Motorola Mobility LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 24, 2020

2019003859 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 24, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/751,227 06/26/2015 Abu T Sayem MM01413 7795
138858 7590 09/24/2020
Motorola/
McKinney Phillips LLC
1440 W. Taylor St.
Suite 749
Chicago, IL 60607
EXAMINER
ABELSON, RONALD B
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2476
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/24/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing.mobility@motorola.com
pipp@mckinneyphillips.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
________________

Ex parte ABU T. SAYEM, MOHAMMED ABDUL-GAFFOOR,
MINH H. DUONG, UGUR OLGUN, and ROBERT E. SLATER
________________

Appeal 2019-003859
Application 14/751,227
Technology Center 2400
________________

Before JASON V. MORGAN, IRVIN E. BRANCH, and
PHILLIP A. BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges.

MORGAN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–15. Claims 16–20 are canceled. We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM IN PART.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as MOTOROLA
MOBILITY LLC. Appeal Br. 2.
Appeal 2019-003859
Application 14/751,227

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Summary of the Disclosure
Appellant’s claimed subject matter relates to “providing high-
throughput and reliable operation in WiFi and cellular environments” by
employing “a switched or multiplexed cellular band antenna to support WiFi
MIMO for mobile handheld operation.” Abstract.
Exemplary Claims
(Key Limitations Emphasized and Bracketing Added)
1. A portable electronic communication device comprising:
a housing;
a WiFi transceiver;
an LTE (long term evolution) transceiver; and
a plurality of antennas, including a first antenna operating for
WiFi at 2400 MHz, and a second antenna supporting at least
cellular bands between 2300 MHz and 2690 MHz, the [1]
second antenna being the sole antenna supporting cellular
bands between 2300 MHz and 2690 MHz and [2] also being
linkable to the WiFi transceiver to provide MIMO (multiple
input, multiple output) operation.
2. The portable electronic communication device in accordance
with claim 1, [3] wherein the device housing is metallic and the
first and second antennas are formed as parts of the device
housing.
Appeal Br. 10 (Claims Appendix).
The Examiner’s rejections and cited references
The Examiner rejects claims 1–15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Cai et al. (US 2013/0065533 A1; published Mar. 14,
2013) (“Cai”) and Clevorn et al. (US 2014/0349584 A1; published Nov. 27,
2014) (“Clevorn”). Final Act. 2–5.
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Application 14/751,227

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ADOPTION OF EXAMINER’S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
With respect to claim 1, we agree with and adopt as our own the
Examiner’s findings as set forth in the Answer and in the Action from which
this appeal was taken, and we concur with the Examiner’s conclusions. We
have considered Appellant’s arguments, but do not find them persuasive of
error. We provide the following explanation for emphasis.
ANALYSIS
Claims 1, 3–9, and 11–15
In rejecting claim 1 as obvious, the Examiner finds that Cai’s teaching
of one or more antennas used by a Long Term Evolution (LTE) device
teaches or suggests a [1] “second antenna being the sole antenna supporting
cellular bands.” Final Act. 3 (citing Cai ¶ 20, Fig. 1). The Examiner
acknowledges that Cai “is silent on the system using” both a first antenna
and the second antenna “simultaneously [for] WiFi to support” multiple
input, multiple output (MIMO) operations. Id. Thus, the Examiner relies on
how Clevorn’s WiFi transceiver 103 uses shared antenna 104—which is
otherwise used by a LTE transceiver 102—for MIMO to teach or suggest the
second antenna [2] “also being linkable to the WiFi transceiver to provide
MIMO (multiple input, multiple output) operation.” Id. (citing Clevorn
¶¶ 85, 87, Figs. 1, 4). The Examiner concludes it would have been obvious
to modify Cai using the teachings and suggestions of Clevorn because
“using two antennas simultaneously for WiFi would allow for increased
bandwidth for WiFi applications.” Id. at 4; see Ans. 7–8.
Appellant contends the Examiner erred because “[i]n Clevorn the
shared antenna is exactly that – shared. It is not the sole antenna supporting
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cellular communications.” Appeal Br. 8. Appellant’s argument accords with
Clevorn, as illustrated in Clevorn’s Figure 4, which is reproduced below.
Clevorn’s Figure 4 illustrates first antenna 403, which is permanently
assigned to LTE transceiver 401, second antenna 405—which through
switch 406 can be switched between LTE transceiver 401 and WiFi
transceiver 402—and third antenna 404, which is permanently assigned to
WiFi transceiver 402. Clevorn ¶ 87.
We agree with Appellant that Clevorn’s second antenna 405 is not the
sole antenna supporting cellular communications; Clevorn’s first antenna
403 also supports cellular communications. But Appellant’s characterization
of Clevorn, though accurate, is not persuasive of Examiner error.
Specifically, the Examiner persuasively relies on Cai, not Clevorn, to
teach or suggest an electronic communications device with a second antenna
being the sole antenna supporting cellular bands. Final Act. 3. Appellant
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does not dispute this finding. Nor does Appellant show error in the
Examiner’s conclusion that it would have been obvious to modify Cai, using
Clevorn’s teachings and suggestions, to enable Cai’s second antenna to be
switched from supporting cellular bands to supporting WiFi MIMO
operations. Id. at 3–4. This would, as the Examiner correctly notes, increase
bandwidth for WiFi operations. Id. at 4. Although it seems enabling WiFi
MIMO operations when using a communication device modified in this
manner would require disabling cellular communications, Appellant fails to
contend that such a trade-off would have made the proposed combination
non-obvious. Absent any arguments or analysis regarding this trade-off, we
agree with the Examiner that the combination of Cai and Clevorn teaches or
suggests disputed recitations [1] and [2].
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection of
claim 1, and claims 3–9 and 11–15, which Appellant does not argue
separately. Appeal Br. 9.
Claims 2 and 10
Appellant argues that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 2 as
obvious because the Examiner fails to show that the combination of Cai and
Clevorn teaches or suggests [3] “wherein the device housing is metallic and
the first and second antennas are formed as parts of the device housing.”
Appeal Br. 8. Appellant, noting multiple requests for the Examiner to
address the recitation, contends there is “no way of knowing whether the
Office’s behavior in this regard reflects a lack of a position on the claims, an
intention to allow the claims, or simply a recurring failure [to] notice the
claims” despite Appellant’s repeated reminders. Reply Br. 2.
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Appellant’s argument with respect to claim 2 is arguably waived
because Appellant fails to separately argue claim 2 under its own heading.
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2017). But the Examiner fails to make a
prima facie rejection of claim 2, skipping over claim 2 (and related claim 10)
entirely in the body of the rejection and in the Answer. Final Act. 2–6; Ans.
4–8. We decline to elevate form over substance here. Therefore, we agree
with Appellant that the Examiner’s findings do not show that Cai or Clevorn
teach or suggest disputed recitation [3].
Accordingly, we decline to sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103
rejection of claim 2, and claim 10, which contains a similar recitation.
CONCLUSION
Claims
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § References Affirmed Reversed
1–15 103 Cai, Clevorn 1, 3–9,
11–15
2, 10
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking subsequent action in connection with this
appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED IN PART