Moore, Nathan et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 6, 2020

14065355 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jan. 6, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/065,355 10/28/2013 Nathan Moore 5679 1087
21834 7590 01/06/2020
Tysver Beck Evans, PLLC
225 S. 6th Street, Suite 1750
Minneapolis, MN 55402
EXAMINER
ALLADIN, AMBREEN A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3693
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/06/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docket@bitlaw.com
dtysver@bitlaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte NATHAN MOORE, JIANING CHEN,
JIM RANSCO II, and JOHN DILLON
____________

Appeal 2019-002697
Application 14/065,355
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before JEFFREY N. FREDMAN, RACHEL H. TOWNSEND, and
MICHAEL A. VALEK, Administrative Patent Judges.

FREDMAN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

This is an appeal1,2 under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) involving claims to a
method of authentication and resource allocation. The Examiner rejected the
claims as indefinite, as obvious, and as reciting non-statutory subject matter.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm the obviousness
rejection.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the Real Party in Interest as Cash
Flow Management, Inc. (see App. Br. 3).
2 We have considered and herein refer to the Specification of Oct. 28, 2013
(“Spec.”); Final Office Action of Sept. 18, 2018 (“Final Act.”); Appeal Brief
of Oct. 31, 2018 (“App. Br.”); Examiner’s Answer of Dec. 20, 2018
(“Ans.”); and Reply Brief of Feb. 20, 2019 (“Reply Br.”).
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Statement of the Case
Background
“Banks and credit unions are constantly looking for ways to reduce
the time their staff spend on routine transactions and increase the time they
spend on engaging with . . . their customers” (Spec. ¶ 3). “It has helped the
teller focus more on the customer and less on the cash as the automation is
handling the counting, tracking and balancing for them” (id. ¶ 4).
The Claims
Claims 26–35 are on appeal. Independent claim 26 is representative
and reads as follows:
26. A method of authentication and resource allocation
comprising
a) at a computer server, receiving from a mobile device
communications relating to a first secure transaction, the first
secure transaction comprising a plurality of actions including
accessing one of a plurality of hardware devices;
b) at the computer server, communicating with the mobile
device to complete all the actions in the first secure transaction
other than the accessing one of the plurality of hardware
devices, wherein the hardware devices are capable of being
controlled by an external computing device;
c) at the computer server, generating an authentication
token for the first secure transaction;
d) at the computer server, storing secure transaction details
for the first secure transaction in a resource request database
accessible by all of the plurality of hardware devices, the secure
transaction details being associated with the authentication
token;
e) at the computer server, transmitting the authentication
token to the mobile device;
f) at a first hardware device of the plurality of hardware
devices, receiving the authentication token from the mobile
device;
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g) at the first hardware device, requesting and receiving the
secure transaction details from the resource request database;
h) at the first hardware device, verifying the authentication
token against the received secure transaction details; and
i) at the first hardware device, using the secure transaction
details to complete the secure transaction.

The Rejections
A. The Examiner rejected claims 26–35 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as
indefinite (Final Act. 2–3).
B. The Examiner rejected claims 26–35 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
obvious over Labrou3 (Final Act. 25–30).
C. The Examiner rejected claims 26–35 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
directed to an abstract idea (Final Act. 3–25).

A. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b)
The Examiner finds
there is a disconnect between the preamble and the body of the
claim. Specifically, the preamble states “a method of
authentication and resource allocation comprising” while the
claim ends with a recitation of . . . “using the secure transaction
details to complete the secure transaction”. The claim does not
actually complete the action of “resource allocation.”
(Final Act. 2–3).
Appellant responds “[t]his preamble does not make the claim less
distinct, nor does the claim fail to particularly point out the invention. There
is no disconnect, and, even if any were present, such disconnect does not rise
to a violation of the requirements of Section 112” (App. Br. 19–20).

3 Labrou et al., US 2006/0206709 A1, published Sept. 14. 2006.
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MPEP § 2173.05(e)(III) states “[t]he mere fact that the body of a
claim recites additional elements which do not appear in the claim’s
preamble does not render the claim indefinite under 35 U.S.C. 112(b).”
“[H]ow much clarity is required necessarily invokes some standard of
reasonable precision in the use of language in the context of the
circumstances.” In re Packard, 751, F.3d 1307, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
In this case, we agree with Appellant that the ordinary artisan would
understand the limitations of claim 26 as functioning to perform
authentication and resource allocation, as recited in the preamble, using the
authentication token process and resource request database recited in the
claim. In particular, step(g) of claim 26 requires a hardware device to
function in “requesting and receiving the secure transaction details from the
resource request database.” This step therefore requires a resource
allocation of transaction details from a resource request database and is
reasonably understood as addressing the limitation in the preamble. There is
no requirement for ipsis verbis repetition of preamble language.

B. 35 U.S.C. § 103 over Labrou
The Examiner finds Labrou teaches the limitations of claim 26 and
finds “Labrou discloses that it is generally understood that a user will have
to fulfill the ATM transaction at the ATM within a specified period of time
that was authorized through the mobile phone” (Final Act. 28). The
Examiner acknowledges that “Labrou does not directly disclose that the
transaction is reversed if the completion report is not received within a
predetermined period though it is implied that the transaction would not be
completed if the specified time period expired” (id.).
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The Examiner finds it obvious
that not fulfilling a previously authorized transaction at the
ATM within a specified time period would result in a reversal
of the authorization at the expiry of the time period as it is
within the capabilities of one of ordinary skill in the art at the
time the invention was made to modify Labrou with the
predicted result of a reversal if the time period for performing
an authorized transaction expired.
(Final Act. 28).
Appellant responds
that the Labrou reference fails to teach the following elements
of the claim:
• (d) at the computer server, storing secure transaction details
for the first secure transaction in a resource request
database accessible by all of the plurality of hardware
devices, the secure transaction details being associated with
the authentication token;
• (g) at the first hardware device, requesting and receiving the
secure transaction details from the resource request
database;
• (h) at the first hardware device, verifying the authentication
token against the received secure transaction details; and
• (i) at the first hardware device, using the secure transaction
details to complete the secure transaction.

(App. Br. 17–18).
We note that Appellant does not argue the claims separately, so claims
27–35 stand or fall with claim 26 because separate reasons for their
patentability were not provided in the Appeal Brief. 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
The issue with respect to this rejection is: Does the evidence of record
support the Examiner’s conclusion that Labrou renders the claims obvious?
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Findings of Fact
1. Labrou teaches
A method, and an apparatus performing the method, is
provided by authenticating a mobile device communicably
connectable to a wireless network by an authentication
parameter from a secure transaction server (STS), as a mobile
device authenticator; providing an STS correlation between a
personal identification entry (PIE) and the mobile device
authenticator; and inputting, by a user, the PIE and a provider
action, to the mobile device authenticator to transmit a
transformed secure user authenticable authorization request to
the STS over the wireless network to authorize an action with a
provider.
(Labrou ¶ 11).
2. Figure 1 of Labrou is reproduced below:

FIG. 1 is a diagram of a computer system 100 to provide
mobile device authentication services . . . a user 102 uses a
mobile wireless device 104 for authentication. The mobile
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wireless device 104 is any mobile wireless computing device or
mobile radio computing device, including, without limitation, a
mobile phone, that wirelessly communicates (e.g., wireless
Internet 105 or mobile phone network) to a secure transaction
server 120.
(Labrou ¶ 32).
3. Labrou teaches a two-factor authentication process for banking
in which:
the user starts the mobile ID application 108 on the mobile
phone 104, selects the provider (e.g., Bank) and the action to
authorize ( e.g., log in) and then enters the user’s PIN. At
operation 506, the mobile ID application 108 generates and
sends a UPTF message to the STS 120. At operation 508, the
STS 120 compares the mobile phone’s message to the
previously received message f[ro]m the provider 106, and if the
two messages agree, the STS 102 responds positively to the
provider 106. At operation 510, the provider 106, upon
receiving a positive response, approves the user’s login request
and authorizes the user’s access to user’s account and proceeds
to display to the user a webpage with the user’s account
information. Therefore, the mobile device authenticator 104 is
a second factor authentication in addition to the first factor
user’s username and password entered at the website.
(Labrou ¶ 78).
4, Labrou teaches authentication at an automated teller machine
(ATM) in which “the ATM 106 requests, via a UPTF message 404 (request
transaction token), from the STS 120 a Transaction Token” after which “the
ATM receives a response UPTF message 404 from the STS 120 with a
specific Transaction Token” (Labrou ¶ 109).
5. Labrou teaches that the server “STS 120 verifies the UPTF user
authorize transaction message 402 of operation 910 against the ATM
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authorize transaction message 404 of operation 908 or against the request
token transaction message at operation 906” (Labrou ¶ 109).
6. Labrou teaches an embodiment where an
ATM transaction authorized through the mobile phone 104 will
be fulfilled or completed whenever the user can interact with
the ATM. . . .
the user 102 stands in the area of the ATM 106 prior to
interacting with the ATM user interface, perhaps waiting in
line. The ATM posts (physically), a number ATM_ID 922 (in a
visible area, say next to its logo) that uniquely identifies this
particular ATM. The STS 120 knows this ATM by that ATM
identifying number. It is also possible that the ATM is
automatically determined by the location of the user, for
example, if the mobile phone 104 is equipped with GPS or
location capabilities . . .
Then, at operation 924, the user 102 starts the mobile ID
authentication application 108 on their mobile 104, and,
optionally, enters in the application 108, the ATM identifier,
such as the number the user sees on the ATM (ATM_ID 922).
(Labrou ¶¶ 111–112).
7. Labrou teaches that after the ATM identifier is in the mobile ID
authentication application:
the STS 120 sends to the ATM identified by ATM_ID a
message that identifies the user that attempts to interact with the
ATM and the details of the requested transaction and a
Transaction Token used to refer to this specific transaction. The
ATM determines if the ATM can indeed perform the requested
transaction for the specified user, and if determined positively,
at operation 928, the ATM sends to the STS 120 an ATM
authorize transaction UPTF message 404 for the transaction
identified by the transaction token. The STS 120 verifies the
UPTF user authorize transaction message 402 against the ATM
authorize transaction message 404, and the STS 120, at
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operations 930, 932, upon a successful verification transmits a
confirmation code to the mobile device 104 and the ATM 106.
Once the user is physically present at the ATM to interact with
the user interface of the ATM 106, the user must enter the
confirmation code at the ATM to complete the transaction. . . .
after which the ATM will simply execute the previously
authorized transaction
(Labrou ¶¶ 112–113).
8. Labrou teaches an embodiment where “[w]hen the user
approaches the ATM, she waves a Near Field Communication (NFC)-
enabled phone to the NFC-enabled ATM which responds by executing the
previously requested transaction” (Labrou ¶ 115).
Principles of Law
“The combination of familiar elements according to known methods
is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.”
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007).
Analysis
We adopt the Examiner’s findings of fact and reasoning regarding the
scope and content of the prior art (Final Act. 25–30; FF 1–8) and agree that
the claims are obvious over Labrou. We address Appellant’s arguments
below.
Appellant contends that the “key distinction between Labrou and the
present claims is that the user in Labrou (the mobile device) must be linked
to a specific ATM” while “the pending claims describe a method that allows
a user to use any of a plurality of hardware devices that can be selected at a
later time when the process is to be completed” (App. Br. 17). Appellant
contends, regarding step (d) of claim 26, that Labrou does “not teach the
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storage of transaction details in any type of database in association with the
authentication token, let alone a database accessible by the plurality of
hardware devices” (App. Br. 18).
We find this argument unpersuasive because, as the Examiner points
out, claim 26 step (d) simply requires “a resource request database
accessible by all of the plurality of hardware devices.” Labrou clearly
teaches a resource request database, specifically the secure transaction server
(FF 1). Labrou teaches that the STS is accessible to a plurality of ATMs
because if only a single ATM was connected, there would be no need for “a
number ATM_ID 922 . . . that uniquely identifies this particular ATM” (FF
6).
To the extent that Appellant is arguing that claim 26 encompasses the
situation where the transaction is first performed and then the user selects a
particular device, such as an ATM, with which to transact, we agree with the
Examiner that this language is not in the claims (see Ans. 35). See In re Self,
671 F.2d 1344, 1348 (CCPA 1982) (“[A]ppellant’s arguments fail from the
outset because . . . they are not based on limitations appearing in the
claims.”). We note that Appellant acknowledges that “language concerning
later selection is not found in the claims” (Reply Br. 4).
Finally, Labrou teaches that the “STS 120 knows this ATM by that
ATM identifying number” (FF 6). Labrou’s use of the phrase “this ATM”
reasonably suggests that in locations where multiple ATMs are present, it
would have been obvious for the STS to authenticate use at whichever ATM
was selected by the user, through entry of the ATM identifying number (FF
6) or by near field communication (FF 8), to allow the user selected ATM to
respond “by executing the previously requested transaction” (FF 8).
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Appellant contends that “Labrou fails to teach these steps g, h, and i
of claim 26” (App. Br. 19). Appellant contends that:
The hardware device in Labrou does not request and receive
secure transaction details from the resource request database, as
Labrou does not even store the transaction details in a database.
Furthermore, the ATM in Labrou does not request transaction
details from a central storage area. In Labrou, the ATM is
provided these details at the beginning of the transaction, and
therefore does not need to request those details at a later time.
Furthermore, because transaction details were not stored in a
resource request database that was accessible by many
hardware devices, Labrou cannot be considered to use the type
of transaction details specified in the claims compare to the
authentication token (step h) or to complete the secured
transaction (step i).
(App.Br. 19).
We are not persuaded. As to step (g) of claim 26, Labrou teaches that
after the user identifies the ATM, the first hardware device (FF 6), “the STS
120 sends to the ATM identified by ATM_ID a message . . . and the details
of the requested transaction and a Transaction Token used to refer to this
specific transaction” (FF 7). Then “the ATM sends to the STS 120 an ATM
authorize transaction UPTF message 404 for the transaction identified by the
transaction token” (FF 7). Thus, Labrou teaches that the ATM requests and
receives the secure transaction details from the STS (secure transaction
server). We agree with the Examiner that these teachings in Labrou
reasonably suggest the step of “requesting and receiving the secure
transaction details from the resource request database” as required by step
(g) of claim 26.
As to step (h) of claim 26, as noted above, Labrou teaches the “ATM
determines if the ATM can indeed perform the requested transaction for the
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specified user, and if determined positively, at operation 928, the ATM
sends to the STS 120 an ATM authorize transaction UPTF message 404 for
the transaction identified by the transaction token” (FF 7). Labrou then
teaches “upon a successful verification transmits a confirmation code to the
mobile device 104 and the ATM 106” (FF 7). Thus, the ATM or first
hardware device compares the transaction requirements with the transaction
token provided by the secure transaction server, verifying that the ATM can
perform the requested transaction. We agree with the Examiner that these
teachings of Labrou reasonably suggest the step of “verifying the
authentication token against the received secure transaction details” as
required by step (h) of claim 26.
Lastly, as to step (i) of claim 26, Labrou teaches “[o]nce the user is
physically present at the ATM to interact with the user interface of the ATM
106, the user must enter the confirmation code at the ATM to complete the
transaction. . . . after which the ATM will simply execute the previously
authorized transaction” (FF 7). Thus, the ATM uses the secure transaction
details previously authorized by the secure transaction server in combination
with the ATM and completes the transaction. We agree with the Examiner
that these teachings of Labrou reasonably suggest the step of “using the
secure transaction details to complete the secure transaction” as required by
step (i) of claim 26.
Conclusion of Law
The evidence of record supports the Examiner’s conclusion that
Labrou renders the claims obvious.

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C. 35 U.S.C. § 101
The Examiner finds the claims “are directed to the abstract idea of
processing of secure transactions using authentication tokens via a series of
steps” (Final Act. 3). The Examiner finds this abstract idea is “directed to
the performance of certain financial transactions” and is a “method of
organizing human activity” (id at 4).
Appellant contends:
The character of the present claims relates to the use of an
authentication token and resource request database to securely
transfer a transaction, begun between two computer devices, to
a third hardware device for completion of the transaction. This
clearly represents an increase in security and efficiency in
computer communications, and hence represents a specific
improvement to the way computers operate.
(App. Br. 9).
Principles of Law
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. See, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S.
208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
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intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and therefore patent
ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as
fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S.
at 611) and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69
(1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and
chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr,
450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)) or software “purporting to improve the
functioning of the computer itself” (Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822
F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The United States Patent and Trademark Office published revised
guidance on the application of 35 U.S.C. § 101. USPTO’s 2019 Revised
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Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance (“Revised Guidance”).4 Under
the Guidance, in determining what concept the claim is “directed to,” we
first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings
of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods
of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (Guidance Step 2A, Prong 1);
and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–
(c), (e)–(h)) (Guidance Step 2A, Prong 2).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim contains an “‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’”
the claimed judicial exception into a patent-eligible application of the
judicial exception. Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 82).
In so doing, we thus, consider whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial
exception that are not “well-understood, routine and
conventional in the field” (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry,
specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.
(Guidance Step 2B). See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–56.
Analysis
Applying the Revised Guidance to the facts on this record, we find
that Appellant’s claims 26–35 are directed to patent-eligible subject matter.

4 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
50–57 (January 7, 2019).
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Because the same issues are present in each of the claims, we focus our
consideration on representative claim 26. The same analysis applied below
to claim 26 also applies to the other rejected claims.
A. Guidance Step 2A, Prong 1
The Revised Guidance instructs us first to determine whether any
judicial exception to patent eligibility is recited in the claim. The Revised
Guidance identifies three judicially-excepted groupings identified by the
courts as abstract ideas: (1) mathematical concepts, (2) certain methods of
organizing human behavior such as fundamental economic practices, and (3)
mental processes.
Claim 26 reasonably falls within one of the three of the judicially-
excepted groupings listed in the Revised Guidance: fundamental economic
practices involving authenticating financial transactions. Alice found an
abstract idea in claims to “a method of exchanging financial obligations
between two parties using a third-party intermediary to mitigate settlement
risk.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 219. Claim 26 recites a method of authentication
where tokens are exchanged to determine if a particular transaction is
authorized or not. This is reasonably understood as a fundamental economic
practice, just as a bank teller requires tokens of authentication such as a
driver’s license or ATM card prior to dispensing money to a customer.
Accordingly, we conclude that the steps of claim 26 recites the judicial
exception of organizing human activities.
B. Guidance Step 2A, Prong 2
Having determined that the claims recite a judicial exception, the
Revised Guidance directs us to next consider whether the claims integrate
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the judicial exception into a practical application. Guidance Step 2A, Prong
2. “[I]ntegration into a practical application” requires that the claim recite
an additional element or a combination of elements, that when considered
individually or in combination, “apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception
in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such
that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
judicial exception.” Guidance at 54.
A judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application when
the claims are drawn to the mere use of “a computer as a tool to perform an
abstract idea.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55; see Electric Power Grp., LLC
v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding that “the focus
of the claims is not on . . . an improvement in computers as tools, but on
certain independently abstract ideas that use computers as tools”); Enfish,
LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335–6 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(determining whether the claims at issue were focused on a “specific
asserted improvement in computer capabilities” or “a process that qualifies
as an ‘abstract idea’ for which computers are invoked merely as a tool”).
Here, we agree with Appellant that there is a practical integration of
the abstract idea. In particular, we agree that “the claims of the present
application describe a detailed process for improving the functioning of
computer communications through the use of an authentication token and a
resource request database” (App. Br. 13).
Enfish explains that “the first step in the Alice inquiry in this case asks
whether the focus of the claims is on the specific asserted improvement in
computer capabilities . . . or, instead, on a process that qualifies as an
‘abstract idea’ for which computers are invoked merely as a tool.” Enfish,
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822 F.3d at 1335–6. Applied to claim 26, we understand the claimed
method to represent a technical improvement in a computer processing
system rather than simply using the computer as a tool.
While this is a close case, the current claims do not simply use the
computer and software as tools to perform a mental process and process of
organizing human activity as routinely performed by a bank teller. Rather,
as argued by Appellant, “the present claims involve storing transaction
details in a database for later retrieval, and the creation, transfer, and
verification of an authentication token to increase the security of computer
communications to allow a secure transaction to be completed at a third
hardware device.” (App. Br. 14).
That is, the claims are drawn to methods of secure communication
between two different computers, which is a problem uniquely faced by
computer authentication systems and differs from the types of authentication
problems faced by bank tellers and customers. Like McRO , that was drawn
to a computer based process that improves operations on the computer
animation process itself, claim 26 is intended to improve the authentication
process of secure transactions on the security of the computer and ATM
themselves. See McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d
1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
DDR held claims were directed to statutory subject matter because
they claim a solution “necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to
overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks.”
DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir.
2014). The same reasoning applies here, because the authentication token
problem for hardware and server devices arises in the realm of computer
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networks, and differs from the authentication problems faced by bank tellers
and customers.
Therefore, on this record, we conclude that the ineligible subject
matter in Appellant’s claim 26 is integrated into a practical application.
C. Guidance Step 2B
Having determined that the judicial exception is integrated into a
practical application, we need not address whether claim 26 is well-
understood, routine, conventional in the field, or simply appends well-
understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
industry. See 84 Fed. Reg. 51.
The rejection of the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is reversed.

CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. §  Basis Affirmed Reversed
26–35 112(b)  26–35
26–35 103  Labrou 26–35
26–35 101 26–35
Overall
Outcome
26–35

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).

AFFIRMED