NESTEC SADownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMar 2, 20212019006575 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 2, 2021) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/607,609 01/28/2015 Jean Luz Rayner 13343-US-NP 1090 69099 7590 03/02/2021 Nestle Purina Petcare Global Resources, Inc Checkerboard Square Intellectual Property Patents ST. LOUIS, MO 63164 EXAMINER MOORE, WALTER A ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3619 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/02/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): purinapatentmail@purina.nestle.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte JEAN LUZ RAYNER, MICHAEL J. SAYLOCK, KORALJKA RADE-KUKIC, HUGO GLORIA-HERNANDEZ, and JULIEN HUGO ____________ Appeal 2019-006575 Application 14/607,609 Technology Center 1700 ____________ Before CATHERINE Q. TIMM, JEFFREY T. SMITH, and JEFFREY R. SNAY, Administrative Patent Judges. SNAY, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1 and 2. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies Nestec S.A. as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 2. Appeal 2019-006575 Application 14/607,609 2 BACKGROUND The invention relates to gluten-free pet food. Spec. ¶ 2. According to the Specification, substituting canola protein isolate and flaxseed meal for wheat germ does not negatively affect product structure, appearance, and palatability. Id. ¶ 7. Claim 1 reads as follows: Claim 1: A gluten-free pet food product having visible small diameter fibers, the gluten-free pet food product comprising: emulsified meat material selected from the group consisting of poultry, beef, pork, lamb and mixtures thereof; and a gluten-replacement ingredient present in the amount of 5% to 35% by weight of the emulsified meat material and wherein the gluten-replacement ingredient comprises a combination of flaxseed meal and canola protein isolate, wherein the gluten-free pet food product does not contain any soy protein. Appeal Br. 21 (Claims Appendix). REJECTION Claims 1 and 2 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Swenson,2 Dingman,3 and Tang.4 OPINION Claim 1 Relevant to Appellant’s arguments on appeal, the Examiner finds Swenson discloses a gluten-free pet food having aligned fibers that simulate 2 US 2008/0233244 A1, published September 25, 2008. 3 US 6,379,738 B1, issued April 30, 2002. 4 US 2009/0286961 A1, published November 19, 2009. Appeal 2019-006575 Application 14/607,609 3 animal meat. Non-Final Act. 3. The Examiner finds Swenson also discloses optional additives, including flaxseed meal and canola protein5 in concentration amounts which encompass those recited in claim 1. Id. at 5. The Examiner finds Swenson teaches optionally including animal meat, and acknowledges Swenson does not specify a meat emulsion. Id. at 4. The Examiner relies on Dingman as evidence it was known to use a meat emulsion in pet food. Id. A preponderance of the evidence presented supports the foregoing findings. Swenson’s disclosure is directed to animal food containing structured plant protein, such as canola. Swenson ¶¶ 2, 30. According to Swenson, the disclosed structured plant protein is formed by extrusion to produce substantially aligned protein fibers that simulate real meat. Id. ¶ 30. Swenson teaches the extruded plant protein product may be blended with animal meat and various micronutrients to meet nutritional requirements of a given animal. Id. ¶¶ 83, 89. “Generally speaking, [a] companion animal composition comprising structured plant protein products may be combined with the macronutrients and micronutrients to meet the nutrient requirements of the animal.” Id. ¶ 112. Swenson states an “aspect of the invention” provides a composition comprising “a structured plant protein product; a fat substance in an amount sufficient to meet the daily nutrient requirements of the companion animal; at least one nutrient selected from the group consisting of vitamins and minerals in an amount sufficient to meet the daily nutrient requirement of the companion animal; and animal meat.” Id. ¶ 10. 5 The Examiner finds Swenson implicitly discloses the canola protein as an isolate and alternatively finds Tang teaches it was known to provide canola protein as an isolate in pet food. Non-Final Act. 6. Appellant does not dispute these findings. Appeal 2019-006575 Application 14/607,609 4 Swenson identifies flaxseed meal as an optional carbohydrate source. Id. ¶ 87. Dingman teaches it was known to replace natural meat with meat emulsions in pet food to reduce cost. Dingman 1:34–37. Appellant argues Swenson’s extrusion process is performed using a protein material pre-mix that is not an emulsion. Id. at 7. Appellant contends Swenson does not suggest that substituting a meat emulsion for the disclosed pre-mix could produce the desired animal food products having substantially aligned protein fibers. Id. at 8. Appellant also contends changing Swenson’s pre-mix to a meat emulsion would “completely change the principle of operation of the extrusion process of Swenson.” Id. at 9. Appellant’s foregoing arguments are not persuasive of reversible error. As noted, Swenson teaches extruding plant protein in a manner that yields structurally aligned fibers to simulate meat. See e.g., Swenson claim 1 (reciting an animal food composition comprising, inter alia, “a structured plant protein product comprising protein fibers that are substantially aligned, the structured plant protein product comprising an extrudate of plant protein material.”). The structured plant protein extrudate may then be combined with additional ingredients such as animal meat. Swenson ¶ 83 (characterizing “[b]lends” or “combination[s] of animal meat and “structured plant protein product produced by the extrusion process.”); id. ¶ 101 (“Typically, the process of making a food composition, particularly for a companion animal, involves hydrating the structure plant protein product . . . and then blending it with the rest of the ingredients that form the food composition.”); id. ¶ 146 (“employing the extruded [plant] protein product of example 4 and combining it with chicken meat”). In light of the foregoing disclosures in Swenson, we are not persuaded that substituting Appeal 2019-006575 Application 14/607,609 5 meat emulsion for animal meat in Swenson’s step of blending meat with plant protein extrudate would materially have changed Swenson’s principal of operation. Contrary to Appellant’s contention, such substitution would not alter Swenson’s pre-mix or extrusion process because the blending would occur after extruding the plant protein material to form the structured plant protein product. Appellant also argues the Examiner applies impermissible hindsight in selecting canola protein isolate and flaxseed meal from the list of possible ingredients identified in Swenson. Appeal Br. 10–11. Swenson expressly identifies canola as a suitable source of plant protein for producing the desired structured plant protein extrudate ingredient. Swenson ¶ 30. Swenson also expressly identifies flaxseed meal as a suitable source of a desired carbohydrate ingredient. Id. ¶ 87. These identifications in Swenson support the Examiner’s finding that one of ordinary skill would have had a reason to select canola and flaxseed meal in formulating Swenson’s animal food composition. The mere fact that Swenson also identifies additional possible sources of plant protein and carbohydrate does not negate Swenson’s identification of canola and flaxseed meal as suitable for the stated purposes. Appellant argues Swenson does not suggest the recited amounts of canola isolate and flaxseed meal. Appeal Br. 12. As noted, Swenson teaches canola protein as a suitable structured plant protein component of the feed composition. Swenson ¶ 30. Swenson also teaches, “the amount of structured protein product in relation to the amount of animal meat in the animal food compositions can and will vary depending upon the composition’s intended use.” Id. ¶ 83. For example, Swenson identifies Appeal 2019-006575 Application 14/607,609 6 structured protein concentrations ranging from 5 to 99% blended with animal meat at concentrations ranging from 0 to 45%. Id. Carbohydrate, such as flaxseed meal, is said optionally to be included in an amount from 1– 99% by weight. Id. ¶ 87. These broad ranges taught by Swenson encompass the narrower range recited in claim 1. Appellant does not persuasively show error in the Examiner’s determination that concentration values within the recited range would not have been prima facie obvious over the broad ranges taught by Swenson. Appellant argues Swenson does not teach a composition that does not contain soy protein because, according to Appellant, “all of the embodiments of Swenson that include visible fibers also use both soybean protein and gluten in high contents.” Appeal Br. 15. See also Reply Br. 2– 3. Swenson’s disclosure is not limited to its working examples. Appellant’s argument does not show error in the Examiner’s findings that Swenson expressly teaches compositions that are gluten-free and formed from plant protein sources other than soy. Lastly, Appellant contends Examples 3–5 set forth in the Specification demonstrate unexpected results. Appeal Br. 17.6 Examples 3–5 report pet food compositions which contained flaxseed meal and canola protein, but 6 Appellant points to paragraphs 4–9 of an unspecified Declaration, Appeal Br. 17, but neither includes a copy of such Declaration in the briefs nor identifies its location in the record. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (“Except as provided for in §§41.41, 41.47 and 41.52, any arguments or authorities not included in the appeal brief will be refused consideration by the Board for purposes of the present appeal.”). To the extent Appellant relies on the Declaration Under 37 C.F.R. § 1.132, dated August 29, 2018, the Declarant’s opinion evidence set forth in paragraphs 4–9 of that document are substantively equivalent to the arguments presented in the Appeal Brief and are addressed below. Appeal 2019-006575 Application 14/607,609 7 omitted wheat gluten and soy protein. Spec. Fig. 1. Appellant contends Examples 3–5 were surprisingly similar in appearance and texture compared to Example 1, which included wheat gluten and soy protein, but omitted flaxseed meal and canola protein. Appeal Br. 17. The burden of establishing that unexpected results support a conclusion of nonobviousness rests with the Appellant. In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 139 (Fed. Cir. 1996). “[W]hen unexpected results are used as evidence of nonobviousness, the results must be shown to be unexpected compared with the closest prior art.” In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388, 392 (Fed. Cir. 1991). “[I]t is not enough to show that results are obtained which differ from those obtained in the prior art: that difference must be shown to be an unexpected difference.” See In re Klosak, 455 F.2d 1077, 1080 (CCPA 1972) (emphasis in original). Additionally, the relied- upon results must be commensurate in scope with the claims. See In re Peterson, 315 F.3d 1325, 1329–31 (Fed. Cir. 2003). “Establishing that one (or a small number of) species gives unexpected results is inadequate proof, for ‘it is the view of [the CCPA] that objective evidence of non-obviousness must be commensurate in scope with the claims which the evidence is offered to support.’” See In re Greenfield, 571 F.2d 1185, 1189 (CCPA 1978) (quoting In re Tiffin, 448 F.2d 791, 792 (CCPA 1971)). Finally, “it is well settled that unexpected results must be established by factual evidence. ‘Mere argument or conclusory statements in the specification does not suffice.’” See In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1994)); see also In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974) (“Attorney’s argument in a brief cannot take the place of evidence.”). Appeal 2019-006575 Application 14/607,609 8 Here, Appellant’s claim recites “a gluten-replacement ingredient in the amount of 5% to 35% by weight,” whereas each of the relied-upon Examples corresponded to a single concentration of 28%. See Spec. Fig. 1. Moreover, claim 1 is not limited in scope with regard to relative concentration of flaxseed meal and canola protein—the two ingredients Appellants asserts are responsible for the resulting appearance and texture. Appellant does not present evidence sufficient to demonstrate the resultant appearance and texture would have been expected for all relative concentrations of these ingredients over the range encompassed by the claims. In addition, although secondary considerations such as unexpected results must be taken into account, they do not necessarily control the obviousness conclusion. See Sud-Chemie, Inc. v. Multisorb Technologies, Inc., 554 F.3d 1001, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[E]vidence of unexpected results and other secondary considerations will not necessarily overcome a strong prima facie showing of obviousness”); Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d at 1372 (“[T]his secondary consideration does not overcome the strong showing of obviousness in this case. Although secondary considerations must be taken into account, they do not necessarily control the obviousness conclusion.”); see also Newell Cos. v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 769 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In this case, viewing Appellant’s qualitative evidence regarding appearance and texture together with the relatively strong evidence supporting the Examiner’s prima facie showing, we are not persuaded of reversible error in the Examiner’s obviousness determination. Appeal 2019-006575 Application 14/607,609 9 For the foregoing reasons, Appellant does not identify error in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1. Appellant does not argue with particularity any error in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 2. The Examiner’s rejection is sustained. CONCLUSION The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1 and 2 is affirmed. DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 2 103(a) Swenson, Dingman, Tang 1, 2 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation