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Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 29, 2019

14530484 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Oct. 29, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/530,484 10/31/2014 Harold Roy Miller 000665.00019 1378
22907 7590 10/29/2019
BANNER & WITCOFF, LTD.
1100 13th STREET, N.W.
SUITE 1200
WASHINGTON, DC 20005-4051
EXAMINER
STERRETT, JONATHAN G
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3623
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/29/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
GPD@bannerwitcoff.com
eofficeaction@bannerwitcoff.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte HAROLD ROY MILLER
Appeal 2019-000776
Application 14/530,484
Technology Center 3600
Before CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR., AMBER L. HAGY, and
KARA L. SZPONDOWSKI, Administrative Patent Judges.
HAGY, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–12, 16, 18, and 20–25, which are all
of the pending claims. Final Act. 1. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as the
applicant, Solution Technology Inc. Appeal Br. 2.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
According to Appellant, the invention is directed to “data processing
and, more particularly, to reaccommodating passengers during irregular
operations.” Spec. ¶ 2. Appellant’s Specification notes that, in air
transportation in particular, “irregular operations (IROPS) may be caused by
weather conditions, flight delays, flight cancellations, and other events.” Id.
¶ 34. When these irregular operations occur, “passenger itineraries may be
disrupted and alternative itineraries may be required.” Id. Appellant’s
Specification purports to describe and claim “systems, methods, and media
for reaccommodating of passengers in real time using a reaccommodation
engine when a schedule of a transportation asset is affected.” Id. ¶ 35.
Claims 1, 12, and 20 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below, is
illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method comprising:
establishing, by a computing device comprising memory
and at least one hardware processor, a connection to a
transportation system;
while the connection to the transportation system is
established, receiving, by the computing device, transportation
information from the transportation system;
based on the transportation information received from the
transportation system, determining, by the computing device, at
least one reaccommodation event associated with irregular
operations of the transportation system;
determining, by the computing device, at least one
passenger affected by the at least one reaccommodation event
associated with the irregular operations of the transportation
system;
receiving, by the computing device, a passenger record
for the at least one passenger affected by the at least one
reaccommodation event associated with the irregular operations
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of the transportation system, the passenger record including a
communication address for a mobile device associated with the
at least one passenger affected by the at least one
reaccommodation event associated with the irregular operations
of the transportation system;
based on the passenger record for the at least one
passenger affected by the at least one reaccommodation event
associated with the irregular operations of the transportation
system, determining, by the computing device, whether to
prioritize reaccommodation of the at least one passenger
affected by the at least one reaccommodation event associated
with the irregular operations of the transportation system;
based on the determining whether to prioritize
reaccommodation of the at least one passenger and based on the
transportation information from the transportation system,
generating, by the computing device, at least one
reaccommodation option for the reaccommodation of the at
least one passenger affected by the at least one
reaccommodation event associated with the irregular operations
of the transportation system;
determining, from the passenger record for the at least
one passenger affected by the at least one reaccommodation
event associated with the irregular operations of the
transportation system, the communication address for the
mobile device associated with the at least one passenger
affected by the at least one reaccommodation event associated
with the irregular operations of the transportation system;
sending, by the computing device and to the
communication address for the mobile device associated with
the at least one passenger, a message including the at least one
reaccommodation option for the reaccommodation of the at
least one passenger affected by the at least one
reaccommodation event associated with the irregular operations
of the transportation system;
receiving, by the computing device and from the mobile
device associated with the at least one passenger, a selection
from the at least one reaccommodation option for the
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reaccommodation of the at least one passenger affected by the
at least one reaccommodation event associated with the
irregular operations of the transportation system;
based on the selected at least one reaccommodation
option, creating, by the computing device, a new transportation
reservation in the transportation system for the at least one
passenger; and
sending, by the computing device and to the
communication address for the mobile device associated with
the at least one passenger, a confirmation of the new
transportation reservation.
REFERENCE
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Number Date
Sink et al. (“Sink”) US 2014/0257879 A1 Sept. 11, 2014

REJECTIONS2
Claims 1–12, 16, 18, and 20–25 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101
as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter (abstract idea). Final
Act. 6–14.
Claims 1–12, 16, 18, and 20–25 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(a) as failing to comply with the written description and enablement
requirements. Final Act. 15–34.
Claims 1–12, 16, 18, and 20–25 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as being unpatentable over Sink. Final Act. 35–55.

2 All rejections are under the provisions of Title 35 of the United States
Code in effect after the effective date of the Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act of 2011.
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OPINION
I. Section 101 Rejection3
The Examiner rejects all of the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101
on the basis that the claimed invention is patent-ineligible because it is
directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. Final Act. 6–14.
Appellant argues that the claims are not directed to an abstract idea, are
directed to patent-eligible subject matter, and the Examiner’s rejection
should be reversed. Appeal Br. 12–17. For the reasons explained below, we
are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s § 101 rejection and we,
therefore, sustain that rejection.
A. Principles of Law
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, an invention is patent-eligible if it claims a
“new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”
35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court, however, has interpreted § 101 to
include an implicit exception: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S.
208, 216 (2014) (citation omitted).
The Supreme Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-step framework
previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012), “for distinguishing patents
that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those
that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at

3 With regard to the Examiner’s § 101 rejection, Appellant argues all claims
collectively with claim 1 (Appeal Br. 17), and we consider claim 1 to be
representative of the claimed subject matter on appeal. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
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217. The first step in the analysis is to “determine whether the claims at
issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Id. For
example, abstract ideas include, but are not limited to, fundamental
economic practices, methods of organizing human activities, an idea of
itself, and mathematical formulas or relationships. Id. at 218–20. The
“directed to” inquiry asks not whether “the claims involve a patent-ineligible
concept,” but instead whether, “considered in light of the specification, . . .
‘their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’” Enfish,
LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (internal
citations omitted). In that regard, we determine whether the claims “focus
on a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology” or are
“directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke
generic processes and machinery.” McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games
Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
If, at the first stage of the Alice analysis, we conclude that the claims
are not directed to a patent-ineligible concept, they are considered patent
eligible under § 101 and the inquiry ends. Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v.
CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
If the claims are directed to a patent-ineligible concept, the second
step in the analysis is to consider the elements of the claims “individually
and ‘as an ordered combination’” to determine whether there are additional
elements that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible
application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79, 78). In
other words, the second step is to “search for an “‘inventive concept’”—i.e.,
an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the
patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the
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[ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. at 217–18 (brackets in original) (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73). The prohibition against patenting an abstract
idea “‘cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula
to a particular technological environment’ or adding ‘insignificant
postsolution activity.’” Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 610–11 (2010)
(internal citation omitted).
The Patent and Trademark Office (the “Office”) has published revised
guidance on the application of 35 U.S.C. § 101. 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50–57 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(“2019 Guidance”). Under the 2019 Guidance, the Office first looks to
whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain
groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or
mental processes); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application. See 2019 Guidance at 52, 54–55; see
also MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).4
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception, and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, does the Office then
look to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial
exception that are not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field
(see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception. See 2019 Guidance at 56. We
follow this framework in our analysis herein.

4 Unless otherwise specified herein, all references to the MPEP are to Rev.
08.2017 (Jan. 2018).
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B. Application of Legal Principles
1. Step One of Alice / 2019 Guidance
Prong 1: Whether the Claims Recite an Abstract Idea
In applying the framework set out in Alice, and as the first step of that
analysis, the Examiner concludes claim 1 recites the abstract idea of
“rescheduling or reaccommodating passengers resulting from an airline
disruption.” Final Act. 6 (emphasis omitted). The Examiner concludes that
this abstract idea falls under the category of “Certain Methods of Organizing
Human Activity,” which, in the July 2015 Update applied by the Examiner,5
includes “concepts relating to interpersonal and intrapersonal activities, such
as managing relationships or transactions between people, social activities,
and human behavior . . . .” Id. at 7 (citing July 2015 Update at 4). The
Examiner determines that “[t]he rescheduling or re-accommodating [of]
passengers is an organizing of human activity as to how passengers can be
rescheduled (i.e. re-accommodated into an airline schedule).” Id. at 7–8.
In challenging the Examiner’s determination that the claims recite an
abstract idea, Appellant does not ostensibly disagree with the Examiner’s
characterization, but argues that the Examiner’s interpretation does not
“align” with any then-existing cases in which claims were determined to be
ineligible as directed to “certain methods of organizing human activity.”
Appeal Br. 13 (citing MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(II)(A)). Appellant then
contends: “Because the alleged abstract idea is not similar to any abstract
idea identified by the courts as an ineligible abstract idea, and because the

5 July 2015 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility, available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ieg-july-2015-
update.pdf) (“July 2015 Update”).
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Examiner has failed to identify any court case rejecting as ineligible the
alleged abstract idea, the rejection under 35 U.S.C. [§] 101 is deficient,
should be withdrawn, and is appealed at least based on this reason.” Id. at
13–14; see also Reply Br. 19.
We disagree that the Examiner has failed to apply the proper analysis.
In rejecting the claims under § 101, the Examiner analyzes the claims using
the Mayo/Alice two-step framework. Specifically, the Examiner looks to the
intrinsic evidence of the claim language and the recited limitations in
determining that the claims, as a whole, are directed to the abstract idea of
rescheduling or reaccommodating passengers resulting from an airline
disruption. See Final Act. 6–12. Although the Examiner does not recite the
precise cases wherein the court found similar ideas to be abstract (see id.),
the Examiner cites to the July 2015 Update at 4, which includes examples of
“Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activity” with cites to cases (id. at
7).
Thus, the Examiner clearly articulates the reasons why the claims are
directed to an abstract idea and notifies the Appellant of the reasons for the
rejection “together with such information and references as may be useful in
judging of the propriety of continuing the prosecution of [the] application.”
35 U.S.C. § 132. In doing so, the Examiner sets forth a prima facie case of
unpatentability. See In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011); 2015
July Update 6 (“[T]he examiner’s burden is met by clearly articulating the
reason(s) why the claimed invention is not eligible, for example by
providing a reasoned rationale that identifies the judicial exception recited in
the claim and why it is considered an exception, and that identifies the
additional elements in the claim (if any) and explains why they do not
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amount to significantly more than the exception”); see also October 2019
Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (“October 2019 Update”)6 at 15–16.
The Examiner’s analysis of the abstract idea is also consistent with the
most recent 2019 Guidance, which uses enumerated groupings of abstract
ideas that are rooted in Supreme Court precedent as well as Federal Circuit
decisions interpreting that precedent. See 2019 Guidance at 51–52; see also
October 2019 Update at 2. By grouping the abstract ideas, the 2019
Guidance synthesizes the holdings of various court decisions to facilitate
examination. The 2019 Guidance describes “[c]ertain methods of
organizing human activity” in terms similar to the definition applied by the
Examiner, including reference to “commercial or legal interactions.” 2019
Guidance at 52. The October 2019 Update provides additional clarification
on “Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activity,” confirming that “not
all methods of organizing human activity are abstract ideas,” while also
confirming that the category include activities that are “commercial or legal
interactions.” October 2019 Update at 4–5. In turn, “commercial
interactions” or “legal interactions” include “subject matter relating to
agreements in the form of contracts, legal obligations, advertising, marketing
or sales activities or behaviors, and business relations.” Id. at 5.
Claim 1 recites rescheduling or reaccommodating passengers resulting
from an airline disruption by reciting: “determining . . . at least one
reaccommodation event associated with irregular operations of the
transportation system”; “determining . . . at least one passenger affected
. . .”; “receiving . . . a passenger record . . .” and “based on the passenger

6 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
peg_oct_2019_update.pdf (October 17, 2019).
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record . . . determining . . . whether to prioritize reaccommodation of the at
least one passenger”; based on that determination, “determining . . . at least
one reaccommodation option . . .”; “sending . . . a message including the at
least one reaccommodation option” to the passenger’s mobile device
communication address; “receiving . . . a selection” of a reaccommodation
option; creating a “new transportation reservation”; and “sending . . .
confirmation of the new transportation reservation” to the passenger’s
mobile device communication address.
We agree with the Examiner that the claims recite a commercial
interaction in terms of, at least, business relations; that is, a “transportation
system” (e.g., airline) rescheduling or reaccommodating passengers
(customers of the airline) resulting from an airline disruption. See Final Act.
6–8; see also 2019 Guidance at 52; October 2019 Update at 5–6. In
particular, passengers who have purchased an airline ticket are in a
commercial (and, indeed, contractual) relationship with the airline. Airline
disruptions affect that relationship by interfering with the airline’s ability to
provide the service to the customer as agreed. As Appellant’s Specification
notes, these disruptions have potential “financial consequences” to the
airline. Spec. ¶ 38. Appellant’s claims are directed to reaccommodating
passengers in the event of such disruptions, and Appellant’s Specification
notes that different options may have different financial consequences for
the airline. Id. ¶¶ 39–43. Appellant’s Specification further notes that certain
passengers may be prioritized in their reaccommodation (id. ¶ 49 (noting
factors, such as “VIP” status, for prioritization)). Thus, Appellant’s claims
provide a business solution (reaccommodation of transportation passengers,
including according to passenger priority status) to a business problem
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(inability of an airline to provide scheduled service to a passenger). As such,
Appellant’s claims are directed to commercial interactions, which qualify as
a certain method of organizing human activity and, thus, as an abstract idea.
Thus, under prong 1 of Step 2A in accordance with the 2019
Guidance, we agree with the Examiner’s conclusions that the claims recite
an abstract idea. We turn now to prong 2.
Prong 2: Whether the Claims Integrate the Abstract
Idea Into a Practical Application7
In accordance with prong 2 of Step 2A of the 2019 Guidance, we
evaluate claims to determine whether they recite additional elements beyond
the abstract idea, and, if so, we evaluate the additional elements to determine
whether they integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. 2019
Guidance at 54. The 2019 Guidance at page 55 provides exemplary
considerations, including whether an additional element:
• “reflects an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or
an improvement to other technology or technical field”;
• “implements a judicial exception with, or uses a judicial
exception in conjunction with, a particular machine or
manufacture that is integral to the claim”;
• “effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article [or
thing] to a different state or thing”; or

7 We acknowledge that some of these considerations may be properly
evaluated under the second step of Alice (Step 2B of Office Guidance as
identified in the 2019 Guidance). Solely for purposes of maintaining
consistent treatment within the Office, we evaluate them under the first step
of Alice (Step 2A of Office Guidance as identified in the 2019 Guidance).
See 2019 Guidance at 54–55.
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• “applies or uses the judicial exception in some other meaningful
way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception
to a particular technological environment.”
The 2019 Guidance also highlights certain examples in which courts
have held that “a judicial exception has not been integrated into a practical
application,” such as where the claims “merely use[] a computer as a tool to
perform an abstract idea” or the additional element adds “insignificant extra-
solution activity” to the abstract idea. 2019 Guidance at 55 (emphasis
added); see also October 2019 Update at 11–15.
The Examiner determines:
The claims are not directed to improving the
operation of a computer and do not recite any such
benefit. Rather the claims are directed to improving the
reaccommodation of persons affected by irregular airline
operations (e.g. delayed or cancelled flights) and merely
use a computer to improve the performance of that
determination—not the performance of a computer.
Final Act. 3; see also id. at 11–12.
We agree. Although Appellant apparently argued prior to appeal that
the claims provide “technical benefits rooted in computer technology” (see
Final Act. 3 (quoting Appellant argument)), Appellant does not advance that
argument on appeal. Nor would such an argument be persuasive. As noted
above, Appellant’s invention is directed to the business problem of
reaccommodating passengers due to irregular operations of the
transportation system, and is directed to the business solution of providing
reaccommodation options to passengers on a prioritized basis—a process in
which a computer is used as a tool in its ordinary capacity. See also Final
Act. 11–12.
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We find the steps beyond the recited abstract idea, such as
“establishing . . . a connection to a transportation system” and “receiving”
and “sending” certain information by a “computing device” and a “mobile
device,” are directed to insignificant extra-solution activity. As our
reviewing court has explained, such data gathering and transmission simply
provide data for other method steps. See, e.g. CyberSource Corp. v. Retail
Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“We have held that
mere ‘[data-gathering] step[s] cannot make an otherwise nonstatutory claim
statutory.”’ (alterations in original) (quoting In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 840
(Fed. Cir. 1989))); see also 2019 Guidance at 55 (identifying “add[ing]
insignificant extrasolution activity to the” abstract idea as an example of
when an abstract idea has not been integrated into a practical application).
Consistent with the Examiner’s determination, we determine the
claims do not include an improvement to another technology or technical
field or an improvement to the functioning of the computer itself; we also
find the claims do not include a transformation of an article or meaningful
limitations beyond generally linking the use of an abstract idea to a
particular technological environment. See Final Act. 11–14. As the
Supreme Court has explained, “if a patent’s recitation of a computer
amounts to a mere instruction to ‘implemen[t]’ an abstract idea ‘on . . . a
computer,’ that addition cannot impart patent eligibility.” Alice, 573 U.S. at
223 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 84).
In summary, we conclude the claims do not integrate the abstract idea
into a practical application sufficiently to remove them from the realm of
reciting patent-ineligible abstract ideas. Accordingly, in step one of the
Alice analysis, we conclude the claims are directed to an abstract idea.
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2. Step Two of Alice / 2019 Guidance
Regarding step two of the Alice analysis, the Examiner finds the
elements of the claims, when considered individually or in combination, do
not recite significantly more than the abstract idea. Final Act. 8–13. In
particular, the Examiner finds:
Since the use of a computer to gather data such as
claimed to process and manipulate it (process it, display a
result and receive further input) is routine and
conventional in the computer arts, the implementation of
the abstract idea on a computer does not provide
significantly more. Additionally the use of
communication or computer devices, including using
mobile devices, to send data back and forth, including
using a communication address (e.g. email address) is
routine and conventional these limitations do not provide
significantly more.
Final Act. 8. In the Answer, the Examiner additionally sets forth evidence
that “computer processing of airline reservations and communication with
passengers is routine and well-known.” Ans. 7–14 (setting forth evidence of
Sabre airline reservation management system).
Appellant argues that the Examiner’s “generic discussion does not
fulfill the required step-2B analysis,” and insists that claim 1 “recites
significantly more than merely ‘storing and retrieving information in
memory.’” Appeal Br. 15. Appellant then recites the entirety of claim 1.
Id. at 15–16. Missing from Appellant’s argument, however, is any
identification of which elements in claim 1 are additional elements beyond
the abstract idea. The analysis in the second step of Alice does not consider
whether the limitations that are part of the recited abstract idea are routine or
well-known. As the Federal Circuit has explained, patent law does not
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protect abstract ideas, “no matter how groundbreaking the advance.” SAP
America, Inc. v. Investpic LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1170 (Fed. Cir. 2018). What
is necessary to impart patent eligibility for a claim that recites an abstract
idea is a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not well-
understood, routine, and conventional.
Examiner addresses the limitations of the claims that are arguably
beyond the recitation of the abstract idea (i.e., establishing a connection by a
computing device, and generating, sending, and receiving data in the form of
reaccommodation options), and finds that those limitations amount to
routine and conventional data processing and communication using generic
computing devices. Final Act. 8, 11–14. Appellant does not address these
findings by the Examiner other than to assert, incorrectly, that they fail to
fulfill the required analysis. See generally Appeal Br. 14–17. For the
reasons stated above, we disagree, and hence we are not persuaded of
Examiner error.
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as patent-ineligible.
For the same reasons, we also sustain the rejection of claims 2–12, 16, 18,
and 20–25, which are not separately argued, as patent-ineligible under
35 U.S.C. § 101. See Appeal Br. 17.
II. Section 112(a) Rejections
The Examiner rejects all pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as
failing to comply with the written description and enablement requirements.
Final Act. 15–34. In particular, the Examiner finds the recitation in claim 18

8 Although the Examiner purports to reject all of the claims (claims 1–12,
16, 18, and 20–25) under § 112, the Examiner discusses only claim 1. Final
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of “whether to prioritize” customers lacks written description and
enablement support in the Specification. Id. at 16.
Claim 1 recites, in relevant part:
based on the passenger record for the at least one
passenger affected by the at least one reaccommodation
event associated with the irregular operations of the
transportation system, determining, by the computing
device, whether to prioritize reaccommodation of the at
least one passenger affected by the at least one
reaccommodation event associated with the irregular
operations of the transportation system . . . .
Appeal Br. 32 (Claims App’x) (emphasis added). As the Examiner
acknowledges, the Specification discusses “predefined rules” for
reaccommodation events and also discusses “prioritization,” but does not
explain all of the “large variety of ways” customers could be scored or
prioritized. Final Act. 16–18 (citing Spec. ¶ 37).
We first address the Examiner’s rejection for lack of written
description. “The ‘written description’ requirement serves a teaching
function, . . . in which the public is given ‘meaningful disclosure in
exchange for being excluded from practicing the invention for a limited
period of time.”’ Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 358 F.3d
916, 922 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Another “purpose of the
‘written description’ requirement is . . . [to] convey with reasonable clarity
to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date [], [the applicant] was in
possession of the invention.” Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555,

Act. 15. We interpret the Examiner’s analysis of the “whether to prioritize”
limitation in independent claim 1 to apply also to the similar recitations in
independent claims 12 and 20, and hence also to all dependent claims.
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1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see also Enzo Biochem Inc. v. GenProbe Inc., 296
F.3d 1316, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The requirement is satisfied when the
specification “set[s] forth enough detail to allow a person of ordinary skill in
the art to understand what is claimed and to recognize that the inventor
invented what is claimed.” Univ. of Rochester, 358 F.3d at 928.
We are persuaded of Examiner error in the rejection under § 112(a)
for lack of written description. As Appellant argues, and we agree, the
Specification describes prioritization of passengers according to several
exemplary factors, including whether the passenger is a VIP or is in danger
of missing a connection. Appeal Br. 17–18; Spec. ¶¶ 37, 49. Indeed, the
Examiner concedes the Specification “provides verbatim support for how
customers or passengers affected by airline flight operation disruptions
would be prioritized.” Final Act. 17. The Examiner takes issue, however,
with the fact that “[t]here is a large variety of ways customers could be
scored or prioritized,” and notes that the Specification does not describe all
those ways. See id. at 18. Although the Specification may not predict and
describe every possible factor or scheme for passenger prioritization, such is
not required to satisfy the written description requirement. As the Federal
Circuit has explained, “our case law is clear that an applicant is not required
to describe in the specification every conceivable and possible future
embodiment of his invention.” Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d
1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of
America, 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc)). Here, we agree
with Appellant that the Specification conveys with reasonable clarity to
those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, Appellant was in
possession of the invention as now claimed, including “determining . . .
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whether to prioritize reaccommodation,” as recited in independent claim 1
and commensurately recited in independent claims 12 and 20. We,
therefore, do not sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) rejection for
lack of written description.
As for enablement, the Federal Circuit has explained that satisfying
the enablement requirement requires that “one skilled in the art, after reading
their disclosures, could practice the invention . . . without undue
experimentation.” Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1253
(Fed. Cir. 2004). The Federal Circuit noted that simply because some
experimentation is necessary “does not preclude enablement; what is
required is that the amount of experimentation ‘must not be unduly
extensive.’” Id. The Federal Circuit further clarified that while the full
scope of the claim must be enabled,
[t]hat is not to say that the specification itself must
necessarily describe how to make and use every possible
variant of the claimed invention, for the artisan’s
knowledge of the prior art and routine experimentation
can often fill gaps, interpolate between embodiments, and
perhaps even extrapolate beyond disclosed embodiments,
depending upon the predictability of the art.
Id.
For reasons similar to those noted above, and for the reasons argued
by Appellant, we are also persuaded of Examiner error in the rejection of the
pending claims for lack of enablement. See Appeal Br. 17–19; Reply Br. 1–
4. The Examiner does not dispute that the Specification enables at least
some embodiments of determining passenger prioritization, but asserts it
does not explain every possible way of carrying out the prioritization. See
Final Act. 17–18. Enablement of every conceivable variation is not
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required, however. See Chiron Corp., 363 F.3d at 1253. Moreover, as
discussed above in connection with the rejection under § 101, the Examiner
finds (and we agree) that the limitations of the claims beyond the abstract
idea do not require more than well-understood, routine, and conventional
technology. See Final Act. 8. The Examiner does not explain how the
ordinarily skilled artisan could, using such conventional technology, apply
some factors (as disclosed in the Specification) in determining passenger
prioritization, but would be required to engage in undue experimentation to
apply other factors. We, therefore, do not sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(a) rejection of claims 1–12, 16, 18, and 20–25 for lack of enablement.
III. Section 103 Rejection9
The Examiner rejects claims 1–12, 16, 18, and 20–25 as obvious over
Sink. Final Act. 35–55.
Appellant argues the Examiner’s rejection is in error for several
reasons. We deem persuasive Appellant’s arguments that Sink fails to
disclose at least two limitations: “sending, by the computing device and to
the communication address for the mobile device associated with the at least
one passenger, a message including the at least one reaccommodation option
. . .”; and “receiving, by the computing device and from the mobile device
associated with the at least one passenger, a selection from the at least one
reaccommodation option . . . .” Appeal Br. 22–29.
Sink discloses an online reservation system in which, when a
traveler’s preferred accommodation is not available, the traveler may place a

9 With regard to the Examiner’s § 103 rejection, Appellant argues all claims
collectively with claim 1 (Appeal Br. 30), and we consider claim 1 to be
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request to be waitlisted for the preferred accommodation. Sink ¶ 3. If and
when the preferred accommodation does become available, the traveler is
assigned to that accommodation “without any intervention by the traveler.”
Id. ¶ 6. The traveler is then notified of the preferred accommodation
assignment. Id. Sink emphasizes that this reassignment is automatic, and
further notes that it may be based on prioritization:
The traveler does not have to periodically check back
with the travel accommodation provider for the possible
availability of their preferred accommodation, hoping
that they get lucky and happen to check back right at the
moment when the preferred accommodation is available.
The traveler is evaluated for the preferred
accommodation based on passenger value parameters
defined by the carrier, and is able to obtain the preferred
accommodation first, based on relative ranking to other
travelers. The disclosed system and methods eliminate
the need for any traveler intervention and significantly
improves the chances of the travel being assigned their
preferred accommodation.
Id. The fact that reassignment is “automatic” without requiring any
intervention by the traveler is emphasized throughout Sink. Sink explains
that one benefit of the automatic reassignment is that the alternative
accommodation originally chosen by the traveler will be freed up for
possibly assignment by the reservation system to another traveler. Id. ¶ 26.
In mapping the disclosures of Sink to claim 1, the Examiner finds
Sink teaches “a communication address for a mobile device associated with
the at least one passenger” by disclosing that the system stores a passenger’s

representative of the claimed subject matter on appeal. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
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email address, which the system will use to notify the customer in the event
of a seat reassignment. Final Act. 15 (citing Sink ¶ 7, Fig. 5). We agree
with that finding. Sink discloses repeatedly that a passenger is notified, such
as through email, in the event of reassignment. E.g., Sink ¶ 6. With regard
to the limitations of “sending . . . at least one reaccommodation option” from
the computing device to the passenger’s communication address and
“receiving . . . a selection” by the computing device from the passenger’s
mobile device, however, the Examiner does not point to any disclosure in
Sink supporting a finding of such an exchange. Rather, the Examiner relies
on Sink’s disclosure of a passenger making a waitlist selection. Final Act.
40–41. Sink discloses that this waitlist selection may be made by a
passenger when making a reservation. E.g., Sink ¶ 30 and Figs. 1–3
(disclosing a passenger accessing a “travel accommodation assignment
interface” and having an option to select a seat and a waitlist option for a
preferred seat). Sink does not disclose, however, that the system sends a
message to the passenger’s “communication address” (e.g., email) with a
reaccommodation option, nor does Sink disclose that the system receives
from the passenger a selection in response to that message, as recited in the
claims. Rather, as noted above, Sink repeatedly emphasizes that the
reassignment of the passenger to a waitlisted preferred seat is done
automatically, without passenger intervention. Sink ¶ 7. The Examiner’s
analysis in the Answer only further underscores this deficiency in the
Examiner’s findings, as the Examiner reiterates reliance on Figure 5 of Sink,
in which a passenger may, using the airline’s website, select an option to be
waitlisted. See Ans. 16–17. Again, nothing in Figure 5 (or in the
corresponding disclosure of Sink) suggests that the airline sends a message
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to the passenger’s communication address with options that the passenger
then selects. Rather, as noted above, Sink repeatedly emphasizes that the
reassignment is automatic, and the passenger is passively notified only if and
when reassignment has already occurred. E.g., Sink ¶ 7.
In short, a key difference between Sink’s teachings and the claimed
invention is that Sink discloses the passenger choosing a preferred seat in
advance by way of a waitlist selection, and then awaiting notification of
whether the preferred seat is later automatically assigned to the passenger.
The claimed invention, in contrast, requires the transportation system to send
a message to the passenger’s designated communication address with one or
more reaccommodation options, and the passenger must then affirmatively
choose an option before reaccommodation will occur.
On this record, we do not have sufficient evidence or findings that
sending reaccommodation options to the passenger and requiring affirmative
selection by the passenger are merely obvious advances over the cited prior
art, which teaches that reaccommodation is done automatically without
passenger intervention. We note Appellant’s contentions present additional
issues. Because the identified issue is dispositive of Appellant’s arguments
on appeal with regard to the Examiner’s § 103 rejection, we do not reach the
additional contentions. On this record, therefore, we are constrained to
reverse the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection of independent claim 1,
and also of independent claims 12 and 20, which contain commensurate
limitations. The dependent claims stand with their respective independent
claims.
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CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–12, 16, 18, and 20–25 is
affirmed.
More specifically:
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–12, 16, 18, and 20–25 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 (patent ineligible / abstract idea) is affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–12, 16, 18, and 20–25 under
35 U.S.C. § 112(a) for lack of written description and lack of enablement are
reversed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–12, 16, 18, and 20–25 under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Sink is reversed.

DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–12, 16,
18, and 20–
25
101 Eligibility 1–12, 16,
18, and
20–25

1–12, 16,
18, and 20–
25
112(a) Written Description
/ Enablement
1–12, 16,
18, and
20–25
1–12, 16,
18, and 20–
25
103 Sink 1–12, 16,
18, and
20–25
OVERALL OUTCOME 1–12, 16,
18, and
20–25

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Because we have affirmed at least one ground of rejection with
respect to each claim on appeal, the Examiner’s decision is affirmed. See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1).

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED