Nicholas William. Whinnett

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 2, 2020

13531293 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jan. 2, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/531,293 06/22/2012 Nicholas William Whinnett 45674-0008 (P64185) 8765
116341 7590 01/02/2020
Schiff Hardin LLP (Intel)
c/o Laura C. Brutman
Schiff Hardin LLP
1185 Avenue of the Americas, Suite 3000
New York, NY 10036
EXAMINER
SCHWARTZ, JOSHUA L
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2642
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/02/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Patents-NY@schiffhardin.com
inteldocs_docketing@cpaglobal.com
lbrutman@schiffhardin.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte NICHOLAS WILLIAM WHINNETT
Appeal 2018-006697
Application 13/531,293
Technology Center 2600
Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, ELENI MANTIS MERCADER, and
ALEX S. YAP, Administrative Patent Judges.
MANTIS MERCADER, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–7, 9–20, 22–25. Claims 8 and 21 are
cancelled. See Final Act. 1. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Intel Corporation.
Appeal Br. 1.
Appeal 2018-006697
Application 13/531,293
2
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a femtocell base station synchronization.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method of determining a timing estimate for use in
synchronizing a femtocell base station to a macrocell base
station, the method in the femtocell base station comprising:
determining an uplink timing estimate from a signal
transmitted from a mobile device to the macrocell base station,
the mobile device being served by the macrocell base station;
determining a downlink timing estimate from a signal
transmitted from the macrocell base station to the mobile device;
determining a timing estimate for use in synchronizing the
femtocell base station to the macrocell base station from the
downlink timing estimate and the uplink timing estimate,
wherein the timing estimate is an estimate of propagation delay
between the macrocell base station and the femtocell base
station; and
adjusting timing of the femtocell base station, thereby
reducing an impact of the propagation delay.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Han
Xu
Guvenc
Soliman
US 2010/0054237 A1
US 2011/0034174 A1
US 2012/0003985 A1
US 2012/0115496 A1
Mar. 4, 2010
Feb. 10, 2011
Jan. 5, 2012
May 10, 2012

REJECTIONS
Claims 1–5, 9–18 and 22–25 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a)
as being unpatentable Soliman in view of Guvenc and further in view of
Han.
Appeal 2018-006697
Application 13/531,293
3
Claims 6, 7, 19, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as
being unpatentable over Soliman, Guvenc, Han, and further in view of Xu.
OPINION
To the extent consistent with our analysis below, we adopt the
Examiner’s findings and conclusions in (i) the Final action from which this
appeal is taken and (ii) the Answer.
Claims 1–5, 9–18 and 22–25 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as
being unpatentable Soliman in view of Guvenc and further in view of Han.
Appellant argues that the Examiner wrongly relies on Han,
specifically paragraph 21 for teaching the limitation of “wherein the timing
estimate is an estimate of propagation delay between the macrocell base
station and the femtocell base station.” Appeal Br. 7. Appellant explains
that Han states
[T]he measured clock difference between the femto-cell Node
Band the macro-cell base station is equal to the sum of their
actual clock difference and a propagation delay, d2/c. By
having the femto-cell adjust its clock by the measured offset,
the clock difference is reduced to the propagation delay, which
it not easy to estimate accurately. But fortunately, it is not
necessary to calibrate the propagation delay out.

Id. (citing Han, para. 21). Appellant asserts that Han teaches away from the
claimed subject matter of estimating propagation delay by admitting that it is
not easy to estimate the propagation delay and does not calibrate the
propagation delay out. Id.
We do not agree with Appellant’s argument. We agree with the
Examiner that Han teaches that the system synchronizes its internal
oscillator based on a measurement from a macro-cell base station. Ans. 3
(citing para. 21). We also agree with the Examiner’s finding that taking a
Appeal 2018-006697
Application 13/531,293
4
measure for an oscillator to adjust a clock is a measurement of time that falls
within a broadest reasonable interpretation of “timing estimate” as that term
is understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, i.e., a measurement with
respect to the timing of the device. Id. We further agree with the Examiner
that Han teaches this measurement for creating an offset between the
macrocell and the femtocell is based on the actual clock difference between
the macrocell and the femtocell, which reduces to (becomes an estimate of)
their propagation delay. Id. We further agree with the Examiner that while
Han may state situations when calculating that delay may not be “necessary”
that doesn’t mean Han doesn’t disclose having a synchronization based on
an estimate of timing delay. Id. at 3–4. Han teaches that “it corrects its
frequency offset and measures the time difference which is the sum of the
clock error and the propagation delay from the macro-cell BS to the home
BS” (emphasis added). Id. at 4 (citing para. 25). The Examiner notes, and
we agree that a “Home BS” (i.e., Home Base Station) is another term
understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to mean “femtocell.” Id.
(citing para. 20 where the home node "provides femto-cell coverage").2
Appellant further argues with respect to claims 2 and 15, that Soliman
teaches that some sequences are repeated, but does not describe the step of
the femtocell identifying repeated portions, not to mention that the repeated

2 See also Spec. ¶ 2: “Femtocell base stations in a Long Term Evolution
(LTE) communication network (otherwise known as Home evolved Node Bs
- HeNBs - or Enterprise evolved Node Bs - EeNBs) are small, low-power,
indoor cellular base stations for residential or business use. They provide
better network coverage and capacity than that available in such
environments from the overlying macrocellular LTE network. Femtocell
base stations use a broadband connection to receive data from and send data
back to the operator's network (known as ‘backhaul’).”
Appeal 2018-006697
Application 13/531,293
5
portions being a cyclic prefix at the start of a symbol and a final portion of
the symbol corresponding to the cyclic prefix, as claimed. Appeal Br. 7–8.
We do not agree. We agree with the Examiner’s finding that
Solliman states at ¶¶ 57–58 that in "sniff[ing]" a packet data is
extracted from the packet such as "extract signatures" (this is
consistent with one type of "sniffing" as that term is understood
in the art (i.e., to examine packets, listen in on them, etc ... ).
The analysis of the extracted information may be used for
timing information. ¶ 68 states that the sniffing may be used to
determine if the packet is a PRACH preamble. This
"determin[ation]" may be made "based on the packet structure
of each of the transmissions". ¶¶ 70–71 state that the PRACH
preamble, which is part of the packet structure, is made up of
sixteen possible preambles signatures, "[e]ach signature is
made up of a 16-chip sequence repeated 256 times.} If the
system extracts a signature from a packet and the determination
that said information is actually a signature is made based on
the structure of that packet, i.e., the structure of its preamble,
and the repeated sequences are what allows the system to
determine which signature is being used and that the structure is
a signature, this would be the system "identifying" repeated
portions in the signal.

Ans. 4. In particular, we agree with the Examiner’s finding that
Soliman teaches that in “sniff[ing]” a packet data is extracted from the
packet such as “extract signatures.” Ans. 4 (citing paras. 57, 58). The
analysis of the extracted information may be used for timing information
such that the sniffing may be used to determine if the packet is a PRACH
preamble. Ans. 4, para. 69.3 We agree with the Examiner, that the
femtocell determines the type of transmission based on the packet structure

3 The Examiner cites to paragraph 68 of Soliman, we consider this an
inadvertent error as paragraph 69 teaches that sniffing may be used to
determine if the packet is a PRACH preamble.
Appeal 2018-006697
Application 13/531,293
6
of each of the transmissions. Ans. 4 (see para. 69). The PRACH preamble,
which is part of the packet structure, is made up of sixteen possible
preambles signatures, "[e]ach signature is made up of a 16-chip sequence
repeated 256 times.” Ans. 4 (citing paras. 70–71). Thus, we agree with the
Examiner’s finding if a system extracts a signature from a packet and
determines that it is a signature based on the structure of the packet, i.e. the
structure of the preamble and repeated sequences, to determine which
signature is being used, then the system is “identifying” repeated portions of
the system. See Ans. 4. Accordingly we agree that Soliman teaches the
disputed limitation of claims 2 and 15.
Appellant further argues that Guvenc paragraphs 18 and 30 do not
teach the limitation of “wherein the estimate of the propagation delay is
determined from a difference between the downlink timing estimate and the
uplink timing estimate” as recited in claim 9 and similarly recited in claim
22. Appeal Br. 8.
We do not agree with Appellant. We agree with the Examiner that
Guvenc teaches inter alia that the same techniques are used to calculate
uplink delays as are used to calculate downlink delays. Ans. 5 (citing paras.
19 and 26). We further agree with the Examiner that Guvenc teaches that
delays between two different links can be calculated. Id. (citing paras. 19
and 30). Accordingly, we further agree with the Examiner that it would
have been obvious to combine the teachings of Guvenc with Soliman and
Han to have a system where there is a measurement of a “delay from a
difference between a downlink timing estimate and an uplink timing
estimate.” Id.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that claims 11 and 24
are patentable because the Examiner did not address sections (ii) or (iii) of
Appeal 2018-006697
Application 13/531,293
7
the claims because as pointed out by the Examiner sections (i), (ii), and (iii)
are recited as alternatives in the claimed language and the prior art only
needs to meet one of these sections. See Appeal Br. 9; Ans. 6. The
Examiner relied on Soliman’s paragraph 48 to meet section (i) of these
claims. Ans. 6.
Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–5, 9–18
and 22–25.
Claims 6, 7, 19, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as
being unpatentable over Soliman in view of Guvenc and further in view of
Han and further in view of Xu.
Appellant does not present any separate, substantive arguments with
respect to these claims. Arguments not made are waived. See 37 C.F.R. §
41.37(c)(1)(iv). Accordingly, we also affirm the Examiner’s rejections of
claims 6, 7, 19, and 20.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejection is Affirmed.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–5, 9–18,
22–25

103(a) Soliman in view of
Guvenc and further in
view of Han
1–5, 9–18,
22–25

6, 7, 19, 20 103(a) Soliman in view of
Guvenc and further in
view of Han and Xu
6, 7, 19, 20
Overall
Outcome:
1–7, 9–20,
22–25

Appeal 2018-006697
Application 13/531,293
8
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED