Ontario Knife Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 21, 1971

191 N.L.R.B. 388 (N.L.R.B. 1971)

388 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Ontario Knife Company and International Union of
Electrical , Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-
CIO-CLC. Case 3-CA-4173
June 21, 1971
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND KENNEDY
On January 28, 1971, Trial Examiner Sidney Sher-
man issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceed-
ing, finding that Respondent had engaged in and was
engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recom-
mending that it cease and desist therefrom and take
certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached
Trial Examiner's Decision. The Trial Examiner also
found that Respondent had not engaged in certain
other unfair labor practices. Thereafter, the General
Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Deci-
sion and a supporting brief, the Charging Party filed
exceptions to the Decision, and Respondent filed excep-
tions to the Decision and a supporting brief. Respond-
ent also filed an answering brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers
in connection with this case to a three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Ex-
aminer made at the hearing and finds that no prejudi-
cial error was committed. The rulings are hereby
affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Ex-
aminer's Decision, the exceptions, the briefs, and the
entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the
Trial Examiner, to the extent consistent herewith.
1. Respondent excepted to the finding of the Trial
Examiner that Kessler carried on surveillance at the
urging of someone in management and that Respond-
ent thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The
Board is in agreement with Respondent.
The Trial Examiner based his finding partly on his
belief that a person as "unsophisticated and diffident"
as Kessler lacked "sufficient temerity" voluntarily to
undertake the surveillance on his own and partly on the
evidence that some supervisors did know that there was
a union meeting on May 16. This is an inadequate basis
from which to draw the inference that someone in man-
agement told Kessler to engage in the surveillance.
Although the evidence shows that Hitchcock, a super-
visor, did mention to Kessler that he had heard that
there was a union meeting to be held that day, it is
uncontradicted that Hitchcock did not know the time
or place of the meeting. Further, although Vice Presi-
dent Beddick admitted that one of the supervisors told
him that the Union was holding a meeting "uptown,"
he states that this information came to him about 11:30
a.m., about 45 minutes after Kessler reportedly was
seen at the site of the meeting.
Based on the foregoing, the preponderance of the
evidence does not support the finding that Respondent
urged, or was even aware of, the activities of employee
Kessler so as to make him an agent for whose deeds
Respondent would be liable.
2. For the reasons given above, we find that Re-
spondent cannot be held liable for creating the impres-
sion of surveillance through Kessler's activity. Kessler
was not identified with management as a supervisor,
and, although some employees later blamed him be-
cause they were caught in the layoff (which was not
discriminatory), there is not sufficient evidence to link
his activity to Respondent.
Accordingly, the Board finds that Respondent did
not violate Section 8(a)(1) either by carrying on surveil-
lance of the union meeting or by creating the impres-
sion of surveillance.
3. The Trial Examiner also found that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) by interrogation of employees
concerning the Union. The only evidence on which this
finding is based shows that, early in May, White, a
supervisor, asked Walkins and two other employees
whether they had heard any talk about the Union. Two
denied that they had, and Walkins did not answer.
This isolated incident by itself is not enough for
finding a violation of the Act. It was a simple question
asked by a supervisor and not of the type to coerce the
employees questioned. Further, the question did not go
to any of the employees' personal affiliations with or
sympathies toward the Union.
In finding a violation of Section 8(a)(1), the Trial
Examiner considered the questioning in the context of
the subsequent surveillance. However, the Board has
herein found Respondent not liable for any other
8(a)(1) conduct to which this isolated incident can be
connected, and we will accordingly order that the alle-
gation in the complaint alleging unlawful interrogation
also be dismissed.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations
Board hereby orders that the complaint herein be, and
it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
SIDNEY SHERMAN, Trial Examiner: The original charge
herein was served upon Respondent' on June 29, 1970,2 the
complaint issued on September 28, and the case was heard on
November 17. After the hearing a brief was filed by Respond-
' The name of Respondent as it appears in the complaint and other papers
has been amended by omitting, as surplusage, the name of its parent.
' All dates hereinafter fall within 1970, unless otherwise indicated.
191 NLRB No. 86
ONTARIO KNIFE COMPANY 389
ent. The issues litigated related to allegations of unlawful
interrogation, surveillance, and layoffs.
Upon the entire record,' including observation of the wit-
nesses' demeanor, the following findings and recommenda-
tions are made:
I. THE RESPONDENT AND ITS COMMERCE
Ontario Knife Company, herein called Respondent, is a
corporation under the laws of the State of New York, and is
engaged at its plant in Franklinville , New York, in the manu-
facture and sale of cutlery. During the 12 months preceding
the issuance of the complaint , Respondent shipped products
valued at more than $50,000 from its Franklinville plant to
points out of State. Respondent is engaged in commerce un-
der the Act.
II. THE UNION
International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC, hereinafter called the Union, is a
labor organization under the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The pleadings raise the following issues:
1. Whether Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by interro-
gation of employees through Supervisor White,' by surveil-
lance of employee Union activities and by creating the im-
pression of such surveillance?5
2. Whether Respondent violated Secion 8(a)(3) and (1) by
laying off 24 employees on or about May 17?
A. Sequence of Events
During 1969, the Union had attempted to organize Re-
spondent's production and maintenance employees. That at-
tempt culminated in an election held on May 8, 1969, which
was lost by the Union. Early the following May, N. Harris,
sought to revive interest in the Union by inviting some of his
fellow employees to attend a meeting at the Lester Hotel, in
Franklinville, to be held at 11 a.m., on Saturday, May 16. At
this meeting those present constituted themselves a union
organizing committee, N. Harris being designated as chair-
man. Late in the night of May 17, and early the next morning,
24 employees, including most of the members of the organiz-
ing committee, were notified that they had been laid off.
During the next 5 months all 24 were offered reemployment.
1. Surveillance
The complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act through the conduct of Kessler on or about
May 16, in engaging in surveillance of employee union activi-
ties and in creating the impression of such surveillance.
Kessler was a young man who had been working for Re-
spondent about 14 months in making time studies of Re-
spondent's jobs. The complaint alleged that he acted as Re-
spondent's agent in connection with the instant surveillance
' For corrections of the transcript and the incorporation in the record of
certain exhibits submitted by Respondent after the hearing, see the order of
January 6, 1971, which is hereby confirmed in those respects, in the absence
of any objection thereto.
Another allegation of interrogation by Vice President Beddick was
withdrawn by the General Counsel at the hearing.
' The surveillance allegations were dismissed at the hearing but rein-
stated by the order of January 6, 1971, which offered Respondent an oppor-
tunity to reopen the record to adduce further evidence in that regard.
Respondent declined to avail itself of this opportunity, and requested leave
only to file a supplementary brief, which request was granted. Such brief has
been received and considered.
incident but did not allege that he was a supervisor, nor was
there any evidence to that effect. While the record shows that
he was paid a salary and enjoyed certain fringe benefits not
shared by the production and maintenance employees, and
while it is evident from the testimony of Respondent's vice-
president, Beddick, that he considered Kessler to be "part of
management,"6 the General Counsel's main reliance here is
apparently on the theory that Kessler was specifically in-
structed by Respondent to engage in the surveillance next
described.
As already related N. Harris had invited a number of
employees to attend a meeting at the Lester Hotel at 11 a.m.
on the 16th, the purpose of which was to revive employee
interest in the Union. N. Harris testified that he and his wife,
G. Harris, arrived at the hotel about 10:40 that morning; that,
about 5 minutes later, upon happening to look out of one of
the windows of the hotel, he saw Kessler standing at a point
across a public square from the hotel and about 200 feet
distant; that Kessler was facing the hotel and was holding a
pad in his hand; that the witness continued to observe Kessler
until about 10:50 a.m., when the witness left the hotel window
to attend to other matters; that, while five or• six of those
invited to the meeting had already arrived by the time he first
saw Kessler, one or two entered the hotel during the next 5
minutes; and that others continued to arrive at the meeting
until 11:05 a.m. G. Harris testified that from inside the hotel
she also saw Kessler at the place and time described by her
husband and that during that time Bradfield, Markiewicz,
and Beaudine arrived at the meeting. Of those three, only
Beaudine appeared at the hearing. While his testimony was
at variance with that of G. Harris as to his actual attendance
at the meeting,' he did testify that about 11:15 a.m., as he
approached the hotel on the way to the meeting, he saw
Kessler at the point described by the Harrises, and that he
was facing the hotel and writing on a pad.
Kessler denied that he was in the vicinity of the hotel at any
time during the morning of the 16th, insisting that he was at
work in the plant the entire morning, and that he was ob-
served during that time by Hitchcock, a supervisor, and Jan-
drew. While admitting that Hitchcock told him that he had
overheard some talk in the plant about a union meeting to be
held that day, Kessler maintained that Hitchcock professed
not to know the time or place of such meeting, and that the
foregoing conversation took place, in any event, at 11:15 a.m.,
which was well after the union meeting had begun. However,
while otherwise corroborating Kessler, Hitchcock estimated
that his conversation with Kessler occurred between about
10:15 and about 10:45 a.m., and not, as Kessler claimed, at
11:15 a.m., and Jandrew corroborated Hitchcock on that
point. If, as the testimony of Hitchcock and Jandrew in-
dicated, Kessler's conversation with Hitchcock terminated at
about 10:45 a.m., when according to both, he left their pres-
ence, and, if one allows for a not unlikely margin of error of
a few minutes in the various estimates of the time of day given
by Hitchcock and Jandrew, on the one hand, and by the
Harrises, on the other, there was no necessary conflict in the
testimony of these four witnesses as to Kessler's movements.
For, Kessler acknowledged that the plant was only two
blocks from the scene of the union meeting, and it seems
proper to infer that Kessler could have negotiated that dis-
6 Beddick explained that he based this characterization of Kessler on the
fact that he was engaged in establishing job standards that would be useful
to management in augmenting productivity.
' Beaudine claimed that he arrived in the area of the hotel about 11:15
a.m., and that, not seeing anyone in front of the hotel who might direct him
to the meeting room, he proceeded past the hotel to a store, where he did
some shopping.
390 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tance in a matter- of several minutes, particularly if he used
his car.' Accordingly, if he left the plant immediately after the
end of his discussion with'Hitchcock and proceeded directly
to the vicinity of the Lester Hotel, he could have arrived there
at about the time that the Harrises claimed to have seen-him.
It follows that the only testimony which cannot be reconciled
with that of the General Counsel 's witnesses as to Kessler's
movement on the 16th is that of Kessler , himself, and the
credibility of that testimony is impeached by the aforenoted
conflict between it and that of Hitchcock and Jandrew, who
had no apparent, ulterior motive for contradicting him. Ac-
cordingly , I credit them rather than Kessler, and find that his
conversation with Hitchcock ended about 10:45 a.m., and
that he was not seen at the plant between that time and at
least about 11:30 a.m .9 Thus, at this juncture there remains
to be resolved only the conflict between Kessler, on the one
hand, and the Harrises and Beaudine, on the other, as to
Kessler's presence near the Lester Hotel between about 10:45
and 11:15 that morning . Even if one discounts the testimony
of G. Harris on that point ," her husband and Beaudine ap-
peared to be more believable than Kessler . I was impressed
by their demeanor and candor," as well as by the fact that,
as noted above, Kessler's version was contradicted on critical
points by Hitchcock and Jandrew. Accordingly, I credit N.
Harris and Beaudine and find that Kessler was observed by
N. Harris ,at the scene of the Union meeting for about 5
minutes shortly before the start of the meeting , that he was
still there at 11: 15 a.m ., when Beaudine drove by, and that
Kessler conducted himself on those occasions in the manner
described by them.
Respondent contends that , even if it be found that Kessler
engaged in surveillance of the Union meeting, there is no basis
for attributing such action to Respondent . Kessler denied
receiving any instruction to engage in such surveillance and,
while it is undisputed that Hitchcock told Kessler there
would be a union meeting that day, Hitchcock denied that he
knew the time or place of the meeting . However, the fact that,
as found above , Kessler was less than candid with respect to
his activities on the morning of the 16th necessarily weakens
the force of his denial that he acted under instructions. More-
over, to credit such denial one would have to assume that
Kessler had sufficient temerity voluntarily to undertake the
surveillance of the activities of fellow employees that were of
no'apparent concern to him . Such an assumption does not
square with the image Kessler presented at the hearing,
which was that of a relatively unsophisticated and diffident
young man . Moreover even if one credits Hitchcock's denial
that he knew where or when, the union meeting would be
held, it does not necessarily follow that other management
representatives were equally ignorant , particularly when one
considers the admission of Vice President Beddick at the
hearing that one of his supervisors, Frost, reported to him at
about 11:30 a.m . on the 16th that the Union was holding a
meeting
e
"uptown ." Under all the circumstances, including
th inherent improbability that orie like Kessler would volun-
tarily and for no apparent reason eng a g e in such a provoca-
tive course of conduct , it is inferred that he did so at the
urging of some one in management . It follows that by Kes-
Kessler's testimony shows that he drove to work that morning.
Kessler gave that as the time that he had a conversation with Jandrew
at the plant, whereas the latter insisted that he did not see Kessler between
10:45 ' and noon. It is not necessary to resolve this conflict.
10 Her credibility was impaired by the apparent conflict between her
testimony that Beaudine actually attended the union meeting and his admis-
sion that he did not.
- ' This was particularly true of Beaudine , who, contrary to his own inter-
est, refused to confirm G. Harris' testimony as to his attendance at the
meeting.
sler's surveillance of the Union meeting Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1).
The question remains whether Respondent , in addition,
created an impression of surveillance through Kessler's ac-
tivity. While Kessler was not identified with management as
a supervisor, the fact that he was ostensibly taking notes, or
preparing to take notes , during his vigil would tend to foster
the impression that he was readying- a report concerning the
union meeting for submission to his superiors at the plant and
that he was doing so at their behest."
It is accordingly concluded that Respondent additionally
violated Section 8(a)(1) by creating through Kessler's con-
duct an impression of surveillance of Union activity.
2. Interrogation
Walkins testified without contradiction, and it is found,
that early in May her supervisor , White, asked her and two
other employees whether they had heard any talk about a
union, that the others denied that they had, and that Watkins
did not answer . Considered in the context of the subsequent
unlawful surveillance found above, the foregoing interroga-
tion is deemed to violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
3. The layoff
Effective May 18, Respondent laid off 24 employees out of
its complement of about 130 employees , including 8 of the 11
employees who, according to G. Harris , attended the union
meeting on May 16. The General Counsel 's primary conten-
tion was that there was no economic need for any layoff and
that the sole purpose thereof was to discourage union activity
among the employees generally. As a secondary position, the
General Counsel contended that, even if it be found that there
was an economic need for a layoff, the record shows that one
of the factors on which Respondent based its selections for
layoff was attendance at the union meeting.
With regard to his primary contention that the layoff was
effected solely for discriminatory reasons, the General Coun-
sel relied on the following matters.
(1) The'fact that none of the employees received any ad-
vance notice of the layoff, except for some who were notified
late the night before.
(2) The fact that Watkins, who was included in the layoff,
had been told some time in April,by'her immediate super-
visor, White, that her request for 2 weeks' leave during the
summer had been partially denied because of an expected
manpower shortage due to impending retirements.
(3) The timing of the layoff in relation to the union meet-
ing.
As to (1), above, Beddick testified without contradiction,
and it is found, that in connection with a previous layoff in
February the employees affected likewise received virtually
no advance notice. While one might deplore such apparently
calloused conduct , Respondent is not on trial for the manner
of its treatment of its employees , except insofar as it may shed
light on its motivation in laying them off; and, since the same
procedure was used on the prior occasion, the precipitateness
of Respondent 's instant action is entitled to little weight as
evidence of discriminatory motivation.
As to (2), above, there was no evidence as to who , if any-
one, was consulted by White before advising Watkins of the
partial denial of her leave request. Moreover, it cannot be
determined from the record that at the time of Watkins' leave
" Kessler admitted that a few of the employees caught in the layoff that
occurred 2 days after the union meeting charged him with responsibility for
their plight. It is clear from this that at least those employees were not only
aware of Kessler's surveillance but regarded it as inspired by management.
ONTARIO KNIFE COMPANY 391
request Beddick had reached a final decision that there would
be a layoff.13
As to the timing of the layoff, as well as its motivation,
Respondent adduced testimony by Beddick that he entered
Respondent's employ in July 1969; that in August he began
expanding the work force to handle an anticipated increase
in output, adding 30 to 35 employees by December 31, 1969;
that in February, after the termination of two contracts, he
laid off 15 employees who were involved in work thereon; that
thereafter, in March, an expected, substantial order failed to
materialize; and that until the latter part of April he had a
number of discussions about the need for further layoffs with
Respondent's president, Trbovich, but without coming to any
conclusion." In the meantime, the ratio of Respondent's in-
ventory to order backlog, which during virtually all of the
preceding 2 years had been well below the 2 to 1 level which
Beddick described as desirable, rose to nearly 4 to 1 in Janu-
ary 1970, remained in that area in February and March, rose
still further in April to a ratio of about 5.5 to 1, and at the
end of May, despite the intervening layoff, still hovered
around 5 to 1.11 The record shows that on April 20, Trbovich
sent Beddick a memorandum, which was placed in evidence
and reads as follows:
Confirming our many recent conversations it is impera-
tive that your work force be reduced 20 per cent immedi-
ately. As you know our sales backlog does not justify
your present level of personnel.... Also please check
with accounting-your costs are too high! Please advise
as soon as it is accomplished!
Beddick added that several days later, after Trbovich orally
confirmed his demand for an immediate layoff, Beddick be-
gan to prepare a list of those to be laid off, selecting the most
expendable employees, and giving weight to seniority only
where ability was equal; that 4 or 5 days before May 18, he
had completed a layoff list containing 28 names; that on May
16, he deleted four of those names; that in the evening of May
17, he met with Trbovich, and discussed the layoff list; that
the witness proposed delaying the layoff but Trbovich insisted
that it be effected immediately; and that the witness promptly
telephoned his supervisors and gave them the names of those
to be laid off. The record shows further that on June 11,
Respondent announced to its employees that due to the low
level of the existing order backlog it was extending to 2 weeks
the usual 1-week vacation shutdown; that Respondent re-
called one laid off employee, Ramsey, on June 16; that the
remaining 23 were offered rehire at various dates between
September 9 and November 12; that during the layoff period
no replacements were hired for any of the 24 employees; and
that there was no substantial, sustained increase in average
overtime per employee until the week ending August 22.
Under these circumstances, the evidence would seem, if
anything, to preponderate in favor of a finding that the May
18 layoff was motivated by purely economic considerations.
It may be urged that, while economically motivated, the
layoff, which took effect on the first work day after the union
meeting, was accelerated because of that meeting. While the
11 As noted below, Beddick indicated that he was not persuaded to effect
the instant layoff until late in April, several days after he received Trbovich's
memorandum of April 20. Watkins was vague as to when in April she asked
for leave, vouchsafing finally that it was probably the latter part of April.
1` While at one point Beddick testified that late in March or early April
Trbovich finally prevailed on him to effect a layoff, this was before Beddick's
memory was refreshed by the introduction of the memorandum from Trbo-
vich of April 20, discussed below, which the witness indicated was instru-
mental in overcoming his objections to a layoff.
15 The foregoing findings as to the relative size of the inventory are based
on summaries of Respondent's business records, which were received in
evidence.
coincidence is suspicious, particularly in view of Beddick's
afarenoted admission that he learned of the union meeting
before the layoff, one is confronted with his uncontradicted
testimony, substantiated by documentary evidence, that Re-
spondent had long been planning a layoff, that pressure, by
Trbovich upon Beddick to effect one culminated in a memo-
randum received by Beddick late in April insisting on an
immediate 20 percent reduction in force; that the stated rea-
son for such insistence was the low order backlog, which in
April, in fact, reached the lowest level in over 2 years; and
that there, was relatively little improvement in May. More-
over, there was no contradiction of Beddicks' testimony,
which I credit, that even as late as May 17, he was still urging
Trbovich to postpone the layoff.
We turn next to the General Counsel's alternative conten-
tion; namely, that some of those laid off were selected in part
or in whole because of their attendance at the union meeting.
Although I credit Beaudine's denial that he attended that
meeting, there was no contradiction of evidence offered by
Mrs. Harris as to the attendance on that occasion by 10 other
employees, of whom seven were included in the layoff." How-
ever, while Beddick admittedly knew of the union meeting
before the layoff and while it has been found that Kessler
acted for Respondent in his surveillance of that meeting,
there is a paucity of evidence as to which employees were
actually seen by Kessler to attend the meeting. The testimony
of the Harrises shows that they did not see Kessler at his
vantage point until after they entered the hotel and there is
no evidence that they were visible to him while they were
observing him from the interior of the hotel. Moreover, Mr.
Harris acknowledged that five or six of those invited to the
meeting had preceded him there, and there is no evidence that
they were seen by Kessler,'? so that for aught that appears in
the record Kessler could have begun his surveillance only
after the Harrises entered the hotel at about 10:40 a.m.'6
While Mr. Harris did testify that one or two employees ar-
rived at the meeting during the 5 minutes that he kept Kessler
under observation, he did not name them. Mrs. Harris did
name three (Bradford, Markiewicz, and Beaudine) who, she
contended, arrived at the meeting during the foregoing 5-
minute period, but, as already noted, the only one of these to
testify (Beaudine) credibly denied that he was at the meeting.
Thus, of the 10 who, it has been found, actually attended the
union meeting, 5 or 6 were acknowledged by Mr. Harris to
have arrived at the meeting before he did. If one adds to that
number the two Harrises, Bradfield and Markiewicz, that
would account for virtually all those actually attending the
meeting."
16 It is true that, except for her husband's identification of Bradfield as
among those attending the meeting, there was no corroboration of her
testimony as to the identity of those present on that occasion other than the
Harrises. This, coupled with the fact that the only other person called to
corroborate her (Beaudine) failed to do so, would justify rejecting her tes-
timony where it is contradicted, and it is only because of the absence of such
contradiction that she is credited here.
" None of them testifed at the hearing.
" In fact, in view of the testimony of Hitchcock and Jandrew, which I
have credited, indicating Kessler was still at the plant until about 10:45 a.m.,
it seems likely that he arrived in the area of the hotel just about the time
that the Harrises detected his presence.
19 While Mr. Harris testified that employees continued to arrive at the
meeting until 11:05 a.m., he did not say how many or who came after he
stopped watching Kessler. If the balance of the Harrises' testimony on this
point is to be credited, there could not have been more than one such arrival.
There is no evidence that Kessler remained at his observation post after
11:15 a.m., nor that he saw , or was seen by any of those leaving the meeting,
which, according to Mr. Harris, lasted at least until noon.
392 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Thus, at best, the record would warrant a finding only that
Bradfield, Markiewicz, and one, unidentified employee20 en-
tered the hotel between the time that Kessler was first de-
tected by the Harrises and the time that he was seen by
Beaudine. As for Bradfield and Markiewicz, Beddick offered
a plausible explanation at the hearing for selecting them for
layoff, as he did with respect to all the others who were
alleged to have attended the meeting, and there was no effec-
tive rebuttal of such testimony nor any attempt to show that
any of those retained were less competent than any of those
laid off. Moreover, any inference of discrimination against
those attending the union meeting is impugned by the fact
that, in recalling the 24 laid off employees, there was no
significant disparity in the treatment accorded those who
attended the union meeting and those who did not. While
four of the former (the Harrises, Enders, and Majchrzak)
were among the last 11 offered reemployment, three (Ram-
sey, Bradfield, and Markiewicz) were among the first 12 to be
asked to return .21
It is therefore concluded that, although the matter is not
free from doubt, the evidence does not preponderate in favor
of a finding that the inclusion in the layoff of certain persons
attending the union meeting was prompted by the fact of such
attendance.
20 See preceding footnote.
" As noted above, Ramsey was recalled on Jutie 16, long before any of
the other 23 employees, and Bradfield and Markiewicz were the only ones
It will accordingly be recommended that the allegation of
discriminatory layoffs be dismissed.
IV THE REMEDY
It having been found that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act, it will be recommended that it be required
to cease and desist therefrom and take appropriate, affirma-
tive action.
V CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Ontario Knife Company is an employer within the
meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act, and is engaged in a
business affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC, is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By coercively interrogating employees about employee
union activities and by engaging in, and creating the impres-
sion of, surveillance of such activities, Respondent has vi-
olated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
5. It has not been proved that any employees were laid off
on May 18, for unlawful reasons.
actually identified as having been seen by Kessler on the 16th. [Recommended Order omitted from publication.]