MX Technologies, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 9, 2020

14481772 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Apr. 9, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/481,772 09/09/2014 John Ryan Caldwell 3552.2.16 1069
136265 7590 04/09/2020
Kunzler, PC. - MX
50 West Broadway
10th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
EXAMINER
JOHNSON, CHRISTINE
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3697
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/09/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docket@kunzlerlaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte JOHN RYAN CALDWELL, RONALD BRENNAN KNOTTS,
and JONATHAN R. HOPKINS
________

Appeal 2019-001630
Application 14/481,772
Technology Center 3600

____________

Before ANTON W. FETTING, PHILIP J. HOFFMANN, and
BRUCE T. WIEDER, Administrative Patent Judges.

WIEDER, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 seeks review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the Examiner’s
final rejection of claims 1–12 and 14–25. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant’s invention “relates generally to financial goal setting and
planning over long periods of time,” and, “more particularly . . . to a system

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as MX
Technologies, Inc. (Appeal Br. 2.)
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for producing multi-dimensional graphics that represent complex financial
goals.” (Spec. ¶ 4.)
Claims 1 and 14 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1 is
illustrative. It recites:
1. A method comprising:
receiving, at a computing device, a plurality of different
financial goals from a user, wherein each of the plurality of
financial goals comprises a goal amount and a time for
completing the financial goal;
receiving, at the computing device, a priority from the user
for each of the financial goals, the priority determining an order
for achieving the financial goals;
generating, at the computing device, a graphical
representation for each of the plurality of financial goals based
on the goal amount and the time for completing the financial
goal;
determining, at the computing device, an area for each
graphical representation as a function of an available size of a
digital display of the computing device;
normalizing, at the computing device, a size of each of the
graphical representations for each of the plurality of financial
goals such that the size of each of the graphical representations
falls within minimum and maximum size limits defined by a
slope of an asymptotic graph;
determining, at the computing device, a relative position
of the graphical representations of each of the plurality of
financial goals on a timeline based at least in part on the time for
completing the financial goals and the priority for the financial
goals, wherein the timeline is oriented such that graphical
representations of financial goals with future time periods are
presented behind graphical representations of financial goals
with more recent time periods;
displaying, on the digital display of the computing device,
the graphical representations of each of the plurality of financial
goals positioned relative to one another along the timeline; and
receiving, at the computing device, input from a user for
zooming into the timeline such that graphical representations of
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financial goals for recent time periods are removed from the
timeline and graphical representations of financial goals for
future time periods are made larger and moved closer to the
foreground, wherein the sizes of the graphical representations of
each of the plurality of goals are automatically adjusted
according to the slope of the asymptotic graph.

REJECTIONS
Claims 1–12 and 14–25 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed
to a judicial exception without significantly more.
Claims 1–12 and 14–25 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as
anticipated by Mackinlay (US 5,276,785, iss. Jan. 4, 1994).

ANALYSIS
The New Matter Objection
The Examiner objects, under 35 U.S.C. § 132(a), to the amendment
filed April 17, 2017 “because it introduces new matter into the disclosure.”
(Final Action 4.) The Examiner “required [Appellant] to cancel the new
matter.” (Id. at 5.)
Appellant argues “that the specification provides support for the claim
terms that the Office Action objects to as reciting new matter, and
respectfully requests that the objection be withdrawn.” (Appeal Br. 5.)
A rejection of claims is reviewable by the Patent Trial and
Appeal Board, whereas an objection and requirement to delete
new matter is subject to supervisory review by petition under 37
CFR 1.181. If both the claims and specification contain new
matter either directly or indirectly, and there has been both a
rejection and objection by the examiner, the issue becomes
appealable and should not be decided by petition.

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MPEP § 2163.06 II; see also id. § 706.01 (“[T]he Board will not hear or
decide issues pertaining to objections and formal matter which are not
properly before the Board.”)
Here, the Examiner has entered an objection and a requirement to
delete the new matter. The Examiner has not entered a rejection associated
with the new matter objection. Therefore, we do not address this
petitionable matter.

The § 101 rejection
“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. Section 101, however,
“contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v.
CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quoting Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)).
Alice applies a two-step framework, earlier set out in Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66
(2012), “for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible
applications of those concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217.
Under the two-step framework, it must first be determined if “the
claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept.” Id. at 218. If the
claims are determined to be directed to a patent-ineligible concept, e.g., an
abstract idea, then the second step of the framework is applied to determine
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if “the elements of the claim . . . contain[] an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient
to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.”
Id. at 221 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–
73, 79).
With regard to step one of the Alice framework, we apply a “directed
to” two-prong test to: 1) evaluate whether the claim recites a judicial
exception, and 2) if the claim recites a judicial exception, evaluate whether
the claim “appl[ies], rel[ies] on, or use[s] the judicial exception in a manner
that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim
is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial
exception.” See USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 54 (Jan. 7, 2019) (hereinafter “2019 Guidance”).
Here, the Examiner determines that claim 1 is “directed to the abstract
idea of organized display of quantitative information” (Final Action 5), and
that the displayed information relates to “a financial goal” (id. at 6).
Appellant disagrees and argues “that the claims at issue are not
directed to concepts that have been found to be abstract ideas such as
fundamental economic practices, organizing human activities, an idea ‘of
itself,’ and/or mathematical relationships/formulas.” (Appeal Br. 5.) “In
particular, the elements of the claims at issue describe an improvement to
the technology by receiving a goal amount, a time period for completing the
goal, and a priority for completing the goal relative to other goals.” (Id.
at 7.)
Under step one of the Alice framework, we “look at the ‘focus of the
claimed advance over the prior art’ to determine if the claim’s ‘character as a
whole’ is directed to excluded subject matter.” Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC
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v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Elec.
Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
The “directed to” inquiry . . . cannot simply ask whether the
claims involve a patent-ineligible concept, because essentially
every routinely patent-eligible claim involving physical products
and actions involves a law of nature and/or natural phenomenon
. . . . Rather, the “directed to” inquiry applies a stage-one filter
to claims, considered in light of the specification, based on
whether “their character as a whole is directed to excluded
subject matter.” Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc.,
790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In
other words, the first step of the Alice framework “asks whether the focus of
the claims is on the specific asserted improvement in [the relevant
technology] or, instead, on a process that qualifies as an ‘abstract idea’ for
which computers are invoked merely as a tool.” Id. at 1335–36; see also
2019 Guidance at 54–55.
The Specification provides evidence as to what the claimed invention
is directed. In this case, the Specification discloses that the invention
“relates generally to financial goal setting and planning over long periods of
time,” and, “more particularly . . . to a system for producing multi-
dimensional graphics that represent complex financial goals.” (Spec. ¶ 4.)
Claim 1 provides further evidence. Claim 1 recites steps performed “at a
computing device” and displayed on a “digital display of the computing
device.” Specifically, claim 1 recites “receiving . . . a plurality of different
financial goals,” “receiving . . . a priority . . . for each of the financial goals,”
“generating . . . a graphical representation for each of the . . . financial
goals,” “determining . . . an area for each graphical representation,”
“normalizing . . . a size of each of the graphical representations,”
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“determining . . . a relative position of the graphical representations . . . on a
timeline,” “displaying . . . the graphical representations . . . positioned
relative to one another along the timeline,” “and receiving . . . input from a
user for zooming into the timeline.”
In short, claim 1 recites a generic computing device and a generic
digital display. (See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 62, 67, 69, 70, 73.) Additionally, the
evidence shows that claim 1 is directed to “selecting certain information,
analyzing it using mathematical techniques, and reporting or displaying the
results of the analysis. That is all abstract.” SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic,
LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018). In other words, the subject of
claim 1
is nothing but a series of mathematical calculations based on
selected information and the presentation of the results of those
calculations . . . . No matter how much of an advance in the
finance field the claim[] recite[s], the advance lies entirely in the
realm of abstract ideas, with no plausibly alleged innovation in
the non-abstract application realm. An advance of that nature is
ineligible for patenting.

Id. at 1163. Thus, claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea of mathematical
concepts. (See 2019 Guidance at 52; see also October 2019 Update: Subject
Matter Eligibility (October 2019) 19 n.20 (available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.
pdf).)
In cases involving software innovations, such as we have here, the
inquiry as to whether the claims are directed to an abstract idea “often turns
on whether the claims focus on ‘the specific asserted improvement in
computer capabilities ... or, instead, on a process that qualifies as an
“abstract idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a tool.’” Finjan,
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Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting
Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335–36). Here, the computing device and digital
display are invoked merely as tools.
Nonetheless, Appellant seeks to analogize claim 1 to the claims in
Enfish. (Appeal Br. 5–6.) We do not find this persuasive. The claims in
Enfish were “specifically directed to a self-referential table for a computer
database.” Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1337. That is, “the plain focus of the claims
[was] on an improvement to computer functionality itself, not on economic
or other tasks for which a computer is used in its ordinary capacity.” Id.
at 1336. Appellant does not persuasively argue how claim 1 improves
computer functionality.
Appellant also seeks to analogize the present claims to those in DDR
Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014). (Appeal
Br. 6–8.) Appellant argues that the invention of claim 1 solves
[p]roblems that conventional systems present includ[ing]
displaying financial goals in an intuitive and easy to view manner
so that a user can quickly and easily see the relative importance
of each goal, the progress made towards each goal, and the
relative sizes of each goal. Accordingly, [claim 1] “allows for
intuitive functionality by allowing a user to get a sense of their
progress toward their fiscal goals at a glance and thereby
intuitively comparing sizes of each of [the graphical
representations of the goals].”

(Appeal Br. 6. (emphasis omitted) (final brackets in original).) We do not
find Appellant’s argument persuasive.
The claims in DDR Holdings “specify how interactions with the
Internet are manipulated to yield a desired result –– a result that overrides
the routine and conventional sequence of events ordinarily triggered by the
click of a hyperlink.” DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1258. As an initial
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matter, we note that Appellant does not sufficiently explain how the steps of
claim 1 improve the technology itself. Claim 1 does not even recite “a
particular way of programming or designing the software . . . , but instead
merely claim[s] the resulting system[].” See Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc.,
842 F.3d 1229, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Claim 1 simply recites the functional
results to be achieved by any means. Appellant does not persuasively argue
how this is analogous to overriding the routine and conventional sequence of
events ordinarily triggered by the click of a hyperlink.
Appellant also seeks to analogize claim 1 to the claims in Core
Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 880 F.3d 1356 (Fed.
Cir. 2018). (Appeal Br. 8–9.) Specifically, Appellant argues that
the claims at issue improve user interfaces for computing devices
by intuitively displaying graphical representations of goals in
such a way that a user can easily discern goal amounts and goal
priorities relative to one based on the sizes of the graphical
representations of the goals and the order in which the graphical
representations are presented on the display, e.g., in the z-
direction of the display.

(Id. at 8.)
We do not find this argument persuasive. In Core Wireless, the
claims were “directed to an improved user interface.” Core Wireless, 880
F.3d at 1362. Specifically:
Claim 1 of the ‘476 patent requires “an application summary
that can be reached directly from the menu,” specifying a
particular manner by which the summary window must be
accessed. The claim further requires the application summary
window list a limited set of data, “each of the data in the list being
selectable to launch the respective application and enable the
selected data to be seen within the respective application.” This
claim limitation restrains the type of data that can be displayed
in the summary window. Finally, the claim recites that the
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summary window “is displayed while the one or more
applications are in an un-launched state,” a requirement that the
device applications exist in a particular state. These limitations
disclose a specific manner of displaying a limited set of
information to the user, rather than using conventional user
interface methods to display a generic index on a computer.

Id. at 1362–63 (emphasis added). In contrast, Appellant’s argument is that
the content of the displayed data constitutes the improvement. (See Appeal
Br. 8–9.) In other words, Appellant’s claim 1 is “focused on providing
information to [the user] . . . , not on improving computers or technology.”
Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
“Like Electric Power, the purported advance ‘is a process of gathering and
analyzing information of a specified content, then displaying the results, and
not any particular assertedly inventive technology for performing those
functions.’ 830 F.3d at 1354.” Id. at 1385. But “even if a process of
collecting and analyzing information is ‘limited to particular content’ or a
particular ‘source,’” this, alone, “does not make the collection and analysis
other than abstract.” SAP Am., 898 F.3d at 1168 (quoting Elec. Power Grp.,
830 F.3d at 1353, 1355).
Additionally, we do not see how the recitation of a generic computing
device and digital display, even in conjunction with the recited functions,
“ensure[s] ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (second and
third brackets in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
Nor do we find any indication in the Specification that the claimed
invention effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a
different state or thing. Nor do we find anything of record that attributes an
improvement in computer technology or functionality to the claimed
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invention or that otherwise indicates that the claimed invention “appl[ies],
rel[ies] on, or use[s] the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” (See 2019
Guidance at 54–55.)
Thus, under prong one of the two prong test in the 2019 Guidance,
claim 1 recites an abstract idea; and, under prong two, additional elements in
claim 1 do not “apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that
imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.”
(See 2019 Guidance at 54.) As such, under step one of the Alice framework,
the claim is directed to an abstract idea, and we move to step two.
Step two of the Alice framework has been described “as a search for
an ‘ “inventive concept” ’ —i.e., an element or combination of elements that
is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly
more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Alice, 573 U.S.
at 217–18 (brackets in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73).
In our analysis under step two of the Alice framework, we examine
“[t]he question of whether a claim element or combination of elements is
well-understood, routine and conventional to a skilled artisan in the relevant
field [which] is a question of fact.” Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360,
1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Here, the question is whether the steps of receiving
data, generating data for display, determining mathematical relations/making
calculations, displaying data, and receiving input are well-understood,
routine and conventional.
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Receiving data, generating data, performing calculations, displaying
data, and receiving additional data are all routine and conventional functions
for a computer processor and digital display, and were previously known to
the industry. See Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1356 (The claims “do not
include any requirement for performing the claimed functions of gathering,
analyzing, and displaying in real time by use of anything but entirely
conventional, generic technology. The claims therefore do not state an
arguably inventive concept . . . .”); see also In re Katz Interactive Call
Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Absent a
possible narrower construction of the terms ‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and
‘storing,’ . . . those functions can be achieved by any general purpose
computer without special programming.”).
Considered as an ordered combination, the generic computer
components of Appellant’s claimed invention add nothing that is not already
present when the limitations are considered separately. For example,
claim 1 does not, as discussed above, purport to improve the functioning of
the computing device and digital display themselves. Nor does it effect an
improvement in any other technology or technical field. Instead, claim 1
amounts to nothing significantly more than an instruction to apply the
abstract idea using generic computer components performing routine
computer functions. That is not enough to transform an abstract idea into a
patent-eligible invention. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 225–26.
Nonetheless, Appellant seeks to analogize claim 1 to the claims in
BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d
1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016). (Appeal Br. 9–10.) In BASCOM, the court
determined that “an inventive concept can be found in the non-conventional
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and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces.” BASCOM
Glob. Internet Servs., Inc., 827 F.3d at 1350. Here, claim 1 does not specify
that the recited computer components must be arranged in a non-
conventional manner.
Nor do we find persuasive Appellant’s attempt to analogize claim 1 to
the claims in Amdocs (Israel) Limited v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d
1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In relevant part, claim 1 of Amdocs recites “computer
code for using the accounting information with which the first network
accounting record is correlated to enhance the first network accounting
record.” Id. at 1299 (emphasis added). In an earlier opinion, Amdocs
(Israel) Limited v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 761 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(“Amdocs I”), the court
construed “enhance” as meaning “to apply a number of field
enhancements in a distributed fashion.” [Amdocs I] at 1340. We
took care to note how the district court explained that “[i]n this
context, ‘distributed’ means that the network usage records are
processed close to their sources before being transmitted to a
centralized manager.” [Amdocs I] at 1338.

Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1300 (second brackets in original).
Particularly in view of the above claim interpretation of the term
“enhance,” we do not find persuasive Appellant’s argument that claim 1
“describe[s] an unconventional way to present financial goals on a timeline.”
(Appeal Br. 10.) Moreover, Appellant does not explain what limitations in
claim 1 correspond to the claim element “to enhance the first network
accounting record,” when the term “enhance” is properly construed.
Appellant’s other arguments, including those directed to now-
superseded USPTO guidance, have been considered but are not persuasive.
(See 2019 Guidance at 51 (“Eligibility-related guidance issued prior to the
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Ninth Edition, R–08.2017, of the MPEP (published Jan. 2018) should not be
relied upon.”).)
In view of the above, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in
rejecting claim 1. Claims 2–12 and 14–25 are not separately argued and fall
with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

The § 102 rejection
Appellant argues that “Mackinlay does not teach or suggest displaying
graphical representations of financial goal information” and that “there are
no references in Mackinlay to any type of goal setting or planning in
general.” (Appeal Br. 12.)
The Examiner determines:
(In light of the Specification (providing no re-definitions)
those of ordinary skill understand the plain meaning of the word
‘goal’ (‘financial goal’) by definition denotes a thing that is not
detectable, or receivable ‘at’ or ‘by’ a computing device. This
word has no commonly understood non-abstract technical
meaning. The claim is utterly devoid of anything that would
convey a detectable distinction between a computing device
receiving a ‘financial goal’ and a computing device receiving
‘data’ (in general). Accordingly, the Examiner’s broadest
reasonable interpretation to avoid indefiniteness is ‘receiving,
by a computing device, data’.)(Mackinlay discloses this
feature, e.g., Fig. 9, processor at 202 receives input from
Keyboard/Mouse 204 and col. 5, lines 55-63).

(Final Action 9.) The Examiner also determines that “[no] functional
relationship exists between the descriptions of information and any
substrate. The claims are not patentably distinguished from the prior art by
these descriptions.” (Answer 14–15.)
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“Anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) requires that ‘each and every
element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently
described, in a single prior art reference.’” In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743,
745 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quoting Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 814
F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir.1987)).
However, when a claim limitation relates to the type of information
being claimed, we generally analyze that limitation under the rubric of
printed matter. “[I]f a limitation claims (a) printed matter that (b) is not
functionally or structurally related to the physical substrate holding the
printed matter, it does not lend any patentable weight to the patentability
analysis.” In re Distefano, 808 F.3d 845, 848 (Fed. Cir. 2015), citing In re
Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381, 1384–85 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Descriptive or printed
“matter must be matter claimed for what it communicates.” Id. at 850. In
other words, the question becomes whether “the claimed informational
content has a functional or structural relation to the substrate.” In re
Distefano, 808 F.3d at 850.
In claim 1, the content of the data, i.e., “financial goals,” is matter
claimed for what it communicates – the financial goals of the user. To
determine whether to lend patentable weight to the term, we ask if “the
claimed informational content has a functional or structural relation to the
substrate,” i.e., the computing device and digital display. See id. We find
no such functional or structural relationship in claim 1, and Appellant does
not explain why the claimed informational content has a functional or
structural relation to the claimed method steps. Therefore, no patentable
weight should be accorded to the claim term “financial goals.” Thus, we do
not find persuasive Appellant’s arguments that Mackinlay does not teach
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displaying financial goal information or that Mackinlay does not refer to
goal setting or planning. (See Appeal Br. 12.)
In view of the above, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in
rejecting claim 1. Claims 2–12 and 14–25 are not separately argued and fall
with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–12 and 14–25 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 is affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–12 and 14–25 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(a)(1) is affirmed.
Specifically:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis  Affirmed Reversed
1–12, 14–25 101 eligibility 1–12, 14–25
1–12, 14–25 102(a)(1) Mackinlay 1–12, 14–25
Overall Outcome 1–12, 14–25

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED