Norman R. Harris, Complainant,v.Ann M. Veneman, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 14, 2001
01991633 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 14, 2001)

01991633

09-14-2001

Norman R. Harris, Complainant, v. Ann M. Veneman, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Agency.


Norman R. Harris v. Department of Agriculture

01991633

September 14, 2001

.

Norman R. Harris,

Complainant,

v.

Ann M. Veneman,

Secretary,

Department of Agriculture,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01991633

Agency No. 970136

DECISION

Norman R. Harris (complainant) timely initiated an appeal from a final

agency decision (FAD) concerning his complaint of unlawful employment

discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The appeal is

accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. Complainant alleged that

he was discriminated against on the basis of sex (male) when he was

suspended for a period of 14 calendar days beginning October 7, 1996,

and ending October 20, 1996.

BACKGROUND

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was

employed as a GS-12 Financial Officer at the agency's Albuquerque,

New Mexico facility. Believing he was a victim of discrimination,

complainant sought EEO counseling and subsequently filed a formal

complaint on January 17, 1997. At the conclusion of the investigation,

complainant was informed of his right to request a hearing before an

EEOC Administrative Judge or alternatively, to receive a final decision

by the agency. When complainant failed to respond within the time period

specified in 29 C.F.R. � 1614.108(f), the agency issued a final decision.

In its FAD, the agency concluded that complainant did not establish

a prima facie case of discrimination based on sex. Specifically, the

agency found that as a result of allegations of sexual harassment from

a GS-6 subordinate employee, an internal investigation was conducted.

Following the investigation, complainant was given a letter of proposed

suspension on June 28, 1996. The agency informed complainant that it

intended to suspend him for a 14 calendar days for conduct unbecoming

a supervisor. Complainant was given the opportunity to respond to the

letter, and on July 29, 1996, complainant submitted his written response

to the proposed suspension.

The agency noted that the investigation disclosed that complainant and a

Voucher Examiner were flirting with each other and it made other coworkers

uncomfortable. In addition, the investigation disclosed that in December

1995, complainant had purchased lingerie, a black negligee and red and

black underwear, for the Voucher Examiner. The complainant's wife had

also accepted a stationary bicycle from the Voucher Examiner in October

1995. There was another incident where complainant had gone to the Voucher

Examiner's home to help her load her household goods to transport to her

new home, and complainant had made some obscene comments and gestures

to her sons while he assisted in the move. The investigation further

revealed that complainant had brought the Voucher Examiner an airplane

ticket to San Diego and that they shared the same room for the night.

The agency concluded that management articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for suspending complainant for 14 days.

Specifically, the agency alleged that complainant did accept something of

significant value from an employee receiving less pay than complainant.

The agency asserts that complainant, as a supervisor, knew or should

have known that accepting a gift from a subordinate for any reason

under the circumstances present in this case was clearly inappropriate.

In addition, the agency concluded that a reasonable employee in a

supervisory position would not give his subordinate a personal gift of

a negligee in exchange for a stationary bike. The agency found that

complainant's gift of a negligee, bra and underwear and the purchase of

an airline ticket to San Diego and sharing a hotel room with a subordinate

is inappropriate and is conduct unbecoming a supervisor.

Complainant makes no new contentions on appeal.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis

first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). For the complainant to prevail, he must first establish a prima

facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,

reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that

a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment

action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction

Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the

agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its

actions. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,

253 (1981). Once the agency has met its burden, the complainant bears the

ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance

of the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited

reason. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the

first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima

facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel

action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third

step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether

the complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the

agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. U.S. Postal Service

Bd. Of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983).

Assuming arguendo, that the complainant established a prima facie case of

discrimination based on his sex, the Commission finds that the agency has

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. The

agency suspended complainant after an internal investigation disclosed

improper conduct on complainant's part as a supervisor, such as giving

his subordinate a personal gift. The record reveals that the proposing

official for the complainant's 14-day suspension was a man.

The burden returns to the complainant to establish that the agency's

reasoning was a pretext for

discrimination. Upon review, the Commission finds that the complainant

has failed to do so. The

complainant argues that it was true that his subordinate did give a

bicycle to his wife after she suffered an injury in a skiing accident,

but this was a bicycle that she wanted to get rid and was going to donate

to a flea market. Complainant also asserts that he took his subordinate

to J.C. Penney's, and she picked out a negligee, and tried on, and also

a bra and panties set, at his suggestion since he wanted to be sure

that she received something equivalent to the worth of the bicycle.

Complainant failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that his

suspension was motivated by a discriminatory animus toward his sex.

Complainant failed to show that female supervisor who acted in a similar

manner were not suspended, nor did he provide any evidence to establish

that his sex, rather than his improper behavior, lead to the suspension.

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, and arguments and

evidence not specifically addressed in this decision, we AFFIRM the FAD.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court.

Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time in which

to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be

filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right

to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

September 14, 2001

________________

Date