Nancy Haley-Martinez, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 25, 2003
01a20092 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 25, 2003)

01a20092

09-25-2003

Nancy Haley-Martinez, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Nancy Haley-Martinez v. United States Postal Service

01A20092

09-25-03

.

Nancy Haley-Martinez,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A20092

Agency No. 4F-950-0036-99

Hearing No. 370-99-X2626

DECISION

Nancy Haley-Martinez (hereinafter referred to as complainant) filed an

appeal from the August 14, 2001, final decision of the United States

Postal Service (hereinafter referred to as the agency) concerning her

complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in violation of Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.,

and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The appeal is timely filed (see 29 C.F.R. � 1614.402(a)) and is accepted

in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the reasons that follow,

the agency's decision is AFFIRMED.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue presented in this appeal is whether complainant has proven,

by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency discriminated against

her based on disability (back), national origin (Hispanic), and sex when

her request for light duty was denied in April 1998.

BACKGROUND

Complainant alleged discrimination based on disability (back), national

origin (Hispanic), and sex when she was not assigned light duty work.

In late 1997, complainant had an off-work accident that aggravated a

previous on-the-job injury to her back. After the off-work injury,

she filed a claim with the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs,

Department of Labor (OWCP), seeking supplemental compensation for her

back injury. According to agency practice, from the time she filed

her OWCP claim and while it was pending, she was eligible for limited

duty work and was assigned to a modified carrier position within her

medical restrictions. It appears that she worked for a short time and

was on leave through April 1998. While she was on leave, in March 1998,

OWCP denied her claim. Also, the agency changed the position to which

she had been assigned and returned it to a full-time carrier position,

because the new housing subdivision for which it was created had opened.

When she sought to return to work in April 1998, she was eligible for

light duty work, only; however, no light duty work was available within

her medical restrictions until February 1999, when she returned to work.

Following a hearing, the AJ found that complainant was not a

qualified person with a disability and that the agency witnesses

had credibly testified that it had no position available within her

medical restrictions. Agency witnesses stated that they searched for

another position within the facility and at other facilities, but no

positions were available that could accommodate her medical restrictions.

With regard to her claims based on sex and national origin, the AJ found

no discrimination, in that, complainant failed to present any evidence

in support of this claim.

On appeal, complainant contended that the agency should have provided

her a reasonable accommodation and found her work within her medical

restrictions at the time she was ready to return to work in April 1998.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by

an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Substantial evidence is defined as �such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.� Universal

Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)

(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory

intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,

456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). In this matter, complainant claims that the

agency discriminated against her based on disability, national origin,

and sex when it failed to afford her a reasonable accommodation in the

form of a light duty position.

Accommodation Claim

Under the Commission's regulations, an agency is required to make

reasonable accommodation to the known physical and mental limitations

of a qualified individual with a disability unless the agency can show

that accommodation would cause an undue hardship. 29 C.F.R. � 1630.9.

As a threshold matter, therefore, one claiming protection under the

Rehabilitation Act must show that s/he is a person with a disability

as defined therein. A person with a disability is one who has, has a

record of, or is regarded as having a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more major life activities. 29 C.F.R. �

1614.203(a)(1). Major life activities include caring for one's self,

performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,

learning, and working. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.203(a)(3). In seeking an

accommodation, an employee must show a nexus between the disabling

condition and the requested accommodation. See Wiggins v. United States

Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01953715 (April 22, 1997).

For purposes of further analysis, we assume, arguendo, and without

finding, that complainant established that she is an individual with a

disability and is entitled to coverage under the Rehabilitation Act.

Because complainant could not perform the core duties of her carrier

position with or without a reasonable accommodation, however, we

find, as did the AJ, that she is not a "qualified" individual with a

disability within the meaning of 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(m). Nevertheless,

the discussion of �qualified� does not end at this point; a�qualified

individual with a disability,� with respect to employment, is defined

as a disabled person who, with or without a reasonable accommodation,

can perform the essential functions of the position held or desired.

29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(m). The term "position" is not limited to the position

held by the employee but also includes positions that the employee could

have held as a result of reassignment. Therefore, in determining whether

an employee is "qualified," an agency must look beyond the position to

which the employee is assigned and consider reassignment.<1>

Upon review of the record, we find that the agency met its obligation

to consider reassignment but found no vacant position which complainant

could perform within her medical restrictions and for which she was

qualified. Further, we note that complainant failed to satisfy her

burden to establish that it is more likely than not (preponderance of

the evidence) that there were vacancies during the relevant time period

into which complainant could have been reassigned. Hampton v. USPS, EEOC

Appeal No. 01986308 (July 31, 2002). A complainant can establish this

by producing evidence of particular vacancies, or, in the alternative,

complainant can show that (1) s/he was qualified to perform a job or

jobs which existed at the agency, and (2) there were trends or patterns

of turnover in the relevant jobs so as to make a vacancy likely during

the time period. Id. Complainant did not provide evidence to support

an assertion that, had the agency searched further at the relevant

time, it would have found a vacant position to which she could have

been reassigned. Accordingly, the Commission finds that complainant

failed to establish her claim that the agency failed to provide her a

reasonable accommodation.

Title VII Claims

Complainant also alleged that she was subjected to discrimination based

on national origin and sex; however, she did not present any facts that

established an inference of discrimination or establish a prima facie

case. Further, complainant did not show that other persons similarly

situated to her that had requested light duty were treated more favorably.

For all of the above reasons, and, after a review of the record, we

discern no basis to disturb the AJ's finding of no discrimination.

The AJ's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, and

the AJ correctly applied the appropriate regulations, policies, and laws.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the agency's decision was proper and is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

____09-25-03______________

Date

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision

was received within five (5) calendar days after it was mailed. I certify

that this decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative

(if applicable), and the agency on:

__________________

Date

______________________________

1The agency is advised that 29 C.F.R. � 1614.203(g), which governed

and limited the obligation of reassignment in the Federal sector,

has been superseded and no longer applies. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.203(b).

The ADA standards apply to all conduct on or after June 20, 2002, and

emphasize, among other things, a broader search for a vacancy. The ADA

regulations regarding reassignment can be found at 29 C.F.R. �� 1630.2(o)

and 1630.9. Additional information can be found in the Appendix to the

ADA regulations and in the EEOC's Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable

Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities

Act (rev. October 17, 2002) at Questions 25-31. These documents are

available on the EEOC's website at www.eeoc.gov.