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Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 9, 2019

13707493 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Oct. 9, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/707,493 12/06/2012 Rui Zhang PARC-20120623-US-NP 5575
35699 7590 10/09/2019
PVF -- PARC
c/o PARK, VAUGHAN, FLEMING & DOWLER LLP
2820 FIFTH STREET
DAVIS, CA 95618-7759
EXAMINER
JOSEPH, TONYA S
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3628
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/09/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
sy_incoming@parklegal.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte RUI ZHANG, OLIVER BRDICZKA and KURT E. PARTRIDGE
____________

Appeal 2019-000397
Application 13/707,493
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before KARA L. SZPONDOWSKI, SCOTT B. HOWARD, and
STEVEN M. AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judges.

HOWARD, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1, 4–9, 12–17, and 20–29, which constitute all of
the claims pending in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Palo Alto
Research Center Inc. Appeal Br. 5.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The disclosed and claimed invention is directed to “modeling a user’s
behavior and activities,” and more specifically to “determining a wait time
for user activities based on behavior and location information that users
share using social-media services.” Spec. ¶ 2.2
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
1. A computer-implemented method, comprising:
obtaining, by a computer server system, a plurality of user-
behavior events from a plurality of mobile devices associated
with a plurality of users waiting at venues to perform an activity
of a target consumer activity type, wherein the user-behavior
events comprise GPS location data polled from a respective
device’s GPS sensor in response to detecting a change in the
respective user’s position, and accelerometer data from a motion
sensor of a respective device;
in response to the plurality of user-behavior events not
including sufficient GPS location data to determine a wait time
for the activity type, determining waiting attributes based at least
on a variation in accelerometer data indicating a change in pose
of a respective user, wherein a respective waiting attribute
indicates at least a time that a respective user enters or leaves a
venue’s waiting queue for an activity of the target activity type;
computing a wait time for a first activity of the activity
type, wherein determining the wait time comprises determining
a wait-period start-time based on one or more of: a minimal
change in GPS location coordinates of a respective user, and the
determined waiting attributes; and
in response to the computed wait time being less than a
wait time for a user’s current or scheduled activity, sending to a

2 We refer to the Specification filed Dec. 6, 2012 (“Spec.”); Final Office
Action mailed Sept. 25, 2017 (“Final Act.”); Appeal Brief filed Feb. 8, 2018
(“Appeal Br.”); Examiner’s Answer mailed Aug. 15, 2018 (“Ans.”); and the
Reply Brief filed Oct. 11, 2018 (“Reply Br.”).
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mobile device near a venue location associated with the target
activity type, a recommendation or incentive to perform the first
activity for the mobile device to present on a display.

REJECTION
Claims 1, 4–9, 12–17, and 20–29 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101
as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 4.

OPINION
An invention is patent eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
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economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. at
611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95
(1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69
(1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and
chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr,
450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth,
vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v.
Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson,
409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
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eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional
features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Memorandum”). Under that guidance, we first look
to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); and

(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception
into a practical application (see Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure (“MPEP”) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. rev.
08.2017 Jan. 2018)).
See Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52, 54–55. Only if a claim (1) recites a
judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical
application, do we then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception
that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field
(see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or

(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See id. at 56.
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Furthermore, the Memorandum “extracts and synthesizes key
concepts identified by the courts as abstract ideas to explain that the abstract
idea exception includes the following groupings of subject matter, when
recited as such in a claim limitation(s) (that is, when recited on their own or
per se)”:
(a) Mathematical concepts—mathematical
relationships, mathematical formulas or equations,
mathematical calculations;

(b) Certain methods of organizing human activity—
fundamental economic principles or practices (including
hedging, insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal
interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts;
legal obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or
behaviors; business relations); managing personal behavior or
relationships or interactions between people (including social
activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions); and

(c) Mental processes—concepts performed in the
human mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgment,
opinion).
Id. at 52 (footnotes omitted).
USPTO Step 2A, Prong 1
The Examiner determines that the claims are “directed to the abstract
idea of computing a wait time based on determined activity-waiting
attributes, which falls into the categories of [] a method of organizing human
activities and [] an idea of itself.” Final Act. 4. The Examiner compares the
claims to those in Accenture, FairWarning, and Electric Power. Final Act. 4
(citing Accenture Global Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728
F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013); FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839
F.3d 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Electric Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830
F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016)); see also Ans. 4.
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Appellant contends that the claims are not directed to a method of
organizing human activity as they do “not involve any such interpersonal or
commercial relationships, behaviors, or activities,” and instead are “directed
to computing a wait time for a first activity based on measured motion,
including acceleration, of a user.” Appeal Br. 21; see also id. at 22.
Appellant further contends that the claims “cannot be performed by the
human mind” because they “make use of rules that are not used by human
practitioners” and “intrinsically depend[] upon measuring equipment.” Id.
at 23. Specifically, Appellant argues that the claims “incorporate ‘rules’ . . .
which allow the system to compute a wait time for a specific activity based
on the GPS location data (and accelerometer data) and subsequently send a
recommendation or an incentive to perform a specific activity,” which
“improves the technological process of analyzing electronically gathered
GPS location and accelerometer data (e.g., gathered via online services or
sites) to aid in electronically providing a recommendation to a user.” Id.
at 20; see also Reply Br. 14–15.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner
erred.
Representative claim 1—with emphasis added—is reproduced below:
1. A computer-implemented method, comprising:
obtaining, by a computer server system, a plurality of
user-behavior events from a plurality of mobile devices
associated with a plurality of users waiting at venues to perform
an activity of a target consumer activity type, wherein the user-
behavior events comprise GPS location data polled from a
respective device’s GPS sensor in response to detecting a change
in the respective user’s position, and accelerometer data from a
motion sensor of a respective device;
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in response to the plurality of user-behavior events not
including sufficient GPS location data to determine a wait time
for the activity type, determining waiting attributes based at least
on a variation in accelerometer data indicating a change in pose
of a respective user, wherein a respective waiting attribute
indicates at least a time that a respective user enters or leaves a
venue’s waiting queue for an activity of the target activity type;
computing a wait time for a first activity of the activity
type, wherein determining the wait time comprises determining
a wait-period start-time based on one or more of: a minimal
change in GPS location coordinates of a respective user, and the
determined waiting attributes; and
in response to the computed wait time being less than a
wait time for a user’s current or scheduled activity, sending to a
mobile device near a venue location associated with the target
activity type, a recommendation or incentive to perform the first
activity for the mobile device to present on a display.
As relevant here, the Guidance explains that mental processes include
“concepts performed in the human mind,” such as “an observation,
evaluation, judgment, [or] opinion.” Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
The emphasized limitations above are steps of observation,
evaluation, and judgment that can be practically performed by a human,
either mentally or with the use of pen and paper. Specifically, the claim
limitations identified above are directed to (i) obtaining user-behavior events
information comprising GPS location information and accelerometer
information (collecting information), (ii) determining if the collected GPS
location information is sufficient or otherwise determining waiting attributes
associated with venue waiting queues from the collected accelerometer
information, computing a wait time for a first activity based on the collected
GPS location and waiting attributes determined from the collected
accelerometer information, determining if the computed wait time for the
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first activity is less than the wait time for the user’s current or scheduled
activity (analyzing the collected information), and (iii) sending a
recommendation to perform the first activity to display on the user’s mobile
device (displaying certain results of the collection and analysis).
Each of those steps, both individually and as a combination, can be
performed by a human, either mentally or with the aid of paper and pencil,
which is similar to the claims found patent ineligible as mental processes in
Electric Power. See Electric Power, 830 F.3d at 1353, 1355 (“collecting
information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and
analysis” are “abstract-idea processes,” and “selecting information, by
content or source, for collection, analysis, and display does nothing
significant to differentiate a process from ordinary mental processes”); see
also SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Labs., SA, 555 F. App’x 950,
955 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he claim at issue here involves a mental process
excluded from section 101: the mental steps of comparing new and stored
information and using rules to identify medical options” and “calls on a
computer to do nothing that is even arguably an advance in physical
implementations of routine mental information-comparison and rule-
application processes”); see also CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions,
Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Thus, claim 3’s steps can all be
performed in the human mind. Such a method that can be performed by
human thought alone is merely an abstract idea and is not patent-eligible
under § 101. Methods which can be performed entirely in the human mind
are unpatentable not because there is anything wrong with claiming mental
method steps as part of a process containing non-mental steps, but rather
because computational methods which can be performed entirely in the
human mind are the types of methods that embody the ‘basic tools of
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scientific and technological work’ that are free to all men and reserved
exclusively to none.”) (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 67) (footnote omitted));
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (“[W]ith the exception of generic computer-implemented steps,
there is nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose them from being
performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper.”); Versata Dev.
Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Courts
have examined claims that required the use of a computer and still found that
the underlying, patent-ineligible invention could be performed via pen and
paper or in a person’s mind.”).
Accordingly, we conclude that claim 1 recites a method of
observation, evaluation, and judgment that can be practically performed in
the human mind, which is a mental process identified in the Memorandum,
and thus an abstract idea.3
USPTO Step 2A, Prong 2
In determining whether claim 1 is “directed to” the identified abstract
ideas, we next consider whether claim 1 recites additional elements that
integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. For the reasons
set forth below, we discern no additional element (or combination of
elements) recited in claim 1 that integrates the judicial exception into a
practical application. See Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55.
The Examiner determines that the additional claim elements (“server,
mobile computing devices, varied sensors”) “amount[] to no more than the
recitation of generic computer structure that serves to perform generic

3 Because we determine the claims recite a mental process, Appellant’s
argument that the claims do not recite certain methods of organizing human
activity is moot.
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computer functions.” Final Act. 5. The Examiner further determines that
there is “no indication that the combination of elements improves the
functioning of a computer or improves any other technology,” and that the
“collective functions merely provide conventional computer
implementation.” Id. Specifically, the Examiner determines that the
claimed invention “does not provide an improvement to software technology
so much as it adds a general purpose computer to . . . an idea of itself.” Ans.
3.
Appellant argues “the system provides meaningful improvements to a
mobile device.” Appeal Br. 27. Specifically, Appellant argues that the
claimed “improvement over previous technology” results from the “system
us[ing] multiple measurement sources to analyze a range of activity types,
giving users concrete recommendations as a result.” Reply Br. 7. Appellant
also argues that the “claims are strongly tied to ‘specific machines,’ such as
an accelerometer and GPS hardware,” requiring “the use of a particular
machine” like in SiRF. Appeal Br. 18–19 (citing SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l
Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2010)); see Appeal Br. 25–26;
Reply Br. 13–14.
We are not persuaded the claims here are comparable to those in
SiRF. In SiRF, the Federal Circuit determined that the claimed GPS receiver
was a machine that was integral to each of the claims at issue. 601 F.3d at
1331. However, in SiRF, the goal of the claims was to determine the
position of the GPS receiver. Id. In other words, the claims of the patents at
issue were determined patent eligible not simply because they required a
GPS receiver, but because they were directed to improved techniques for
computing the position of the GPS receiver. No such technological
improvement is evident in the claimed invention. Unlike the situation in
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SiRF, Appellant does not identify any improvement to GPS technology.
Instead, Appellant’s claims merely invoke the use of a GPS sensor as a data-
gathering tool that polls GPS location data. However, determining a
geographic location is precisely the expected manner of operation of a GPS
sensor. Likewise, Appellant does not identify any improvement to
accelerometer technology. Instead, Appellant’s claims merely invoke the
use of a motion sensor that gathers accelerometer data to detect a change in
the user’s position, which is precisely the expected manner of operation of a
motion sensor. The same analysis applies to the claimed gyroscope,
compass, and microphone.
Claim 1 does not constitute an improvement to computer technology;
rather, it merely adapts the abstract idea of “gather[ing] a combination of
user-behavior events that describes a user’s current location and/or
behavior” and “determin[ing] how much time the user or a group of users
spends waiting in a queue to perform an activity” to an execution of steps
practically performed by computers. Spec. ¶ 22. For example, the
Specification describes the “[c]omputer system 100 can . . . include a
computing device 104 coupled to network 102 and associated with user
106,” and “computing device 104 can include a smartphone 104.1, a tablet
computer 104.2, or any other personal computing device 104.n such as a
laptop computer, a desktop computer, etc.” Id. ¶ 29. As another example,
the Specification describes that the “user 106 can configure computing
device 104 to periodically determine location and/or motion information
about user 106 (e.g., using a location sensor embedded within or attached to
computing device 104” such as a “global positioning service (GPS) sensor”
or “and accelerometer . . . of the user’s mobile computing device.” Id. ¶ 30.
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Relying on a computer to perform routine tasks more quickly or more
accurately is insufficient to render a claim patent eligible. See Alice, 573
U.S. at 224 (“use of a computer to create electronic records, track multiple
transactions, and issue simultaneous instructions” is not an inventive
concept); Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687
F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (a computer “employed only for its most
basic function . . . does not impose meaningful limits on the scope of those
claims”); MPEP § 2106.05(f)(2) (“Use of a computer or other machinery in
its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or
transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer
components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic
practice or mathematical equation) does not provide significantly more.”).
Moreover, the “mere automation of manual processes using generic
computers does not constitute a patentable improvement in computer
technology.” Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044,
1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Appellant also compares the claims to those in McRO and Enfish.
Specifically, Appellant argues that the claims “incorporate ‘rules’ . . . which
allow the system to compute a wait time for a specific activity based on the
GPS location data (and accelerometer data) and subsequently send a
recommendation or an incentive to perform a specific activity,” which
“improves the technological process of analyzing electronically gathered
GPS location and accelerometer data (e.g., gathered via online services or
sites) to aid in electronically providing a recommendation to a user.” Appeal
Br. 20 (citing McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299
(Fed. Cir. 2016)); see Reply Br. 14–15. Appellant further argues that the
claims “are directed to a specific implementation of a solution . . . to a
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problem in the software arts.” Reply Br. 8 (citing Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft
Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
Appellant’s reliance on McRO and Enfish is not persuasive. In
McRO, the claims recited a “specific . . . improvement in computer
animation” using “unconventional rules” that related “sub-sequences of
phonemes, timings, and morph weight sets” to automatically animate lip
synchronization and facial expressions for three-dimensional characters that
only human animators could previously produce. McRO, 837 F.3d at 1302–
03, 1307–08, 1313–15. The Federal Circuit reasoned that “the incorporation
of the claimed rules” improved an existing technological process. Id.
at 1314.
Similarly, in Enfish, the Federal Circuit decided that the claims
satisfied § 101 under Mayo/Alice step one because they recited a “specific
improvement to the way computers operate,” i.e., an improved database
configuration that permitted faster and more efficient searching. Enfish,
822 F.3d at 1330–33, 1336, 1339. Further, the Federal Circuit has explained
that the claims in Enfish “did more than allow computers to perform familiar
tasks with greater speed and efficiency” and “actually permitted users to
launch and construct databases in a new way.” Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat
Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2018); see also Secured Mail Sols.
LLC v. Universal Wilde, Inc., 873 F.3d 905, 910 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (explaining
that the claims in Enfish “focused on an improvement to computer
functionality itself”).
Unlike the claims in McRO and Enfish, the claims here do not
improve computer functionality itself or cover a technology-based solution
that improves an existing technological process. See Final Act. 5; Ans. 3–6.
For instance, the claims do not recite an advance in hardware or software
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that improves the functionality of, for examples, the GPS or motion sensors.
Instead, we agree with the Examiner that the claimed additional elements
(i.e., (1) a “computer server system” or “apparatus” comprising “a processor
and a memory,” and (2) “mobile devices” with “GPS sensors,” “motion
sensors,” and “displays”) are “amount[] to no more than the recitation of
generic computer structure that serves to perform generic computer
functions.” Final Act. 5. Furthermore, the claims “are directed to data from
an accelerator, gyroscope and GPS and sound from a microphone, as
opposed to the actual devices themselves” (Ans. 4–5) and do not recite using
rules to improve a technological process. As the Examiner explains, the
claims, “require the use of a computer” but “it is this incorporation of a
computer, not the claimed rule, that purportedly ‘improves the existing
technological process’ by allowing the automation of further tasks.” Id. at 4
(citing FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1094); see Ans. 6.
Appellant also compares the claims to those in DDR and BASCOM.
Specifically, Appellant argues that the claims “are directed to a ‘solution
necessarily rooted in computer technology,’” and “without these myriad of
computing entities, the instant claims cannot provide the improvement to the
computer technology of sharing and receiving useful user information based
on portable Internet-enabled computing technologies.” Reply Br. 9 (citing
DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014));
see Reply Br. 10–11. Appellant also argues that the claims “solve a mobile-
device-centric problem with a solution that is necessarily rooted in mobile
computing technology.” Appeal Br. 24 (citing BASCOM Glob. Internet
Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)); see
Appeal Br. 26.
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In DDR Holdings, the Federal Circuit determined that certain claims
satisfied § 101 under Mayo/Alice step two because “the claimed solution
amount[ed] to an inventive concept for resolving [a] particular Internet-
centric problem,” i.e., a challenge unique to the Internet. DDR Holdings,
773 F.3d at 1257–59; see also Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp.,
839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (noting that “[i]n DDR Holdings, we
held that claims ‘directed to systems and methods of generating a composite
web page that combines certain visual elements of a “host” website with
content of a third-party merchant’ contained the requisite inventive
concept”). The Federal Circuit explained that the patent-eligible claims
specified “how interactions with the Internet are manipulated to yield a
desired result . . . that overrides the routine and conventional sequence of
events ordinarily triggered by the click of a hyperlink.” DDR Holdings,
773 F.3d at 1258. The court reasoned that those claims recited a
technological solution “necessarily rooted in computer technology” that
addressed a “problem specifically arising in the realm of computer
networks.” Id. at 1257. According to the Federal Circuit, “DDR Holdings
does not apply when . . . the asserted claims do not ‘attempt to solve a
challenge particular to the Internet.’” Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chi.
Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting In re TLI
Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 613 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
Similarly, in BASCOM, the claims recited a “specific method of
filtering Internet content” requiring “the installation of a filtering tool at a
specific location, remote from the end-users, with customizable filtering
features specific to each end user.” BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1345–46, 1350.
The Federal Circuit reasoned that the claims covered “a technology-based
solution . . . to filter content on the Internet that overcomes existing
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problems with other Internet filtering systems” and “improve[s] an existing
technological process.” Id. at 1351 (citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 223); see Alice,
573 U.S. at 223 (explaining that “the claims in Diehr were patent eligible
because they improved an existing technological process”).
Unlike the claims in DDR and BASCOM, claim 1 is not necessarily
rooted in computer technology. See Final Act. 5, Ans. 5–6. As discussed
above, the claimed invention merely adapts the abstract idea of “gather[ing]
a combination of user-behavior events that describes a user’s current
location and/or behavior” and “determin[ing] how much time the user or a
group of users spends waiting in a queue to perform an activity” to an
execution of steps practically performed by computers. Spec. ¶ 22. As the
Examiner correctly finds, the claimed invention is not directed to a
“particular arrangement of elements” as a “technical improvement.” Ans. 6.
Specifically, the claims “are directed to data from an accelerator, gyroscope,
and GPS and sound from a microphone, as opposed to the actual devices
themselves.” Id. at 4–5. Unlike the patent-eligible claims in DDR Holdings,
the claims here do not attempt to solve a challenge particular to the Internet.
See Appeal Br. 34, 36, 38; see also Final Act. 5; Ans. 5–6. Instead,
considering wait times and suggesting alternative venues is equivalent to the
work done by a pre-internet concierge when making reservations.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s
determination that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea, and we find the
claimed additional elements do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical
application.
USPTO Step 2B
Turning to step 2B of the USPTO Guidance, we look to whether
claim 1 (a) adds a specific limitation or combination of limitations that are
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not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field, or (b) simply
appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known
to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial
exception. Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
The Examiner concludes that the additional claim elements (“server,
mobile computing devices, varied sensors”) “amount[] to no more than the
recitation of generic computer structure that serves to perform generic
computer functions that are well-understood, routine, and conventional
activities.” Final Act. 5.
Appellant argues that the “claims are strongly tied to ‘specific
machines,’ such as an accelerometer and GPS hardware,” requiring “the use
of a particular machine.” Appeal Br. 18–19; see Appeal Br. 25–26, Reply
Br. 13–14.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner
erred. As discussed above, claim 1 is directed to “gather[ing] a combination
of user-behavior events that describes a user’s current location and/or
behavior” and “determin[ing] how much time the user or a group of users
spends waiting in a queue to perform an activity. Spec. ¶ 22. Similarly, the
claimed additional elements (i.e., (1) a “computer server system” or
“apparatus” comprising “a processor and a memory,” and (2) “mobile
devices” with “GPS sensors,” “motion sensors,” and “displays”) amount to
no more than mere instructions to apply the abstract idea using generic
computer components, which is insufficient to provide an inventive concept.
See Alice, 573 U.S. at 225–226.
Appellant does not direct our attention to anything in the Specification
that indicates the computer components perform anything other than well-
understood, routine, and conventional functions, such as collecting data (i.e.,
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obtaining user-behavior events information comprising GPS location
information and accelerometer information), manipulating data (i.e.,
determining if the collected GPS location information is sufficient or
otherwise determining waiting attributes associated with venue waiting
queues from the collected accelerometer information, computing a wait time
for an activity based on the collected GPS location and waiting attributes
from the collected accelerometer information, determining if the computed
wait time is less than the wait time for the user’s current or scheduled
activity), and displaying data (i.e., sending a recommendation to perform the
activity to display on the user’s mobile device). Moreover, those types of
generic computer components performing generic computer functions have
been found to be well-understood, routine, and conventional. See, e.g.,
Electric Power, 830 F.3d at 1355 (“Nothing in the claims, understood in
light of the specification, requires anything other than off-the-shelf,
conventional computer, network, and display technology for gathering,
sending, and presenting the desired information”); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google,
Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“That a computer receives and
sends the information over a network—with no further specification—is not
even arguably inventive”); TLI Commc’ns, 823 F.3d at 614 (server that
receives data, extracts classification information from the received data, and
stores the digital images insufficient to add an inventive concept); Alice, 573
U.S. at 225–26 (receiving, storing, sending information over networks
insufficient to add an inventive concept); CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1370
(use of Internet to verify credit-card transaction does not add enough to
abstract idea of verifying the transaction); see also MPEP § 2106.05(d)
(“Courts have held computer‐implemented processes not to be significantly
more than an abstract idea (and thus ineligible) where the claim as a whole
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amounts to nothing more than generic computer functions merely used to
implement an abstract idea, such as an idea that could be done by a human
analog (i.e., by hand or by merely thinking.”)).
Conclusion on Section 101 Rejection
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 as being
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter, as well as independent claims 9
and 17 with commensurate limitations, and dependent claims 4–8, 12–16,
and 20–29, which are argued for similar reasons. See Appeal Br. 27–32.

CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 4–9, 12–17, 20–29 is affirmed.
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 4–9,
12–17,
20–29
101 Judicial exception 1, 4–9,
12–17,
20–29

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED