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Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 24, 2020

14858161 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jun. 24, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/858,161 09/18/2015 Michael J. Mouser 67289-017 PUS1 7097
26096 7590 06/24/2020
CARLSON, GASKEY & OLDS, P.C.
400 WEST MAPLE ROAD
SUITE 350
BIRMINGHAM, MI 48009
EXAMINER
MERLINO, DAVID P
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3669
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/24/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
cgolaw@yahoo.com
ptodocket@cgolaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte MICHAEL J. MOUSER, PHILIP A. WEAVER, and
DONALD J. FINNEY
____________

Appeal 2019-0064661
Application 14/858,1612
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before PHILLIP J. KAUFFMAN, TARA L. HUTCHINGS, and
ALYSSA A. FINAMORE, Administrative Patent Judges.

HUTCHINGS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

1 Our Decision references Appellant’s Specification (“Spec.,” filed Sept. 18,
2015), Election and Amendment (“Election and Amendment,” filed Jan. 24,
2017), Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed May 30, 2019), Reply Brief
(“Reply Br.,” filed Aug. 28, 2019), Notice of Change in Real Party
(“Notice,” filed Sept. 5, 2019), the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed June
28, 2019), and Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed May 30, 2018).
2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant indicates that the real party in interest is “The
Hertz Corporation.” Notice 1.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final
rejection of claims 1, 4–7, 12, 13, 16–19, and 24.3 We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM IN PART.

CLAIMED INVENTION
Appellant’s claimed invention relates to user authentication for an
occupant of a vehicle, such as a rental vehicle. Spec. ¶ 2.
Claims 1 and 13 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1,
reproduced below, is representative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method implemented by a computing device in a
vehicle, comprising:
obtaining identifying information from an occupant of
the vehicle, wherein the identifying information is received via
an input device operatively connected to the computing device;
determining whether the computing device has
connectivity to a remote authentication server;
based on a determination that the computing device lacks
connectivity to the remote authentication server, temporarily
enabling full operation of the vehicle until the computing
device has connectivity to the remote authentication server; and
based on a determination that the computing device has
connectivity to the remote authentication server:
transmitting a request to the remote authentication
server, wherein the request includes the identifying
information and a vehicle identifier of the vehicle, and

3 The Appeal Brief includes claims 8–11 and 20–23 in the Appendix of
Claims. However, these claims have been withdrawn. Final Act. 2; see also
Election and Amendment 10 (indicating “claims 1, 4-7, 12-13, 16-19, and 24
are elected, and [non-elected] claims 2-3, 8-11, 14-15, 20-23 are
withdrawn”).
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requests that the remote authentication server determine,
based on the identifying information and the vehicle
identifier, whether the occupant is authorized to operate
the vehicle; and
controlling whether full operation of the vehicle is
enabled or disabled based on a response sent from the
remote authentication server to a mobile device of the
occupant that is separate from the computing device.

REJECTIONS
Claims 6 and 18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as indefinite
for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter
Appellant regards as the invention.
Claims 1, 5–7, 12, 13, 17–19, and 24 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as unpatentable over Okada (US 7,679,486 B2, iss. Mar. 16, 2010) and
Hoyos (US 2015/0363986 A1, pub. Dec. 17, 2015).
Claims 4 and 16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Okada, Hoyos, and Drori (US 5,650,774, iss. July 22, 1997).

ANALYSIS
Indefiniteness
The Examiner rejects claims 6 and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as
indefinite. Final Act. 3. More specifically, the Examiner concludes that
claim 6 should depend from claim 5, and that claim 18 should depend from
claim 17. Id. “Appellant agrees with the Examiner.” Appeal Br. 3.
Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claims 6 and 18 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(b).

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Obviousness
Independent Claims 1 and 13, and Dependent Claims 4, 7, 12, 16, 19,
and 24
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner
erred in rejecting claims 1 and 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103, because Okada and
Hoyos do not teach or suggest “controlling whether full operation of the
vehicle is enabled or disabled based on a response sent from the remote
authentication server to a mobile device of the occupant that is separate from
the computing device,” as recited in claim 1, and similarly recited in claim
13. Appeal Br. 4–5.
Appellant argues that Hoyos does not teach “sending the authorization
notification to the mobile device when the vehicle has already been
temporarily enabled,” as recited in claim 1, and similarly recited in claim 13.
Appeal Br. 4–5. Appellant contends that Hoyos, instead, “only discloses
sending the authorization notification to the mobile device as part of the
initial authorization and enablement of the operation of the vehicle.” Id.
at 4.
Appellant’s argument does not apprise us of Examiner error, at least
because the Examiner relies on Okada for teaching of an authorization
notification when the vehicle has been temporarily enabled. Final Act. 5
(citing Okada 15:20–23), 9; see also Okada 15:18–23 (describing that a
temporarily-enabled vehicle is shifted from a temporary permission mode to
an authentic mode after central authentication is completed in agreement).
The Examiner relies on Hoyos only for teaching that it would have been
obvious to modify Okada to send the authorization notification to a mobile
device of the occupant, instead of the computing device. Final Act. 5 (citing
Hoyos ¶¶ 25, 120), 9; see also Hoyos ¶ 120 (describing that an authorization
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notification is sent to an on-board computer or a mobile device of the user
attempting to gain access to the vehicle).
Therefore, we sustain the rejection of independent claims 1 and 13
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Okada, Hoyos, and Drori.
Appellant does not provide additional arguments with respect to the
rejections of dependent claims 4, 7, 12, 16, 19, and 24 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103. See Appeal Br. 6 (asserting that the dependent claims are allowable
by virtue of their dependence from an allowable base clam). Therefore, we
also sustain the rejections of claims 4, 7, 12, 16, 19, and 24 under 35
U.S.C. § 103.
Dependent Claims 5 and 17
We are persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner erred in
rejecting claim 5 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 because Hoyos fails to teach that the
response sent from the remote authentication server to a mobile device
“includes an authentication code,” as required by claim 5. Appeal Br. 5.
The Examiner finds that sending an authorization notification from a system
server to a mobile device, as taught by Hoyos at paragraph 120, teaches the
claimed response includes an authentication code. Final Act. 6. Yet, Hoyos
teaches that the authorization notification sent to the mobile device identifies
the user, and indicates that the user has been authenticated and authorized.
Hoyos ¶ 121.
In the Answer, the Examiner elaborates that the term “‘authentication
code’ is not defined within the claim” and, thus, could be interpreted as “any
signal, representation, [or] transmission, etc.” Ans. 4. We disagree.
Although Appellant’s Specification does not define “authentication code,”
Appellant’s Specification describes an “authentication code” consistent with
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its plain meaning, i.e., as a code, such as a personal identification number
(PIN) or password, used to perform authentication. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 6, 8,
22, 33, 35, 45, 48. For example, paragraph 33 of the Specification explains
that the authentication system “receive[s] an authentication code, such as a
PIN or password, from the user (e.g., on the touch display 12) and either
authenticate[s] the PIN locally or transmit[s] to the authentication server 36
for authentication.” In our view, one of ordinary skill in the art would
understand, in light of the Specification, that the claimed “authentication
code” is not any signal, but rather a code used to perform authentication. No
such authentication code is evident from the portion of Hoyos relied upon
the Examiner. Therefore, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 5 under 35
U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Okada and Hoyos.
Claim 17 recites language similar to claim 5. Accordingly, we do not
sustain the rejection of claim 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Okada and Hoyos for the same reasons set forth above with respect to
claim 5.
Dependent Claims 6 and 18
Claim 6 depends from claim 1, and claim 18 depends from claim 13.
Appellant acknowledges that claim 6 should depend from claim 5, and that
claim 18 should depend from claim 17. Appeal Br. 3. However, because a
corresponding amendment has not been entered, the proper scope of these
claims remains unclear. Therefore, we do not sustain, pro forma, the
rejection of these claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Okada
and Hoyos. See, e.g., In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862 (CCPA 1962) (A prior
art rejection cannot be sustained if the hypothetical person of ordinary skill
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in the art would have to make speculative assumptions concerning the
meaning of claim language.).

CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § References/Basis Affirmed Reversed
6, 18 112(b) Indefiniteness 6, 18
1, 5–7, 12,
13, 17–19,
24
103 Okada, Hoyos 1, 7, 12, 13, 19, 24
5, 6, 17,
18
4, 16 103 Okada, Hoyos, Drori 4, 16
Overall
Outcome
1, 4, 6, 7,
12, 13, 16,
18, 19, 24
5, 17

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED IN PART