New Millennium Sports, S.L.U.v.Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung fur Draussen GmbH & Co. KGaA

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 10, 2014

No. 91195604 (T.T.A.B. Jun. 10, 2014)

Philip R
S.L.U.

Robert A
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Opposition No. 91195604
2

The application states, “The mark consists of a nonhuman paw print.” Color is not
claimed as a feature of the mark.
New Millennium Sports, S.L.U. (“opposer”) opposed registration of the mark
for the goods in International Class 25 only. Applicant’s goods in Class 25 are the
following:
Clothing, namely, pullovers, sweaters, sweatshirts, shirts,
blouses, t-shirts, polo shirts, jackets, parkas, anoraks,
coats, wind cheaters, vests, pants, shorts, underwear, ski
wear, ski pants, ski suits, swimwear and beachwear,
scarves, gloves, belts, waterproof and weatherproof
clothing, namely, windproof and waterproof jackets, down
vests, down jackets, weatherproof jackets, waterproof
pants, fleece jackets, fleece shorts, fleece pullovers, ski
pants, fleece pants, fleece sweaters, waterproof hats,
fleece mittens, boots lined with wool, waterproof snow
boots, waterproof hiking shoes, weatherproof hiking boots,
weatherproof trekking boots and waterproof shoes;
footwear, namely, boots, shoes, sandals, sport shoes,
slippers; headgear, namely, hats, headbands and caps.
Opposer brings its opposition under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground that applicant’s mark, as used in connection with
those goods, so resembles opposer’s registered mark set forth below2 as to be likely
to cause confusion, mistake or deception.

Opposer’s mark is registered for the following goods:
clothing; namely, track suits, trousers, shorts, vests,
shirts, sweat shirts, stockings, socks, rainwear,

2 Reg. No. 1856808 issued on October 4, 1994; Section 8 affidavit accepted; Section 15
affidavit acknowledged; renewed.
Opposition No. 91195604
3

waistcoats; footwear; namely, sport shoes, boots, and
slippers; headgear; namely, caps and hats.
In answering the notice of opposition, applicant admitted that the earliest
date of use of its mark that it can rely on is September 10, 2009,3 which is the filing
date of the opposed application. Applicant denied the other salient allegations of
the notice of opposition. Applicant also stated a counterclaim for cancellation of
opposer’s pleaded registration on the ground that opposer has abandoned use of the
registered mark.4 Opposer denied all allegations of the counterclaim. The case has
been fully briefed.
I. The record.
The record includes the pleadings and, by operation of Trademark Rule
2.122, 37 C.F.R. § 2.122, the application file for the opposed mark and the file
history of the registration that is the subject of the counterclaim for cancellation.
The parties stipulated that “Any documents produced by the parties in
response to requests for production of documents or interrogatories shall be deemed
admissible and are made of record in this proceeding…. Objections to admissibility
of such documents are hereby waived.”5 The documents were identified by page
numbers on a schedule attached to the stipulation, but they were not attached to
the stipulation. Opposer filed some of the identified documents (consisting of a one-

3 Answer and Counterclaim, ¶ 5.
4 Applicant also stated affirmative defenses of waiver, estoppel, and failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. Applicant did not pursue those defenses and they are
deemed waived.
5 Stipulation filed October 16, 2012, TTABvue # 43; stipulation accepted October 31, 2012,
TTABvue # 44.
Opposition No. 91195604
4

page affidavit of opposer’s chief executive officer Carlos Garcia Cobaleda; and
advertising and marketing materials of opposer) as an attachment to its main brief,
which recited the terms of the stipulation in its description of the record. Applicant
in its main brief, filed thereafter, also recited the terms of the stipulation and stated
“Applicant does not dispute Opposer’s description of the evidence of record” and
“Neither party has raised any objections to the evidence of record.”6 Even though
the materials attached to opposer’s brief should have been filed under a notice of
reliance during opposer’s testimony period, in view of the terms of the stipulation
and the lack of any objection by applicant, we will consider them.
The record also includes the following testimony and evidence:
A. Opposer’s evidence.
1. Printouts of information from the electronic database records of the Patent
and Trademark Office showing the current status and title of opposer’s
pleaded registration, filed with the notice of opposition. TTABvue # 1.

2. Testimony deposition of Duarte Da Silveira, president and chief executive
officer of Kelme North America, LLC. TTABvue # 49.

3. Notice of reliance of January 13, 2013, including applicant’s responses to
certain interrogatories and USPTO records relating to applicant’s cancelled
U.S. Reg. No. 2760796. TTABvue # 46.

4. Rebuttal notice of reliance of June 13, 2013, including materials duplicative
of those filed with the January 13, 2013 notice of reliance. TTABvue # 54.

B. Applicant’s evidence.
1. Notice of reliance on opposer’s written responses to selected interrogatories,
document requests and requests for admission. TTABvue # 50.

6 Applicant’s brief at 2. See also id., fn1.
Opposition No. 91195604
5

2. Notice of reliance on information relating to third-party registrations and
applications. TTABvue # 51.

3. Notice of reliance on printouts of certain internet web pages. TTABvue ## 52-
53.

II. Standing.
Opposer has properly made of record its pleaded registration and has
demonstrated its use of a paw print design in connection with the sale of its goods.7
Opposer has thus shown that it is not a mere intermeddler and has established its
standing to oppose registration of applicant’s mark. See Cunningham v. Laser Golf
Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 55 USPQ2d 1842 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d
1092, 50 USPQ2d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1999); and Lipton Industries, Inc. v. Ralston
Purina Co., 670 F.2d 1024, 213 USPQ 185 (CCPA 1982).
Applicant has standing to bring its counterclaim for cancellation of opposer’s
registered mark on the basis of opposer’s assertion of its mark and registration
against applicant in the notice of opposition. See Ohio State University v. Ohio
University, 51 USPQ2d 1289, 1293 (TTAB 1999) (“[A]pplicant’s standing to assert
the counterclaim arises from applicant's position as a defendant in the opposition
and cancellation initiated by opposer.”). See also Finanz St. Honore B.V. v. Johnson
& Johnson, 85 USPQ2d 1478, 1479 (TTAB 2007).
III. Applicant’s counterclaim.
We begin by considering applicant’s counterclaim for cancellation of opposer’s
pleaded registration.

7 Da Silveira Exhibits 3-12.
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Opposition No. 91195604
7

Opposer has also admitted that its use of this version of the mark has continued
throughout the period of 2005 to 2011.11 For purposes of comparison, we reproduce
the registered form of the mark below:

A change in the form in which a registered mark is used, accompanied by
cessation of use of the original form with no intent to resume use thereof, may
constitute abandonment of the registered mark if the change constitutes a “material
alteration.” Paris Glove of Canada Ltd. v. SBC/Sporto Corp., 84 USPQ2d 1856,
1861 (TTAB 2007).12 “A change in the form of a mark does not constitute
abandonment or a break in continuous use if the change neither creates a new mark
nor changes the commercial impression of the old mark.” Id., citing J. Thomas
McCarthy, 3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §17:26 (4th ed.
2007). In order to avoid a finding of material alteration, “[t]he modified mark must
contain what is the essence of the original mark, and the new form must create the
impression of being essentially the same mark.” Visa International Service
Association v. Life-Code Systems, Inc., 220 USPQ 740, 743 (TTAB 1983).

11 Opposer’s responses to requests for admission Nos. 8-14, TTABvue # 50.
12 See also General Foods Corporation v. Ito Yokado Co., Ltd., 219 USPQ 822, 825 fn.10
(TTAB 1983) (stating, in dicta, “Abandonment may result from a material change in the
registered mark, i.e., such that the mark being used is not the registered mark but a
different mark.”).
Opposition No. 91195604
8

Applicant argues:
[T]he design shown in Opposer’s Mark [as registered],
rather than being interpreted by consumers as a paw,
might be interpreted by consumers in one of at least four
other ways – as a mountain with the sun’s rays, a volcano,
a setting sun, or an abstract design. By contrast, both
parties agree that the design shown in Opposer’s
Replacement Mark would be interpreted as a paw.13
Applicant argues, quoting TMEP § 1609.02(a), that “The general test of
whether an alteration is material is whether, if the mark in an application for
registration had been published, the change would require republication in order to
present the mark fairly for purposes of opposition.”14 Applicant points out:
[In 2004] there were 7 registrations or applications for
marks in Class 25 that included depictions of paws with
nails or claws, and of those 7 registrations or applications,
2 consisted only of depictions of paws with nails or claws.
It would have been perfectly rational for the owners of
these 7 registrations and applications to have wanted to
oppose registration of Opposer’s Replacement Mark, even
if they had not wanted to oppose registration of Opposer’s
Mark.15
Opposer argues that its modified mark “creates the same commercial
impression as the Original Mark”:16
The Original Mark and the Modernized Mark both
contain the word element KELME, with each letter being
solid and capitalized. Both marks have paw print
elements to the right of the KELME word element that
are the same height as the capital letters of the KELME
word elements and that are solid. Both marks have paw

13 Applicant’s reply brief at 6.
14 Applicant’s main brief at 29.
15 Id. at 30-31 (citations to the record omitted).
16 Opposer’s rebuttal brief at 5.
Opposition No. 91195604
9

print elements with top and bottom portions that begin
and end on the same plane as the top and bottom portions
of the KELME lettering. Both marks have solid,
triangular-shaped palmar/plantar paw pads. Both marks
have solid, four oval-shaped digital pads that are
similarly oval-shaped, the same size, and that are
similarly oriented around the palmar/plantar pad.17
Opposer also points out that when it submitted a combined affidavit of use
and application for renewal of its registration,18 accompanied by specimens of use
showing the mark in its modified form, the Patent and Trademark Office accepted
the same and renewed the registration.19
After careful review, we find that the modified version of opposer’s mark does
not constitute a material alteration. With respect to the style of the lettering, we
note that the style shown in the registration is relatively non-distinctive, and the
style in which the letters are now presented is also highly conventional. The literal
element of the mark, KELME, is far more distinctive than the lettering in which it
is presented, and we find that the impression that it creates is not materially
affected by a change in the style of the letters.
As the parties have noted, the primary change to the mark is the addition of
nails or claws to the “paw” design to the right of the word KELME. We are not
persuaded by applicant’s claim that the design, as registered, would be interpreted
as something other than a paw. If the design resembles in any way a mountain, a
volcano, or a setting sun, it does so only in a very vague way. On the other hand,

17 Id.
18 Affidavit under § 8 and request for renewal under § 9, filed October 14, 2004.
19 Notice of acceptance and notice of renewal, issued November 16, 2004.
Opposition No. 91195604
10

the design resembles a paw print with reasonable clarity and conforms to
conventional concepts of what an animal’s paw or paw print would look like. See,
for example, the third-party registrations shown in applicant’s Exhibits HH and
KK, for marks that are described, respectively, as an “animal paw” and a “dog’s
paw,” and both of which, like opposer’s design, consist primarily of a rounded
triangle with four irregular ovals:20

We expect that customers would likely interpret opposer’s design as a paw.
Graphically, the newly added claws are a very small component of the overall
design, relative to the other elements of the design. Moreover, inasmuch as it is
common knowledge that an animal’s paws are accompanied by claws, the addition
of a visual indication of the claws does not materially alter the impression conveyed
by the design. It appeared to be a paw before, and now it still appears to be a paw.
In other ways – the size and position of the paw relative to the wording – the mark
is essentially unchanged. The fact that the shapes that compose the paw design
have been made somewhat more regular and symmetrical makes little overall

20 U.S. Reg. Nos. 3614300 and 3894401, applicant’s notice of reliance TTABvue #51,
Exhibits HH and KK. Numerous other similar examples can be seen in the same notice of
reliance.
Opposition No. 91195604
11

impression. The original paw design was reasonably close to symmetrical and the
modified form of the mark is only slightly more balanced.
The rule of thumb invoked by applicant – the hypothetical question of
whether a proposed amendment to a mark that had already been published would
warrant republication in order to present the mark fairly for purposes of opposition
– reflects policy concerns that are relevant to the question before us. In this case,
we do not find that the changes to opposer’s mark would warrant republication.
The publication of the original mark would have put interested persons on notice
that the mark included a representation of an animal’s paw. The changes in the
modified version of the mark are typical of the variations to be reasonably expected
in representations of animals’ paws.21
We have given no weight to the fact that the Post-Registration Division of the
Patent and Trademark Office granted the request for renewal of opposer’s
registration. That renewal did not deprive applicant of its right to petition for
cancellation of the registration on grounds of abandonment and to have its claim
determined by the Board.
We find that the essence of the original mark is present in the mark as
modified; that the modified mark creates the impression of being essentially the
same mark; and that the commercial impression of the old mark has not been
changed. Accordingly, we find that the differences between the mark that opposer
currently uses and the mark that appears in its registration do not constitute a

21 See, for example, the various representations of paws used by third parties shown in
applicant’s notice of reliance at TTABvue ## 52 and 53.
Opposition No. 91195604
12

material alteration of the registered mark. Accordingly, applicant has not shown
that opposer has abandoned use of its registered mark. Applicant’s counterclaim for
cancellation is dismissed.
IV. Opposer’s claim under Section 2(d).
We turn now to opposer’s claim under Trademark Act § 2(d) on the ground of
priority and likelihood of confusion.
In view of opposer’s ownership of a valid and subsisting registration of its
pleaded mark, priority is not in issue with respect to the mark and goods identified
in that registration. King Candy, Inc. v. Eunice King’s Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400,
182 USPQ 108 (CCPA 1974).
Our determination of likelihood of confusion is based on an analysis of all of
the probative facts in evidence that are relevant to the factors set forth in In re E. I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co. 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973). See also In
re Majestic Distilling Co., Inc., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
A. The parties’ goods.
Turning first to the similarity or dissimilarity of the goods at issue, we find
that the parties’ goods are, in part, identical. Opposer’s registration and the
opposed application both cover sweatshirts; shirts; vests; shorts; footwear, namely,
boots, sport shoes, and slippers; and headgear, namely, hats and caps. Moreover,
the goods identified as “trousers” and “rainwear” in opposer’s registration are at
least closely related in nature to the goods identified in the application as “pants”
Opposition No. 91195604
13

and “waterproof and weatherproof clothing, namely, windproof and waterproof
jackets, … weatherproof jackets, [and] waterproof pants.”
We need not address the similarity between opposer’s goods and each and
every one of applicant’s identified goods. In the context of likelihood of confusion, it
is sufficient if likelihood of confusion is found with respect to use of the mark on any
item that comes within the description of goods in a given International Class in the
application or registration. Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, 648
F.2d 1335, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (CCPA 1981); Apple Computer v. TVNET.Net, Inc.,
90 USPQ2d 1393, 1398 (TTAB 2007). Accordingly, the du Pont factor relating to the
similarity of the goods favors a finding of likelihood of confusion.
B. The parties’ channels of trade.
We next consider the parties’ established and likely-to-continue trade
channels. To the extent that the parties’ goods are identical (i.e., sweatshirts;
shirts; vests; shorts; boots, sport shoes, and slippers; hats and caps), we must
presume that the parties’ goods move through the same channels of trade. See
American Lebanese Syrian Associated Charities Inc. v. Child Health Research
Institute, 101 USPQ2d 1022, 1028 (TTAB 2011); In re Smith and Mehaffey, 31
USPQ2d 1531, 1532 (TTAB 1994); In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 101 USPQ2d
1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012).22 As there are no limitations as to channels of trade in
the identifications of goods in the registration and application, we presume that the
parties’ goods move in all channels of trade normal for such goods. See Octocom

22 Applicant admits as much in its brief at 26 (“[A]s a matter of law the parties’ trade
channels … will be presumed to be the same or similar….”)
Opposition No. 91195604
14

Syst. Inc. v. Houston Computers Svcs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787
(Fed. Cir. 1990); Paula Payne Products Co. v. Johnson Publishing Co., 473 F.2d 901,
177 USPQ 76 (CCPA 1973); In re Linkvest S.A., 24 USPQ2d 1716, 1716 (TTAB
1992). Opposer’s witness testified that its trade channels included casual wear
retailers, sporting goods retailers, wholesalers, secondary distribution vendors, and
the internet.23 Applicant has stated that its potential trade channels are stores
operated by applicant, shop-in-shop systems, third-party stores, and online stores.24
Applicant contends, however, that the similarity of trade channels “does not
mean that this factor weighs in Opposer’s favor.”25 Applicant argues that
“consumers understand that clothing stores sell clothing from many manufacturers.
Consumers who go to a clothing store and see numerous brands are not going to
believe that they come from the same source.”26 We are not persuaded. If two
marks are confusingly similar, the fact that they may be found in the same
channels of trade would increase the likelihood of customer confusion. Accordingly,
this du Pont factor weighs in favor of a finding of likelihood of confusion.
C. Customers; Conditions of sale.
We next consider “the conditions under which and the buyers to whom sales
are made.” du Pont at 567. Because the parties’ goods are in part identical, we
must presume that the classes of customers at issue are the same. See In re Viterra

23 Da Silveira 40:23-41:21.
24 Applicant’s response to interrogatory No. 2, opposer’s notice of reliance at TTABvue # 46.
25 Applicant’s brief at 26.
26 Id. at 26-27.
Opposition No. 91195604
15

Inc., 101 USPQ2d at 1908. Opposer describes the customers of both parties as
“average purchasers” who “are unlikely to exercise a great deal of care” in
purchasing the goods.27 Clearly the universe of customers for the parties’ goods is
very broad and includes all members of the general public having an interest in
purchasing goods such as sweatshirts, sport shoes, and hats. In addition, nothing in
the record suggests that purchasers of such goods have any special degree of
sophistication. However, applicant argues:
[The goods at issue] are mostly articles of clothing that
constitute important purchases, not merely because they
often cost more than $100, but also because they are the
types of goods that consumers do not soon replace by
purchasing similar items. And they are the types of
products that consumers know they will have to take the
time to return if they do not fit. … These simply are not
casual impulse purchases.28
[The goods] feature a variety of footwear, outerwear, and
trousers that must fit and are expensive, often purchased
with the help of a salesman, often expressions of the
wearer’s personal style, and purchased infrequently.
They are not “casual, everyday items,” and must be
purchased with care, not on impulse.29
To buy either party’s products, a consumer will usually
interact with a salesperson and take the time to try on the
item, particularly if the item is a pair of athletic shoes.
Usually the consumer does not just go into a store aisle,
pick up a product, and bring it to the cash register. The
general sales model often entails assistance, and this
assistance minimizes confusion.30

27 Opposer’s brief at 18-19.
28 Applicant’s brief at 19.
29 Id. at 21.
30 Id. at 26.
Opposition No. 91195604
16

We are not persuaded by applicant’s characterization of the conditions of
purchase. It is true that some of the parties’ goods, such as footwear, may cost more
than $100 and require some deliberation in order to select the correct size and fit.
However, other goods of applicant, such as t-shirts, caps, and headbands are
relatively inexpensive and may well be selected without special care. Neither are
we persuaded that the assistance of a salesperson would be an inevitable aspect of a
sale of the goods.
Considering that the relevant customers would include ordinary consumers
using an average degree of care, and that the conditions of sale would not
necessarily entail increased deliberation or the assistance of sales personnel, we
find this du Pont factor to be neutral or slightly favoring a finding of likelihood of
confusion.
D. The marks at issue.
We next consider the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks at issue in
terms of appearance, sound, meaning, and overall commercial impression. We base
our determination on a consideration of the marks in their entireties. In re
National Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See also
Franklin Mint Corp. v. Master Mfg. Co., 667 F.2d 1005, 212 USPQ 23, 234 (CCPA
1981). However, there is nothing improper in stating that, for rational reasons,
more or less weight has been given to a particular feature of a mark, provided the
ultimate conclusion rests on a consideration of the marks in their entireties. In re
Opposition No. 91195604
17

National Data Corp., 224 USPQ at 751; see also Price Candy Company v. Gold
Medal Candy Corporation, 220 F.2d 759, 105 USPQ 266, 268 (CCPA 1955).
Applicant points out that opposer’s registered mark includes the “fanciful”
term KELME; that this term constitutes the dominant portion of opposer’s mark;
and that this dominant portion is absent from applicant’s mark.31 Applicant points
out that its mark consists only of a design that would be immediately recognizable
as a paw (including claws), while the design in opposer’s mark could be perceived as
something else, in part because it is rendered in less detail and lacks any
representation of claws. Applicant contends that opposer’s design looks like
something drawn by a child; that if it is perceived to be a paw, it would be the paw
of a harmless pet, whereas applicant’s design depicts the paw of “an animal that …
has not been domesticated.” Applicant points out that its design is oriented at an
angle, that it is generally “realistic,” as opposed to the “schematic” quality of
opposer’s design, and that it is “obviously not symmetrical,” as opposed to the
symmetry of opposer’s design.32
It is clear that the KELME component of opposer’s mark creates a visual and
phonetic impression that is absent from applicant’s mark. However, even if we
assume that KELME constitutes the dominant portion of the mark, the design
component standing to the right of the term KELME is a salient, distinctive feature
of the mark which must be given due consideration. Opposer contends that

31 Applicant’s brief at 5-7.
32 Id. at 7-9.
Opposition No. 91195604
18

applicant’s mark is confusingly similar to this design and, for that reason, is likely
to cause confusion as to the source of applicant’s goods.
We give relatively little weight to the fact that in applicant’s mark, the paw is
presented at an angle, in contrast to the vertical presentation of opposer’s design
element. Even though the owner of a trademark may intend that the mark be
displayed only at one approved angle, in the marketplace customers may encounter
marked materials such as labels, packages, hangtags and even signs in a variety of
orientations. This fact would tend to reduce the impact on customers of the
“approved” angle of the mark.
Considering other purely visual aspects of the two designs, we note that
opposer’s design includes a large, rounded, triangular shape surmounted by four
smaller, slightly irregular ovals. In applicant’s mark there is a corresponding
rounded triangular shape that is more irregular and less symmetrical than the
triangle in opposer’s mark. In opposer’s mark the long axes of the four small ovals
are in a radiating pattern. The ovals in applicant’s mark are roughly parallel to
each other. In each case the middle two ovals are positioned farther from the base
line of the triangle than are the outer two ovals. Applicant’s mark, unlike opposer’s
design, has four smaller shapes at the outer tips of the four ovals. These features of
applicant’s mark are completely absent from opposer’s design. Despite the
differences that we note here, and giving due regard to the differences noted by
applicant in its brief at 5-9, the two designs have substantial visual similarities.
Opposition No. 91195604
19

With respect to the significance or connotation of the two designs, applicant
has described its mark as “a nonhuman paw print”;33 and has stated that it is
“immediately recognizable as a paw.”34 As we discussed above in Section III, we
find that opposer’s design, also, would be perceived as a paw or paw print.
Applicant’s alternative interpretations of opposer’s design (volcano, setting sun,
mountain) are not persuasive. Overall, we find the two designs to be similar in
meaning or connotation, as both of them would be interpreted as a paw or paw
print.
With respect to sound, it is obvious that neither design has any phonetic
element.
We must, of course, compare the overall commercial impression of opposer’s
mark in its entirety, including the appearance, sound and meaning of the term
KELME, with the commercial impression created by applicant’s mark. We find that
applicant’s mark creates a commercial impression that is substantially similar to
that of opposer’s mark, as it resembles in many respects the design component of
opposer’s mark. Companies that use marks consisting of a word plus a logo often
display their logos alone, unaccompanied by the literal portions of their trademarks.
Indeed, opposer has demonstrated that it sometimes displays its paw design (in its
modified form) separate and apart from the KELME designation.35 Applicant’s
mark could therefore be interpreted by customers as a display of opposer’s design,

33 Application, description of the mark.
34 Applicant’s brief at 7.
35 Da Silveira Exhibit 3 (top of shoe box); Exhibit 7 (cover of 2007 “soccer” catalogue);
Exhibit 8 (cover of 2007 “indoor” catalogue).
Opposition No. 91195604
20

apart from opposer’s word element. See In re United States Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ
707, 709 (TTAB 1985) (“Applicant's mark would appear to prospective purchasers to
be a shortened form of registrant's mark.”). Accordingly, we find that the du Pont
factor of the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks favors a finding of likelihood of
confusion.
E. Similar marks in use.
In accordance with du Pont, we consider any evidence of record regarding
“the number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods.” du Pont at 567.
Applicant has submitted substantial evidence relating to “paw” trademarks that
have been registered36 and used37 in connection with clothing. Applicant argues:
[C]onsumers are aware that the presence of a paw as or in
a mark is not sufficient to allow them to determine the
origin of the product sold under those marks. Consumers
realize that in order to determine the origin of the
products, they must look to differences between the paws
and additional indicia of origin, both in the marks and
elsewhere, on the products. … This dilution of paws in
marks in Class 25 in the U.S. thus substantially lessens
the likelihood of confusion.38
For purposes of demonstrating the weakness of a mark, we generally give
little weight to third-party registrations, because they are not evidence that the
marks are in use. Productos Lacteos Tocumbo S.A. de C.V. v. Paleteria La
Michoacana Inc., 98 USPQ2d 1921, 1934 (TTAB 2011). In this case, we note that
applicant has demonstrated through internet evidence that many of the registered

36 Applicant’s notice of reliance at TTABvue # 51.
37 Applicant’s notice of reliance at TTABvue ## 52-53.
38 Applicant’s brief at 16.
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Opposition No. 91195604
22

Clemson U. Bates College Ohio U. Princeton High School

Others among these marks are quite different from opposer’s design. See, e.g.,
Exhibits N (University of Maine – five digits, prominent claws); R (University of
Montana – five long digits, long claws, M design on palm); S (University of South
Dakota – SD monogram in center of one-piece paw); U (St. Vincent College –
vertical claw marks across the pad of the paw); Y (Towson University – tiger stripes
across paw); AA (Barron Collier High School – two paws); and BB (Palmetto Ridge
High School – five digits, prominent claws, PR monogram on palm).
We find it significant that the marks in Exhibits J-BB are displayed on
apparel primarily in an ornamental fashion: that is, they are emblazoned on the
apparel in large format and in prominent placement such as on the chest of a shirt
or on the side of the leg of a pair of pants. Moreover, it is clear that these marks are
displayed for the purpose of showing an association with particular colleges, high
schools, and their sports teams, rather than to identify an apparel company or a
sporting goods company. In other words, these marks “tell[ ] the purchasing public
… not the source of manufacture but the secondary source” of the goods, In re
Paramount Pictures Corporation, 213 USPQ 1111, 1112 (TTAB 1982) (in the
present case the secondary sources being educational institutions or athletic teams).
This is most apparent on those college or high school websites that, in offering
apparel marked with the school or team mark, also identify the actual
Opposition No. 91195604
23

manufacturers of the goods. See, e.g., Exhibits L (Under Armour hat, U-Trau
boxers, Jansport sweatpants); N (Jansport and Russell t-shirts, U-Trau boxers,
Boxercraft capris pants, etc.); P (Hurley board short); Q (Champion t-shirts,
sweatshirts, pants, Nike t-shirt); S (Adidas hoops short, Russell t-shirt, Jansport
sweatshirt, etc.); T (Champion t-shirts and sweatshirts, Cutter & Buck polos, etc.);
U (Jansport t-shirts, etc.); W (Champion and Under Armour t-shirts, Jansport
pants); Z (sweatshirts by Jerzees, Independent Trading Co., and Bella+Canvas); BB
(District Threads sweatshirt, Port & Company t-shirt). Inasmuch as the college,
high school and athletic team marks perform the function of secondary source
indicators rather than conventional marks of apparel companies, their impact on
the distinctiveness of opposer’s apparel trademark is somewhat reduced.
Similarly, the marks shown on apparel in Exhibits E, G, H and I appear to be
used primarily as secondary source indicators for businesses offering pet-related
goods and services.
We note also that, while many of the paw designs in Exhibits A through BB
consist of variations of the “pad plus four digits” format that is seen in opposer’s
design, they are displayed together with other distinguishing matter, such as
college names or acronyms, monograms, and distinctive graphic details. In this
regard, these designs, as actually presented to the marketplace, are substantially
more distinct from opposer’s mark than is the mark that applicant wishes to
register, which has no wording and only very subtle graphic details to distinguish it
from opposer’s design.
Opposition No. 91195604
24

In view of the foregoing, we find that the du Pont factor of the number and
nature of similar marks in use on similar goods is neutral.
F. The fame of opposer’s mark.
Opposer maintains that its mark is “well-known and famous.”40 Fame, if it
exists, plays a dominant role in the likelihood of confusion analysis because famous
marks enjoy a broad scope of protection. A famous mark has extensive public
recognition and renown. Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Products Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 63
USPQ2d 1303, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Recot Inc. v. M.C. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 54
USPQ2d 1894, 1897 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Kenner Parker Toys, Inc. v. Rose Art
Industries, Inc., 963 F.2d 350, 22 USPQ2d 1453, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Because of
the extreme deference that we accord a famous mark in terms of the wide latitude
of legal protection it receives, and the dominant role fame plays in the likelihood of
confusion analysis, it is the duty of the party asserting that its mark is famous to
clearly prove it. Leading Jewelers Guild Inc. v. LJOW Holdings LLC, 82 USPQ2d
1901, 1904 (TTAB 2007).
For purposes of a claim of likelihood of confusion, fame arises if a “significant
portion of the relevant consuming public … recognizes the mark as a source
indicator.” Palm Bay Imports Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En
1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1694 (Fed Cir. 2005). Fame for likelihood of
confusion purposes may be measured indirectly by the volume of sales of the goods
or services sold under the mark, advertising expenditures, and other factors such as

40 Opposer’s brief at 20.
Opposition No. 91195604
25

length of time of use of the mark; widespread critical assessments; notice by
independent sources of the products identified by the marks; and the general
reputation of the products and services. Bose Corp., 63 USPQ2d at 1308.
Opposer argues that for more than a decade it has advertised and sold its
goods to “thousands of retail sellers of athletic apparel and footwear,” including
“major retail sellers”; and that “annual sales of goods bearing the Mark have
historically been robust.”41 Opposer has made of record select information relating
to the dollar value of sales of goods under the mark.42 The information disclosed is
very limited and shows opposer’s sales to be very modest. There is testimony
indicating that opposer’s goods have had some degree of exposure at the Wimbledon
tennis tournament and the Olympics, and to have been worn by the Spanish
national soccer team, Real Madrid Soccer Club, and some well-known soccer
players.43 However, that testimony is quite vague and lacking in essential detail.
Opposer has submitted no evidence regarding its advertising expenditures.
After careful consideration, we find that opposer has not demonstrated fame
for purposes of a likelihood of confusion analysis. Accordingly, we find the du Pont
factor of fame to be neutral.
G. Absence of actual confusion.
Opposer has admitted that it has no knowledge of any instance of actual
confusion involving the parties’ marks. On the other hand, applicant has admitted

41 Id. See also id. at 10-11; and applicant’s rebuttal brief at 7-9.
42 Da Silveira 39:5-12. See also Cobaleda affidavit, filed with opposer’s brief on the case.
43 Da Silveira 45:15-46:16.
Opposition No. 91195604
26

that it “does not sell goods under Applicant’s Mark in the U.S.”;44 and that it has “no
current channels of trade for goods sold under Applicant’s Mark in the U.S.”45
Although applicant’s responses to interrogatories indicate that it formerly did
business in the United States, the extent of that business is not apparent on this
record. Thus, there is no indication that there has been a meaningful opportunity
for confusion to occur. Under the circumstances, we find the lack of evidence of
actual confusion to be a neutral factor in our analysis of likelihood of confusion. Cf.
Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Group, Inc., 94 USPQ2d 1645, 1660 (TTAB
2010), aff’d, 637 F.3d 1344, 98 USPQ2d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
H. Balancing the factors.
The record indicates that the parties’ respective marks are substantially
similar; that their goods are identical in part; and that both parties offer or intend
to offer their goods through similar trade channels to ordinary consumers who
exercise an ordinary degree of care. Applicant has shown that that there is some
presence in the marketplace of other paw marks. Opposer has not shown its mark
to be famous. There are no known instances of actual confusion.
We have considered all of the evidence of record and all arguments of the
parties relevant to the issues before us, including those not specifically discussed
herein. Our analysis of the du Pont factors leads us to find that applicant’s mark,
as used in connection with the identified goods, so closely resembles opposer’s

44 Opposer’s notice of reliance at TTABvue # 46, applicant’s response to interrogatory No. 1.
45 Id., applicant’s response to interrogatory No. 2.
Opposition No. 91195604
27

registered mark as to be likely to cause confusion, mistake or deception as to the
source of applicant’s goods.
Decision:
The opposition is sustained as to applicant’s goods in International Class 25
and registration is refused as to those goods. After expiration of the applicable
appeal period, the application will be permitted to proceed with respect to the goods
in International Classes 9, 18, 20, and 22.
Applicant’s counterclaim for cancellation is dismissed.