rule on them briefly.

10 After the opposition and cancellation actions were consolidated in the subject
proceeding, Plaintiff filed amended cancellation petitions, as set forth above (45
TTABVUE), and Defendant filed answers, again as described above (51, 52
TTABVUE). Although Defendant’s amended answers do not reiterate the allegations
of the counterclaim, it is clear that the counterclaim in the two cancellation
proceedings, set forth at 33 TTABVUE of the then-consolidated cancellation
proceedings in Canc. No. 92048698, have been maintained. We treat Plaintiff’s
answers to the counterclaims at 22 TTABVUE in the opposition and at 24
TTABVUE in the then-consolidated cancellations to be the operative pleadings
answering the counterclaim.
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
9
Defendant’s Objections to Plaintiff’s Evidence
Defendant’s objection that Plaintiff’s Registration No. 3315078 is not of
record is overruled. Defendant has counterclaimed to cancel the registration;
therefore, it is of record by operation of Trademark Rule 2.122(b)(1) (“the file
… of each registration against which a petition or counterclaim for
cancellation is filed forms part of the record of the proceeding without any
action by the parties”). Defendant has also objected to consideration of the
registration for Plaintiff’s mark TAMARINDO OLÉ. We find that this
registration is not of record, since Plaintiff’s witness, David Fox, Plaintiff’s
president and founder, testified only that Plaintiff has “a US trademark
registration for the mark ‘Tamarindo Ole’” and that Exhibit 2 to his
deposition “show[s] the trademark registration for Tamarindo Ole.” 81
TTABVUE 14. Exhibit 2 is a “soft copy” of the registration; it does not show
current status and title. There was no testimony as to the current status of
the registration, which issued five years before he gave his testimony. See
Trademark Rule 2.122(d)(2), which lists the procedure for making of record
an unpleaded registration owned by a party.11
The objection to Exhibit 6 to the Fox testimony is overruled; the exhibit is
pages from Plaintiff’s website, and was properly authenticated; however, we
take note that, as pointed out by Defendant, Mr. Fox testified that the glasses

11 Even if this registration were of record, it would have no effect on the outcome of
this proceeding; the registration was not pleaded, nor do we consider the issue of
likelihood of confusion based on this registration to have been tried, so the
registration would have had very little, if any, probative value.
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
10
depicted in the website, which bear Plaintiff’s trademark, were never actually
in use. Fox disc. dep., 75 TTABVUE 47. Defendant’s hearsay objection to
Exhibit 30 to Mr. Fox’s testimony deposition, a computer-generated report
listing sales to grocery stores, and the testimony regarding it, is that the
identification of customers as grocery stores was based on information from
Plaintiff’s route drivers, who actually service the customers. Plaintiff has not
shown that it is part of the drivers’ regular business duties to identify the
nature of the customers on their routes, and therefore information regarding
the type of customer would not constitute business records subject to the
hearsay exception.12 Accordingly, to the extent that Mr. Fox’s testimony
regarding the nature of particular customers that are reflected in Exhibit 30
is based solely on hearsay, i.e., information obtained by Plaintiff’s route
drivers, that testimony, and the characterization of the customers shown in
the exhibit, has been given no consideration.
Finally, the objections to Exhibits A-D in Plaintiff’s notice of reliance are
overruled. These printouts from third-party websites are admissible for what
the printouts show on their face.
Plaintiff’s Objections to Defendant’s Evidence
As for Plaintiff’s objections, we overrule its objections to Defendant’s
evidence regarding Defendant’s use of its marks for non-beverage goods. One

12 We recognize that Plaintiff apparently undertook to have its customers identified
as to their nature because of a Board order regarding Defendant’s motion to compel.
However, this does not transform the information provided by the route drivers into
business records.
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
11
of the du Pont factors is “the variety of goods on which a mark is or is not
used.” In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563,
567 (CCPA 1973). Accordingly, this evidence is relevant and has been
considered. Plaintiff has also objected to the testimony of Rhonda Harper,
Defendant’s expert, in its entirety, and asks that it be stricken. The Board is
reluctant to strike testimony altogether on the basis of substantive
objections; rather such objections are considered by the Board in its
evaluation of the probative value of the testimony. Alcatraz Media Inc. v.
Chesapeake Marine Tours Inc., 107 USPQ2d 1750, 1755 (TTAB 2013). We
will not go into an extensive discussion of the case law interpreting Fed. R.
Evid. 702 regarding expert witness testimony. In this case we are satisfied
that Ms. Harper is an expert in general retail marketing. However, we are
not persuaded that she is an expert with respect to the retail beverage
industry. For example, she could not answer whether many specific brands of
beverages are sold both from fountain dispensers and bottles or cans,
including 7-UP, A&W ROOT BEER and DR. PEPPER. We therefore give
limited weight to her testimony about the beverage industry and what
consumers will think; we also point out that ultimate conclusions of law on
the issue of likelihood of confusion are the province of the Board, not of a
witness, even an asserted expert witness.
The Record
The record includes:
• the pleadings
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
12
• the files of Defendant’s Application Serial No. 77426608 (the opposed
application) and Registrations Nos. 3161729 and 3223608 (subjects of the
cancellation actions),13 and the file of Petitioner’s Registration No.
3315078 (the subject of the counterclaim)
• the testimony, with exhibits, of Plaintiff’s witness and president, David
Fox, and Defendant’s witnesses Rhonda Harper, Kimberly Greenway and
Veronica Moreno
• Plaintiff’s notices of reliance on Internet printouts, Defendant’s
responses to certain of Plaintiff’s discovery requests, and Plaintiff’s sales
history reports (Exhibit K)14
• Defendant’s eight notices of reliance on two discovery depositions of
David Fox,15 Plaintiff’s responses to Defendant’s discovery requests
(interrogatories and requests for admission); copies of certain of
Defendant’s registrations; certain of Defendant’s responses to Plaintiff’s
interrogatories (filed pursuant to Trademark Rule 2.120(j)(5)); and
certain documents Defendant provided in response to Plaintiff’s
document production requests.16

13 Because these files are automatically of record by virtue of Trademark Rule
2.122(b)(1), it was unnecessary for Defendant to submit them under its fifth Notice
of Reliance.
14 Sales history reports are not acceptable for submission under notice of reliance,
since they are not printed publications or official records under Trademark Rule
2.122(e). However, Defendant has treated them as being of record, see Defendant’s
main trial brief, 89 TTABVUE 14, so we consider this exhibit as having been
stipulated into the record by the parties.
15 We note that Defendant submitted these discovery depositions in their entireties.
Although this is permitted by the rules, we point out that, as opposed to testimony
depositions, it benefits both the Board and the parties if the propounding party culls
unimportant portions of discovery depositions and submits only the relevant
portions. See Trademark Rule 2.120(j)(3)(i); Sports Authority Michigan Inc. v. PC
Authority Inc., 63 USPQ2d 1781, 1787 (TTAB 2001) (“[E]ach party has submitted
discovery deposition transcripts in toto, i.e., has made no apparent effort to identify
and introduce only those portions that are relevant to our determination of the
pleaded claims. While not improper, it is more effective to file only those portions
that are relevant and explain their relevancy in the notice of reliance”); Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board Manual of Procedure (TBMP) § 704.09 (2015) (“In order to
avoid creating an overly large record of irrelevant evidence, parties should, where
appropriate, file only those portions of a discovery deposition transcript that are
relevant to the pleaded claims”).
16 Documents provided in response to production requests may not be made of record
by notice of reliance, see Trademark Rule 2.120(j)(3)(ii), and in any event the
responding party may not make its own discovery responses of record except when
necessary to make not misleading the discovery responses submitted by the
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
13
Additional Preliminary Matters Regarding Issues or Evidence
A. In its trial brief Defendant makes the claim that Plaintiff’s president
filed a materially false Section 15 affidavit, a charge to which Plaintiff
responded in its reply brief. What is clearly attorney argument has been
proffered instead of fact. To the extent that Defendant is attempting to assert
another ground for its counterclaim, such was neither pleaded nor tried. We
have given no consideration to the arguments made by either attorney on this
point.17 Defendant also takes issue, in its trial brief, with the specimens
Plaintiff submitted in prosecuting the application underlying its pleaded
registration. Even if this issue had been tried (which it was not), the
acceptability of specimens is an ex parte matter. See Century 21 Real Estate
Corp. v. Century Life of America, 10 USPQ2d 2034, 2035 (TTAB 1989).
B. Plaintiff submitted its entire notice of reliance under seal. Board
proceedings are public, and therefore only truly confidential material should
be filed under seal. A rule of reasonableness dictates what information should
be redacted, and only in very rare instances should an entire submission be
deemed confidential. See TMBP § 703.01(p) and cases cited therein. Clearly
many of the exhibits, such as third-party webpages, do not constitute

inquiring party. However, Plaintiff has treated them as being of record, so we
consider them as having been stipulated into the record.
17 We note that Plaintiff, in explaining why it filed a Section 15 affidavit for its
registration, makes the statement that the Board has the power to rectify the
Section 15 component. Reply brief, 91 TTABVUE 11. Because the validity of the
Section 15 affidavit is not before us, we do not have such authority. Therefore, if
Plaintiff determines that the Section 15 affidavit was filed in error, Plaintiff may
wish to file a petition to the Commissioner.
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
14
confidential material. In view thereof, Plaintiff is allowed THIRTY (30)
days from the mailing date of this decision to file a copy of its notice
of reliance for the public record, with only truly confidential
material redacted, failing which all of the exhibits will become part
of the public record.
C. There is a similar problem with Defendant’s submissions. All of the
testimony depositions, with exhibits, submitted by Defendant were marked
“confidential,” and Defendant failed to submit redacted copies. It is quite
clear that the testimony depositions contain non-confidential material, since
Defendant repeated much of the testimony in unredacted portions of its trial
brief filed for the public record. Accordingly, Defendant is allowed
THIRTY (30) days from the mailing date of this decision to file copies
of the testimony depositions and exhibits of Veronica Moreno,
Kimberly Greenway and Rhonda Harper, with only truly
confidential material redacted, failing which the entirety of the
transcripts will become part of the public record.
D. During the course of this proceeding, Defendant filed Section 8
affidavits in connection with its registrations at issue in the two cancellation
proceedings. These affidavits did not include a statement of continuing use
for, inter alia, “yogurt-based beverages” and “herbal teas” in Registration No.
3161729, and “herbal teas” in Registration No. 3223608, thereby effectively
cancelling them from the registrations. These are the goods that Plaintiff’s
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
15
petitions for partial cancellation seek to have deleted from the identifications
in the respective registrations.18 As a result, Defendant asserts that
Cancellation No. 92049127 is moot, and that the claim regarding herbal teas
in Cancellation No. 92048698 is moot as well.
We do not agree with Defendant’s mootness argument. Trademark Rule
2.134(b) provides that, after the commencement of a cancellation proceeding,
if it comes to the attention of the Board that the respondent has permitted its
involved registration to be cancelled under Section 8 of the Act, an order may
be issued allowing the respondent time in which to show cause why such
cancellation should not be deemed to be the equivalent of a cancellation by
request of the respondent without consent and should not result in entry of
judgment against respondent. “The purpose of 37 CFR § 2.134(b) [Rule
2.134(b)], and the policy underlying the issuance of a show cause order, is to
prevent a cancellation proceeding respondent whose subject registration
comes due, during the course of the proceeding, for a § 8 or § 9 affidavit, …
from being able to moot the proceeding, and avoid judgment, by deliberately
failing to file the required affidavits … .” See TBMP § 602.02(b) and cases
cited therein. Here, the deletions requested by Defendant in its Section 8
affidavits were not brought to the attention of the Board prior to or during
trial. At this point, with briefing having been completed, there would be no
point in issuing an order to show cause; it is clear that the deletion of the

18 Registration No. 3223608 still contains “yogurt-based beverages.”
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
16
involved goods from the Section 8 declarations was deliberate, and not the
result of mistake or inadvertence, and that Defendant believed that such
deletion would moot or partially moot the subject actions. See Defendant’s
Trial brief, 89 TTABVUE 12.
We recognize that Trademark Rule 2.134(b) refers to the cancellation of a
registration. Here Plaintiff is not attempting to cancel each registration in its
entirety, but to cancel only specific items in Defendant’s registrations, and
these items are among those that Defendant requested to have deleted as
part of its Section 8 filings. Nonetheless, the purpose behind Rule 2.134(b) is
to prevent a defendant from mooting a cancellation action. Therefore, we find
that Rule 2.134(b) applies to the present situation, where the cancellation
proceeding is to cancel only certain goods from a registration, and the
defendant deletes those specific goods from its registration as part of its filing
a Section 8 affidavit in order to moot the proceeding.
We therefore grant the petitions to cancel the registrations insofar as
these deleted goods are concerned. As a result, our decision herein is a final
judgment as to Plaintiff’s pleaded claims with respect to the goods at issue
that Plaintiff sought to cancel and Defendant deleted from its registrations
via the Section 8 affidavits it filed during the course of these proceedings.
Standing
In its answers to the petitions for cancellation, 50, 51 TTABVUE,
Defendant has admitted “that on July 7, 2007, the Examining Attorney cited
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
17
[Defendant’s] Registration Nos. 3,223,608 and 3,161,729, along with four
other registrations owned by [Defendant] for marks incorporating the mark
OLÉ, against Orange Bang’s Application No. 78/738,452 on the ground of
likelihood of confusion.” ¶ 4. This is sufficient to establish that Plaintiff has
standing to bring the cancellation actions. ShutEmDown Sports Inc. v. Lacy,
102 USPQ2d 1036, 1041 (TTAB 2012) (pending application refused
registration based on a likelihood of confusion with mark in respondent’s
registration shows petitioner has real interest in proceeding, and has
standing).
With respect to the opposition, Plaintiff’s ownership of pleaded
Registration No. 3315078 has been admitted by Defendant, and is the subject
of Defendant’s counterclaim. This registration is for the mark OLÉ for rice
and milk-based beverages, namely horchata, and non-carbonated fruit juice
beverages; Defendant’s applied-for mark is for OLÉ MEXICAN FOODS and
design for, inter alia, dairy and fruit based beverages. In view of this
registration, Plaintiff has established its real interest in the proceeding, and
therefore its standing. See Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 55
USPQ2d 1842 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Lipton Industries, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co.,
670 F.2d 1024, 213 USPQ 185 (CCPA 1982).
Finally, based on the fact that Plaintiff’s pleaded registration has been
asserted in the opposition and the cancellation proceedings, Defendant has
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
18
established its standing as plaintiff in the counterclaim. See DAK Industries
Inc. v. Daiichi Kosho Co., 35 USPQ2d 1434, 1438 (TTAB 1995).
Counterclaim
Defendant seeks restriction of Plaintiff’s Registration No. 3315078,
pleaded by Plaintiff in both the notice of opposition and the petitions for
cancellation. In this counterclaim, Defendant alleges that it began using the
trade name and trademark OLÉ in 1988 in connection with tortillas and
tortilla chips, and then expanded use of the mark to other Mexican style food
products “sold through supermarkets and other retail food stores for later
preparation and consumption off the premises”;19 that Plaintiff uses its OLÉ
mark only in connection with concentrates for use in the preparation of
fountain drinks sold through beverage dispensers, and that the identification
of goods in Plaintiff’s registration (rice and milk-based beverages, namely
horchata; and non-alcoholic and non-carbonated fruit juice beverages) is
overly broad; that Plaintiff has never used its OLÉ mark on ready-to-drink
beverages distributed through retail food and grocery stores, supermarkets,
mass retailers, superstores and Mexican sit-down restaurants or taquerias
or, if it has, then it has abandoned its use of its mark through such channels
of trade or to such classes of consumers. As a result, Defendant seeks a
restriction of Plaintiff’s registration to essentially limit the description of

19 The quoted language appears in the counterclaim filed in the opposition; in the
counterclaim in the cancellation proceedings Defendant uses the phrase “sold
through retail food and grocery stores, supermarkets, mass retailers, superstores,
and Mexican sit-down restaurants or taquerias.”
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
19
goods to concentrates for the identified beverages, for “use in the preparation
of fountain drinks sold through beverage dispensers,” while at the same time
offering a restriction of the goods in its own application and registrations to
specify that they would be “pre-mixed, ready-to-drink” beverages “sold off-the
shelf in individual or multi-serving containers, excluding sales of
concentrates for use in the preparation of fountain drinks.” Defendant also
requests that, in the event that the foregoing restrictions “are not sufficient
in themselves to avoid a likelihood of confusion,” that its identification of
goods “be further or alternatively amended,” answer to opposition, ¶ 21, 12
TTABVUE 9, to restrict the channels of trade, “for sale primarily through
retail food and grocery stores, supermarkets, mass retailers, superstores, and
Mexican sit-down restaurants or taquerias” and that the identification of
Plaintiff’s identification of goods “be further or alternatively amended” to
restrict the channels of trade to exclude “sale through retail food and grocery
stores, supermarkets, mass retailers, superstores, and Mexican sit-down
restaurants or taquerias.” That is, Defendant asks that the dairy beverages
identified in both its registrations and application and in Plaintiff’s
registration be restricted as to “form,” and if that restriction is not sufficient
to avoid likelihood of confusion, that they also be restricted as to channels of
trade.
In the Board’s order of August 24, 2011, 37 TTABVUE, which denied the
parties’ cross motions for summary judgment in the opposition (the
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
20
proceedings had not yet been consolidated), the Board explained that, after
trial, we would first decide the counterclaim for partial cancellation and then
would decide the opposition depending on what happened with the
counterclaim, i.e., if the counterclaim were granted, the opposition would be
decided with the description of Plaintiff’s goods as restricted by the
counterclaim, in association with Defendant’s proposed amendment of its
identification of goods, while if the counterclaim were dismissed, we would
determine the opposition based on the original identification of goods in
Plaintiff’s registration, but with the proposed amendments to Defendant’s
identification of goods.
The present case, which now includes not only the opposition but the two
cancellation proceedings, does not involve a typical counterclaim, which seeks
to cancel a registration in its entirety. Instead, Defendant seeks to restrict
the goods in Plaintiff’s registration by “form” and by channels of trade, with a
concomitant limitation in the form of the goods and channels of trade in
Defendant’s application and registrations. When such a restriction of a
registration is sought, Section 18 of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1068,
gives the Board the authority to modify the registration by limiting the goods
or services specified therein, or otherwise restrict or rectify with respect to
the register the registration of a registered mark. In order to succeed in
restricting a registration by using the provisions of Section 18, the plaintiff or
counterclaim plaintiff must show that the entry of the proposed restriction to
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
21
the goods in the defendant’s registration will avoid a finding of likelihood of
confusion, and that the defendant or counterclaim defendant is not using its
mark on those goods that will be effectively excluded from the registration if
the proposed restriction is entered. See Eurostar Inc. v. “Euro-Star”
Reitmoden GmbH & Co., 34 USPQ2d 1266, 1270 (TTAB 1994).
Because of these general principles regarding Section 18, and the fact that
the proposed restrictions to both Plaintiff’s registration and Defendant’s
registrations and application were clearly meant by Defendant to be
considered together, we will not follow the procedure set forth in the Board’s
August 24, 2011 order to the letter. Rather, it is most efficient to decide
whether the two sets of restrictions, first as to form and, if necessary as to
channels of trade, proposed by Defendant to both Plaintiff’s registration and
Defendant’s application and registrations, will avoid a finding of likelihood of
confusion.
First, we note that the marks are identical or substantially identical.
Plaintiff’s pleaded registration is for OLÉ in standard characters;
Defendant’s Registration No. 3223608 is also for OLÉ in standard characters.
As for Defendant’s Application Serial No. 77426608 for OLÉ MEXICAN
FOODS and design, although this mark has the additional descriptive
wording MEXICAN FOODS and the design of a bull, as well as some
geometric background designs, the dominant element of the mark is the word
OLÉ, which is most prominent visually, and is the only distinctive word in
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
22
the mark. Supporting this view is Ms. Moreno’s testimony that although
Defendant’s original mark included the words OLÉ MEXICAN FOODS,
consumers always called it OLÉ. 90 TTABVUE.20
Defendant has argued differences in the marks based on how the evidence
shows the marks to be actually used. It appears that Defendant has taken
this position because it believes that Plaintiff’s pleaded registration is not of
record, and therefore that Plaintiff may rely only on its common law rights.
However, as previously noted, Defendant has counterclaimed to cancel
Plaintiff’s registration by its attempt to modify the registration, and thereby
has made the registration of record. Therefore, it can be relied on by any
party to the proceeding. Thus, we consider the marks as they appear in both
Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s registrations and Defendant’s application and, as
noted, find them to be either identical or substantially the same.

20 Because Defendant marked all of its testimony as “confidential,” and did not
submit redacted copies, the testimony does not appear in TTABVUE, the public
record of Board proceedings. Therefore, in citations to the testimony of Defendant’s
witnesses Moreno, Greenway and Harper, we provide only the TTABVUE entry
number of the confidential filing.
As previously noted, because Defendant deleted all of the goods which are the
subject of the petition to cancel Defendant’s Registration No. 3161729 without
Plaintiff’s consent, the petition to cancel this registration as to those goods is
granted. In any event, that mark, too, is confusingly similar to Plaintiff’s registered
mark. The word OLÉ, which is superimposed on a green fan-like background with
some arrow designs on either side, is clearly the dominant part of the mark, as it is
the only part of the mark that can be articulated. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d
1358, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (if a mark comprises both a word and
a design, the word is normally accorded greater weight because it would be used by
purchasers to request the goods). Further, Defendant’s president and co-owner,
Veronica Moreno, testified that the intention in creating this mark was to emphasize
the word OLÉ. 90 TTABVUE.
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
23
Given this similarity of the marks, we consider whether the restrictions
that Defendant has proposed to Plaintiff’s registration and its own
registration21 and application will avoid a finding of likelihood of confusion.
The first restriction Defendant suggests is as to the form of the parties’ goods,
so that Plaintiff’s beverages would be limited to concentrates for beverages
used for the preparation of fountain drinks, rather than beverages per se,
while Defendant’s beverages would be identified as pre-packaged ready-to-
drink beverages sold off-the-shelf, as follows:
Proposed identification for Plaintiff’s beverage goods:
Concentrates for rice and milk-based beverages, namely
horchata; and concentrates for non-alcoholic and non-carbonated
fruit juice beverages, all for use in the preparation of fountain
drinks sold through beverage dispensers;

Proposed identification for Defendant’s beverage goods in the
application: Pre-mixed, ready-to-drink dairy and fruit-based
non-alcoholic food beverages sold off-the shelf in individual or
multi-serving containers, excluding sales of concentrates for use
in the preparation of fountain drinks.

Proposed identification for Defendant’s beverage goods in
Registration No. 3223608: pre-mixed, ready-to-drink yogurt-
based beverages sold off-the-shelf in multi-serving containers,
excluding the sales of concentrates for use in the preparation of
fountain drinks.

It is clear that Plaintiff sells concentrates for beverages, rather than pre-
mixed, ready-to-drink beverages, to retailers, and that the finished beverages
are delivered to the ultimate consumers through fountain dispensers and

21 Because Defendant deleted “yogurt-based beverages” from Registration No.
3161729 when it filed its Section 8 affidavit, its proposed restriction to the
identification for “yogurt-based beverages” now applies only to Registration No.
3223608.
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
24
“visual” dispensers,22 rather than in pre-packaged individual or multi-serving
containers that one would take “off-the-shelf” of a retail store. However,
merely because there are differences in the form of the products does not
necessarily mean that restricting the identification of goods in this manner
will avoid confusion. Although Plaintiff’s goods may be sold to retailers as
concentrate, the retailers then mix the concentrate with water and sell it
under Plaintiff’s mark as a ready-to-drink beverage, so that the ultimate
consumer of the product views the mark as applied to a beverage, not a
concentrate. See Exhibits 8 and 9 to Fox test. for examples of bowl dispensers
and fountain dispensers of Plaintiff’s OLÉ beverages. 81 TTABVUE 207, 209.
For example, a consumer can go to a fountain dispenser with various
“spigots” marked with the brand and flavor of beverage, including Plaintiff’s
beverages, and place a cup under a spigot and a ready-to-drink beverage will
be delivered to the consumer. Fox test., 81 TTABVUE 31-34. Cf. J.C. Hall Co.
v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 340 F.2d 960, 144 USPQ 435, 438 (CCPA 1965), in
which the Court found similarity of blank checks and greeting cards in part
because, although the blank checks were sold only to banks and not the
general public, the utility of the checks was in their dissemination to and use
by the customers of the bank.

22 These dispensers are large plastic containers in which the concentrate has already
been mixed with water to form a finished drink, as opposed to a fountain dispenser
in which the concentrate mixes with water as it is being dispensed.
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
25
In view of this, the consumer is likely to regard the fountain-dispensed
beverage as merely another form of “packaging” of the beverage, as opposed
to being only a concentrate that is subsequently mixed with water, in the
same way that he or she would regard a can or a bottle of a beverage as
different forms of packaging of the same beverage. Further, the record shows
that companies sell both fountain drinks and canned and bottled beverages
under the same marks. Defendant’s own expert witness, Rhonda Harper,
testified that the following brands are used for beverages sold both through
fountain dispensers and in bottled form: COCA-COLA, PEPSI, SPRITE,
MOUNTAIN DEW, GATORADE, MINUTE MAID LEMONADE,
TROPICANA PINK LEMONADE and HI-C. 87 TTABVUE. Plaintiff also
submitted website pages in which third-parties’ products are shown as being
available through fountain dispensers and in pre-packaged containers. 54
TTABVUE 7-78. Although Defendant’s expert witness testified that there is a
difference in the marketing practices of large companies such as Coca-Cola
and small regional beverage companies, we see no basis upon which to find
that consumers would believe, upon seeing the identical or substantially
similar mark for a fountain beverage and a pre-packaged beverage, that the
beverages would emanate from different sources because they are regional, as
opposed to national, brands. First, it is not clear whether consumers would
regard brands that they are familiar with as being regional brands, or,
conversely, whether they would recognize some brands that they are familiar
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
26
with as being national brands. Second, even if we were to accept that
Plaintiff’s mark would be viewed as a regional brand, Plaintiff has submitted
evidence that smaller companies’ beverages are advertised as being sold both
through fountain dispensers and in pre-packaged form. See Exhibit D to
Plaintiff’s notice of reliance, 54 TTABVUE 67-78, for beverages offered under
the mark JUICY WHIP.
Accordingly, we find that the restriction to the form of Plaintiff’s identified
beverages (along with the restriction to the form of Defendant’s identified
beverages) would not serve to avoid likelihood of confusion. Accordingly,
Defendant’s proposed restriction pursuant to Section 18 to the identification
in terms of the form of the goods is denied.
Defendant has also proposed, if the restriction as to the form of the goods
is not sufficient to avoid confusion, a restriction regarding both Plaintiff’s and
Defendant’s channels of trade. In addition to the restriction as to the form of
Plaintiff’s goods, Defendant asks that the identification be further restricted
to exclude sales through retail food and grocery stores, supermarkets, mass
retailers, superstores, and Mexican sit-down restaurants or taquerias, while
in turn it would further restrict the challenged goods in the identifications of
its registration and application to sales primarily through retail food and
grocery stores, supermarkets, mass retailers, superstores, and Mexican sit-
down restaurants or taquerias.
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
27
We find that Defendant’s proposed restriction to the channels of trade of
Plaintiff’s registration (with the concomitant restriction to its own channels
of trade) fails to meet the requirements of Eurostar. First, Defendant has not
shown that Plaintiff does not sell its goods in some of the channels of trade
that Defendant would exclude from Plaintiff’s registration. Although we have
not given consideration to the characterizations of customers provided by
Plaintiff’s route drivers, as discussed supra, Plaintiff’s president testified as
to his own knowledge regarding some of the customers. In particular, he
testified that Plaintiff’s beverages are sold through a food stand in a mass
retailer/superstore.23 Plaintiff also submitted printouts of its records showing
sales to, inter alia, restaurants.24 We also note that Defendant’s proposed
restriction, to “sales primarily through retail food and grocery stores,
supermarkets, mass retailers, superstores, and Mexican sit-down restaurants
or taquerias,” would not prevent Defendant from selling its goods in other
channels of trade, including the trade channels to which Defendant would
have Plaintiff restrict its goods.
In any event, even if we were to find that Plaintiff and Defendant sell
their goods in separate channels of trade, that would not be sufficient to
obviate a finding of likelihood of confusion. Despite the differences in the
channels of trade, the same consumers are likely to encounter both parties’

23 Defendant’s witness Ms. Moreno described this same superstore as a grocery store.
90 TTABVUE.
24 These printouts were submitted under seal, and therefore we will not identify the
specific customers.
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
28
goods because they may shop in a supermarket and eat in a fast food
restaurant or in a “sit-down” restaurant, or buy a fountain beverage in a
convenience store and shop in a grocery store or a superstore. So, for
example, a consumer who gets Plaintiff’s OLÉ beverage from a fountain
dispenser in a fast food restaurant and later sees OLÉ prepackaged
beverages in a supermarket is likely to assume that these products emanate
from the same source.
In view of our finding that the restrictions proposed by Defendant to
Plaintiff’s registration (along with the restrictions proposed to Defendant’s
own registration and application) are not sufficient to avoid a likelihood of
confusion, we dismiss Defendant’s counterclaim to restrict Plaintiff’s
registration pursuant to Section 18. It appears that Defendant’s proposed
restrictions to the identifications in its application and registration, as to
both form and trade channels, was offered on the assumption that Plaintiff’s
registration would be restricted, and was contingent on that occurring. See
Embarcadero Technologies Inc. v. RStudio Inc., 105 USPQ2d 1825 (TTAB
2013) (Section 18 proposed amendments may be asserted in the alternative).
Because we have denied the counterclaim to restrict the registration, we
proceed with our analysis of Plaintiff’s likelihood of confusion claim based on
Defendant’s unrestricted identifications; however, even if Defendant’s
registration and application were restricted it would not affect the result
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
29
herein, since Plaintiff’s identification is not restricted as to form or channels
of trade.
Plaintiff’s Claims
We now turn to Plaintiff’s petition to partially cancel Defendant’s
registrations and its opposition to Class 29 of Defendant’s application. As
noted previously, because Defendant had, in filing its Section 8 affidavits,
deleted from its registrations certain goods that Plaintiff had sought to cancel
without Plaintiff’s consent, we grant, as requested, the petition to partially
cancel Registration No. 3161729 (the subject of Cancellation No. 92049127)
for OLÉ and design by deletion of “yogurt-based beverages” in Class 29 and
“herbal teas” in Class 30; and we grant the petition to partially cancel
Registration No. 3223608 (the subject of Cancellation No. 92048698) for OLÉ
by deletion of “herbal teas” in Class 30. As a result, the only outstanding
issues before us are the petition to cancel “yogurt-based beverages” from
Registration No. 3223608 for OLÉ, and the opposition to the mark OLÉ
MEXICAN FOODS and design for the goods in Class 29, “dairy and fruit
based non-alcoholic food beverages.”
With respect to the cancellation of yogurt-based beverages from
Registration No. 3223608, Defendant has asserted in its main brief that
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for partial cancellation. Apparently
Defendant treats Plaintiff’s claim as having been brought solely under
Section 18 of the Trademark Act, and therefore it contends that Plaintiff
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
30
must prove (1) that “the proposed restriction under Section 18” will avoid a
finding of likelihood of confusion, and (2) that Defendant is not using its
mark on the goods that would be excluded from the registration if “the
proposed restriction” is entered. 89 TTABVUE 52. Although, in its motion to
amend the petition to cancel to limit its petition to the beverage goods
identified in Defendant’s registration, 45 TTABVUE, Plaintiff referred to
Section 18 of the Act, the petition itself makes clear that the ground asserted
by Plaintiff is likelihood of confusion. See ¶ 8 (“Petitioner asserts that
Registrant’s OLÉ mark is likely to be confused with Petitioner’s OLÉ mark
when used in connection with beverage goods”). Moreover, because Plaintiff
seeks to strike from Defendant’s registration goods as listed therein, there is
no need for Plaintiff to rely on Section 18. See Johnson & Johnson v.
Obschestvo s Ogranitchennoy, 104 USPQ2d 2037, 2039 (TTAB 2012); DAK
Industries Inc. v. Daiichi Kosho Co., 35 USPQ2d at 1437 (“Because applicant
[the counterclaim petitioner] seeks to strike from opposer’s registration goods
specifically listed therein, applicant [as the plaintiff] need not plead (as was
required in Eurostar) that a finding of likelihood of confusion will be avoided
by the restriction it seeks.”). Plaintiff’s claim is a straightforward claim to
cancel specific beverage items from Defendant’s registration, not to restrict
the goods by their form/packaging or channels of trade, as Defendant’s
Section 18 counterclaim seeks to do. The ground for cancellation is likelihood
of confusion, a ground that is available to Plaintiff under Section 14 of the
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
31
Act because it brought its petition on January 4, 2008, just nine months after
the registration issued on April 3, 2007.
There are two elements to proving the ground of likelihood of confusion:
priority and likelihood of confusion.
Priority
With respect to the opposition, because Plaintiff’s pleaded registration is
of record, priority is not in issue as to the goods identified in Plaintiff’s
registration. See King Candy Company v. Eunice King’s Kitchen, Inc., 496
F.2d 1400, 182 USPQ 108 (CCPA 1974). In any event, Plaintiff began use of
its mark on beverages in 1981, well before Defendant began use of the
opposed mark. Fox disc. and test. deps., 61 TTABVUE 119, 81 TTABVUE 11.
There is some inconsistency about when Defendant first began using its
mark, its president having testified variously that Defendant did not develop
the mark until 2007, and that it used this mark for a yogurt-based beverage
“in 2005, close to that time.” Moreno test., 90 TTABVUE. In any event,
Plaintiff’s use of its mark is much earlier than any of the dates for which
Defendant claims use of the mark.
As for the cancellation proceeding, because both Plaintiff and Defendant
own registrations, priority is in issue, and therefore Plaintiff has the burden
to prove its priority. Brewski Beer Co. v. Brewski Brothers Inc., 47 USPQ2d
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
32
1281 (TTAB 1998).25 There is no question that Plaintiff is the prior user of
the mark OLÉ for beverages. As stated above, the record shows that Plaintiff
began using this mark on beverages in 1981. Defendant did not provide
evidence of any use prior to 1988, when the present owners of the company
bought it; Ms. Moreno, the president and co-owner, testified that the
company they bought was “very small” and was making only tortilla chips
and salsa. 90 TTABVUE. Ms. Moreno could not recall exactly when
Defendant made anything that might be characterized as a beverage, and in
the absence of clear evidence of use, Defendant would be entitled to rely only
on the November 2, 2004 filing date of the application that resulted in the
OLÉ registration, which is after the filing date of the application underlying
Plaintiff’s registration and after Plaintiff’s demonstrated first use. In any
event, it is clear that prior to 2001 Defendant was not selling any beverage
products. Greenway test., 88 TTABVUE.
Likelihood of confusion
Our determination of the issue of likelihood of confusion is based on an
analysis of all of the probative facts in evidence that are relevant to the
factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 177 USPQ at 567.
See also, In re Majestic Distilling Co., Inc., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201
(Fed. Cir. 2003).

25 Defendant appears to argue that neither party in a cancellation proceeding can
rely on its registration, and can rely only on its common law rights. This is not a
correct statement of the law.
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
33
Both Plaintiff’s registered mark OLÉ and Defendant’s registered mark
OLÉ are legally identical. Because they are standard character marks, and
therefore are not limited as to style or font, they can be depicted in the same
manner. As for Defendant’s applied-for mark, shown below, Defendant has
acknowledged that “The word mark OLÉ is the dominant element of both the
OLÉ logo and the OLÉ MEXICAN FOODS Logo [the latter being the way
Defendant refers to the applied-for mark] and together create the continuing
commercial impression of Defendant’s OLÉ brand.” Defendant’s main brief,
89 TTABVUE 17.

We agree that the word OLÉ is the dominant element. It dominates the
mark visually by its size and placement. Further, the words MEXICAN
FOODS are descriptive of (if not generic for) Defendant’s goods, and EST.
1988, is, because of its size, likely not to be noticed and, in any event, would
be viewed as describing when Defendant began operating. Thus, the primary
source-identifying part of the mark is the word OLÉ. The design element of a
bull and the geometric background elements are not sufficient to distinguish
the mark from Plaintiff’s mark OLÉ because they would not be articulated by
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
34
consumers in referring to the goods, and by its very nature a background
element or carrier would not be the dominant part of a mark. See In re
Viterra Inc., 101 USPQ2d at 1908; In re Hughes Furniture Indus., Inc., 114
USPQ2d 1134, 1138 (TTAB 2015) (design feature of mark that merely serves
as carrier does not distinguish applicant’s mark from cited mark).
Although Defendant has, as indicated above, acknowledged that OLÉ is
the dominant element of the applied-for mark, it also argues that its mark
creates a different commercial impression from Plaintiff’s mark. This
argument is based, in part, on the misconception that Plaintiff may only rely
on its common law rights in the particular manner in which it uses its mark;
however, as previously noted, Plaintiff may rely on its registration for OLÉ in
standard characters, and a registered mark in standard characters is not
limited to any particular display. In re Viterra Inc., 101 USPQ2d at 1909,
1910; Citigroup v. Capital City Bank Group, Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 98 USPQ2d
1253, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Thus, Defendant’s arguments about the different
design elements and lettering styles in the parties’ marks as actually used
are not persuasive. Nor are we persuaded by Defendant’s argument that
MEXICAN FOODS in Defendant’s mark distinguishes the marks; even if
consumers were to articulate these words (and despite Defendant’s
unsupported assertion,26 it is not clear that they would articulate words that
are so highly descriptive, if not generic, of the goods), the additional words do

26 “Consumers are likely to use all three words—‘Olé Mexican Foods’—when
referring to Defendant’s Logo.” Brief, 89 TTABVUE 33.
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
35
not affect the identical pronunciation of the source-identifying portion of
Defendant’s mark and the entirety of Plaintiff’s mark.
Nor are we persuaded by Defendant’s argument that the marks have
different meanings and commercial impressions because the inclusion of EST.
1988 and OLÉ MEXICAN FOODS in Defendant’s mark identifies the
company that is the source of the products, while Plaintiff’s mark OLÉ would
be understood only as an exclamation of approval. Again, because of the
highly descriptive/generic nature of MEXICAN FOODS for Mexican food
products, consumers are likely to regard this term as describing the foods,
rather than to view OLÉ MEXICAN FOODS as the name of the company
that was established in 1988. The legend EST. 1988, as we previously said, is
depicted in such relatively small lettering that many consumers will not
notice it or, if they did, reach the conclusion that the mark as a whole
connotes a company. Moreover, at least some of the beverages for which
Plaintiff uses its mark OLÉ are designed to appeal to a Hispanic clientele,27
so consumers who are familiar with Plaintiff’s mark and encounter
Defendant’s mark on yogurt-based beverages are likely to view the words
MEXICAN FOODS as merely a descriptor of the beverages. Thus, the
presence or absence of MEXICAN FOODS in the parties’ marks does not
serve to distinguish them.

27 For example, some of Plaintiff’s advertising materials identify the goods as
“Authentic Hispanic Drinks,” Exhibit 4 to Fox discovery deposition, and Mr. Fox
stated at that deposition that particular drinks, such as horchata, Jamaica,
tamarindo and mango, are popular with Hispanics. 61 TTABVUE 23.
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
36
Accordingly, we find that Defendant’s registered mark is legally identical
to Plaintiff’s pleaded mark, and that, because many elements in Defendant’s
applied-for mark have little or no source-indicating value, such mark is
substantially similar to Plaintiff’s pleaded mark in appearance,
pronunciation, meaning and commercial impression. This du Pont factor
weighs heavily in Plaintiff’s favor. See In re Majestic Distilling Co., 65
USPQ2d at 1204.
Turning next to the du Pont factors of the similarity of the goods and
channels of trade, Plaintiff’s goods are identified in its registration as “rice
and milk-based beverages, namely horchata; and non-alcoholic and non-
carbonated fruit juice beverages”; the opposed goods in Defendant’s
application are “dairy and fruit based non-alcoholic food beverages.” The
fruit-based beverages in both the registration and application are legally
identical.28 Further, because the goods are in-part legally identical, they must
be presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of
purchasers. See In re Viterra Inc., 101 USPQ2d at 1908; Hewlett-Packard Co.
v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
The goods sought to be cancelled in Defendant’s registration are “yogurt-
based beverages”; Plaintiff’s registration includes “horchata,” a rice and milk-

28 We need not discuss the relatedness of the dairy beverages in Defendant’s
application and Plaintiff’s goods, since if there is a likelihood of confusion with any
of the goods in the class, likelihood of confusion must be found. See Tuxedo
Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, 648 F.2d 1335, 209 USPQ 986, 988
(CCPA 1981).
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
37
based beverage. Where identical marks are involved, as is the case here, the
degree of similarity between the parties’ goods that is required to support a
finding of likelihood of confusion declines. Teledyne Technologies Inc. v.
Western Skyways Inc., 78 USPQ2d 1203, 1207 (TTAB 2006); In re Opus One
Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812, 1815 (TTAB 2001). Defendant points out that
horchata is a “rice and milk-based beverage,” not a yogurt-based beverage,
and that there are specific differences in the beverages, and therefore they
are not interchangeable. However, the question is not whether consumers
will confuse the beverages, but whether they will confuse the source of the
beverages. Bd. of Regents, Univ. of Tex Sys. v. S. Ill. Miners, LLC, 110
USPQ2d 1182, 1189 (TTAB 2014) (“The issue, of course, is not whether
purchasers would confuse the goods or services, but rather whether there is a
likelihood of confusion as to the source thereof.”). “‘[I]t is not necessary that
the products of the parties be similar or even competitive to support a finding
of likelihood of confusion.’ Instead, likelihood of confusion can be found ‘if the
respective products are related in some manner and/or if the circumstances
surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the
mistaken belief that they emanate from the same source.’” Coach Servs. Inc.
v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715 (TTAB 2007)).
Here, the parties’ goods are both beverages, and both are dairy-based.
Further, prior to selling its yogurt-based beverage, Defendant sold pre-mixed
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
38
packaged horchata and horchata concentrate, Moreno test., 90 TTABVUE;
Greenway test., 88 TTABVUE, thus showing that both horchata and yogurt-
based beverages can emanate from a single source. In view of the foregoing,
including the fact that the parties’ marks are identical, we find that the
du Pont factor of the similarity of the goods favors Plaintiff.
As for the channels of trade with respect to the goods in Plaintiff’s
registration and Defendant’s registration, because, in light of our
determination on Defendant’s Section 18 request, there are no restrictions in
the identifications, the goods must be deemed to travel in all appropriate
channels of trade for such goods. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital Bank Group Inc.,
98 USPQ2d at 1261. Plaintiff has shown that its horchata beverage has been
sold to such retail establishments as markets, food stands in a
grocery/superstore,29 fast food restaurants and taquerias. Defendant has
acknowledged that its yogurt-based beverages can also be sold in some of the
same outlets; in fact, Defendant’s proposed restriction to its own
identification of goods is for sales in “retail food and grocery stores,
supermarkets, mass retailer, superstores, and Mexican sit-down restaurants
or taquerias.” Moreover, the goods can be sold to the same classes of
consumers, which would include the general public. Thus, the du Pont factor
of the channels of trade favors Plaintiff.

29 As noted in footnote 20, this is the way Defendant’s owner characterized this
outlet.
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
39
The factor of the conditions under which sales are made also favors
Plaintiff. The ultimate purchasers of the beverages are members of the
general public. Both Plaintiff and Defendant agree that both parties’ goods
are relatively inexpensive, and can be purchased on impulse. Plaintiff’s brief,
80 TTABVUE 35; Defendant’s brief, 89 TTABVUE 41. Purchasers of
relatively inexpensive, comestible goods subject to frequent replacement have
been held to a lesser standard of purchasing care. Specialty Brands, Inc. v.
Coffee Bean Distribs., Inc., 748 F.2d 669, 223 USPQ 1281, 1282 (Fed. Cir.
1984). This du Pont factor favors Plaintiff.
The next du Pont factor we consider is “the fame of the prior mark.”
Defendant claims that this factor favors it, pointing to evidence of the fame of
its mark. However, Defendant is not the prior user of the mark, and
therefore, by definition, any reputation accruing to Defendant’s mark is not
relevant for consideration of this factor. In fact, to the extent that a later user
of a mark would saturate the market with its advertising and sales, this
could lead to reverse confusion, in which the prior user’s rights would be
adversely affected by the later user’s activities. See generally In re Shell Oil
Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993). With respect to
Plaintiff’s showing under this factor, Plaintiff does not claim that its mark is
famous, and certainly the evidence submitted by Plaintiff would not be
sufficient to demonstrate fame.30 This du Pont factor is neutral.

30 Again, because these figures were submitted under seal, we do not detail them in
this opinion.
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
40
The sixth du Pont factor is the number and nature of similar marks in use
on similar goods. There is no evidence of current third-party use. The only
evidence that Defendant points to are consent agreements found in Plaintiff’s
registration file. The file shows that, during the examination of the
application which eventually issued as Plaintiff’s registration, the Examining
Attorney refused registration based on registrations owned by HEB Grocery
Company, LP and IP Brands, LLC, and also advised of prior pending
applications by these registrants that, if they issued into registrations, might
also be cited against Plaintiff’s application. Plaintiff then submitted consents
by these third parties. The consent by HEB Grocery, which was signed on
December 21, 2005, states that HEB Grocery is the owner of U.S.
Registration No. 2645987 for the mark CAFÉ OLE & Design for use in
connection with coffee, and is the owner of pending U.S. Application Serial
No. 78267945 for the trademark CAFÉ OLE for use in connection with ready-
to-drink coffee-based beverages. The consent by IP Brands, which was signed
on October 6, 2006, states that IP Brands is the owner of U.S. Registration
No. 2727542 for the mark OLÉ for use in connection with coffee, and the
owner of pending U.S. Trademark Application Serial Nos. 78506431 for
LATTE OLE, and 7855736 for FRAPPE OLE. The response accompanying
these consents, filed on October 17, 2006, advised the Examining Attorney
that IP Brands agreed to always use the phrase GOURMET COFFEE in
association with OLE and only use such phrase in connection with coffee and
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
41
coffee-based beverages, and that HEB Grocery agreed to always use the term
CAFÉ in association with OLE and only use this mark in association with
coffee and coffee-based beverages. Plaintiff made the further statement in its
response that these registrants “only use such phrase in connection with
coffee and coffee-based beverages,” and that in light of the agreements
Plaintiff will not use OLÉ in association with any coffee or coffee-based
beverage goods.
Although third-party registrations are not evidence that a mark is in use,
see In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co., 29 USPQ2d 1783 (TTAB 1993), we treat
Plaintiff’s statement in its response that the registrations “only use such
phrase in connection with coffee and coffee-based beverages” as an admission
that the third-party registrants’ marks were in use for coffee and coffee-based
beverages on October 17, 2006, when it filed this response. Nonetheless, we
do not treat this statement as an admission that the marks were in use at the
time of trial of the instant proceedings, nor is there any evidence to show
such use at this time.
Defendant also refers to the consent agreements to argue that Plaintiff’s
mark is entitled to a limited scope of protection, because “Plaintiff
acknowledged restriction on the scope of its rights in the OLÉ mark based on
these third-party uses.” Brief, 89 TTABVUE 42. In In re Majestic Distilling
Co., 65 USPQ2d at 1204, the applicant pointed to the fact that the owner of
the cited registration had entered into agreements with third parties, thereby
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
42
showing that the registrant had taken the position that there was no
likelihood of confusion with respect to others’ usage of those marks in
connection with their particular goods. The Court was not persuaded by this
argument. In particular, the Court pointed out that the consent agreements
between the registrant and third parties were “several years old and may not
reflect current views.” Therefore, the registrant “may no longer hold the same
view with respect to likelihood of confusion as it did when it executed those
third-party agreements or when it argued to the PTO that there was no
likelihood of confusion.” 65 USPQ2d at 1206. Again, in the present case the
consents were signed in 2005 and 2006. Further, the goods of the third
parties in the consents at issue were coffee and coffee-based products.
Defendant’s goods, on the other hand, are yogurt-based beverages, and as we
have already discussed, there is a close relationship between these goods and
Plaintiff’s horchata.
Moreover, Plaintiff has used its mark OLÉ for over thirty years, and the
mark is only somewhat suggestive of the goods, conveying a slight laudatory
connotation that these are goods that one would cheer for. (Defendant has
translated OLÉ in its Registration No. 3161729 as “Bravo”; we take judicial
notice that it is also listed in English-language dictionaries as an interjection
“used as a shout of approval, triumph, or encouragement”31). Thus, we agree

31 Dictionary.com Unabridged, based on Random House Dictionary, © 2014. The
Board may take judicial notice of dictionary definitions, Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac
v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imp. Co., 213 USPQ 594 (TTAB 1982), aff'd, 703 F.2d 1372,
217 USPQ 505 (Fed. Cir. 1983), including online dictionaries that exist in printed
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
43
with Plaintiff that its mark is deserving of a degree of protection that would
extend to preventing another to own a registration for the identical mark for
closely related goods, or for a substantially similar mark for legally identical
goods.
The next du Pont factors we consider are the nature and extent of any
actual confusion, and the length of time during and conditions under which
there has been concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion. There is
no evidence of any actual confusion. However, Defendant admits that “the
geographic overlap has been minimal to date,” 89 TTABVUE 42, and
therefore we find that the absence of such evidence has no real probative
value. See, e.g., Productos Lacteos Tocumbo S.A. de C.V. v. Paleteria La
Michoacana Inc., 98 USPQ2d 1921, 1935 (TTAB 2011); Carl Karcher Enters.,
Inc. v. Stars Restaurants Corp., 35 USPQ2d 1125, 1133 (TTAB 1995).
Accordingly, we agree with Defendant that these du Pont factors are neutral.
Finally, both parties have discussed the question of “natural zone of
expansion,” so we address those arguments as well. Plaintiff’s arguments in
effect go to the du Pont factor of similarity of the goods, essentially
contending that we should consider the natural zone of expansion of
Plaintiff’s goods to determine the relatedness of the goods. In general in an
inter partes situation, the doctrine of natural expansion is used in connection
with priority. Under this doctrine the first user of a mark in connection with

format or have regular fixed editions. In re Red Bull GmbH, 78 USPQ2d 1375, 1377
(TTAB 2006).
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
44
particular goods or services possesses superior rights in the mark as against
subsequent users of the same or similar mark for any goods or services which
purchasers might reasonably expect to emanate from it in the normal
expansion of its business under the mark. General Mills Inc. v. Fage Dairy
Processing Industry SA, 100 USPQ2d 1584, 1598 (TTAB 2011), judgment set
aside on other grounds, 110 USPQ2d 1679 (TTAB 2014). Normally, this
doctrine is used in the context of parties’ dueling claims of priority. Id.; cf. In
re Kysela Pere et Fils Ltd., 98 USPQ2d 1261, 1266 (TTAB 2015) and In re 1st
USA Realty Professionals Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1584 (TTAB 2007),
regarding zone of expansion in ex parte cases. In this case, the evidence is
clear that Plaintiff is the prior use of the mark OLÉ on beverages, and that
Defendant’s “yogurt-based beverages” are closely related to Plaintiff’s
identified “milk-and-rice based beverages, namely horchata.” Therefore, there
is no need to apply a natural zone of expansion analysis.
Defendant takes a different approach with its argument, contending that
beverages are within the natural scope of expansion of Defendant’s goods.
However, because we have found that it is Plaintiff, not Defendant, that has
priority, Defendant cannot rely on an expansion of goods theory.
Conclusion
With respect to the opposition, priority is not in issue, and in any event we
find that Plaintiff has shown that it has priority of use of its mark OLÉ for
rice and milk-based beverages, namely horchata, and non-alcoholic and non-
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
45
carbonated fruit juice beverages. Plaintiff has also shown that Defendant’s
use of its applied-for mark, OLÉ MEXICAN FOODS and design for the goods
in Class 29, “dairy and fruit based non-alcoholic beverages,” and that
Defendant’s use of its registered mark, OLÉ, for “yogurt-based beverages,” is
likely to cause confusion with the mark and goods in Plaintiff’s registration.
Further, because Defendant deleted certain goods in its two registrations
(yogurt-based beverages and herbal teas in Registration No. 3161729 and
herbal teas in Registration No. 3223608) without the consent of Plaintiff,
judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff on its pleaded ground of likelihood of
confusion with respect to those goods.
Decision:
Defendant’s counterclaim to restrict Plaintiff’s Registration No. 3315078
is dismissed. Plaintiff’s Opposition No. 91189001 to Application Serial No.
77426608 with respect to the goods in Class 29 is sustained. Plaintiff’s
petition to partially cancel Defendant’s Registration No. 3223608
(Cancellation No. 92048698) with respect to yogurt-based beverages in Class
29 and herbal teas in Class 30, and Plaintiff’s petition to partially cancel
Defendant’s Registration No. 3161729 (Cancellation No. 92049127) with
respect to the goods “yogurt-based beverages” in Class 29 and “herbal teas” in
Class 30 are granted.
Because the opposition was brought against Class 29 of Defendant’s
Application Serial No. 77426608, the application will go forward to
Opp. No. 91189001, Canc. Nos. 92048698 and 92049127
46
publication solely for the goods in Class 30, namely, “tortillas.” Defendant’s
Registration No. 3223608 will have the goods “yogurt-based beverages”
deleted from Class 29. The other goods for which the petitions to cancel have
been granted have already been deleted from the registrations at Defendant’s
request.
As noted herein, Plaintiff is allowed until THIRTY (30) days of the
mailing date of this decision to file a copy of its notice of reliance for the
public record, with only truly confidential material redacted, and Defendant
is allowed the same period to file the transcripts of the testimony depositions,
with exhibits, of its three witnesses, Moreno, Greenway and Harper, with
only truly confidential material redacted, failing which the unredacted
papers in their entireties will become part of the public record.