Oracle International Corporation

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 1, 2020

2019005725 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 1, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/273,646 05/09/2014 Niladri DE 2011-0339US01 9132
74739 7590 07/01/2020
Potomac Law Group, PLLC (Oracle International)
8229 Boone Boulevard
Suite 430
Vienna, VA 22182
EXAMINER
MEINECKE DIAZ, SUSANNA M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3683
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/01/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
bgoldsmith@potomaclaw.com
eofficeaction@appcoll.com
patents@potomaclaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte NILADRI DE, SRINIVASU DUDALA, and
MANI KUMAR VRAN KASIBHATLA
Appeal 2019-005725
Application 14/273,646
Technology Center 3600
Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, PHILLIP J. HOFFMANN, and
BRADLEY B. BAYAT, Administrative Patent Judges.
BAYAT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 4, 5, 7, 9–11, 15, 16, 20, 22, 23, and
25–28. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Oracle International
Corp. Appeal Br. 2.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Independent claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed
subject matter:
1. A non-transitory computer-readable medium having
instructions stored thereon that, when executed by a processor,
cause the processor to dynamically distribute tasks, the dynamic
distributing comprising:
calculating a plurality of scores for a plurality of tasks that
are assigned to multiple project resources, wherein each score is
calculated based on a finish-by date-time for each task, a planned
finish date-time for each task, a planned effort for each task, and
a base priority for each task;
determining an order that the plurality of tasks are
executed based on the plurality of scores;
determining a buffer time distribution for the plurality of
tasks based on the plurality of scores, wherein,
a plurality of buffer values are calculated for the
tasks,
time from an overall project buffer time is
distributed as task specific buffer times for each task based
on the calculated score for each task and the calculated
buffer values,
the distributed task specific buffer times for each
task are based on task specific buffer times for tasks that
are up-stream according to the determined order, and
for at least one task, a first portion of the task
specific buffer time for the one task is applied before a
start to the one task and a second portion of the task
specific buffer time for the one task is applied after the end
of the one task;
displaying the plurality of tasks and a project plan timeline
within a user interface, wherein the plurality of tasks are
displayed in the order that the plurality of tasks are executed and
the task specific buffer times distributed to each task are
indicated in the displayed project timeline based on displayed
finish-by date-times for each task and displayed start date-times
for each task;
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after the displaying of the plurality of tasks and the project
plan timeline, determining whether a task from among the
plurality of tasks violates its finish-by date-time;
identifying an eligible task for swapping when it is
determined that the task violates its finish-by date-time; and
swapping a position of the task that violates its finish-by
date-time with a position of the eligible task within the order that
the plurality of tasks are executed.
REJECTION
Claims 1, 4, 5, 7, 9–11, 15, 16, 20, 22, 23, and 25–28 are rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non-statutory subject matter. Final Act.
7; Answer 4.
OPINION
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
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in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
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to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO has published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Under the Guidance, we look to
whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure (“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate
that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the
claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
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(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See Guidance.

Prong One of Revised Step 2A of the Guidance
Appellant argues all claims together on the basis of claim 1. Appeal
Br. 33. We also select claim 1 as representative; thus, the remaining claims
stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
The Examiner determines the claims are “directed to the dynamic
distribution of tasks,” which involves “[c]alculating a plurality of scores,
determining an order that the plurality of tasks are executed based on the
scores, and determining a buffer time distribution,” and which represents “an
analyzing of data, and mathematical relationships/formulas.” Answer 5.
The preamble of claim 1 recites a non-transitory computer-readable
medium executed by a processor to dynamically distribute tasks, involving
the following steps.
Claim 1 recites “calculating a plurality of scores for a plurality of
tasks,” which the Specification describes as “a formula used to calculate a
score for each task within a set of tasks.” Spec. ¶ 10; see also id. ¶¶ 20, 24
(providing formulas for this calculation). Under the broadest reasonable
interpretation, this step represents a mathematical calculation and a mental
process because such calculation can be performed in the human mind or
with the aid of pen and paper.
The following step recites “determining an order that the plurality of
tasks are executed based on the plurality of scores, ” which the Specification
indicates that the order of tasks is based on the value of scores for tasks,
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such that the value of scores are used to sort tasks in order. Spec. ¶¶ 21–22,
30. Sorting and organizing tasks based on the value of scores is also a
mental process that can practically be performed in the human mind or with
the aid of pen and paper.
The step of “determining a buffer time distribution” for the tasks
involves calculating buffer values, distributing buffer times based on the
calculated score, calculated buffer values, and buffer time attributed to “up-
stream tasks,” and distributing some buffer before and some buffer time
after a task. See Spec. ¶¶ 36–45. This step also involves mathematical
calculations, and can also be performed in the human mind with the aid of
pen and paper.
Claim 1 further recites “determining whether a task from among the
plurality of tasks violates its finish-by date-time; identifying an eligible task
for swapping when it is determined that the task violates its finish-by date-
time; and swapping a position of the task.” The determination of whether a
task violates its finish-by date-time is performed by comparing the current
finish-by date-time with the required finish-by date-time, and making a
judgement, which can be performed in the human mind is also a mental
process. See Spec. ¶ 54. And, “swapping a position of the task that violates
its finish-by-date time with a position of the eligible task” merely involves
an alteration of data representing the order by substituting one position for
another, which can be performed mentally or with the aid of pen and paper.
See id.
These steps of the method individually and in combination recite a
judicial exception (i.e., an abstract idea) because they are capable of being
performed mentally in the human mind and/or with the aid of pen and paper,
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and involve mathematical calculations, as indicated by the Examiner.
Answer 9 (“a human user could perform the project planning algorithm”).
As such, we determine claim 1 recites a judicial exception.
Prong Two of Revised Step 2A of the Guidance
Because we determine that the claim recites a judicial exception, the
next step is to evaluate whether the claim recites “additional elements,” such
that the judicial exception is integrated into a “practical application.”
Guidance at 54. We use the term “additional elements” for “claim features,
limitations, and/or steps that are recited in the claim beyond the identified
judicial exception.” See Guidance at 55 n.24. The Examiner identifies two
“additional elements” that are outside the scope of the identified judicial
exception, which are the preamble of claim 1, and “displaying the plurality
of tasks and a project plan within a user interface.” See Answer 4–6.
As discussed above, the preamble of claim 1 recites a non-transitory
computer-readable medium executed by a processor to dynamically
distribute tasks by performing the recited steps. Yet, none of the recited
steps are tied to the processor, with each step being performed without any
connection to computer technology. If the body of a claim fully and
intrinsically sets forth all of the limitations of the claimed invention, and the
preamble merely states, for example, the purpose or intended use of the
invention without breathing life into the claim, then the preamble is not
afforded considerable patentable weight, and the limitation is of no
significance to claim construction. Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard
Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 1999). This is not only evident in
independent claim 1, but also in independent claim 11, which merely recites
“[a] computer-implemented method” in the preamble of the claim without
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any indication that the recited steps are performed by computing device or
processor.
As to the “user interface,” the Specification describes that a project
plan timeline and tasks can be “displayed within a user interface,” but does
not describe the nature, structure, or function of the user interface beyond its
ordinary use. For example, the Specification describes: “Processor 22 can
also be operatively coupled via bus 12 to a display 24, such as a Liquid
Crystal Display (‘LCD’). Display 24 can display information to the user.”
Spec. ¶ 13. The claimed user interface does not alter what the Specification
describes as the purpose of the claimed invention, “a computer system that
displays data” (Spec. ¶ 1) and to “dynamically distribute tasks within the
displayed project plan timeline based on the calculated scores” (Spec. ¶ 10);
as such, this additional limitation does not reflect any improvement to
computer capabilities, or to another technology or technical field.
Accordingly, we determine that claim 1 does not integrate the recited
judicial exception into a “practical application” under the Guidance.

Step 2B of the Guidance
In Step 2B, we consider whether an “additional element,” or
combination of “additional elements,” adds a specific limitation or
combination of limitations that are not well-understood, routine,
conventional activity in the field, which would be considered “something
more” than the judicial exception. Guidance at 56.
As discussed, the “additional element” of displaying “with a user
interface” is a standard function of a general-purpose computer. See, e.g.,
Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
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(“Nothing in the claims, understood in light of the specification, requires
anything other than off-the-shelf, conventional computer, network, and
display technology for gathering, sending, and presenting the desired
information”).
We thus agree with the Examiner that the additional element of
claim 1 merely “perform routine operations, including those identified by the
courts as well-understood, routine, and conventional computer functions.”
Answer 7. As such, claim 1 does not encompass an “inventive concept” that
is “something more” than the recited judicial exception. Guidance at 56. On
this record, we agree with the Examiner that these additional limitations
considered individually and in combination do not provide an inventive
concept.

Appellant’s Arguments
In general, we adopt the Examiner’s findings and Response to
Arguments in the Answer as our own. Answer 4–16. We additionally
highlight and further explain several points below in support of those
findings.
Appellant begins by arguing that the Specification describes
technological “improvements to task modeling and interface technology,” at
Figure 4, and paragraphs 16–18, 45, 48, and 50–55. Appeal Br. 9–11; Reply
Br. 2–6.
We find the task-modeling improvement argument unpersuasive,
because any asserted improvement in “task modeling” is merely an attempt
to improve the judicial exception, so that any “task modeling” improvement
is encompassed within the abstract idea itself. “What is needed is an
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inventive concept in the non-abstract application realm.” SAP Am., Inc. v.
InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018). “[A] claim for a new
abstract idea is still an abstract idea.” Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics
Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (emphasis omitted).
As to alleged improvement in “interface technology,” our review of
the cited portions of the Specification do not support Appellant’s contention.
Figure 4 is a high-level flow chart of the abstract method, which includes
merely displaying the results of the analysis “within a user interface.”
Paragraphs 16–18, 45, 48, 50, 51, and 53–55 merely describe the specifics of
developing a project plan using the claimed steps. Paragraph 52 describes
that “the plurality of tasks and a project plan timeline are displayed within a
user interface,” and that the “plurality of tasks can be displayed within the
project plan timeline based on the order that the plurality of tasks are
executed,” but does not otherwise describe a user interface or any
improvements to user interface technology. The cited portions of the
Specification do not support the contention that the claimed invention
provides any improvement to “interface technology.”
In their Reply Brief, Appellant appears to argue that the display itself
is improved because it executes project planning logic, in that “the swapping
functionality recited in claim 1 is integrated with the display.” Reply Br. 6.
This is unpersuasive because there is no display claimed, and no language
that indicates the user interface, which would be visible on the display, has
any function other than operating in its ordinary capacity as a tool to display
the results of the project planning analysis.
Further, Appellant argues that some of the limitations of claims 1, 4,
and 26:
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cannot be dismissed as a conventional display of data, as the
display is tightly integrated with the novel, non-obvious, and
unconventional software. Indeed, this is not merely displaying
information in a conventional manner, as the software processing
itself is not conventional, and thus the user interface that is tightly
integrated with this processing is improved.
Appeal Br. 12; Reply Br. 3, 10.
Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive because the claim merely calls
for the display of information, but does not recite anything that indicates the
display is more “tightly integrated” with the software than in any
conventional computer system. The Specification, for instance, does not
even describe the user interface in the context of the processor that is
connected to a display. See Spec. ¶ 13.
Appellant contends the Examiner “oversimplifies,” and “fails to
consider the ordered combination of elements, including the resultant
functionality,” which is allegedly illustrated “by showing the additional
elements as bolded portions of previously pending claim 1.” Appeal Br. 13–
14; Reply Br. 10–14. We find this contention unpersuasive at least because
the only identified “additional element” is “within a user interface.” There is
no claimed “ordered combination of elements” possible with only one
“additional element.” We disagree that the Examiner has over-simplified the
claim.
In an attempt to persuade us that claim 1 recites a “practical
application . . . due to technical improvements,” Appellant asserts that in the
claim, “the high level of resistance to task delays and the enhanced
flexibility exhibited by the claimed display of the project plan is achieved
based on an integration with the back-end data, or the plurality of scores and
plurality of buffer values that are akin to a data structure.” Appeal Br. 15;
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Reply Br. 12–13. This is unpersuasive because Appellant relies on the
abstract project planning scheme, rather than any “technical improvements”
reflected in the additional limitations recited in the claim.
Appellant also unsuccessfully argues that claims 4 and 26 “further
demonstrate the tight integration between the dynamic display functionality
and the back-end data.” Appeal Br. 16. Claim 4, for instance, does not
recite any language about displaying data representing the swapped
elements. Claim 26 merely recites “displaying the plurality of tasks and an
updated project plan timeline within the user interface,” without requiring
any further “integration” between the display and data being displayed.
We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s argument that “[s]imilar to the
moving of icons based on usage from Example 37, the claimed dynamic
display functionality that swaps tasks based on complex back-end
calculations (e.g., calculated scores, buffer values, distributed buffers,
resultant finish-by date-times, etc.) integrates any abstract idea in the claims
into a practical application.” Appeal Br. 18; Reply Br. 14–16. As noted by
Appellant, Example 372 includes “automatically moving the most used icons
to a position on the GUI closest to the start icon of the computer system
based on the determined amount of use.” Appeal Br. 17. This is easily
distinguished from claim 1, which recite no particular user interface function
besides using the user interface in its ordinary capacity for simply displaying
data. Claim 1 is not similar to Example 37, because the user interface

2 USPTO, Subject Matter Eligibility Examples: Abstract Ideas, available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/101_examples_37to42_
20190107.pdf (January 7, 2019).
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recitation of claim 1 does not impose any meaningful limits on practicing the
abstract idea.
We are similarly unpersuaded by Appellant’s argument that
Example 40 of the Office’s Subject Matter Eligibility examples (see
footnote 2) are similar to claim 1. Appeal Br. 18–20. According to
Appellant, Example 40 provides for “collecting additional Netflow protocol
data relating to the network traffic when the collected network delay, packet
loss, or jitter is greater than the predefined threshold,” which provides “ a
particular improvement in collecting traffic data.” Appeal Br. 18. Unlike
the alleged “improvement realized by the claims over conventional
approaches” of project planning of claim 1, which is part of the abstract idea,
the improvement in Example 40 was related to “improved network
monitoring,” which improves network technology. See Appeal Br. 19.
Claim 1 is distinguished from Example 40 because claim 1 does not recite
any communications network, let alone improvements to network
technology.
We also are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the claims in
Core Wireless3 are similar to the claims before us here, because claim 1
provides “specific improvements to interface technology and specific
improvements to the functioning of a computer.” Appeal Br. 24 (emphasis
omitted); see also id. 20–24, Reply Br. 16–22. For example, to the extent
there is an improvement in claim 1, the improvement is to the abstract idea,
and this improvement is implemented with conventional computer
equipment, processing, and display of results. Although Core Wireless is

33 Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 880 F.3d 1356
(Fed. Cir. 2018).
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“directed to a particular manner of summarizing and presenting information
in electronic devices,” resulting in an improved user interface, claim 1 does
not recite an improved user interface, as we indicated above. See Core
Wireless, 880 F.3d at 1362. There, the court stated:
Claim 1 of the ’476 patent requires “an application summary that
can be reached directly from the menu,” specifying a particular
manner by which the summary window must be accessed. The
claim further requires the application summary window list a
limited set of data, “each of the data in the list being selectable
to launch the respective application and enable the selected data
to be seen within the respective application.” This claim
limitation restrains the type of data that can be displayed in the
summary window. Finally, the claim recites that the summary
window “is displayed while the one or more applications are in
an un-launched state,” a requirement that the device applications
exist in a particular state. These limitations disclose a specific
manner of displaying a limited set of information to the user,
rather than using conventional user interface methods to display
a generic index on a computer. Like the improved systems
claimed in Enfish, Thales, Visual Memory, and Finjan, these
claims recite a specific improvement over prior systems,
resulting in an improved user interface for electronic devices.
Id. at 1362–63. In contrast, Appellant’s claim is directed to a process that
qualifies as an abstract idea for project planning, in which a user interface
is invoked merely as a tool to display initial and updated results.
We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s argument that similar to McRO,4
claim 1 provides “an improved interface with the software,” which are
“specific improvements to computer technology.” Appeal Br. 25; Reply
Br. 22–23. In McRO, the Federal Circuit addressed claims directed to “[a]

4 McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (hereinafter “McRO”).
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method for automatically animating lip synchronization and facial
expression of three-dimensional characters.” McRO, 837 F.3d at 1307. The
court reviewed the specification of the patent at issue and found that, rather
than invoking the computer merely as a tool, “[c]laim 1 of the [asserted]
patent is focused on a specific asserted improvement in computer
animation.” Id. at 1314. The court found that the plain focus of the claim
was on an improvement to computer functionality itself, not on tasks for
which a computer is used in its ordinary capacity. Unlike McRO, which
focused on a specific means or method that improved the relevant
technology, in contrast, claim 1 here is directed to an abstract idea, by
merely invoking a generic user interface to display results. Thus, the focus
here is not on improving any technology, but on displaying project planning
results data using a generic user interface.
Appellant draws a parallel between claim 1 and the claims in Trading
Technologies Int’l. Inc. v. CQG, Inc., 675 Fed. Appx. 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2017),
alleging that claim 1 provides “improvements to interface technology.”
Appeal Br. 26–27. Appellant’s reliance on Trading Technologies is
unavailing. In Trading Technologies, the Federal Circuit accepted the lower
court’s holding, that the claims provided “an inventive concept that allows
traders to more efficiently and accurately place trades using this electronic
trading system.” Trading Technologies, 675 F. App’x at 1004. “The court
distinguished this system from the routine or conventional use of computers
or the Internet, and concluded that the specific structure and concordant
functionality of the graphical user interface are removed from abstract ideas,
as compared to conventional computer implementations of known
procedures.” Id. Thus, the distinguishing feature for the claims in Trading
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Technologies was an advance in efficiency provided by an improved
graphical user interface as compared to other computer processes. In
contrast to Trading Technologies, no such distinguishing features are recited
in claim 1, and the steps before us do not concern an improvement to a user
interface technology.
We also see no correlation between claim 1 and the claims in either
Ex parte Relyea,5 or Ex parte Vallone.6 Appeal Br. 27. The invention in
Relyea concerned “targeted advertising for a micro-group of users that
changes dynamically as different users join or leave the micro-group,” which
is not analogous to the claims at issue here. Relyea, 2018 WL 1947230,
at *1. The invention in Vallone relates to “icon-based user interfaces,” and
the panel found “the character of the claims as a whole is directed to
improved user interfaces for electronic devices, and improved methods for
accessing and navigating electronic records.” 2018 WL 3425485, at *4.
The claim here does not rely on “icon-based user interfaces,” or “improved
user interfaces for electronic devices,” and thus we are not persuaded that
they are relevant. Moreover, non-precedential decisions of the Board are not
binding on us.
Appellant also argues “the scheduling functionality provided by the
improved user interface does not have a pre-electronic scheduling analog at
least because such functionality would be impractical, inefficient, and would
take so long as to not be useful if performed” manually. Appeal Br. 27. We
disagree, because the pre-electronic analog to the claimed system is

5 Ex parte Donald H. Relyea Jr., Brian F. Roberts, and Alex Zavatone,
2018 WL 1947230 (PTAB 2018).
6 Ex parte Anthony J. Vallone, 2018 WL 3425485 (PTAB 2018).
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manually using Critical Path Method techniques to create Gantt and PERT
charts, as has been known and performed for decades. “As we have
explained, ‘the fact that the required calculations could be performed more
efficiently via a computer does not materially alter the patent eligibility of
the claimed subject matter.”’ FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Systems, Inc.,
839 F.3d 1089, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Appellant also argues the claims are “impractical to perform mentally
or with pen and paper,” because of the “sophisticated set [of] calculations
and determinations,” and the “complexity of the calculated score,
determined order, determined buffer time distribution, and resultant
display.” Reply Br. 7. We disagree because we are not apprised of any
“sophisticated set [of] calculations and determinations” required by the
claim that would be impractical to perform mentally or with the aid of pen
and paper.
Also unavailing is Appellant’s argument that “similar to the claims in
Bascom,” the “ordered combination of elements” of claims 1, 4, and 26
“improves the functioning of a computer at least based on the improved
accuracy, flexibility, and efficiency of the computer task management and
realized computer interface.” Appeal Br. 29. In Bascom,7 the Federal
Circuit held that “[t]he inventive concept described and claimed in the '606
patent is the installation of a filtering tool at a specific location, remote from
the end-users, with customizable filtering features specific to each end user.”
Bascom, 827 F.3d at 1350. The court explained that the remote location of a
filtering tool having customizable user-specific filtering features provides

7 Bascom Global Internet Services, Inc., v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d.
1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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the filtering tool both the benefits of a filter on a local computer and the
benefits of a filter on the ISP server, which is a technical improvement over
prior art ways of filtering content. Id. at 1350-51. Here, Appellant has not
demonstrated any particular arrangement in the claim as providing an
inventive concept parallel to Bascom in claiming a technology-based
solution. Instead, as we have explained above, any improvement advanced
by the claims is within the abstract idea for project planning, rather than any
improvement to computer capabilities or user interface technology.
Finally, we are unpersuaded by the Appellant’s argument that “the
Examiner has failed to establish that the ordered combination of additional
elements recited in claim 1 is well-understood, routine, and conventional in
the field.” Appeal Br. 31 (citing Berkheimer8); Reply Br. 23–25. This,
according to Appellant, is because “claims 1, 4, and 26 recite a user interface
that is tightly coupled with software,” which “achieves improvements to user
interface technology.” Appeal Br. 32. As we have noted, nothing in the
cited claims recite any improvement to user interface technology. See Elec.
Power, 830 F.3d at 1355.
Therefore, Appellant has not persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, we sustain the
rejection of claim 1, including claims 4, 5, 7, 9–11, 15, 16, 20, 22, 23, 25–
28, which fall with claim 1.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is AFFIRMED.

8 Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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DECISION SUMMARY
Claim(s) 35 U.S.C. § Basis/Reference(s) Affirmed Reversed
1, 4, 5, 7, 9–
11, 15, 16,
20, 22, 23,
25–28
101 Eligibility 1, 4, 5, 7, 9–
11, 15, 16,
20, 22, 23,
25–28

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED