My Door View, LLCDownload PDFTrademark Trial and Appeal BoardMar 26, 202188444283 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 26, 2021) Copy Citation THIS OPINION IS NOT A PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB Mailed: March 26, 2021 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE _____ Trademark Trial and Appeal Board _____ In re My Door View, LLC _____ Serial No. 88444283 _____ Nigamnarayan Acharya of Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP,1 for My Door View, LLC. Benjamin Rosen, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 120, David Miller, Managing Attorney. _____ Before Zervas, Goodman and Lebow, Administrative Trademark Judges. Opinion by Lebow, Administrative Trademark Judge: Applicant, My Door View, LLC, applied to register the mark MYDOORVIEW, as amended, in standard characters on the Principal Register for 1 Applicant’s brief identifies its counsel’s law firm as noted above which, along with that firm’s physical and email address, remains as the correspondence address of record. Applicant’s reply brief, however, identifies another firm, Greenberg Traurig, with a different physical and email address. It is the responsibility of a party to a Board proceeding, or its attorney, to update any changes to its postal and email address by filing a separate change of address with the Board using ESTTA. Any failure to receive correspondence due to a change of address of which the Board has not been given separate written notice lies with the party or its attorney. See TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF PROCEDURE (TMEP) § 117.07 (June 2020). A courtesy copy of this decision will be mailed to the alternate email address shown in the reply brief. Serial No. 88444283 - 2 - Downloadable software to enable electronic gate access; downloadable software to enable a cloud based video intercom for multi-family properties; downloadable software to enable gate access control through video and intercom, in International Class 9; and Electronic gate control, namely, providing a website featuring technology enabling users to remotely operate and control electronic gates in homes and offices; providing online non-downloadable software to enable electronic gate access; business safety consulting in the nature of computer security consulting; consultancy in the field of home and business computer security; providing online non-downloadable software to enable a cloud based video intercom for multi-family properties; providing online non-downloadable software to enable gate access control through video and intercom, in International Class 42.2 The Trademark Examining Attorney refused registration under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground that Applicant’s mark, when used in connection with the identified goods and services, so resembles the registered mark on the Principal Register for “Wireless communication devices for transmitting images taken by a camera” in International in Class 9,3 as 2 Application Serial No. 88444283 was filed on May 23, 2019 under Section 1(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), based on Applicant’s allegation of first use anywhere and in commerce as of January 1, 2019 for the goods in Class 9, and as of January 19, 2019 for the services in Class 42. The mark was originally identified as “MY DOOR VIEW,” which Applicant amended during prosecution to address the Examining Attorney’s specimen of use requirement. February 12, 2020 Response to Office Action, TSDR 1. Page references in this opinion to the application record refer to the online database of the USPTO’s Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (“TSDR”) system. All citations to documents contained in the TSDR database are to the downloadable .pdf versions of the documents. References to the briefs on appeal refer to the Board’s TTABVUE docket system. 3 Registration No. 5257387 (“the Registration”), which registered August 1, 2017, disclaims the word “DOOR.” The registration describes the mark as consisting of “the stylized words Serial No. 88444283 - 3 - to be likely to cause confusion. When the refusal was made final, Applicant appealed to this Board and requested reconsideration. After the Examining Attorney denied Applicant’s request for reconsideration, the appeal was resumed. The appeal is fully briefed. We affirm the refusal. I. Applicable Law The fundamental purpose of Trademark Act Section 2(d) is to prevent confusion as to source of goods or services, and to protect registrants from damage caused by registration of confusingly similar marks. Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 224 USPQ 327, 331 (1985). Our analysis is based on all of the probative evidence of record. In re E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”). In making our determination, we consider each DuPont factor for which there is evidence and argument. See In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 129 USPQ2d 1160, 1162-63 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Varying weights may be assigned to each DuPont factor depending on the evidence presented. See Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp. Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1688 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[T]he various evidentiary factors may play more or less weighty roles in any particular determination”). In any likelihood of confusion analysis, two key considerations are the similarities ‘MY DOOR’, with a tapering halo ring beginning above the letter ‘Y’, and continuing through the opening in the first letter ‘O’, and terminating under the letter ‘M’.” Serial No. 88444283 - 4 - between the marks and the similarities between the goods and services. See In re Chatam Int’l Inc., 380 F.3d 1340, 71 USPQ2d 1944, 1945-46 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the marks.”). A. Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Marks We begin with the first DuPont factor, which requires us to determine the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks when viewed in their entireties in terms of appearance, sound, connotation and overall commercial impression. Palm Bay Imps. Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018), aff’d mem., 777 Fed. Appx. 516 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)). The test is not whether the marks can be distinguished in a side-by-side comparison, but rather whether their overall commercial impressions are so similar that confusion as to the source of the goods offered under the respective marks is likely to result. See Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing Coach Servs. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). Our focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who normally retains a general rather than a specific impression Serial No. 88444283 - 5 - of trademarks. See Neutrogena Corp. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 410 F.2d 1391, 161 USPQ 687, 688 (CCPA 1969) (many consumers “may have but dim recollections from having previously seen or heard one or the other of the involved marks.”); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1740 (TTAB 2014). The average purchaser in this case would be a home or business owner seeking software and/or electronic devices for security monitoring, control and/or access to areas such as residential and business properties. The marks are similar because both marks include the wording MY DOOR. That wording comprises the first two of only three words in Applicant’s mark, and the entirety of wording in Registrant’s mark. “Thus, upon encountering each mark, consumers must first notice [these] identical lead word[s].” Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 1992). See also In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“The identity of the marks’ initial two words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first.”). Applicant argues that both marks “contain a permutation of the term ‘my door,’” but “the additional terms and aspects that comprise Registrant’s mark and the lack thereof in Applicant’s mark have trademark and market significance, which results in them creating a disparate appearance, sound, and meaning.”4 In particular, “the term ‘view’ in Applicant’s Mark significantly increases the length of the mark and changes the visual impression. Visually, Applicant’s Mark is a single compound word 4 6 TTABVUE 6 (Applicant’s Brief). Serial No. 88444283 - 6 - of the words ‘my’ ‘door’ and ‘view.’ Applicant further argues that Registrant’s mark includes a halo type design, which will at least affect the impression of the marks,” and that the Examining Attorney has improperly dissected the marks contrary to the “anti-dissection rule.”5 We agree that there are some differences between the marks that must be considered, but find the marks very similar overall. The lack of spacing between the words in Applicant’s mark, which makes it a “single compound word,”6 is not particularly significant. See In re 3Com Corp., 56 USPQ2d 1060, 1062 (TTAB 2000) (“the mere deletion of a space between the words ATM and LINK does not transform this otherwise generic term into a source indicator or change the commonly understood meaning of the term.”). Additionally, while Registrant’s mark includes a halo design element, embedded within the wording and emanating from the first letter “O” in DOOR, it is not the dominant element in the mark, which is instead its wording. It is settled that where, as here, a mark is comprised of both words and a design, the words are normally accorded greater weight, in part because consumers are likely to remember and use the words to request the goods or services. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1911 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“the verbal portion of a word and design mark likely will be the dominant portion”); In re Appetito Provisions Co. Inc., 3 USPQ2d 1553, 1554 (TTAB 1987) (“[I]f one of the marks comprises both a word and a design, 5 Id. 6 Id. Serial No. 88444283 - 7 - then the word is normally accorded greater weight because it would be used by purchasers to request the goods or services.”); In re National Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“[T]here is nothing improper in stating that, for rational reasons, more or less weight has been given to a particular feature of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in their entireties.”). Here, there is nothing in the record to suggest that consumers will utilize the design portion of Applicant’s mark to request its goods and services, rather than the wording. With the exception of the added word VIEW, the wording of the compared marks is virtually identical. Adding a term to a registered mark generally does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks. See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (CCPA 1975) (finding BENGAL and BENGAL LANCER and design confusingly similar); In re El Torito Restaurants, Inc., 9 USPQ2d 2002, 2004 (TTAB 1988) (finding MACHO and MACHO COMBOS confusingly similar); In re Denisi, 225 USPQ 624, 624 (TTAB 1985) (holding PERRY’S PIZZA and PERRY’S, both for restaurant services, likely to cause confusion, noting that “where a newcomer has appropriated the entire mark of a registrant, and has added to it a non-distinctive term, the marks are generally considered to be confusingly similar”). This is especially true here given that the additional term VIEW as applied to Applicant’s goods and services appears highly suggestive. Applicant’s goods and services refer to multifamily properties and include, inter alia, software for gate Serial No. 88444283 - 8 - access and control through video. A “gate” is “the frame or door that closes a gate.”7 The goods and services likely will allow the user to visually determine who is at the gate. Consequently, we do not agree with Applicant’s contention that the compared marks have “completely different meanings,” or its unsupported speculation that MYDOORVIEW “will likely be interpreted to mean ‘the view from a door,’” whereas “Registrant’s mark will be taken to mean ‘my door’ or more probably ‘my door camera.’”8 Consumers familiar with Registrant’s MY DOOR wireless communication devices for transmitting images taken by a camera may therefore mistakenly believe that MYDOORVIEW is a new line of products or services associated with MY DOOR wireless communication devices with a visual feature. Applicant argues that the facts in this case are similar to those in Approved Pharm. Corp. v. P. Leiner Nutritional Prods. Inc., 5 USPQ2d 1219 (TTAB 1987), where the Board found that confusion between the marks HEALTHY LIFE and HEALTHY FOR LIFE for vitamins and dietary food supplements “while possible, is not likely.” Id. at 1221. However, Approved Pharm. Corp. involved a consent to use and register agreement signed by the respondent. Id. That fact carried great weight in the Board’s decision in that case. See In re Four Seasons Hotels Ltd., 987 F.2d 1565, 26 USPQ2d 1071, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (consent agreements should carry great 7 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/gate (accessed March 23, 2021). The Board may take judicial notice of dictionary definitions from online sources when the definitions themselves are derived from dictionaries that exist in printed form or have regular fixed editions. See In re White Jasmine LLC, 106 USPQ2d 1385, 1392 n.23 (TTAB 2013); In re Red Bull GmbH, 78 USPQ2d 1375, 1378 (TTAB 2006). 8 6 TTABVUE 8 (Applicant’s Brief). Serial No. 88444283 - 9 - weight in the likelihood of confusion analysis); Amalgamated Bank of N.Y. v. Amalgamated Trust & Sav. Bank, 842 F.2d 1270, 6 USPQ2d 1305, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1988); DuPont, 177 USPQ at 568 (“[W]hen those most familiar with use in the marketplace and most interested in precluding confusion enter agreements designed to avoid it, the scales of evidence are clearly tilted. It is at least difficult to maintain a subjective view that confusion will occur when those directly concerned say it won’t”). Applicant’s comparison is therefore inapposite. Applicant also cites In re Covalinski, 113 USPQ2d 1166 (TTAB 2014), which held confusion unlikely between the mark REDNECK RACEGIRL and Design -- -- and the registered mark RACEGIRL, even when used on in- part identical goods, to argue that the “the combination of two words in the registered mark create distinct, significant commercial impressions in the purchaser’s mind such that this design element alone should dictate no likelihood of confusion.”9 However, in that case and unlike the facts here, the Board found the “overall commercial impression” of the applicant’s mark “dominated by its design features, particularly the large double-letter RR configuration,” id. at 1169, because the “graphic devices serve not only to draw attention to the RR letters apart from the wording, but also make the letters that form the ‘a-c-e’ of the word ‘RACEGIRL’ difficult to notice.” Id. at 1168. 9 Id. at 7. Serial No. 88444283 - 10 - As the Examining Attorney correctly notes, citing United Global Media Grp., Inc. v. Tseng, 112 USPQ2d 1039, 1049, (TTAB 2014), our focus must be on “the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general, rather than specific, impression of trademarks.”10 While the marks have some slight differences in appearance and sound due to the added word VIEW in Applicant’s mark and the halo design element in Registrant’s mark, when viewed in their entireties, the marks are more similar than dissimilar in overall appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. Applicant argues that “Registrant has a very weak mark (consisting of the terms ‘my’ and ‘door’ with the term ‘door disclaimed).”11 “Even if the combined term “mydoor” is not ubiquitous,” Applicant urges, “the marks effectively only share the weak terms ‘my’ and ‘door,’ which effectively allows the marks to coexist.”12 Applicant cites Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334, 115 USPQ2d 1671, 1674 (Fed. Cir. 2015), a case it likens to the present case, for the principle that “[w]hen a party uses a relatively weak trademark the law permits a competitor to come closer in use than if the mark was strong.”13 Applicant also asserts that “[t]he term ‘my door’ is a descriptive term….”14 10 8 TTABVUE 11 (Examining Attorney’s Brief). 11 6 TTABVUE 12 (Applicant’s Brief). 12 Id. 13 Id. (paraphrasing Juice Generation, 115 USPQ2d at 1338-1339). 14 Id. at 8. Serial No. 88444283 - 11 - The problem with Applicant’s inherent weakness argument, as the Examining Attorney observes, is that [A]pplicant has provided no evidence that any of the wording in the applied-for mark, or any of the wording in the registered mark, is commonly used in the marketplace for similar goods or services. Applicant also puts forth no evidence that the combined phrase “MY DOOR”, which is registered on the principal register, is descriptive for the underlying good or services of applicant or registrant such that the registrant should not be afforded a broad scope of protection.15 We therefore have no basis to consider Registrant’s MY DOOR mark is so highly suggestive that the scope of protection afforded to the Registration should be limited. Even if we were to assume that Registrant’s mark is suggestive, it nonetheless remains inherently distinctive as applied to the goods identified in the Registration. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 54 USPQ2d 1065, 1068 (2000) (word marks that are arbitrary, fanciful, or suggestive are “held to be inherently distinctive.”). Hence, it must be accorded at least the normal scope of protection to which all inherently distinctive marks are entitled. In re Great Lakes Canning, Inc., 227 USPQ 483, 485 (TTAB 1985) (“[T]he fact that a mark may be somewhat suggestive does not mean that it is a ‘weak’ mark entitled to a limited scope of protection”). The first DuPont factor weighs in favor of finding likelihood of confusion. 15 8 TTABVUE 12-13 (Examining Attorney’s Brief). Applicant does provide evidence of five USPTO TESS database printouts of five third-party registrations for “my”-formative marks for random software that is unrelated to the goods and services here, but makes no mention of them in its brief. And even if it had, they are not probative. See In re Thor Tech Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1634, 1639 (TTAB 2009) (third-party registrations for goods that appear to be in fields which are far removed from the goods at issue are of limited probative value). Serial No. 88444283 - 12 - B. Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Goods and Services and their Trade Channels The second DuPont factor concerns the “similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as described in an application or registration,” and the third DuPont factor concerns the “similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to- continue trade channels.” DuPont, 177 USPQ at 567; Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1159, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2014). It is “not necessary that the goods be identical or even competitive to support a finding of a likelihood of confusion.” Coach Servs., 101 USPQ2d at 1722 (quoting 7- Eleven, Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)). “[L]ikelihood of confusion can be found ‘if the respective goods are related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that they emanate from the same source.’” Id. The Examining Attorney contends that Applicant’s software goods and security- related services, and Registrant’s wireless camera transmission devices, “are commonly produced and provided by the same entities, provided in the same trade channels, and used for related and complementary purposes.”16 In support, he provides the following examples from third parties, including Registrant, who “produce security and electronic monitoring and control software, wireless communication camera devices, and that provide security and monitoring services and consulting related thereto, all together and under the same mark”:17 16 8 TTABVUE 5 (Examining Attorney’s Brief). 17 Id. at 5-6. Serial No. 88444283 - 13 - o Registrant, Intrasonic Technology, Inc. (intrasonictechnology.com), in addition to promoting its wireless communication devices for transmitting images taken by a camera, also advertises security and monitoring services: “Upgrade your security with the MyDoor™ IP Video Doorbell, featuring an exclusive adjustable camera with Night- Vision…. Receive notifications of guests and speak with them as though you were home. Unlock a door and gate with remote technology.”18 o ADT (adt.com) advertises (i) wireless security cameras similar in nature to Registrant’s cameras, as well as (ii) home security, monitoring and access services: “Add video surveillance to get a clear, HD view inside your home, day or night with wireless indoor security cameras… Keep an eye on your property day or night with ADT outdoor security cameras to extend your video surveillance outside of the home.”19 o Alarm.com advertises customized security products and services including (i) a door camera with two-way voice through the Alarm.com application, and (ii) video monitoring from anywhere” by using a “smartphone or tablet to view live streaming video while away from your property.” “Get a video alert if someone lingers at your door” or “a car enters your driveway.”20 o CPI (cpisecurity.com) provides residential, business and new construction security solutions including doorbell cameras with application software that provide “alerts any time there’s activity at the front of your home”; intercom access that allows one to “ask the person to leave with the push of a button”; and to “[k]now when the delivery person arrives, unlock the door and ask them to leave the package inside – all from your mobile device, no matter where you are.”21 o The Google store (store.google.com) provides (i) indoor and outdoor security cameras and (ii) a Google Nest application (play.google.com) that controls associated thermostats, alarm systems, and indoor and outdoor cams, and provides alerts via an Android device or tablet: “Get an alert when someone locks or unlocks the door. With Home/Away Assist and Auto-Lock, your door can lock itself when you leave.”22 18 August 12, 2019 Office Action, TSDR 11. 19 Id. at 13-15. 20 Id. at 16-18. 21 March 3, 2020 Final Office Action, TSDR 8-26. 22 Id. at 27-34. Serial No. 88444283 - 14 - o Resideo (resido.com) offers (i) Honeywell Home WiFi security cameras that provide live video stream security monitoring and recording of homes, including motion and sound detectors for doors, windows, and rooms, controls home appliances, and provides access through mobile devices through an associated application;23 and (ii) an application, Total Connect 2.0, that provides mobile management of security systems including features that include locking and unlocking doors.24 o SimpliSafe (simplisafe.com) sells (i) a security camera that provides live and recorded audio and video that is accessible through a smartphone, tablet or computer, which provides motion detection and other features; (ii) a door lock system that locks and unlocks doors when the system is armed or by timer, and provides alerts when accessed; (iii) a video doorbell; and (iv) a home security application to control a security system.25 o Vivint (vivint.com) promotes (i) a security doorbell camera, “the gateway to your home,” with two-way talk, one-way video, recording, unlocking of doors, turning on lights, and notifications via a mobile device; (ii) a smart home application that automates home systems with management of lighting and climate controls, operation of garage doors and door locks, security camera monitoring, and door interaction with visitors through the doorbell camera; and (iii) consultation services to customize a home security system.26 Third-party evidence of this sort is probative of the relatedness of the goods and services, and the similarity of the channels of trade and classes of customers. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re 1st USA Realty Professionals, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1585 n.4 (TTAB 2007) (“[E]vidence that third parties offer both types of goods or services … is [] evidence that the public would believe that both types of goods or services emanate from a single source.”). 23 Id. at 35-49. 24 Id. at 50-56. 25 Id. at 57-71. 26 Id. at 72-94. Serial No. 88444283 - 15 - All of the above third-parties promote the sale of wireless communication devices for transmitting images taken by a camera (Registrant’s goods), as well as some type of software application, downloadable or non-downloadable, that provides video and/or intercom capability, and most are customizable for residential and business properties (Applicant’s goods and services). This evidence shows that both goods identified in the registration and some of the goods and services identified in the involved application are provided by the same parties, through the same trade channels, usually under the same mark. In a similar vein, Applicant’s gate access software, as well as its home security consulting services, would be used by the same consumers, perhaps at the same time as those who seek home security cameras and monitoring, particularly those consumers having gated properties. Applicant does not controvert the Examining Attorney’s third-party evidence showing that Applicant’s home security goods and services are related to Registrant’s wireless communication devices for transmitting images taken by a camera. Instead, Applicant argues that “Registrant’s goods are directed to a [sic] ‘wireless devices’ or a network of devices to a camera which may undoubtedly involve the use of the software or software itself. In contrast, Applicant’s good/services are directed to (a) a software solution and (b) viewing images from remote locations.”27 In the same paragraph, Applicant states that, “[n]ot surprisingly, Registrant’s website is showing a wireless doorbell, which is not Applicant’s solution or software. In any event, the 27 6 TTABVUE 10-11 (Applicant’s Brief). Serial No. 88444283 - 16 - applications [sic] must be compared to the use on specific webpages.”28 Applicant’s focus on the mode of software is irrelevant to our determination of whether the respective goods and services are commercially related. In any event, most of the third-party evidence reference “solutions” in the context of the video cameras being promoted, and the ability to view images obtained through those video cameras through remote devices, such as smart phones, tablets, and computers that may be accessed anywhere. Additionally, Applicant’s reference to Registrant’s website and its depiction of a wireless doorbell is misplaced, and Applicant’s contention that we must compare the respective identifications with the uses shown on the specific web pages is erroneous. As the Examining Attorney notes, when analyzing an applicant’s and registrant’s goods and services for similarity and relatedness, that determination is based on the identification of the goods and services in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.29 See Stone Lion, 110 USPQ2d at 1162 (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)); Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, 811 F.2d 1490, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1815 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (quoting CBS, Inc. v. Morrow, 708 F.2d 1579, 218 USPQ 198, 199 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). Registrant’s “communication devices for transmitting images taken by a camera” are not limited to doorbell cameras. They may, for example, include electronic gate 28 Id. 29 8 TTABVUE 9 (Examining Attorney’s Brief). Serial No. 88444283 - 17 - cameras, or any device that captures and transmits images. Nor are they limited in the scope of their use, which may include the same “multi-family properties” that Applicant targets with its goods and services. We are required to give full sweep to Registrant’s identified goods, construing them to encompass all goods of the type identified. Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 719 F.3d 1367, 107 USPQ2d 1167, 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Paula Payne Prods. Co. v. Johnson Publ’g Co., Inc., 473 F.2d 901, 177 USPQ 76, 77-78 (CCPA 1973). The third-party evidence of record supports a finding that wireless communication devices for transmitting images taken by a camera, and software goods and services that provide video intercom access, are related goods and services that consumers encounter emanating from the same source, under the same marks. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69 (TTAB 2009). Furthermore, because there are no limitations as to channels of trade or classes of purchasers in identification of the goods and services in the application or the Registration, we must presume that the identified goods move in all channels of trade normal for such goods and are available to all potential classes of ordinary consumers thereof. See Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp. Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Jump Designs LLC, 80 USPQ2d 1370, 1374 (TTAB 2006); In re Elbaum, 211 USPQ 639, 640 (TTAB 1981). The third-party evidence shows that the same or similar goods and services of Applicant and Registrant are indeed offered through the same trade channels, sometimes on the same webpage. Serial No. 88444283 - 18 - On consideration of all the evidence, we find that “the respective products [and services] are related in some manner and/or ... the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that they emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., 101 USPQ2d at 1722 (quoting 7-Eleven, 83 USPQ2d at 1724). For these reasons, the second and third Dupont factors favor of finding likelihood of confusion. II. Conclusion Viewed in their entireties, Applicant’s MYDOORVIEW mark and Registrant’s marks are confusingly similar; their respective goods and services are commercially related; and the trade channels and classes of purchasers overlap. In view thereof, we find Applicant’s mark for its identified goods and services to be likely to cause confusion with Registrant’s mark for its identified goods. Decision: The refusal to register is affirmed. Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation