NSIXTY LLC (PATENT OWNER) et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 1, 2020

2020003003 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 1, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
90/014,030 10/11/2017 8619115 32983-00023 5695
33772 7590 07/01/2020
MCDONALD HOPKINS LLC
600 Superior Avenue, East
Suite 2100
CLEVELAND, OH 44114-2653
EXAMINER
GE, YUZHEN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3992
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/01/2020 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte NSIXTY LLC
Patent Owner and Appellant
____________

Appeal 2020-003003
Reexamination Control 90/014,030
Patent 8,619,115 B2
Technology Center 3900
____________

Before JOHN A. JEFFERY, MARC S. HOFF, and ERIC B. CHEN,
Administrative Patent Judges.

CHEN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
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Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 134(b) and 306, Appellant1 appeals from the
final rejection of claims 1–20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
An oral hearing was held on May 27, 2020. The record includes a
written transcript of the oral hearing.
We AFFIRM.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Reexamination Proceedings
A request for ex parte reexamination of U.S. Patent No. 8,619,115 B2
(“the ’115 patent”) was filed on October 11, 2017, and assigned
Reexamination Control No. 90/014,030. The ’115 patent, entitled “Video
Communication System and Method for Using Same,” issued December 31,
2013 to James Matthew Stephens and Matthew Berlage, based on
Application No. 12/688,238, filed January 15, 2010, which claims priority to
Provisional Application No. 61/205,140, filed on January 15, 2009.

Claimed Subject Matter
The claims are directed to a video communication system, which
includes a kiosk for recording video messages created by a user and a
database for storing and providing access to the video. (Abstract.)

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as NSixty,
LLC. (Br. 3.)
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Related Litigation
The ’115 patent has been asserted in NSixty v. uPost Media, Inc., No.
2:17-cv-2233 (D. Nev. Aug. 22, 2017) and NSixty, LLC v. Open Air
Entertainment, LLC, No. 2:17-cv-08650 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2017). These
cases have been stayed pending the outcome of this ex parte reexamination
proceeding. (Br. 3.)
The ’115 patent has also been asserted in NSixty, LLC v. a2z, Inc., No.
1:17-cv-1987 (D.C. Md. July l7, 2017). This case has been terminated
pursuant to a settlement agreement. (Id.)

The Claims
Claims 1 and 2 are illustrative of the claimed subject matter, with
disputed limitations in italics:
1. A video communication system comprising:
a portable kiosk comprising:
a camera configured to record a video communication;
a network connection capable of communicating with a
network; and
a graphical user interface for inputting identification data
related to a user;
wherein said camera, network connection and graphical
user interface are integrated within said portable kiosk;
a database connected to said network, said database configured
to receive said video communication and said identification data from
said kiosk and associate said video communication with said
identification data;
a remote access point configured to access said video
communication from said database by way of a website;
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wherein said user inputs said identification data into said
website to communicate with said database, and further wherein said
database matches said identification data from said website with said
identification data associated with said video communication to allow
said user access to said video communication.

2. The system of claim 1 wherein said kiosk includes
a user identification device.

REFERENCES
Name Reference Date
Massarsky US 6,718,123 B1 Apr. 6, 2004
Belz et al. US 7,158,175 B2 Jan. 2, 2007
Woodworth et al. US 7,961,212 B2 June 14, 2011
Liwerant et al. US 2005/0246752 A1 Nov. 3, 2005

The Rejections
A. Claims 1–7, 10, 11, 13–15, and 18–20 stand rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Liwerant.
B. Claims 1–7, 10, 11, 13–15, and 18–20 stand rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Liwerant.
C. Claims 8, 9, 12, 16, and 17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103
being unpatentable over Liwerant and Massarsky.
D. Claims 1–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Massarsky and Belz.
E. Claims 1–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Massarsky, Belz, and Woodworth.

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OPINION
§ 112(f) Claim Construction
We are persuaded by Appellant’s argument (Br. 12–13, 15–16) that
the Examiner erred in construing independent claim 1 as having means-plus-
function claim limitations, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112(f).2
The Examiner interpreted the limitation “database configured to
receive said video communication and said identification data from said
kiosk and associate said video communication with said identification data”
as invoking 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). (Final Act. 7.) In particular, the Examiner
found that “[b]ecause a database does not have sufficient structure to
perform the [f]unctions [as claimed], the Examiner concludes that ‘database’
is a nonce term having no specific structure.” (Id. (emphasis omitted); see
also Ans. 26–27.) We do not agree.
A claim limitation that does not use the term “means” or “step” will
trigger the rebuttable presumption that 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph,
does not apply. Personalized Media Commc’ns, LLC v. ITC, 161 F.3d 696,
703–04 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The presumption is overcome when “the claim
term fails to ‘recite sufficiently definite structure’ or else recites ‘function
without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.’”
Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en
banc). “The standard is whether the words of the claim are understood by

2 The Examiner’s error was harmless, because the interpretation of
independent claim 1 as containing means-plus-function limitations was not
applied to the prior art rejections.
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persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as
the name for structure.” Id. at 1349.
One technical definition of “database” is “[a] file composed of
records, each containing fields together with a set of operations for
searching, sorting, recombining, and other functions.” MICROSOFT®
COMPUTER DICTIONARY 141 (5th ed. 2002). Likewise, the Federal Circuit
has recognized the term “database” is defined as “[a]ny electronically-stored
collection of data.” Alan Freedman, The Computer Glossary 86 (9th ed.
2001); accord In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 981 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing
this definition from an earlier edition).
The ’115 patent discloses the following:
The kiosk 12 is further configured to communicate with the
database 14. For example, the kiosk may upload video
communications to the database 14 and receive instructions or
messages from the database 14. It is understood that video
communications may include audio files, video files, text files,
other type of electronic media files, or any combination thereof.
The database 14 may receive video communications and
corresponding message data from the kiosk 12 and store the
video communications based on the corresponding message
data.
(Col. 2, ll. 24–33 (emphasis added).)
In view of the disclosure in the ’115 patent of conventional database
14 for storing electronic media files (e.g., audio, video, or text), Appellant
has not claimed the “database” as specialized hardware requiring special
programming. Rather, Appellant has claimed a general purpose “database”
which functions conventionally “to receive . . . and associate” data in the
form of “video communication” and “identification data.” Thus, it is not
necessary for Appellant to disclose more structure than the general purpose
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database, which functions “to receive and associate” data. See In re Katz
Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (functions such as “processing,” “receiving,” and “storing” that can be
achieved by any general purpose computer without special programming do
not require disclosure of more structure than the general purpose processor
that performs those functions).
Accordingly, we are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that “one of
skill in the art would know that the ’115 Patent uses the term ‘database’ in
its ordinary meaning and that this ordinary meaning itself connotes
structure” (Br. 12) and “the ’115 Patent uses the term ‘database’ consistent
with its ordinary meaning under the broadest reasonable interpretation
standard as would be understood by a person skilled in the art” such that
“[t]his meaning of a database defines structure in and of itself” (id. at 13).
Thus, we do not agree with the Examiner’s interpretation that the
limitation “database configured to receive said video communication and
said identification data from said kiosk and associate said video
communication with said identification data” invokes 35 U.S.C. § 112(f).
The Examiner further interpreted the limitation “remote access point
configured to access said video communication from said database by way
of a website” as invoking 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). (Final Act. 9.) In particular,
the Examiner found that “[b]ecause a remote access point does not have
sufficient structure to perform the [f]unctions [as claimed], the Examiner
concludes that ‘remote access point’ is a nonce term having no specific
structure.” (Id. (emphasis omitted); see also Ans. 29–31.) Again, we do not
agree.
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One technical definition of “access point” is “a transceiver [in a
wireless LAN (local area network)] that connects the LAN to a wired
network.” MICROSOFT® COMPUTER DICTIONARY 14 (5th ed. 2002). A
“transceiver,” which is “short for a transmitter/receiver,” is defined as “a
device that can both transmit and receive signals” and “connects a computer
to the network.” (Id. at 527.)
The ’115 patent discloses the following:
The database 14 may allow stored video communications
to be remotely accessed. For example, video communications
stored on the database 14 may be accessible through a website
16. In an embodiment, a user 17 may retrieve a stored video
communication from the database 14 by inputting a portion of
the message data related to the desired video communication
into the website 16.
(Col. 2, ll. 48–54.)
The database 14 may send information related to the
video communication and message data to a user. For example,
the database 14 may send an email containing a web link to the
website 16 to the email address provided by a user. By
activating the web link, a user may stream, download, or
otherwise access the video communication. The database 14
may also send a text message or email web link to a cell phone,
allowing the cell phone user to access the video
communication.
(Col. 3, ll. 8–16.)
Additionally, the database may grant access to the video
communications by sending a web link via email that allows the
video communication to be streamed to a computer, viewed on
a cell phone, downloaded, or otherwise accessed.
(Col. 5, l. 67 to col. 6, l. 3.)
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In view of the disclosure in the ’115 patent of a conventional cell
phone or a conventional computer receiving video communications from
database 14, Appellant has not claimed the “remote access point” as
specialized hardware requiring special programming. Rather, Appellant has
claimed a general purpose “remote access point,” which functions
conventionally to “access said video communication from said database.”
Thus, it is not necessary for Appellant to disclose more structure than the
remote access point, which functions to “access said video communication
from said database.” See Katz, 639 F.3d at 1316.
Accordingly, we are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that “one of
skill in the art would know that the term remote access point is the device or
point of remote access, e.g., remote computers, cell phones, PDAs, mobile
devices, and other electronic devices” (Br. 15) and “the ’115 Patent uses the
term ‘remote access point’ consistent with its ordinary meaning under the
broadest reasonable interpretation standard as would be understood by a
person skilled in the art” and “[t]his meaning of a remote access point
defines structure in and of itself” (id. at 16).
Thus, we do not agree with the Examiner’s interpretation that the
limitation “remote access point configured to access said video
communication from said database by way of a website” invokes 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(f).

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§ 103 Rejection—Massarsky and Belz
Claims 1 and 3–20
We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s arguments (Br. 31) that the
combination of Massarsky and Belz would not have rendered obvious
independent claim 1, which includes the limitation “graphical user
interface.”
The Examiner found that Figure 5D of Massarsky, which illustrates
monitor 32 for entering a code for retrieving the user’s photographic image,
corresponds to the limitation “graphical user interface.” (Ans. 74–75.) In
particular, the Examiner found that “Figs. 5C and 5D of Massarsky show
graphical user interfaces” and “Massarsky teaches a graphical user interface
for inputting identification data related to a user because the Photo ID
Number is an identification data related to a user and because a graphical
user interface is used for inputting identification.” (Id. at 74.) We agree
with the Examiner’s findings.
Figure 1 of Massarsky illustrates photobooth/e-mail center 10, which
includes “E-mail station 14 . . . fitted with keyboard 38 for entering the code
and any other information” (col. 4, ll. 53–54) and monitor 32 (col. 5, ll. 21–
24). Massarsky explains that “[i]n response to a prompt displayed on
monitor 32, the user enters the code . . . printed on the photograph printed at
the photobooth using keyboard 38” (col. 5, ll. 65–67) and “once a user
accesses the web site of the web server, they are prompted to enter the code,
corresponding to the digitized photograph” (col. 6, ll. 21–23). Because
Figure 5D of Massarsky illustrates monitor 22 displaying a web site with
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graphical images and dialog boxes for the entry of codes, Massarsky teaches
the limitation “graphical user interface.”
Appellant argues the following:
The Office Action appears to suggest that modification of
Massarksy [sic] to substitute a graphical user interface would be
inherent. Inherency is not shown by what may occur or by
what is possible. Moreover, the Office Action has not provided
any basis in fact and/or technical reasoning to reasonably
support the determination.
(Br. 31.) Contrary to Appellant’s arguments, the Examiner also cited to
Figure 5D of Massarsky for teaching the limitation “graphical user
interface.” (Ans. 74.) Other than a conclusory statement that “the Office
Action has not provided any basis in fact and/or technical reasoning to
reasonably support the determination,” Appellant has not provided any
persuasive arguments or evidence as to why the Examiner’s findings with
respect to Massarsky are erroneous.
Thus, we agree with the Examiner that the combination of Massarsky
and Belz would have rendered obvious independent claim 1, which includes
the limitation “graphical user interface.”
We are further unpersuaded by Appellant’s arguments (Br. 32) that
the combination of Massarsky and Belz would not have rendered obvious
independent claim 1, which includes the limitation “portable kiosk.”
The Examiner found that photobooth/e-mail center 10 of Massarsky
corresponds to the limitation “portable kiosk.” (Final Act. 21.) In
particular, the Examiner interpreted “portable” as meaning “capable of being
carried or moved about” (id. at 11) and cited to Figure 3 of Massarsky,
which illustrates e-mail station 14 of photobooth/e-mail center 10 “with a
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wheel, making center 10 portable” (id. at 21). We agree with the
Examiner’s findings.
Independent claim 1 recites a “portable kiosk” (emphasis added).
One relevant plain meaning of “portable” is “capable of being carried or
moved about.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 907 (10th
ed. 1999). Moreover, the Specification of the ’456 patent describes the
following:
As illustrated in FIGS. 2 and 3, the kiosk 12 may be a
stand-alone unit. With reference to FIG. 2, the components of
the kiosk 12 may be contained within a body 28. Alternatively,
as shown in FIG. 3, the components of the kiosk 12 may be
connected to a leg assembly 30. It will be understood,
however, that the kiosk 12 may be supported in any manner.
For example, the kiosk 12 may be mounted or secured to a wall,
post, or other stable portion of the venue. In addition, the kiosk
12 may be portable such as installed in a vehicle, or configured
as a mobile unit.
(Col. 5, ll. 4–13 (emphases added).)
In an embodiment, the message-recording device 20
includes a digital video camera, a microphone, and a keyboard.
. . . The kiosk 12 may include a display 24 to allow the user to
watch or review the video communication during or after it is
recorded.
(Col. 4, ll. 14–21 (emphases added).) Figures 2 and 3 of the ’115 patent,
which illustrates kiosk 12 as stand-alone units, are reproduced below:
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As illustrated in Figures 2 and 3, the height of message-recording device 20
(e.g., digital video camera) or display 24, which allows a user to watch a
video communication, can be approximated as the height of the user.3 Thus,
under the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the ’115 patent,
we interpret “portable” as “capable of being carried or moved about,” which

3 In general, patent drawings are not to scale. See Hockerson-Halberstadt,
Inc. v. Avia Group Int’l, 222 F.3d 951, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[I]t is well
established that patent drawings do not define the precise proportions of the
elements and may not be relied on to show particular sizes if the
specification is completely silent on the issue.”). However, because the
function of kiosk 12 is to permit users to record themselves with various
backgrounds, we can infer that the height of kiosk 12 is approximately the
height of the user.
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includes stand-alone kiosk 12 (e.g., unsecured to walls), such kiosk 12
having the approximate height of the user, as illustrated in Figures 2 and 3.
Massarsky relates to “a combination photobooth/e-mail center [10]
adapted to take a digitized photograph of a user at a first station . . . and to
transmit the photograph via electronic mail.” (Col. 1, ll. 7–10.) Figure 1 of
Massarsky illustrates photobooth/e-mail center 10, having photobooth
station 12 and e-mail station 14 (col. 4, ll. 23–27), which includes monitor
32 for displaying the digitized photograph or for e-mail (col. 5, ll. 22–25).
Figure 3 of Massarsky, which illustrates a cross-sectional photobooth/e-mail
center 10, and further includes a wheel (unlabeled), is reproduced below:

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Figure 3 of Massarsky illustrates e-mail station 14 as a free standing unit,
such that that height of monitor 32 is approximately the height to the user
(see Fig. 8).
Moreover, Figure 6 of Massarsky, which illustrates two-sided station
50, is reproduced below:

Figure 6 of Massarsky illustrates two-sided station 50 as a free standing unit,
such that height of monitor 32 (unlabeled) is approximately the height to the
user (see Fig. 8).
Thus, because Figure 3 of Massarsky illustrates that e-mail station 14
further includes a wheel, which provides for the capability for e-mail station
14 to be moved about, and as a free standing unit with the height of the user,
Massarsky teaches the limitation “portable kiosk.” Alternatively, because
Figure 6 illustrates two-sided station 50 as a free standing unit with the
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height of the user, such that two-sided station 50 is capable of being carried
or moved about, Massarsky teaches the limitation “portable kiosk.”
Appellant argues the following:
Massarsky describes a center 10 that has both an email
station 14 and a photobooth station 12. . . . The Office Action
alleges that FIG. 3 of Massarsky shows a wheel. The
specification is silent regarding the alleged wheel. Further,
with or without a wheel, Massarsky does not disclose, teach, or
suggest a portable kiosk as properly construed: “a freestanding
or supported unit that houses components for recording, storing
and communicating a video communication and provides those
components to the public, and is light enough, rugged enough,
and free enough of encumbering external connections to be
carried by a user.”

Rather, Massarsky shows a large photobooth/center 10.
(Br. 32.) However, Appellant’s proposed construction contains subjective
language, for example, “light enough, rugged enough, and free enough . . . to
be carried by a user,” such that one of ordinary skill in the art would be
unable to ascertain the scope of the claim. Even if we adopt the claim
construction proposed by Appellant, other than the conclusory statement that
“Massarsky does not disclose, teach, or suggest a portable kiosk,” Appellant
has provided an insufficient explanation to adequately distinguish the
limitation “portable kiosk” over photobooth/e-mail center 10 of Massarsky.
Appellant further argues the following:
Massarsky shows a large photobooth/center 10. This
center 10 is installed at a mall . . . . This is the same type of
publicly installed system of Woodworth and Wasilewski. The
Patent Owner addressed this very issue in a response date
August 15, 2013. The examiner, as evidenced by the Notice of
Allowance, agreed that one of skill in the art would know that
such large booths installed at malls would not qualify as a
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“portable kiosk.” Moreover, having a wheel would not make
such a booth a “portable kiosk.”
(Br. 32.)
A review of the original prosecution history of the ’115 patent,
assigned Application No. 12/688,238, indicates that Appellant argued the
following:
Woodworth specifically recites that network terminals may be
located at a “public kiosk.” [A] public kiosk commonly refers
to a booth or stationary setup located at a venue such as a mall.
In fact, cell phone carriers such as Verizon, the owner of the
cited application, commonly setup such kiosks in malls and
other sale areas. This type of stationary public kiosk is they
referenced in Woodworth and differs from a portable kiosk.
Further, Wasilewski teaches an ATM machine. By nature,
ATM machines are designed to not be portable but stationary,
so that the contents cannot be taken.
(Response to Office Action 7, filed Aug. 15, 2013 (emphases added).) In the
Notice of Allowance, mailed August 20, 2013, the Examiner was silent with
respect to both Woodworth and Wasilewski. Thus, Appellant’s argument
that “[t]he examiner, as evidenced by the Notice of Allowance, agreed that
one of skill in the art would know that such large booths installed at malls
would not qualify as a ‘portable kiosk’” (Br. 32), is unsupported by the
prosecution history. Instead, Appellant previously argued that neither a
“stationary public kiosk” nor an “ATM machine” is considered “portable”
and the Examiner did not provide any commentary with respect to
Woodworth and Wasilewski. Moreover, Massarsky is silent with to
photobooth/e-mail center 10 being described as either “large” or being
located at a “mall.”
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Thus, we agree with the Examiner that the combination of Massarsky
and Belz would have rendered obvious independent claim 1, which includes
the limitation “portable kiosk.”
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of independent claim 1 under 35
U.S.C. § 103. Claims 3–13 depend from claim 1, and Appellant has not
presented any additional substantive arguments with respect to these claims.
Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claims 3–13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103,
for the same reasons discussed with respect to independent claim 1.
Independent claim 14 recites limitations similar to those discussed
with respect to independent claim 1, and Appellant has not presented any
additional substantive arguments with respect to these claims. We sustain
the rejection of claim 14, as well as dependent claims 15–20, for the same
reasons discussed with respect to claim 1.

Claim 2
We are also unpersuaded by Appellant’s arguments (Br. 33) that the
combination of Massarsky and Belz would not have rendered obvious
dependent claim 2, which includes the limitation “wherein said kiosk
includes a user identification device.”
The Examiner found that electronic database 44 of Belz, which is
accessible for authorized users for accessing digital photographs on web 30,
corresponds to the limitation “wherein said kiosk includes a user
identification device.” (Final Act. 24.)
Belz explains that “electronic database 44 also provides long-term
storage of the uploaded images for each user” and “stored images are
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accessible (e.g. viewable) via the Internet by authorized users.” (Col. 6,
ll. 28–31.) Because Belz explains that electronic database 44 is only
available to “authorized users,” Belz teaches the limitation “wherein said
kiosk includes a user identification device.”
Appellant argues the following:
[T]he Office Action already cites Belz’s computer for the
authentication limitations recited in claim 1, thus, it cannot also
be an identification device. If it were, that would mean that
claim 2 does not provide any further limits to claim 1. This
violates the doctrine of claim differentiation.
(Br. 33.)
However, the Examiner cited to column 5, lines 7–11 of Massarsky
and alternately, cited to column 2, lines 1–12 of Belz for teaching the
limitation “wherein said user inputs said identification data into said website
to communicate with said database, and further wherein said database
matches said identification data from said website with said identification
data associated with said video communication to allow said user access to
said video communication,” as recited in claim 1. (Final Act. 23.) In other
words, the Examiner cited to the username and password for the “OFOTO”
website of Belz for the limitations of claim 1 (id.) and cited to electronic
database 44 of Belz for the limitations of claim 2 (id. at 24). Other than a
conclusory statement that the Examiner’s findings “violate[] the doctrine of
claim differentiation,” Appellant has not adequately explained how the
doctrine of claim differentiation is applicable.
Thus, we agree with the Examiner that the combination of Massarsky
and Belz would have rendered obvious dependent claim 2, which includes
the limitation “wherein said kiosk includes a user identification device.”
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Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of dependent claim 2 under 35
U.S.C. § 103.

Other Pending Rejections
We do not reach the additional cumulative rejections of claims 1–20
under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(b) and 103 as being anticipated or unpatentable over
various combinations of Liwerant, Massarsky, Belz, and Woodworth.
Affirmance of the obviousness rejection based on Massarsky and Belz
discussed previously renders it unnecessary to reach the remaining
obviousness rejections, as all of claims 1–20 have been addressed and found
unpatentable. Cf. In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (not
reaching additional obviousness rejections).

CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 over Massarsky and Belz is affirmed.

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DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–7, 10, 11,
13–15, 18–
20
102(b)4 Liwerant
1–7, 10, 11,
13–15, 18–
20
1035 Liwerant
8, 9, 12, 16,
17
1036 Liwerant,
Massarsky

1–20 103 Massarsky, Belz 1–20
1–20 1037 Massarsky, Belz,
Woodworth

Overall
Outcome
1–20

REQUESTS FOR EXTENSIONS OF TIME
Requests for extensions of time in this ex parte reexamination
proceeding are governed by 37 C.F.R. § 1.550(c). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).

AFFIRMED

hh

4 Cumulative rejection.
5 Cumulative rejection.
6 Cumulative rejection.
7 Cumulative rejection.
Appeal 2020-003003
Reexamination Control 90/014,030
Patent 8,619,115 B2

22

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