NXP B.V.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 6, 2020

14275722 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 6, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/275,722 05/12/2014 Timotheus Arthur van Roermund 81538645US04 1023
65913 7590 07/06/2020
Intellectual Property and Licensing
NXP B.V.
411 East Plumeria Drive, MS41
SAN JOSE, CA 95134
EXAMINER
LE, THANH T
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2495
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/06/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ip.department.us@nxp.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte TIMOTHEUS ARTHUR van ROERMUND,
CORNELIS MARINUS MOERMAN, and
PETER MARIA FRANCISCUS ROMBOUTS1
____________________

Appeal 2019-003254
Application 14/275,722
Technology Center 2400
____________________

Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, and
JAMES W. DEJMEK, Administrative Patent Judges.

NAPPI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1, 2, and 6 through 21, claim 5 is indicated as reciting
allowable subject matter. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a) (2018). Appellant has not set forth a statement in the Appeal Brief
identifying the real party in interest. Accordingly, we assume the named
inventors are the real parties in interest. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(i).
Alternatively, we note that the application has been assigned to NXP B.V.
See Assignment (recorded May 15, 2014, reel/frame: 032907/0309).
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Application 14/275,722

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INVENTION
The invention relates generally to a data processing system, “which
comprises at least two security levels and key material stored at a specific
one of said security levels, wherein the key material is tagged with a
minimum security level at which the key material may be stored.” Abstract.
Claim 1 is reproduced below.
1. A data processing system comprising:
at least two hardware components with an assigned
security level from 0 to N, where N is in integer;
a first hardware component having a first security
level Ll;
a second hardware component having a second
security level L2; and a key tagged with a minimum
security level M from 0 to N, wherein the key resides
initially on the first hardware component such that the
first security level Ll is greater than or equal to the
tagged minimum security level M, and the key is moved
from the first hardware component to the second
hardware component only when the second security level
L2 is greater than or equal to the tagged minimum
security level M.

PRIOR DECISION
This application was the subject of an earlier appeal, Appeal No.
2017-008332, mailed December 27, 2017, in which at the Examiner’s
rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 was reversed, the Examiner’s rejections
under 35 U.S.C. § 112 was affirmed, and some of the rejections under
35 U.S.C. § 103 were affirmed. Subsequent to that decision, on February
27, 2018, Appellant filed a Request for Continued Examination (RCE) and
the instant decision on appeal is of the RCE application.
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EXAMINER’S REJECTIONS2
The Examiner rejected claims 1, 2, and 8 through 11 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as unpatentable over Meissner (US 2011/0055580 A1, pub. Mar. 3,
2011), Matsushima (US 2011/0081017 A1, pub. Apr. 7, 2011), and Wray
(US 2006/0174112 A1, pub. Aug. 3, 2006). Non-Final Act. 3–6.
The Examiner rejected claims 6, 7, 12 through 14, 16, 20, and 21
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Meissner, Matsushima, Wray,
and Marano (US 2009/0292930 A1, pub. Nov. 26, 2009). Non-Final Act. 6–
10.
The Examiner rejected claim 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Meissner, Matsushima, Wray, Marano, and Sprunk (US
7,929,701 B1, iss. Apr. 19, 2011). Non-Final Act. 10–11.
The Examiner rejected claims 17 through 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Meissner, Matsushima, Wray, and Sinclair (PorKI:
Making User PKI Safe on Machines of Heterogeneous Trustworthiness,
Proceedings of the 21st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
(ACSAC 2005) (2005). Non-Final Act. 11–13.

35 U.S.C. § 103 Rejection of claims 1, 2, and 8 through 11 based
upon Meissner, Matsushima, and Wray
Appellant asserts the rejection of claims 1, 10, and 11 is in error as the

2 Throughout this Decision we refer to the Appeal Brief filed January 11,
2019 (“Appeal Br.”); Reply Brief filed March 20, 2019 (“Reply Br.”); Non-
Final Office Action mailed October 12, 2018 (“Non-Final Act.”); and the
Examiner’s Answer mailed February 14, 2019 (“Ans.”).
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combination Meissner, Matsushima, and Wray does not teach the claim
limitation of “the first security level Ll is greater than or equal to the tagged
minimum security level M” and “the key is moved from the first hardware
component to the second hardware component only when the second
security level L2 is greater than or equal to the tagged minimum security
level M.” Appeal Br. 6–7; Reply Br. 2–3 (emphasis omitted). The
arguments directed to both limitations assert the references do not teach
tagged security level. Appeal Br. 6–7; Reply Br. 2–3. Specifically,
Appellant argues the Examiner’s reliance on Official Notice does not
address the claimed “tagged minimum security level.” Appeal Br. 6.
Additionally, with respect to Wray, Appellant argues:
While the claims recite movement of the key from the first
hardware component to the second hardware component, Wray
lacks a tagged key. Instead, [Wray’s] security tag is
encapsulated with data packets from user domains. Also see
paragraph [0022]. There is no tagging of the cryptographic key
in Wray.
Appeal Br. 7. Further, with respect to Meissner Appellant states:
Meissner cannot move the key in the claimed manner because
Meissner lacks a tagged minimum security level M. Hence,
Meissner cannot determine whether the second security level
L2 is greater than or equal to the tagged minimum security level
M.
Appeal Br. 7 (emphasis omitted).
The Examiner responds to Appellant’s arguments stating that Official
Notice was taken that it is well known that security levels are in integers and
cites to Matsushima as also including this teaching. Answer 4 (citing
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Matsushima ¶ 62). Further, the Examiner finds that Meissner teaches
assigning security levels to hardware components, Matsushima teaches keys
are assigned with a minimum security level at which they may be stored, and
Wray discloses the concept of tagging security level for data. Answer 5–6
(citing Meissner ¶ 23; Matsushima Fig. 4, ¶ 62; Wray, Abstract). Based
upon these teachings the Examiner concludes the combination would be
obvious “because tagging security level to key material will ensure having
needed information at once and to prevent mis-routing data to unwanted
security destination. Therefore, [a] ‘tagged minimum security level’ is
obviously taught by the cited references.” Answer 6.
We concur with the Examiner and are not persuaded of error by
Appellant’s arguments. Representative claim 1 recites a key tagged with a
minimum security level M and this tagged security level is used to determine
if the key can be moved from a first to a second hardware component. The
claims do not define what “tagged” means. However, Appellant’s
Specification states “the key material is tagged by means of an attribute
attached to or comprised in said key material, and said attribute has a value
that is indicative of the minimum security level at which the key material
may be stored.” Specification 3, lines 21–23. Thus, when interpreted in
light of Appellant’s Specification, the tagged key is just a key that has an
attribute attached to it that indicates a security level.
We have reviewed the cited teachings of Matsushima and concur
with the Examiner’s finding that the reference teaches transferring keys from
one device to another only if the security level of the sending device, which
generated the key, is equal to or higher than the receiving device. See
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Matsushima ¶ 62. We consider the security level of the device that
generated the key, to be an attribute of the key’s security level and thus
tagged within the meaning of the claim. We additionally concur with the
Examiner that Wray teaches tagging packets with a security level before
communicating them over a network. See Wray, Abstract, ¶ 6. Although
Wray does not disclose that the packets contain keys, we consider it obvious
in combination with Meissner and Matsushima that the packets contain keys.
With regard to the tag being a minimum security level M, we note that
representative claim 1 does not preclude the minimum security level M from
being the same as the security level of the device generating the key, as in
Matsushima.3 The claim recites that the minimum security level is used in a
comparison with the security levels of the second component, to determine
whether it can be moved, i.e., it represents the minimum security level of the
device to which it can be moved. The security level of the device generating
the key in Matsushima, equated to the tagged minimum security level is used
in the same manner. Matsushima states “keys are only output to an output
destination device having a security level equal to or higher than the security
level of the device that generated the keys.” Matsushima ¶ 62. Accordingly,
Appellant has not persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s rejection of

3 The claimed first hardware component, upon which the key is initially
resides, which is equated to the device generating the key in Matsushima, is
identified as having a security level greater than or equal to the security level
tagged to the key. Thus, construing the key as having the same security
level as that of the generating device is not inconsistent with representative
claim 1.
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representative claim 1 and claims 8 through 11 grouped with claim 1.4
With respect to claim 2, Appellant argues that the rejection is in error
as:
On page 6, the Office Action cited Wray’s Abstract. As
described above, Wray does not tag keys. Instead, Wray’s
abstract, like paragraph [0022], discloses “tagging the data
packet from a user domain.” Consequently, the Office Action
does not present a prima facie case of obviousness.
Appeal Br. 8 (emphasis omitted).
This argument has not persuaded us of error. As discussed above, we
consider the combined teaching of Meissner, Matsushima, and Wray to
teach the claimed tagged keys. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 2.

35 U.S.C. § 103 Rejection of claims 6, 7, 12 through 14, 16, 20, and
21 based upon Meissner, Matsushima, Wray, and Marano
With respect to dependent claim 6, Appellant argues that the claim
recites that the key is tagged to keep track of the lowest security level which
is not taught by Marano, as found by the Examiner. Appeal Br. 10; Reply
Br. 4. Appellant states:
Marano’s document security level may be updated either up or
down, while the claimed ISL tracks the lowest security level.
Once it goes down, it does not go back up. Thus, Marano

4 Appellant argues claims 1, 10, and 11 as a group. Appeal Br. 6–7,
Appellant asserts claims 8 and 9 are allowable for the same reasons as claim
1. Appeal Br. 9.
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teaches away from the claimed subject matter of an ISL tag that
keeps track of a lowest security level. The lowest security level
is an absolute minimum, unlike the tagged minimum security
level. Hence, the Office Action does not present a prima facie
case of obviousness for claim 6.
Appeal Br. 10 (emphasis omitted).
In response to Appellant’s arguments, the Examiner states that
“because Marano’s teaching of tagging and tracking secure document based
on its usage history would include all the places the secure document has
been resided and would certainly include tagging and tracking lowest and
highest security level the secure document has been resided.” Answer 8.
We concur with the Examiner and are not persuaded of error by
Appellant’s argument. Claim 6 recites that the internal security level keeps
track of the lowest security level of the key. Claim 6 does not preclude the
tracking all security levels of the key, and tracking all security levels of the
key would necessarily include the lowest security level. The Examiner finds
Marano teaches a system that keeps track of documents and the security
policies for the document. In combination with the other references, this
teaches keeping track of the security level of the key. Non-Final Act. 7
(citing Marano, Abstract). We concur and also note that Marano identifies
that the tracked document includes security parameters in paragraphs 6 and
37. Further, paragraph 40 of Marano discusses this information being
tracked in a log of all usage. Accordingly, Appellant’s arguments have not
persuaded us the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 6.
With respect to claim 7, Appellant argues that claim 7 recites the key
is tagged with a list indicative of a history of security levels which is not
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taught by Marano. Appeal Br. 11.
We are not persuaded of error by this argument as discussed above
with respect to claim 6, we find that Marano teaches tracking the security
parameters of a document in a log which includes a history of security levels
of locations where the document has resided. Although Marano discusses
the tracking of a document and not a key, the rejection of claim 7 is based
upon the combination of Marano with Meissner, Matsushima, and Wray. As
discussed above, Matsushima discusses transferring keys between devices.
Thus, Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded us the Examiner erred in
rejecting claim 7 over the combination of Meissner, Matsushima, Wray, and
Marano.
With respect to dependent claim 13 Appellant argues that the claim
recites that the security level is reset to a new security level after the key is
moved to a third component with a lower level. Appeal Br. 12.
These arguments have not persuaded us of error, as discussed above
with respect to claims 6 and 7, Marano teaches a log of the security settings
of a document and in combination with the other references in the rejection,
suggests tracking the security level of the a transferred key. As Marano’s
log tracks the security settings, it will have a new entry (is reset) as the
document (key in combination) moves to a new device with a lower security
setting. Accordingly, we are not persuaded of error in the rejection of claim
13.
With respect to claim 16, Appellant argues claim 16 recites a history
of security levels and asserts that “history refers to usage of a document and
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is not equivalent to a history of security levels for key material as claimed.”
Appeal Br. 13.
We are not persuaded of error by this argument. As discussed above
with respect to claims 6 and 7, Marano teaches a log of the security settings
of a document and in combination with the other references in the rejection,
suggests tracking the security level of the a transferred key. As Marano’s
log tracks the security settings, it will have a new entry for each location and
each security level of the document (key in combination). Accordingly, we
are not persuaded of error in the rejection of claim 16.
Appellant has not presented separate arguments with respect to claims
12, 14, 20, and 21 except to say they are allowable due to dependency on
claim 1. As Appellant has not persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 1, we similarly sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims
12, 14, 20, and 21.

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CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 2, 8–
11
103 Meissner,
Matsushima, Wray
1, 2, 8–11
6, 7, 12–
14, 16,
20, 21
103 Meissner,
Matsushima, Wray,
Marano
6, 7, 12–14,
16, 20, 21

15 103 Meissner,
Matsushima, Wray,
Marano, Sprunk
15
17–19 103 Meissner,
Matsushima, Wray,
Sinclair
17–19
Overall
Outcome
1, 2, 6–21

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED