Oracle International Corporation

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 28, 2022

2020005872 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 28, 2022)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/609,103 01/29/2015 Noel Portugal ORACP0131 8718 80812 7590 03/28/2022 Trellis IP Law Group/Oracle 235 Westlake Center #23 Daly City, CA 94015 EXAMINER KIYABU, KARIN A ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2626 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/28/2022 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): docket@trellislaw.com megan@trellislaw.com sherry@trellislaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte NOEL PORTUGAL and JEREMY ASHLEY Appeal 2020-005872 Application 14/609,103 Technology Center 2600 Before BRADLEY W. BAUMEISTER, GREGG I. ANDERSON, and MINN CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judges. CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant2 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1-3, 5, 6, 8-14, 17, and 19-25, which 1 In this Decision, we refer to Appellant’s Appeal Brief filed March 16, 2020 (“Appeal Br.”) and Reply Brief filed August 12, 2020 (“Reply Br.”); and the Examiner’s Final Office Action mailed October 21, 2019 (“Final Act.”) and Answer mailed June 12, 2020 (“Ans.”). We also refer to the Specification filed January 29, 2015 (“Spec.”). Rather than repeat the Examiner’s findings and Appellant’s contentions in their entirety, we refer to these documents. 2 “Appellant” herein refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42 (2012). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Oracle International Corporation. Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2020-005872 Application 14/609,103 2 constitute all the claims pending in this application. See Final Act. 2. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The subject matter of the present application pertains to “software and accompanying user interface display screens and methods for using multiple computing device displays.” Spec. ¶ 1. Claims 1, 19, and 20 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below with the key disputed limitations italicized, illustrates the claimed subject matter: 1. A method for coordinating display of an application across multiple display screens in a computing environment, the computing environment including one or more computing devices in communication with a software application, wherein the software application provides displayable information accessible to the one or more computing devices, a computing device of the one or more computing devices executing the steps of the method, the method comprising: receiving a signal from a user input mechanism of a first device, the first device characterized by the user input mechanism in communication with a first display; displaying content of a first user interface display screen on the first display in response to the signal, wherein the content of the first user interface display screen includes a first visual feature and a second visual feature; receiving, at the first device, information about a characteristic of a second display that is larger than the first display; generating instructions for a second user interface display screen for presentation on the second display that is larger than the first display, wherein the second user interface display screen is coordinated with the first user interface display screen, Appeal 2020-005872 Application 14/609,103 3 wherein the first user interface display screen and the second user interface display screen are associated with the software application, wherein the second user interface display screen includes the content of the first user interface display screen and one or more additional features relative to the first user interface display screen, wherein the content is arranged differently on the first user interface display screen and the second user interface display screen so that at least one of the additional features is between the first visual feature and the second visual feature of the content of the first user interface display screen, wherein the instructions provide the one or more additional features, and wherein the instructions are generated in part based on the information about the characteristic of the second display; and transmitting the instructions from the first device to the second display enabling a second device to present the second user interface display screen on the second display according to the instructions. Appeal Br. 19-20 (Claims App.). Appeal 2020-005872 Application 14/609,103 4 REJECTIONS The Examiner relies on the following references: Name3 Reference Date Schmidt US 6,160,585 Dec. 12, 2000 Pilu US 2003/0058275 A1 Mar. 27, 2003 Golden US 2009/0235170 A1 Sept. 17, 2009 Choi US 2011/0283334 A1 Nov. 17, 2011 Cotte US 2013/0290882 A1 Oct. 31, 2013 Lee US 2014/0009394 A1 Jan. 9, 2014 Park US 2014/0026068 A1 Jan. 23, 2014 Allen US 2014/0325561 A1 Oct. 30, 2014 Fishman US 2015/0074721 A1 Mar. 12, 2015 Claims 1-3, 5, 6, 8-12, 19, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over the combined teachings of Cotte, Choi, and Park. Final Act. 4-16. Claims 13 and 17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over the combined teachings of Cotte, Choi, Park, and Lee. Final Act. 16-20. Claim 14 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over the combined teachings of Cotte, Choi, Park, and Golden. Final Act. 20-23. Claim 21 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over the combined teachings of Cotte, Choi, Park, and Allen. Final Act. 23- 24. 3 All citations herein to the prior art are by reference to the first named inventor only. Appeal 2020-005872 Application 14/609,103 5 Claims 22 and 23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over the combined teachings of Cotte, Choi, Park, Lee, and Fishman. Final Act. 24-27. Claim 24 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over the combined teachings of Cotte, Choi, Park, and Schmidt. Final Act. 27-28. Claim 25 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over the combined teachings of Cotte, Choi, Park, and Pilu. Final Act. 28- 30. OPINION We have considered Appellant’s arguments (Appeal Br. 13-18; Reply Br. 2-10) in light of the Examiner’s findings and explanations (Final Act. 4- 30; Ans. 3-16). For the reasons set forth below, we are not persuaded of Examiner error in the rejection of the pending claims, and we, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejections. We adopt as our own: (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken (Final Act. 4-30) and (2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellant’s Appeal Brief (Ans. 3-16). We concur with the conclusions reached by the Examiner, and we highlight the following for emphasis.4 4 Only those arguments made by Appellant have been considered in this decision. Arguments Appellant did not make are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2019). Appeal 2020-005872 Application 14/609,103 6 Claims 1-3, 5, 6, 8-12, 19, and 20 Appellant argues the rejections of independent claims 1, 19, and 20 collectively with regard to the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Appeal Br. 13-14. Appellant does not separately argue patentability for dependent claims 2, 3, 5, 6, and 8-12. Id. at 14. Therefore, based on Appellant’s arguments, we decide the appeal of claims 1-3, 5, 6, 8-12, 19, and 20 based on claim 1 alone with respect to the Examiner’s rejection based on the combination of Cotte, Choi, and Park. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2019). In rejecting claim 1 over the combination of Cotte, Choi, and Park, the Examiner finds Cotte teaches most limitations of claim 1, including “displaying content of a first user interface display screen on the first display . . . wherein the content of the first user interface display screen includes a first visual feature and a second visual feature,” “generating instructions for a second user interface display screen for presentation on the second display that is larger than the first display,” “wherein the second user interface display screen includes the content of the first user interface display screen and one or more additional features relative to the first user interface display screen,” “wherein the content is arranged differently on the first user interface display screen and the second user interface display screen so that at least one of the additional features is between the first visual feature and the second visual feature of the content of the first user interface display screen,” and “transmitting the instructions from the first device to the second display enabling a second device to present the second user interface display screen on the second display according to the instructions.” Final Act. 5-7. Appeal 2020-005872 Application 14/609,103 7 In particular, the Examiner relies on Cotte’s disclosure of an emulated graphical user interface of a smartphone displayed enlarged on an external display unit, such as a television set. Final Act. 5-7 (citing Cotte Fig. 1, ¶¶ 5, 12, 20, 42, 48-54, 69, 75-80, 123, 124, 133-135); Ans. 3-4 (citing Cotte ¶¶ 12, 20, 76-78). The Examiner identifies in Cotte the display of smartphone 20 as the recited “first display” and the display of television unit 40 as the recited “second display that is larger than the first display.” Final Act. 5-6 (citing Cotte Fig. 1, ¶¶ 48-54, 123, 124, 133-135). The Examiner further identifies Cotte’s graphical user interface of a smartphone as corresponding to the recited “content of a first user interface display screen on the first display” and Cotte’s graphical display output on the display of television unit 40 as corresponding to the recited “second user interface display screen . . . on the second display.” Ans. 3-4 (citing Cotte ¶¶ 12, 20, 76-78); Final Act. 5-6 (citing Cotte Fig. 1, ¶¶ 42, 48-54, 69, 123, 124, 133-135). The Examiner further finds that Cotte’s emulation of the smartphone’s graphical user interface on the television display teaches “the second user interface display screen includes the content of the first user interface display screen,” as recited in claim 1. Final Act. 6 (citing Cotte ¶¶ 75-80, 133-135). The Examiner also finds that Cotte’s disclosure of “combining the emulated user interface with graphical elements of at least one other source, which generates graphical outputs” on the television display, teaches the recited feature of “the second user interface display screen includes the content of the first user interface display screen and one or more additional features relative to the first user interface display screen.” Ans. 3-4 Appeal 2020-005872 Application 14/609,103 8 (emphasis added) (citing Cotte ¶¶ 76-78). Specifically, the Examiner finds that Cotte’s additional graphical output displayed on the television unit from sources other than the smartphone, such as “TV receiver, video recorder, DVD player (these produce analog/digital graphics data for a video image), desktop computer, multimedia centre (these produce e.g. also their own user interfaces)” teaches including in “the second user interface display screen” “one or more additional features” relative to “the first user interface display screen,” e.g., the smartphone graphical user interface. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Cotte ¶¶ 12, 20, 76-78); Final Act. 6 (citing Cotte ¶¶ 75-80, 133- 135). The Examiner further finds that Cotte’s combining the emulated smartphone user interface with graphical elements of other source(s) teaches “the content is arranged differently on the first user interface display screen and the second user interface display screen,” as recited in claim 1, because in Cotte The combining is preferably an arranging of the emulated user interface and the graphical output of another source/other sources on the display area of the external display unit and includes particularly preferably at least one action from the following group, wherein the actions are carried out with reference to the emulated user interface and/or the graphical output of the other source(s): enlarging and/or reducing, moving, placing on top of one another or superposing, rotating, mirroring, setting transparency, aligning to a grid. Ans. 4 (underlined emphasis added) (citing Cotte ¶ 78); Final Act. 6 (citing Cotte ¶ 78). According to the Examiner, Cotte teaches “at least one of the additional features is between the first visual feature and the second visual Appeal 2020-005872 Application 14/609,103 9 feature of the content of the first user interface display screen” “when at least one of the additional features is superposed between the first and second visual features of the content of the first user interface display screen” in Cotte’s combined graphical display on the television screen. Final Act. 6-7 (emphasis added) (citing Cotte ¶¶ 20, 78). Appellant argues that Cotte does not teach “the content is arranged differently on the first user interface display screen and the second user interface display screen,” as recited in claim 1, because “[a]lthough Cotte’s content may be enlarged, reduced, moved, superimposed, rotated, mirrored, or made transparent (see Cotte 0078), the features of content are the same and in the same arrangement with respect to each other in both Cotte’s mobile device and on Cotte’s larger display.” Appeal Br. 13 (emphasis added) (citing Cotte ¶¶ 38, 42, 49-52, 78, Figs. 3, 4). Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive of Examiner error. First, Appellant’s argument is directed only to Cotte’s emulated smartphone user interface when the Examiner’s rejection is based on Cotte’s graphical display on the television screen (the claimed “second user interface display screen”), which includes the emulated smartphone user interface and graphical output from other sources, such as “TV receiver, video recorder, DVD player (these produce analog/digital graphics data for a video image), desktop computer, multimedia centre (these produce e.g. also their own user interfaces).” See Cotte ¶ 77 (underlined emphases added); Ans. 3-4 (citing Cotte ¶¶ 12, 20, 76-78). Second, although Appellant does not explain how Appellant interprets the claim term “content,” the Specification describes broadly that the recited “content” includes “visual information.” Spec. ¶ 59 (“rendering instructions Appeal 2020-005872 Application 14/609,103 10 may be any computer code that specifies information usable by a display mechanism to present visual information or other content via the display mechanism” (emphases added)). In view of the Specification, the visual information displayed on Cotte’s television screen (the claimed “second user interface display screen”) falls within the meaning of “content,” as recited in the claim. See In re Smith Int’l, Inc., 871 F.3d 1375, 1382-83 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (internal citations omitted) (“The correct inquiry in giving a claim term its broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification is . . . an interpretation that corresponds with what and how the inventor describes [the] invention in the specification, i.e., an interpretation that is ‘consistent with the specification.’”). Lastly, the Specification describes broadly that “[t]he terms ‘format,’ ‘layout,’ and ‘content arrangement’ may be employed interchangeably herein.” Spec. ¶ 105 (emphases added). Similarly, the Specification describes that “[a] given UI architecture (and associated UI display screen rendering) is characterized by a particular format, i.e., arrangement of content elements associated therewith.” Id. (emphases added). As discussed above, the Specification also describes visual elements as content elements. Id. ¶ 59. In view of these disclosures in the Specification, the visual information displayed on Cotte’s television screen-which combines the emulated smartphone user interface and graphical output or user interface from other sources by “arranging” the visual elements on the television screen, e.g., “enlarging and/or reducing, moving, placing on top of one another or superposing, rotating,” etc.-teaches or suggests “the content is Appeal 2020-005872 Application 14/609,103 11 arranged differently on the first user interface display screen and the second user interface display screen,” as recited in claim 1. See Cotte ¶ 78; Ans. 4 (citing Cotte ¶ 78); Final Act. 6 (citing Cotte ¶ 78); Smith Int’l, 871 F.3d at 1382-83. Appellant further argues that “rotating” [the same graphical elements of the smartphone] does not teach or suggest one or more additional features relative to the first user interface display screen, wherein the content is arranged differently on the first user interface display screen and the second user interface display screen so that at least one of the additional features is between the first visual feature and the second visual feature of the content of the first user interface display screen, as recited in claim 1. Reply Br. 4. We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s argument because the Examiner identifies as the recited “one or more additional features relative to the first user interface display screen” Cotte’s graphical output from sources other than the smartphone, such as “TV receiver, video recorder, DVD player (these produce analog/digital graphics data for a video image), desktop computer, multimedia centre (these produce e.g. also their own user interfaces).” See Cotte ¶ 77 (bold emphasis added); Ans. 3-4 (citing Cotte ¶¶ 76-78). As discussed above, the Examiner further finds that Cotte teaches “at least one of the additional features is between the first visual feature and the second visual feature of the content of the first user interface display screen,” as recited in claim 1, “when at least one of the additional features is superposed between the first and second visual features of the content of the first user interface display screen” in Cotte’s combined graphical display on the television screen. Final Act. 6-7 (emphasis added) (citing Cotte ¶¶ 20, 78). Appeal 2020-005872 Application 14/609,103 12 Based on the foregoing analysis and on this record, we determine that Cotte teaches or suggests “wherein the second user interface display screen includes the content of the first user interface display screen and one or more additional features relative to the first user interface display screen” and “wherein the content is arranged differently on the first user interface display screen and the second user interface display screen so that at least one of the additional features is between the first visual feature and the second visual feature of the content of the first user interface display screen,” as recited in claim 1. Appellant further contends that Cotte teaches away from these limitations because Cotte describes “the content to have the same features with the same arrangement with respect to each other on a mobile device and on a larger display.” Appeal Br. 13. Similarly, Appellant argues that Figures 3 and 4 of Cotte describe both the smartphone and the external display displaying the same picture of a sailboat in water, and, therefore, Cotte teaches away from the disputed limitations discussed above. Reply Br. 3. As discussed above, the Examiner relies on Cotte’s disclosure of a combined graphical display on the television screen, which includes the emulated smartphone user interface and graphical output from other sources, such as “TV receiver, video recorder, DVD player (these produce analog/digital graphics data for a video image), desktop computer, multimedia centre (these produce e.g. also their own user interfaces).” See Cotte ¶ 77 (underlined emphasis added); Ans. 3-4 (citing Cotte ¶¶ 12, 20, 76-78). We disagree with Appellant’s argument because “the ‘mere disclosure of more than one alternative’ does not amount to teaching away Appeal 2020-005872 Application 14/609,103 13 from one of the alternatives where the reference does not ‘criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution claimed.’” SightSound Techs., LLC v. Apple Inc., 809 F.3d 1307, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). The Examiner further relies on Park as teaching “wherein the instructions provide the one or more additional features,” as recited in claim 1. Id. at 8-9 (citing Park Figs. 7, 8, 9, ¶¶ 56, 57). Appellant does not dispute the Examiner’s findings regarding this limitation. The Examiner also relies on Choi for the limitations “receiving, at the first device, information about a characteristic of a second display that is larger than the first display” and “transmitting the instructions from the first device to the second display enabling a second device to present the second user interface display screen on the second display according to the instructions,” as recited in claim 1. Final Act. 7 (citing Choi Fig. 1, ¶¶ 34- 36, 89, 91). Appellant does not dispute the Examiner’s findings regarding these limitations. Turning next to reasons to combine the references, the Examiner finds that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Cotte, Choi, and Park in the manner explained by the Examiner to obtain the benefit of “providing an efficient screen display of the external display device.” Final Act. 9 (citing Park ¶ 12). Appellant contends that there is no motivation to combine Cotte, Choi, and Park because the references teach away from the recited feature of one or more additional features relative to the first user interface display screen, wherein the content is arranged differently on the first user interface display screen and the second user interface display screen so that at least one of the additional features is Appeal 2020-005872 Application 14/609,103 14 between the first visual feature and the second visual feature of the content of the first user interface display screen. Reply Br. 2-3 (emphases omitted). Similarly, Appellant asserts that Park teaches away from claim 1 because “Park requires the features displayed on the mobile device and the larger screen to be the same and with the same arrangement.” Appeal Br. 14. We disagree with Appellant’s argument because the mere fact that the references describe an alternative feature different from those features of Cotte relied on by the Examiner does not amount to teaching away unless the references criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution claimed. Fulton, 391 F.3d at 1201. In sum, Appellant does not persuade us that the Examiner erred in finding that the combination of Cotte, Choi, and Park teaches or suggests all limitations of claim 1. We also find that the Examiner articulates sufficient reason, supported by rational underpinning, for combining the teachings of Cotte, Choi, and Park in the manner described by the Examiner. For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded of Examiner error in the rejection of claim 1. We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-3, 5, 6, 8-12, 19, and 20 over the combination of Cotte, Choi, and Park. Claims 13 and 17 Claims 13 and 17 each directly or indirectly depend from claim 2 and further recite additional limitations. The Examiner finds that Lee teaches the additionally recited limitations of claims 13 and 17. Final Act. 17-20. Claim 13 depends from claim 10, which in turn depends from claim 2, and further recites “wherein the second user interface display screen Appeal 2020-005872 Application 14/609,103 15 includes one or more additional user interface controls relative to the first user interface display screen.” Appeal Br. 21-22. As discussed above, Appellant does not separately argue patentability for dependent claims 2 and 10 (id. at 14), and we sustain the Examiner’s rejections of claims 2 and 10 based on the combination of Cotte, Choi, and Park. With regard to claim 13, the Examiner finds that Lee teaches “wherein the second user interface display screen includes one or more additional user interface controls relative to the first user interface display screen,” as recited in claim 13, because Figure 1B of Lee describes a “multi mirroring service” “connecting several mobile terminals 201 and 202 to one image display device 100 and simultaneously displaying the screens of the mobile terminals 201 and 202 on the image display device 100.” Lee ¶ 57; Final Act. 17. According to the Examiner, “second user interface display screen 100 includes icons of mobile terminal 201 displayed on the second user interface display screen 100 (one or more additional user interface controls) relative to a first user interface display screen 202).” Final Act. 17 (citing Lee Figs. 1B, 3, ¶¶ 57, 77, 79, 97). The Examiner further finds that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Cotte, Choi, and Park, with the teachings of Lee to obtain “the benefit of controlling a display device with another device during mirroring of a display image.” Final Act. 18 (citing Lee ¶¶ 57, 79). Appellant argues that Lee does not teach the additionally recited limitation of 13 because the “icons” of mobile terminal 201 relied upon by the Examiner “are not controls.” Appeal Br. 17. Appellant asserts that the “icons” are instead “images that Lee’s display 100 received from Lee’s Appeal 2020-005872 Application 14/609,103 16 mobiles 201 and 202.” Id. (citing Lee Fig. 1B, ¶ 57). According to Appellant “images are not user interface controls.” Id. Appellant argues that “[f]or similar reasons, Lee does not teach or suggest Claim 17.” Id. The Examiner responds, The icons of mobile terminal 201 displayed on the second user interface display screen 100 control the user interface of the mobile terminal 201 and part of the second user interface display screen 100 that displays the mobile 201 screen when selected using input unit 155 by activating the related application and changing the displayed screens. Ans. 12 (emphases added) (citing Lee Figs. 1B, 3, ¶¶ 57, 77, 79, 97). We agree with the Examiner. Lee describes “[t]he user controlling several mobile terminals 201 and 202 through the image display device 100,” i.e., the claimed “second user interface display screen.” Lee ¶ 57. Lee further describes the operation of user input unit 155 connected to image display device 100: “The controller 180 receives the user command for controlling the mobile terminal 200 from the user through the user input unit 155.” Id. ¶ 79. Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive of Examiner error because Appellant does not address the disclosures in Lee that provide express teachings of using icons and user interface displayed in the image display device 100 (the claimed “second user interface display screen”) to control the mobile terminals. For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded of Examiner error in the rejection of claim 13. We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 13 over the combination of Cotte, Choi, Park, and Lee and the rejection of claim 17, which is argued on the same basis as claim 13. Appeal 2020-005872 Application 14/609,103 17 Claim 14 Claim 14 depends from claim 2 and further recites “wherein the first computing resource includes a first speaker system, and wherein the second computing resource includes a second speaker system,” “wherein the first set of information includes information contained in a first audio signal tailored for use by the first computing resource, and wherein the second set of information includes information contained in a second audio signal tailored for use by the second computing resource,” and “wherein the second speaker system includes additional functionality relative to the first speaker system, and wherein the additional functionality is adapted to use additional information contained in the second audio signal relative to the first audio signal.” Appeal Br. 22. In rejecting claim 14 over the combination of Cotte, Choi, Park, and Golden, the Examiner finds Choi teaches “wherein a first computing resource includes a first speaker system,” as recited in claim 14. Final Act. 20-21 (citing Choi Fig. 2, ¶¶ 36, 62). The Examiner further relies on Golden as teaching the rest of the limitations additionally recited in claim 14. Id. 21-23 (citing Golden Fig. 1, ¶ 37). Appellant argues that Golden does not teach or suggest “two systems,” i.e., the disclosed display device and sound system, “communicate with each other” and, therefore, does not teach the recited limitations of claim 14. Appeal Br. 17-18. The Examiner finds Appellant’s argument unpersuasive because Appellant’s argument is not commensurate with the claim language, which does not require “two systems communicating with each other.” Ans. 14. Appeal 2020-005872 Application 14/609,103 18 We agree with the Examiner. Accordingly, we are not persuaded of Examiner error in the rejection of claim 14, and, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 14 over the combination of Cotte, Choi, Park, and Golden. Claims 22 and 23 Claim 22 depends from claim 1 and further recites “wherein the one or more additional features includes at least one user interface control operable for controlling the second user interface display screen from the first user interface display screen.” Appeal Br. 25. Claim 23 depends from claim 22 and further recites “wherein the first display activates the user interface control displayed on the second user interface display screen based on a mechanism selected from a group consisting of the first display being a touch screen display, gesture detection, and voice or sound commands.” Id. The Examiner finds the combination of Cotte, Choi, Park, Lee, and Fishman teaches the additional recited limitations of claim 22 and 23. Final Act. 24-27. The Examiner also finds that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Cotte, Choi, and Park with the teachings of Fishman to “obtain the benefit of reducing the number of components for controlling a display.” Final Act. 26. Appellant argues that the Examiner’s proffered combination does not teach the limitations of claim 22 because “Lee teaches that two mobile devices both send images to a device and that the images are mirrored on the receiving device.” Appeal Br. 15. Appellant asserts, therefore, that Lee teaches away from the disputed limitations of claim 1. This argument is unpersuasive because, as discussed above with respect to claim 1, the Examiner relies on Cotte’s disclosure of a combined Appeal 2020-005872 Application 14/609,103 19 graphical display on the television screen, which includes the emulated smartphone user interface and graphical output from other sources, as teaching the disputed limitations. Moreover, the mere fact that the references describe an alternative feature different from those features of Cotte relied on by the Examiner does not amount to teaching away unless the references criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution claimed. Fulton, 391 F.3d at 1201. As for claim 23, Appellant asserts the Examiner in rejecting claim 23 “appears to assert . . . that Lee’s remote 155 teaches ‘first display’ as recited. However, a remote cannot be a display.” Appeal Br. 16. The Examiner responds that this argument “is not commensurate with the rejections in the [Final Office Action].” We agree with the Examiner. Contrary to Appellant’s contention, the Examiner’s rejection of claim 23 relies on Cotte’s smartphone display as teaching “the first display” recited in claim 23. Final Act. 26 (citing Cotte Fig. 1, ¶ 124). Accordingly, we are not persuaded of Examiner error in the rejection of claims 22 and 23, and, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 22 and 23 over the combination of Cotte, Choi, Park, Lee, and Fishman. Claim 25 Claim 25 depends from claim 1 and further recites “wherein the second user interface display screen includes tiles that each include a subset of the content of the first user interface display screen and a subset of the one or more additional features.” Appeal Br. 25. The Examiner finds that Pilu teaches the additionally recited limitation of claim 25. Final Act. 28-29 (citing Pilu Figs. 2, 3 ¶¶ 54, 62). Appeal 2020-005872 Application 14/609,103 20 Specifically, the Examiner finds that thumbnails 35a-g with labels 40a-g indicating whether the image represented by the thumbnail is shared with a remote program, as depicted in Pilu’s Figure 2, teach or suggest the “tiles” recited in claim 25. Final Act. Final Act. 28-29 (citing Pilu Figs. 2, 3 ¶¶ 54, 62). The Examiner further finds that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Cotte, Choi, and Park with the teachings of Pilu to arrive at the subject matter recited in claim 25 “to obtain the benefit of enabling a user to ‘facilitate easy recognition of images’ and which users images are shared.” Final Act. 29- 30 (citing Pilu ¶¶ 44, 62). Appellant argues that Pilu’s thumbnails are not “tiles” recited in claim 25. Appeal Br. 15; Reply Br. 7-8. Citing an online magazine, Appellant asserts that claims 25 requires “tiles to be squares or rectangles in rows and columns with no space between them.” Reply Br. 7 (emphasis added). Appellant further contends, without support, that “The term ‘tile’ has been borrowed from the art of roof laying. A roof layer would not look at Pilu’s low resolution miniature images 35a-35g and text labels 40a-40g and envision ‘tiles’ in any manner.” Id. Appellant’s Specification, however, describes information cards depicted in Figure 5 as “tiles 154,” which show spaces between each information card. Spec. Fig. 5 (element 154), ¶¶ 113, 119. In view of these disclosures in the Specification, the rectangular thumbnail panels depicted in Figures 2 and 3 of Pilu teaches or suggests “tiles” recited in claim 25. See In re Smith Int’l, 871 F.3d at 1382-83 (“The correct inquiry in giving a claim term its broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification is . . . an interpretation that corresponds with what and how the inventor describes Appeal 2020-005872 Application 14/609,103 21 [the] invention in the specification, i.e., an interpretation that is ‘consistent with the specification.’”). Appellant’s argument and evidence are not persuasive because, when construing terms under a reasonably broad interpretation standard, “we give the intrinsic evidence priority over extrinsic evidence with which it is inconsistent.” Immunex Corp. v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLC, 977 F.3d 1212, 1221-22 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2799 (2021). Appellant also argues that Pilu’s thumbnails do not teach or suggest and “even teach away from” the disputed limitations of claim 1. Appellant’s argument is not persuasive of Examiner error because, as discussed above with respect to claim 1, the Examiner relies on Cotte as teaching the disputed limitations of claim 1. Appellant’s “teaching away” argument is also unpersuasive because the mere fact that the references describe an alternative feature different from those features of Cotte relied on by the Examiner does not amount to teaching away unless the references criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution claimed. Fulton, 391 F.3d at 1201. In sum, we determine that the Examiner has shown sufficiently that Pilu teaches or suggests the additionally recited limitation of claim 25. We also find that the Examiner articulates sufficient reason, supported by rational underpinning, for combining the teachings of Cotte, Choi, Park, and Pilu in the manner described by the Examiner. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 25 over the combination of Cotte, Choi, Park, and Pilu. Appeal 2020-005872 Application 14/609,103 22 CONCLUSIONS For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded of Examiner error in the rejection of claims 1-3, 5, 6, 8-14, 17, and 19-25. We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejections on this record. The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1-3, 5, 6, 8-14, 17, and 19-25 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is affirmed. DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1-3, 5, 6, 8- 12, 19, 20 103 Cotte, Choi, Park 1-3, 5, 6, 8- 12, 19, 20 13, 17 103 Cotte, Choi, Park, Lee 13, 17 14 103 Cotte, Choi, Park, Golden 14 21 103 Cotte, Choi, Park, Allen 21 22, 23 103 Cotte, Choi, Park, Lee, Fishman 22, 23 24 103 Cotte, Choi, Park, Schmidt 24 25 103 Cotte, Choi, Park, Pilu 25 Overall Outcome 1-3, 5, 6, 8- 14, 17, 19- 25 Appeal 2020-005872 Application 14/609,103 23 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED