NICE-SYSTEMS LTD.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardJun 24, 20202019002382 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 24, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/980,056 12/28/2015 Hila WEISMAN P-79063-US 5901 49443 7590 06/24/2020 Pearl Cohen Zedek Latzer Baratz LLP 1500 Broadway 12th Floor New York, NY 10036 EXAMINER SPOONER, LAMONT M ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2657 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 06/24/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): Arch-USPTO@PearlCohen.com USPTO@PearlCohen.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte HILA WEISMAN, PETER IZSAK, INNA ACHLOW, and VICTOR SHAFRAN Appeal 2019-002382 Application 14/980,056 Technology Center 2600 Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, and LARRY J. HUME, Administrative Patent Judges. DIXON, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 3–5, 7, 9, 10, 12–14, 16, 18, and 19. Claims 2, 6, 8, 11, 15, 17, and 20 have been canceled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). An oral hearing was held on May 21, 2020. A transcript of the oral hearing was entered into the administrative record on June 2, 2020. We REVERSE. 1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a) (2018). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as NICE LTD. Appeal Br. 1. Appeal 2019-002382 Application 14/980,056 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The claims are directed to a method and apparatus for text normalization in noisy channels. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method for text normalization in a plurality of noisy channels, performed on a computing device having a processor, memory, and one or more code sets stored in the memory and executing in the processor, the method comprising: generating a set of models for a respective set of communication channels; generating, based on the set of models, a respective set of channel specific error-type adapter frameworks, wherein each of the channel-specific error-type adapter frameworks is optimized for a respective communication channel; receiving, by the processor, a text entry and channel origin data of the text entry; determining, by the processor, whether the text entry matches an in-vocabulary (IV) entry or whether the text entry is an out-of-vocabulary (OOV) entry; if the text entry is determined to have a matching IV entry; outputting, by the processor, the matching IV entry; and if the text entry is determined to be an OOV entry; implementing, by the processor, the relevant channel-specific error-type adapter framework based on the channel origin data; wherein the channel-specific error-type adapter framework is optimized for the specific channel from which the text entry originated; and Appeal 2019-002382 Application 14/980,056 3 wherein the channel-specific error-type adapter framework further comprises a probabilistic model of one or more error-type priors in the specific channel; normalizing, by the processor, the text entry using the channel-specific error-type adapter framework; wherein the channel-specific error-type adapter framework comprises one or more error-type adapters; wherein the one or more error-type adapters comprise at least one of a spelling error-type adapter, an abbreviation error-type adapter, an acronym error-type adapter, a phonetic shorthand error-type adapter, and a word concatenation error-type adapter; and wherein each error-type adaptor [sic adapter] is configured to model a different type of error to be normalized; and outputting one or more candidate normalized forms of the text entry. REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner as evidence is: Name Reference Date Nasri et al. US 2012/0072204 A1 Mar. 22, 2012 Beaufort et al. US 2013/0096911 A1 Apr. 18, 2013 Stoytchev et al. US 2015/0193431 A1 July 9, 2015 REJECTIONS Claims 1, 3–5, 9, 10, 12–14, 18, and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Nasri in view of Beaufort. Claims 7 and 16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Nasri in view of Beaufort as applied to claim 1 above, and further in view of Stoytchev. Appeal 2019-002382 Application 14/980,056 4 OPINION 35 U.S.C. § 103 With respect to claims 1, 3–5, 9, 10, 12–14, 18, and 19, Appellant contends the application-type specific modules of the Nasri reference are not interchangeable between communication channels or channel types. Appeal Br. 5. Appellant contends the relied upon paragraphs 85–107 of the Nasri reference uses “context,” as opposed to “channel” to determine how to normalize. Appeal Br. 7. Appellant argues the Nasri reference does not discuss the concept of in-vocabulary (IV) versus out of vocabulary (OOV). Appeal Br. 8. Appellant also argues the “normalization portions of Nasri do not differentiate between different channels from which the text is received as is asserted in the Office Action, p. 7, but rather normalize the text found based on preset rules, e.g. para. [0099].” Appeal Br. 8. Appellant contends: Nasri does parse or extract text based on channel, e.g. paras. [0087]-[0094], but this is a separate process (see, e.g. Nasri para. [0081]) from normalization, and does not teach or suggest the claimed “normalizing, by the processor, the text entry using the channel-specific error-type adapter framework”. Normalizing text refers to transforming the text itself to a standard format (e.g. translating abbreviations), and does not include parsing, which may be considered preprocessing. In contrast, the claims on appeal use a process where a framework is, e.g., “optimized for a specific channel from which the text entry originated.” Parsing in Nasri may be focused on extracting the text according to the different formats of the channels but normalizing in Nasri is not according to, as with some example embodiments of the claimed invention, different language specific models (frameworks) which are unique per channel and with each framework including a probabilistic model of one or more error-type priors. Appeal Br. 8 Appeal 2019-002382 Application 14/980,056 5 Appellant argues the Examiner acknowledges the Nasri reference does not explicitly use the term IV (in vocabulary), and the Examiner relies upon the Beaufort reference for normalizing both IV and OOV in a single channel. Appeal Br. 10–11. The Examiner disagrees with Appellant’s arguments and finds paragraph 87 of the Nasri reference discloses “generating a set of models for a respective set of communication channels.” Ans. 4. “The Examiner notes the SMS, MMS, video, e-mail, etc. are all deemed explicit communication channels, the same as described by the applicant” as described in paragraph 3 of Appellant’s Specification which discloses various different communication channels. Ans. 4–5 (emphasis omitted). The Examiner finds the “question of the generation is inherent, without generation thereof, they cannot be identified.” The Examiner further relies upon paragraph 58 of the Nasri reference to teach or suggest the generation of rules for a set of communication channels. Ans. 5. Regarding the claimed “channel-specific error-type adapter frameworks is optimized for a respective communication channel,” the Examiner further finds paragraphs 87–107 of the Nasri reference teach or suggest application type and “specific defined type and corresponding different set of rules, thus channel specific to type, the rules per type including a specific error-type framework for correction based on application type, see his ‘email’ vs. ‘RSS’ feed, each having respective rules for correction.” Ans. 6 (emphasis omitted). The Examiner further opines that the various discussions throughout the Nasri reference clearly show the various applications “absolutely do not all use the same general model,” and the Examiner further cites to Appeal 2019-002382 Application 14/980,056 6 paragraphs 0094, 0097, 0120, 0053–0056 of Nasri. Ans. 7. With respect to Appellant’s arguments that Nasri uses context opposed to channel to determine how to normalize, the Examiner maintains that “a complete and thorough explanation of how the channels are explicitly related to normalization” and the Examiner further cites to paragraphs 58, 102, 120– 122 of Nasri. Ans. 7. “‘On appeal to the Board, an applicant can overcome a rejection by showing insufficient evidence of prima facie obviousness or by rebutting the prima facie case with evidence of secondary indicia of nonobviousness.’” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 985-86 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). [T]he examiner bears the initial burden, on review of the prior art or on any other ground, of presenting a prima facie case of unpatentability. If that burden is met, the burden of coming forward with evidence or argument shifts to the applicant. After evidence or argument is submitted by the applicant in response, patentability is determined on the totality of the record, by a preponderance of evidence with due consideration to persuasiveness of argument. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992). “A rejection based on section 103 clearly must rest on a factual basis. . . .” In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1017 (CCPA 1967). “The Patent Office has the initial duty of supplying the factual basis for its rejection. It may not . . . resort to speculation, unfounded assumptions or hindsight reconstruction to supply deficiencies in its factual basis.” Id. “Obviousness may not be established using hindsight or in view of the teachings or suggestions of the inventor.” Para-Ordnance Mfg. v. SGS Importers Int’l, 73 F.3d 1085, 1087 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing W.L. Gore & Appeal 2019-002382 Application 14/980,056 7 Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1551, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). “The mere fact that the prior art may be modified in the manner suggested by the Examiner does not make the modification obvious unless the prior art suggested the desirability of the modification.” In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citing In re Gordon, 733 F.2d 900, 902 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). “It is impermissible to use the claimed invention as an instruction manual or ‘template’ to piece together the teachings of the prior art so that the claimed invention is rendered obvious.” Fritch, 972 F.2 at 1266 (citing In re Gorman, 933 F.2d 982, 987 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). We disagree with the Examiner as to the Nasri reference explicitly teaching or suggesting the steps of “generating a set of models for a respective set of communication channels” and “generating, based on the set of models, a respective set of channel specific error-type adapter frameworks.” We note that paragraph 58 of Nasri discloses using models to generate the tagging module and tagging rules and paragraphs 107, 119, and 120 of Nasri disclose a single language model. Consequently, we cannot agree with the Examiner’s expansive interpretation of the express teachings of the Nasri reference. For essentially the same reasons argued by Appellant, we do not agree with the Examiner’s finding that the Nasri reference teaches or suggests “the set of models for a respective set of communication channels, and channel specific error-type adapter framework.” Ans. 8. Moreover, the Examiner finds “it is clear that the application type, TTS or email, using the explicit statistical data for that type, via the metadata attributes, to resolve the case ambiguity, is thus channel specific.” Ans. 11. Appeal 2019-002382 Application 14/980,056 8 The Examiner further finds that the Beaufort reference is only relied upon for teaching in vocabulary (IV) and out of vocabulary (OOV) determinations for the SMS channel. Final Act. 8; Ans. 12–14. The Examiner further finds that Appellant is arguing the references individually rather than what the combination would have taught or suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art. Ans. 11. We disagree with the Examiner and find that the plural models disclosed by the Beaufort reference pertain to the sub portions of the same SMS channel and does not teach or suggests the claimed “set of models for a respective set of communication channels” or “generating, the based on the set of models, a respective set of channel specific error-type adapter frameworks,” as claimed. Consequently, we agree with Appellant that the Examiner has not shown that the combination of Nasri and Beaufort teach or suggest the claimed invention by a preponderance of the evidence. Additionally, we find the Examiner speculates as to the specific teachings and suggestions of the prior art references, as relied upon as evidence to support the obviousness rejection.2 Therefore, we do not agree 2 The Examiner has it backwards with respect to the misplaced focus on interpreting the teachings of the reference, instead of properly interpreting the claims under BRI, and then reading the properly construed claim language on the corresponding features found in the reference(s). If it is not clear what the reference teaches, and some degree of speculation is required, the Examiner should search for a better reference, because we cannot engage in speculation to affirm the Examiner. Cited prior art references do not “read on” claim limitations, rather, a particular claim limitation “reads on” the corresponding feature(s) found in the cited prior art reference(s) after the claim language is properly construed in accordance with the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification. See e.g., Atlas Powder Co. v. IRECO, Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed Cir. Appeal 2019-002382 Application 14/980,056 9 with the Examiner’s findings and conclusion of obviousness based upon the speculative factual findings for the rejection of independent claim 1 and independent claims 10 and 19 and their dependent claims 3–5, 9, 12–14, and 18, which contain similar limitations. With respect to dependent claims 7 and 16, the Examiner has not identified how the teachings of the Stoytchev reference remedy the noted deficiency above. Therefore, we similarly cannot sustain the rejection dependent claims 7 and 16 for the same reasons. CONCLUSION We reverse the Examiner’s obviousness rejections. 1999)(“Anticipation of a patent claim requires a finding that the claim at issue ‘reads on’ a prior art reference.”). We note claim construction is an important step in a patentability determination. Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 353 F.3d 928, 933 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Both anticipation under § 102 and obviousness under § 103 are two-step inquiries. The first step in both analyses is a proper construction of the claims . . . The second step in the analyses requires a comparison of the properly construed claim to the prior art.” (internal citations omitted)) (emphasis added). See also the mapping rule: 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(c)(2) (“When a reference is complex or shows or describes inventions other than that claimed by the applicant, the particular part relied on must be designated as nearly as practicable. The pertinence of each reference, if not apparent, must be clearly explained and each rejected claim specified.” (Emphasis added). Appeal 2019-002382 Application 14/980,056 10 DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 3–5, 9, 10, 12–14, 18, 19 103 Nasri, Beaufort 1, 3–5, 9, 10, 12–14, 18, 19 7, 16 103 Nasri, Beaufort, Stoytchev 7, 16 Overall Outcome 1, 3–5, 7, 9, 10, 12–14, 16, 18, 19 REVERSED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation