Monster Energy Companyv.Cavaliers Hockey Holdings, LLC

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 6, 2020

91240680 (T.T.A.B. Oct. 6, 2020)

Mailed: October 6, 2020

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____

Monster Energy Company
v.
Cavaliers Hockey Holdings, LLC
_____

Opposition No. 91240680
_____

Clayton R. Henson, Hans L. Mayer, Baraa Kahf, and Steven J. Nataupsky of Knobbe,
Martens, Olsen & Bear, LLP for Monster Energy Company.

Thomas M. Williams of Barack Ferrazzano Kirschbaum and Nagelberg LLP
for Cavaliers Hockey Holdings, LLC.
_____

Before Bergsman, Greenbaum and Hudis, Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Bergsman, Administrative Trademark Judge:

Cavaliers Hockey Holdings, LLC (Applicant) filed eight intent-to-use applications
under Section 1(b) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), seeking registration on
the Principal Register of the mark CLEVELAND MONSTERS and design,
reproduced below:

This Opinion Is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Precedent of the TTAB
PrePrecedent of the TTAB
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The description of the mark in each application reads as follows:
Color is not claimed as a feature of the mark. The mark
consists of the stylized word “CLEVELAND” above the
stylized word “MONSTERS”. A stylized design of a monster
consisting of the head of a monster and its eyes surrounded
by ripples of water appears above and to the left of the word
“CLEVELAND”.
Applicant disclaims the exclusive right to use the name “Cleveland.”
Applicant seeks to register its mark for the goods and services listed below:
1. “Costume jewelry; earrings; jewelry and imitation jewelry; pendants; rings;
watches,” in International Class 14;1
2. “Athletic pants; caps being headwear; coats; gloves; gym pants; hats; jackets;
jogging pants; pants; polo shirts; scarves; shirts; sports pants; sports shirts;
sweat pants; sweat shirts; t-shirts; tops as clothing; warm-up suits; wind
resistant jackets,” in International Class 25;2
3. “Publications and printed matter, namely, stickers, decals, memo pads, note
pads, ballpoint pens, pencils, paper banners and flags, stationery folders, wire-
bound notebooks, portfolio notebooks, unmounted and mounted photographs,
calendars, bumper stickers, statistical books, guide books, and reference books
in the field of hockey; magazines in the field of hockey; catalogs featuring
hockey; commemorative game and souvenir programs in the field of hockey;
paper pennants, stationery and printed certificates in the field of hockey;
entertainment printed certificates for fans; statistical information sheets for

1 Serial No. 87546801 filed July 28, 2017.
2 Serial No. 87547147 filed July 28, 2017.
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hockey topics; newsletters, brochures, pamphlets and game schedules in the
field of hockey; bank checks; credit cards not magnetically coded ,” in
International Class 16;3
4. “Toys, games and sporting goods, namely, hockey pucks and hockey sticks;
hockey kits comprised of hockey pucks, hockey sticks and hockey goalie pads;
bobblehead action figures; stuffed toys,” in International Class 28;4
5. “Computer programs for viewing statistics or trivia about hockey; computer
software, namely, screen savers featuring hockey themes, computer software
to access and view computer wallpaper, computer browsers, computer skins
and computer cursors; computer game software; magnets; credit cards
magnetically encoded; downloadable video-stream recordings in the field of
hockey provided over the Internet; downloadable computer software for
viewing databases of information, statistical information, trivia, polling
information, and interactive polling in the field of hockey provided over the
Internet; downloadable computer game software; downloadable interactive
video games and trivia game software provided over the Internet;
downloadable computer software for use as screensavers, wallpaper, browsers,
skins and cursors over the Internet; downloadable electronic publications in

3 Serial No. 87547252 filed July 28, 2017.
4 Serial No. 87548887 filed July 31, 2017.
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the nature of magazines, newsletters and game schedules all in the field of
hockey provided over the Internet,” in International Class 9;5
6. “Computerized on-line retail store, ordering, retail store services, electronic
retail store services and mail-order catalog services featuring an array of
hockey-themed merchandise; promoting the goods and services of others by
allowing sponsors to affiliate these goods and services with a hockey program;
promoting the sale of goods and services of others through the distribution of
promotional contests provided over the Internet; conducting public opinion poll
surveys and public opinion poll surveys in the field of hockey for business and
non-business and marketing and non-marketing purposes over the Internet;
conducting interactive public opinion polls in the field of hockey,” in
International Class 35;6
7. “Audio broadcasting; cable television broadcasting; radio broadcasting;
subscription television broadcasting; television broadcasting; video
broadcasting; webcasting services in the nature of providing on-line chat rooms
and on-line interactive chat rooms with guests for transmission of messages
among computer users concerning the field of hockey; broadcasting programs
over the Internet; providing on-line electronic bulletin boards for transmission
of messages among computer users concerning the field of hockey; providing

5 Serial No. 87548893 filed July 31, 2017.
6 Serial No. 87548901 filed July 31, 2017.
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access to databases featuring interactive polling in the field of hockey,” in
International Class 38;7 and
8. “Entertainment services, namely, sporting activities involving the
performance by a hockey team in the nature of live performances by a hockey
team; entertainment and educational services in the nature of on-going
television and radio programs in the field of hockey and rendering live hockey
games and hockey exhibitions; the production and distribution of radio and
television broadcasts of hockey games, hockey events and programs in the field
of hockey; conducting and arranging hockey clinics and coaches ’ clinics and
hockey events; entertainment services in the nature of personal appearances
by a costumed mascot at hockey games and exhibitions, clinics, promotions,
and other hockey-related events, special events and parties; fan-club services;
entertainment services, namely, providing a website featuring the following
content - non-downloadable videos in the field of television highlights,
interactive television highlights, radio programs, radio highlights, and audio
recordings in the field of hockey, and hockey news in the nature of information,
statistics and trivia about hockey; on-line computer games; providing non-
downloadable on-line magazines, newsletters, and game schedules in the field
of hockey over the Internet,” in International Class 41.8

7 Serial No. 87548912 filed July 31, 2017.
8 Serial No. 87548930 filed July 31, 2017.
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Monster Energy Company (Opposer) opposes registration of Applicant’s mark
under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground that
Applicant’s mark so resembles Opposer’s MONSTER marks and MONSTER family
of marks for, inter alia, energy drinks and clothing as to be likely to cause confusion,
mistake or deception. Opposer pleaded its ownership of 23 registrations for
MONSTER formative marks including, but not limited to, the registrations listed
below:
1. MONSTER ENERGY, in standard character form, for the goods and services
listed below:
● “Non-alcoholic beverages, namely, energy drinks, excluding perishable beverage
products that contain fruit juice or soy,” in International Class 32;9
● “Fruit juice drinks having a juice content of 50% or less by volume that are shelf
stable, carbonated soft drinks, carbonated drinks enhanced with vitamins, minerals,
nutrients, amino acids and/or herbs, but excluding perishable beverage products that
contain fruit juice or soy, whether such products are pasteurized or not ,” in
International Class 32;10 and

9 Registration No. 4036681 registered October 11, 2011; Sections 8 and15 declarations
accepted and acknowledged. Opposer disclaimed the exclusive right to use the word “Energy.”
10 Registration No. 3057061 registered February 7, 2006; renewed. Opposer disclaimed the
exclusive right to use the word “Energy.”
The drawing of the mark in this registration is in typed drawing form. Effective November 2,
2003, the USPTO amended Trademark Rule 2.52, 37 C.F.R. § 2.52, to replace the term
“typed” drawing with “standard character” drawing. A typed mark is the legal equivalent of
a standard character mark. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909
n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“until 2003, ‘standard character’ marks formerly were known as ‘typed’
marks.”).
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● “Promoting goods and services in the sports, motorsports, electronic sports, and
music industries through the distribution of printed, audio and visual promotional
materials; promoting sports and music events and competitions for others,” in
International Class 35;11
2. M MONSTER ENERGY and design, reproduced below:

The description of the mark provides that “the mark consists of the stylized letter ‘M’
and stylized words ‘MONSTER ENERGY.’”
Opposer registered the mark for the goods listed below:
● “Beverages, namely, carbonated soft drinks, carbonated soft drinks enhanced
with vitamins, minerals, nutrients, amino acids and/or herbs, carbonated energy and
sports drinks, fruit juice drinks having a juice content of 50% or less by volume that
are shelf stable, but excluding perishable beverage products that contain fruit juice
or soy, whether such products are pasteurized or not,” in International Class 32;12

11 Registration No. 4721433 registered April 14, 2015; Sections 8 and 15 declarations accepted
and acknowledged.
12 Registration No. 3134841 registered August 20, 2006; renewed. Opposer disclaimed the
exclusive right to use the word “Energy.”
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● “Clothing, namely, t-shirts, hooded shirts and hooded sweatshirts, sweat shirts,
jackets, pants, bandanas, sweat bands and gloves; headgear, namely, hats and
beanies,” in International Class 25;13
● “Stickers; sticker kits comprising stickers and decals; decals,” in International
Class 16;14 and
● “Sports helmets,” in International Class 9;15 and
3. M MONSTER ENERGY and design reproduced below, for “silicone wrist
bands; silicone bracelets; jewelry, namely, bracelets and wristbands,” in
International Class 14.16

The description of the mark reads as follows:
Color is not claimed as a feature of the mark. The mark
consists of a stylized letter “M” to the left of the stylized
words “MONSTER ENERGY”.

13 Registration No. 3908601 registered January 18, 2011; renewed.
14 Registration No. 3908600 registered January 18, 2011; Sections 8 and 15 declarations
accepted and acknowledged. Opposer filed a Section 9 renewal application on February 10,
2020.
15 Registration No. 3914828 registered February 1, 2011; renewed.
16 Registration No. 4332062 registered May 7, 2013; Sections 8 and 15 declarations accepted
and acknowledged.
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Opposer also pleaded it “uses or licenses the use of its MONSTER™ mark in
connection with sports bags, sports helmets, gloves, sports equipment, stickers,
decals, lanyard, and wristbands, among many other products.”17
Applicant, in its Answer, denied the salient allegations in the Notice of Opposition.
As its first affirmative defense, Applicant pleaded the prior registration defense based
on its ownership of registrations for the marks listed below:18

17 Notice of Opposition ¶ 2 (1 TTABVUE 21).
18 Amended Answer to Opposer’s Notice of Opposition ¶¶39 (11 TTABVUE 27-28).
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As its second affirmative defense, Applicant pleaded laches, estoppel,
acquiescence, and waiver based on a “co-existence and cross-promotion of goods and
services sold in connection with Applicant’s LAKE ERIE MONSTERS mark and
Opposer’s MONSTER mark.”19
I. Evidentiary objections
Applicant lodged numerous objections to Opposer’s testimony and evidence.
Administrative Trademark Judges preside over Board proceedings, not lay jurors
who might be easily misled, confused, or prejudiced by flawed evidence. Cf. Harris v.
Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 346 (1981) (“In bench trials, judges routinely hear inadmissible
evidence that they are presumed to ignore when making decisions.”). “Ultimately, the
Board is capable of weighing the relevance and strength or weakness of the objected-
to testimony and evidence in this case, including any inherent limitations, which
precludes the need to strike the challenged testimony and evidence if the objection is
well-taken.” Poly-America, L.P. v. Ill. Tool Works Inc., 124 USPQ2d 1508, 1510 (TTAB
2017).
None of the evidence Applicant seeks to exclude is outcome determinative. Given
this fact, coupled with the number of objections, we see no compelling reason to
discuss any one or more of them specifically. Suffice it to say, we have considered all
of the testimony and exhibits submitted. In doing so, we have kept in mind the
various objections raised by Applicant and we have accorded whatever probative
value the subject testimony and evidence merit. See Luxco, Inc. v. Consejo Regulador

19 Amended Answer to Opposer’s Notice of Opposition ¶¶40-42 (11 TTABVUE 28-29).
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del Tequila, A.C., 121 USPQ2d 1477, 1479 (TTAB 2017). As necessary and
appropriate, we address any limitations to the evidentiary material to our decision.
Id.
II. The Record
The record includes the pleadings, and, by operation of Trademark Rule 2.122(b),
37 C.F.R. § 2.122(b), the files of the subject applications. In addition, the parties
introduced the evidence listed below:20
A. Opposer’s testimony and evidence.
1. Notice of reliance on Opposer’s pleaded registrations printed from
the USPTO Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR)
system showing the current status to and title of the registrations;21

2. Notice of reliance on Applicant’s responses to Opposer’s first set of
interrogatories;22

3. Notice of reliance on Applicant’s admissions to Opposer’s first set of
requests for admission;23

20 Citations to the record or briefs in this opinion also include citations to the publicly
available documents on TTABVUE, the Board’s electronic docketing system. See, e.g., Turdin
v. Trilobite, Ltd., 109 USPQ2d 1473, 1476 n.6 (TTAB 2014). The number preceding
“TTABVUE” corresponds to the docket entry number; the number(s) following “TTABVUE”
refer to the page number(s) of that particular docket entry.
21 19 TTABVUE 16-145. Opposer did not introduce a copy of its pleaded registration No.
4721432 for the stylized letter “M” alone for “promoting goods and services in the sports,
motorsports, electronic sports, and music industries through the distribution of printed,
audio and visual promotional materials; promoting sports and music events and competitions
for others,” in International Class 35. Because this mark does not include the word “Monster,”
it is not relevant.
22 19 TTABVUE 147-163.
23 19 TTABVUE 166-176. A party may introduce only an admission to a request for admission
through a notice of reliance. Trademark Rule 2.120(k)(3)(i), 37 C.F.R. § 2.120(k)(3)(i). A denial
or statement that the responding party cannot respond to the request does not establish the
truth or falsity of the assertion, but rather leaves the matter for proof at trial. Life Zone Inc.
v. Middleman Grp. Inc., 87 USPQ2d 1953, 1957 n.10 (TTAB 2008) (denials to requests for
admission inadmissible because “unlike an admission (or a failure to respond which
constitutes an admission), the denial of a request for admission establishes neither the truth
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4. Notice of reliance on Applicant’s responses to Opposer’s first set of
requests for production of documents;24

5. Notice of reliance on Applicant’s initial disclosures;25

6. Notice of reliance on Applicant’s responses to Opposer’s second set of
interrogatories;26

7. Notice of reliance on copies of Opposer’s 10-K reports from 2002-
printed from the website of the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission;27

8. Notice of reliance on copies of printed publications available to the
general public in libraries and in general circulation among members
of the public;28

9. Notice of reliance on copies of documents available on the Internet;29

10. Notice of reliance on portions of the discovery deposition of Mike
Ostrowski, Applicant’s President and designated Rule 30(b)(6)
witness;30

nor the falsity of the assertion, but rather leaves the matter for proof at trial.”). As such, we
have considered only the admissions to the requests for admission.
24 19 TTABVUE 178-197. Responses to a request for production of documents introduced
through a notice of reliance are admissible solely for purposes of showing that a party has
stated that there are no responsive documents; documents produced in response to the
requests are generally not admissible by notice of reliance alone. Trademark Rule
2.120(j)(3)(ii), 37 C.F.R. § 2.120(j)(3)(ii); see also City Nat’l Bank v. OPGI Mgmt. GP
Inc./Gestion OPGI Inc., 106 USPQ2d 1668, 1674 n.10 (TTAB 2013) (responses to document
production requests are admissible solely for purposes of showing that a party has stated
that there are no responsive documents); ShutEmDown Sports Inc. v. Lacy, 102 USPQ2d
1036 n.7 (TTAB 2012) (written responses to document requests indicating that no documents
exist may be submitted by notice of reliance).
25 19 TTABVUE 199-202.
26 19 TTABVUE 204-210.
27 19 TTABVUE 212-466 and 20-22 TTABVUE.
28 23-24 TTABVUE.
29 25-32 TTABVUE.
30 33-41 TTABVUE. Opposer posted the portions of the Ostrowski discovery deposition
designated confidential at 38-41 TTABVUE.
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11. Testimony declaration of Rodney Sacks, Opposer’s Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer;31

12. Rebuttal notice of reliance on documents available on the Internet;32
and

13. Rebuttal testimony declaration of Rodney Sacks.33

B. Applicant’s testimony and evidence.
1. Testimony declaration of Mike Ostrowski;34

2. Notice of reliance on copies of registrations consisting in part of the
word “Monster” owned by Applicant;35

3. Notice of reliance on copies of third-party registrations for marks
consisting of the word “Monster”;36

4. Notice of reliance on official records consisting of the notices of
opposition in two Board proceedings and the complaint in a civil
action;37

5. Notice of reliance on printed publications purportedly reporting on
Opposer’s overreach in asserting trademark rights in Opposer’s
MONSTER trademarks;38

6. Notice of reliance on Opposer’s admissions to Applicant’s requests for
admission;39

31 42-47 TTABVUE. Opposer posted the portions of the Sacks testimony declaration
designated confidential at 48-54 TTABVUE.
32 60-61 TTABVUE.
33 62 TTABVUE.
34 55 TTABVUE. Applicant posted the portions of the Ostrowski testimony declaration
designated confidential as 56 TTABVUE.
35 57 TTABVUE 88-150.
36 57 TTABVUE 152-911 and 58 TTABVUE.
37 59 TTABVUE 3-409.
38 59 TTABVUE 411-442.
39 59 TTABVUE 444-453.
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7. Notice of reliance on Opposer’s supplemental response to Applicant’s
requests for admission Nos. 1-3;40 and

8. Notice of reliance on Opposer’s responses to Applicant’s interrogatory
Nos. 3, 9 and 10.41

III. Entitlement to a Statutory Cause of Action42
To establish entitlement to a statutory cause of action under Sections 13 or 14 of
the Trademark Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate a real interest in the proceeding
and a reasonable belief of damage. Australian Therapeutic Supplies Pty. Ltd. v.
Naked TM, LLC, 965 F.3d 1370, 2020 USPQ2d 10837 at *3 (Fed. Cir. 2020); see also
Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar Co., 753 F.3d 1270, 111 USPQ2d 1058
(Fed. Cir. 2014); Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 101
USPQ2d 1713, 1727 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 50 USPQ2d
1023, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Opposer established its entitlement to a statutory cause of action by properly
introducing into evidence its pleaded registrations showing the status of the
registrations and their title in Opposer. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp.,
222 F.3d 943, 55 USPQ2d 1842, 1844 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (plaintiff’s two prior
registrations suffice to establish plaintiff’s direct commercial interest and its

40 59 TTABVUE 455-459.
41 59 TTABVUE 461-468.
42 Our decisions have previously analyzed the requirements of Sections 13 and 14 of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1063-64, under the rubric of “standing.” Despite the change in
nomenclature, our prior decisions and those of the Federal Circuit interpreting Sections 13
and 14 remain applicable.
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standing); N.Y. Yankees P’ship v. IET Prods. & Servs., Inc., 114 USPQ2d 1497, 1501
(TTAB 2015). Applicant, in its brief, did not challenge Opposer’s standing.
IV. Priority
Because Opposer’s pleaded registrations are of record, and Applicant did not file
a counterclaim to cancel the pleaded registrations, priority in the opposition
proceeding is not at issue with respect to the marks and goods or services identified
therein. Mini Melts, Inc. v. Reckitt Benckiser LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1464, 1469 (TTAB
2016) (citing King Candy Co. v. Eunice King’s Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 182 USPQ
108, 110 (CCPA 1974)).
Even though Opposer did not plead ownership of a registration for the mark
MONSTER, Opposer alleged, “[s]ince at least 2002, long before the filing date of the
Applications, Opposer has been, and still is, engaged in the development, marketing,
and/or sale of energy drinks and clothing under the MONSTER™ mark” and
promoting goods and services in the sports and music industries since 2003.43 In its
brief, Opposer argues that it has used MONSTER to identify its beverage product
line and a wide range of other products and services, including sporting events.44
However, in its brief, Opposer does not refer to any testimony or evidence regarding
Opposer’s use of MONSTER as a stand-alone mark for beverages, clothing, or sports
promotion. Nevertheless, Rodney Sacks testified Opposer began using its MONSTER
mark to identify beverages and apparel in 2002.45

43 Notice of Opposition ¶2 (1 TTABVUE 21).
44 Opposer’s Brief, p. 6 (64 TTABVUE 13).
45 Sacks Testimony Decl. ¶3 (19 TTABVUE 3).
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Sacks Exhibit 2 are copies of representative samples of Opposer’s beverage
products.46 The word “Monster” always appears in the stylized format, reproduced
below, in close connection with Opposer’s “M” logo or the word “Energy.” The display
reproduced below is representative of the use of the mark displayed in Sacks’ Exhibit
2.

Mr. Sacks testified,
9. Monster does not use the word “energy” immediately
following MONSTER on all of its products. For example,
the JAVA MONSTER®, CAFFE MONSTER®,
ESPRESSO MONSTER®, MONSTER MAXX®, and
MONSTER REHAB® products bear the MONSTER
mark without the term “energy” immediately following
“MONSTER.”47

46 Sacks Testimony Decl. ¶8 and Exhibit 2 (42 TTABVUE 6 and 144-153).
47 Sacks Testimony Decl. ¶10 (42 TTABVUE 6).
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We cannot find any other evidence of MONSTER used as a stand-alone mark for
any goods or services other than beverages. Accordingly, we find that Opposer has
proved its use of MONSTER in a stylized form in connection with beverages since
2002.
The filing dates of Applicant’s applications are July 28 and 31, 2017, respectively.
Mike Ostrowski, Applicant’s President, testified that Applicant first used its
CLEVELAND MONSTERS and design mark on the goods in Classes 9, 14, 16, 25,
and 28 and the services in Classes 35, 38, and 41 as of July 31, 2016.48 Applicant first
used the LAKE ERIE MONSTERS mark in Classes 16 and 25 as of January 25,
2007.49
We find that Opposer has proven priority with respect to the marks and goods for
Opposer’s registrations introduced into the record and for the stand alone stylized
MONSTER word mark for beverages.
V. Likelihood of Confusion
We base our determination under Section 2(d) on an analysis of all of the probative
facts in evidence that are relevant to the factors bearing on the likelihood of confusion.
In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (CCPA 1973)
(“DuPont”), cited in B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 113
USPQ2d 2045, 2049 (2015). See also In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 65

48 Ostrowski Testimony Decl. ¶9 (55 TTABVUE 5-7).
49 Id. at ¶9 (55 TTABVUE 7). Applicant’s original name for the CLEVELAND MONSTERS
hockey team was the LAKE ERIE MONSTERS. The team began playing in the American
Hockey League (AHL) during the 2007-08 season. Id. at ¶14 (55 TTABVUE 8).
Opposition No. 91240680

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USPQ2d 1201, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2003). “In discharging this duty, the thirteen DuPont
factors ‘must be considered’ ‘when [they] are of record.’” In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912
F.3d 1376, 129 USPQ2d 1160, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2019), quoting In re Dixie Rests. Inc.,
105 F.3d 1405, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1997), quoting DuPont, 177 USPQ
at 567. “Not all of the DuPont factors are relevant to every case, and only factors of
significance to the particular mark need be considered.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc.,
901 F.3d 1367, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1800 (Fed. Cir. 2018), quoting In re Mighty Leaf
Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2010). See also M2 Software,
Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006);
ProMark Brands Inc. v. GFA Brands, Inc., 114 USPQ2d 1232, 1242 (TTAB 2015)
(“While we have considered each factor for which we have evidence, we focus our
analysis on those factors we find to be relevant.”).
“Each case must be decided on its own facts and the differences are often subtle
ones.” Indus. Nucleonics Corp. v. Hinde, 475 F.2d 1197, 177 USPQ 386, 387 (CCPA
1973). In any likelihood of confusion analysis, two key considerations are the
similarities between the marks and the similarities between the goods or services.
See In re Chatam Int’l Inc., 380 F.3d 1340, 71 USPQ2d 1944, 1945-46 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ;
Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29
(CCPA 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative
effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [and services] and
differences in the marks.”). See also In re i.am.symbolic, LLC, 866 F.3d 1315, 123
USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“The likelihood of confusion analysis considers
Opposition No. 91240680

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all DuPont factors for which there is record evidence but ‘may focus … on dispositive
factors, such as similarity of the marks and relatedness of the goods.’”), quoting
Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed.
Cir. 2002).
A. The strength of Opposer’s MONSTER marks, including the fame of Opposer’s
mark and the number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods and
services.

Opposer alleges that its MONSTER marks have become famous50 and argues, in
its brief, that its marks are famous.51 Fame, if it exists, plays a dominant role in the
likelihood of confusion analysis because famous marks enjoy a broad scope of
protection or exclusivity of use. A famous mark has extensive public recognition and
renown. Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods. Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 63 USPQ2d 1303, 1305
(Fed. Cir. 2002); Recot Inc. v. M.C. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1897
(Fed. Cir. 2000); Kenner Parker Toys, Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 963 F.2d 350, 22
USPQ2d 1453, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Fame, the fifth DuPont factor, enables Opposer to expand the scope of protection
afforded its pleaded marks by adducing evidence of “[t]he fame of the prior mark
(sales, advertising, length of use).” Under the fifth factor, likelihood of confusion fame
is not “an all-or-nothing measure.” Joseph Phelps Vineyards, LLC v. Fairmont
Holdings, LLC, 857 F.3d 1323, 122 USPQ2d 1733, 1734 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (Fed. Cir.
2017). It “varies along a spectrum from very strong to very weak.” Palm Bay Imps.,

50 Notice of Opposition ¶9 (1 TTABVUE 27).
51 Applicant’s Brief, p. 33 (64 TTABVUE 40).
Opposition No. 91240680

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Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d
1689, 1694 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting In re Coors Brewing Co., 343 F.3d 1340, 68
USPQ2d 1059, 1063 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
To determine a mark’s place on the spectrum of from very strong to very weak, we
consider its inherent or conceptual strength, based on the nature of the mark itself,
and its commercial strength, based on its marketplace recognition. See In re
Chippendales USA, Inc., 622 F.3d 1346, 96 USPQ2d 1681, 1686 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“A
mark’s strength is measured both by its conceptual strength (distinctiveness) and its
marketplace strength.”); Bell’s Brewery, Inc. v. Innovation Brewing, 125 USPQ2d
1340, 1345 (TTAB 2017); Top Tobacco, L.P. v. N. Atl. Operating Co., Inc., 101 USPQ2d
1163, 1171-72 (TTAB 2011) (the strength of a mark is determined by assessing its
inherent strength and its commercial strength); Tea Bd. of India v. Republic of Tea
Inc., 80 USPQ2d 1881, 1899 (TTAB 2006) (market strength is the extent to which the
relevant public recognizes a mark as denoting a single source); J.T. McCarthy,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11:83 (5th ed. 2020) (“The
first enquiry is for conceptual strength and focuses on the inherent potential of the
term at the time of its first use. The second evaluates the actual customer recognition
value of the mark at the time registration is sought or at the time the mark is asserted
in litigation to prevent another’s use.”).
We may measure commercial strength (or fame) indirectly, by volume of sales and
advertising expenditures and factors such as length of use of the mark, widespread
critical assessments, notice by independent sources of the goods or services identified
Opposition No. 91240680

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by the mark, and general reputation of the goods or services. Weider Publ’ns, LLC v.
D&D Beauty Care Co., 109 USPQ2d 1347, 1354 (TTAB 2014).
1. The inherent or conceptual strength of Opposer’s MONSTER marks.
The RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (2020) defines the word “Monster”
as, inter alia,
noun
1. a legendary animal combining features of animal and
human form or having the forms of various animals in
combination, as a centaur, griffin, or sphinx.
2. any creature so ugly or monstrous as to frighten people.
3. any animal or human grotesquely deviating from the
normal shape, behavior, or character.
4. a person who excites horror by wickedness, cruelty, etc.
5. any animal or thing huge in size.
___
adjective
8. huge; enormous; monstrous: a monster tree.52
Based on the dictionary definitions alone, the word “Monster” appears to be an
arbitrary term when used in connection with beverages, apparel, promoting goods
and services in the sports, motorsports, electronic sports, and music industries,
stickers, sticker kits comprising stickers and decals, decals, sports helmets, and

52 Dictionary.com accessed on August 31, 2020. The Board may take judicial notice of
dictionary definitions, including online dictionaries that exist in printed format. In re Cordua
Rests. LP, 110 USPQ2d 1227, 1229 n.4 (TTAB 2014), aff’d, 823 F.3d 594, 118 USPQ2d 1632
(Fed. Cir. 2016); In re S. Malhotra & Co. AG, 128 USPQ2d 1100, 1104 n.9 (TTAB 2018); In
re Red Bull GmbH, 78 USPQ2d 1375, 1378 (TTAB 2006).
Opposition No. 91240680

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jewelry.53 However, the sixth DuPont factor allows Applicant to contract that scope
of protection by adducing evidence of “[t]he number and nature of similar marks in
use on similar goods.” DuPont, 177 USPQ at 567.
Although Applicant did not proffer evidence of third-party use of other MONSTER
marks, it introduced copies of its own registrations for “Monster” marks and third -
party registrations consisting of the word MONSTER. “[E]xtensive evidence of third-
party use and registrations is ‘powerful on its face,’ even where the specific extent
and impact of the usage has not been established.” Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung Fur
Draussen GmbH & Co. KGAA v. New Millennium Sports, S.L.U., 797 F.3d 1363, 116
USPQ2d 1129, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC,
794 F.3d 1334, 115 USPQ2d 1671, 1674 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). Third-party registrations,
in particular, are relevant to prove that some segment of a mark that both parties
use has a normally understood and well-recognized descriptive or suggestive
meaning, leading to the conclusion that the segment is relatively weak. Juice
Generation, 115 USPQ2d at 1675. See also Tektronix, Inc. v. Daktronics, Inc., 534
F.2d 915, 189 USPQ 693, 694-95 (CCPA 1976) (even if “there is no evidence of actual
use” of “third-party registrations,” such registrations “may be given some weight to
show the meaning of a mark in the same way that dictionaries are used”).54

53 See Nautilus Grp., Inc. v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 372 F.3d 1330, 71 USPQ2d 1173,
1180 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (defining an arbitrary mark as “a known word used in an unexpected
or uncommon way” and observing that such marks are typically strong because they
naturally serve to identify a particular source of a product or service).
54 We do not consider Applicant’s registrations, nor the third-party registrations, to determine
the commercial strength of Opposer’s MONSTER marks. Opposer’s Brief, p. 47 (64
TTABVUE 54) (arguing third-party registrations cannot establish commercial weakness).
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We turn first to the 15 CLEVELAND MONSTER or LAKE ERIE MONSTER
registrations owned by Applicant that are not subject to any petitions to cancel by
Opposer or any other entity.55
Class 9
Registration No. 5515631 for the mark CLEVELAND MONSTERS, in standard
character form, for computer software, namely, screen savers featuring hockey
themes; magnets; downloadable computer software for use as screensavers,
wallpaper; downloadable electronic publications in the nature of game schedules in
the field of hockey provided over the Internet.56
Class 14
Registration No. 5460834 for the mark CLEVELAND MONSTERS, in standard
character form, for earrings, jewelry, jewelry and imitation jewelry, costume jewelry,
and rings.57
Class 16
Registration No. 3890431 LAKE ERIE MONSTERS and design, reproduced
below, for paper pennants;58

55 57 TTABVUE 88-150.
56 The description of goods covers the same goods as in Applicant’s application Serial No.
87548893 involved in this opposition.
57 The description of goods covers the same goods as in Applicant’s application Serial No.
87546801 involved in this opposition.
58 Paper pennants are part of the description of goods in Applicant’s application Serial No.
87547252 involved in this opposition.
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Registration No. 5482814 for the mark CLEVELAND MONSTERS, in standard
character form, for paper banners and flags, unmounted photographs, paper
pennants, game schedules in the field of hockey;59 and
Registration No. 5795803 for the mark CLEVELAND MONSTERS, in standard
character form, for publications and printed matter, namely, stickers, decals and
bumper stickers in the field of hockey and paper pennants in the field of hockey.60
Class 2561
Registration No. 3897555 LAKE ERIE MONSTERS, in standard character form,
for t-shirts, shirts, jerseys, hats, and caps;
Registration No. 3890431 LAKE ERIE MONSTERS and Design, reproduced
above, for t-shirts, shirts, polo shirts, sweatshirts, jerseys, hats, caps, and jackets;
Registration No. 5795810 for the mark CLEVELAND MONSTERS, in standard
character form, for coats, wind-resistant jackets and wind jackets; and

59 Paper banners and flags, unmounted photographs, paper pennants, game schedules in the
field of hockey are part of the description of goods in Applicant’s application Serial No.
87547252 involved in this opposition.
60 Publications and printed matter, namely, stickers, decals and bumper stickers in the field
of hockey and paper pennants in the field of hockey are part of the description of goods in
Applicant’s application Serial No. 87547252 involved in this opposition.
61 The description of goods in these registrations encompass the description of goods in
Applicant’s application Serial No. 87547147 involved in this opposition.
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Registration No. 5950480 for the mark CLEVELAND MONSTERS, in standard
character form, for gloves and scarves.
Class 28
Registration No. 5482815 for the mark CLEVELAND MONSTERS, in standard
character form, for toys, games and sporting goods, namely, hockey pucks and hockey
sticks; bobblehead action figures; stuffed toys.62
Class 3563
Registration No. 5482813 for the mark CLEVELAND MONSTERS, in standard
character form, for computerized on-line retail store, ordering, retail store services,
electronic retail store services and mail-order catalog services featuring an array of
hockey-themed merchandise; and
Registration No. 5950481 for the mark CLEVELAND MONSTERS, in standard
character form, for promoting the goods and services of others by allowing sponsors
to affiliate these goods and services with a hockey program; promoting the sale of
goods and services of others through the distribution of promotional contests provided
over the Internet; conducting public opinion poll surveys and public opinion poll
surveys in the field of hockey for business and non-business and marketing and non-
marketing purposes over the Internet; conducting interactive public opinion polls in
the field of hockey.

62 This description of goods is the same as the description of goods in Applicant’s application
Serial No. 87548887 involved in this opposition.
63 The description of goods in these registrations encompass the description of goods in
Applicant’s application Serial No. 87548901 involved in this opposition.
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Class 38
Registration No. 5944445 for the mark CLEVELAND MONSTERS, in standard
character form, for webcasting services in the nature of providing on-line chat rooms
and on-line interactive chat rooms with guests for transmission of messages among
computer users concerning the field of hockey; broadcasting programs over the
Internet; providing on-line electronic bulletin boards for transmission of messages
among computer users concerning the field of hockey; providing access to databases
featuring interactive polling in the field of hockey.64
Class 4165
Registration No. 5515632 for the mark CLEVELAND MONSTERS, in standard
character form, for entertainment services, namely, sporting activities involving the
performance by a hockey team in the nature of live performances by a hockey team;
entertainment and educational services in the nature of on-going television and radio
programs in the field of hockey and rendering live hockey games and hockey
exhibitions; the production and distribution of radio and television broadcasts of
hockey games, hockey events and programs in the field of hockey; conducting and
arranging hockey clinics and coaches' clinics and hockey events; fan-club services;
entertainment services, namely, providing a website featuring the following content
- non-downloadable videos in the field of television highlights, interactive television

64 The description of services in Applicant’s application Serial No. 87548912 involved in this
opposition encompasses the description of services in this registration.
65 The description of goods in these registrations encompass the description of goods in
Applicant’s application Serial No. 87548930 involved in this opposition.
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highlights, radio programs, radio highlights, and audio recordings in the field of
hockey, and hockey news in the nature of information, statistics and trivia about
hockey; providing non-downloadable on-line game schedules in the field of hockey
over the Internet; and
Registration No. 5950479 for the mark CLEVELAND MONSTERS, in standard
character form, for entertainment services in the nature of personal appearances by
a costumed mascot at hockey games and exhibitions, clinics, promotions, and other
hockey-related events, special events and parties; providing non-downloadable on-
line magazines and newsletters in the field of hockey over the Internet.
We turn now to third-party registrations. Applicant introduced copies of the
following third-party registrations:
● 39 third-party MONSTER registrations in Class 9 (Applicant’s Exhibits 16-65).66
The following registrations are illustrative:
•Registration No. 5324782 for the mark ATOMIC MONSTER for, inter alia,
digital downloadable video files for delivery to mobile telephone and personal
digital devices featuring adventure, drama and action;67
•Registration No. 5738624 for the mark BOSS MONSTER for computer game
software for use on mobile and cellular phones;68 and

66 57 TTABVUE 152-356. We did not consider Registration Nos. 4636890, 5713125 or 5029695
because they do not include the word “monster.” (57 TTABVUE 358-367).
67 57 TTABVUE 152.
68 57 TTABVUE 156.
Opposition No. 91240680

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•Registration No. 5246319 for the mark CAP MONSTERS for, inter alia,
computer game software;69
● five third-party MONSTER registrations in Class 14 (Applicant’s Exhibits 69-
76).70
● 32 third-party MONSTER registrations in Class 16 (Applicant’s Exhibits 77-
109).71 The following registrations are illustrative:
•Registration No. 3289638 for the mark BUFF MONSTER for stickers;72
•Registration No. 4943918 for the mark FAMOUS MONSTERS for, inter alia,
posters;73 and
•Registration No. 3655951 for the mark GREEN MONSTER for, inter alia,
posters and mounted and unmounted photographs;74
● 35 third-party MONSTER registrations in Class 25 (Applicant’s Exhibits 116-
151);75

69 57 TTABVUE 160.
70 57 TTABVUE 368-394. All five registrations are for some form of jewelry or jewelry making
kits.
We did not consider Registration Nos. 5521379 or 4533853 because they do not include the
word “monster.” (57 TTABVUE 396-402).
71 57 TTABVUE 404-538. We did not consider Registration Nos. 4955963, 4999914, 4636890,
3771431, 4354158, or 4396609 because they do not include the word “monster.” (57
TTABVUE 540-562).
72 57 TTABVUE 404.
73 57 TTABVUE 408.
74 57 TTABVUE 412.
75 57 TTABVUE 564-734. All 35 registrations are for some form of apparel.
We did not consider Registration Nos. 4824047, 4746450, 4755341, 4955963, 5517917,
5682053, 4999914, 4636890, 3771431, 3533870, 5669226, 5860109, 4389572, 4497252,
Opposition No. 91240680

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● 80 third-party MONSTER registrations in Class 28 (Applicant’s Exhibits 169-
249).76 The following registrations are illustrative:
•Registration No. 3586236 for the mark BLUE MONSTER for, inter alia,
stuffed toy animals;77
•Registration No. 5142951 for the mark BREAKFAST MONSTERS! for, inter
alia, plush toys;78 and
•Registration No. 5890552 for the mark BUTTON JAR MONSTERS for
stuffed and plush toys;79
● 20 third-party MONSTER registrations in Class 35 (Applicant’s Exhibits 252-
272).80 The following registrations are illustrative:
•Registration No. 5858083 for the mark 3 HEADED MONSTER for, inter alia,
advertising, marketing and promotion services;81

5586900, 4396609, or 5670992 because they do not include the word “monster.” (57
TTABVUE 736-797).
76 57 TTABVUE 799-911 and 58 TTABVUE 6-237. We did not consider Registration Nos.
3771431 or 4396609 because they do not include the word “monster.” (58 TTABVUE 239-
245).
77 57 TTABVUE 802.
78 57 TTABVUE 810.
79 57 TTABVUE 813.
80 58 TTABVUE 247-331. We did not consider Registration Nos. 3781552, 4076006, or
5284363 because they do not include the word “monster.” (58 TTABVUE 333-346).
81 58 TTABVUE 247.
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•Registration No. 3989509 for the mark ADMONSTERS for, inter alia,
providing an online interactive website featuring advertising and
advertisement services;82 and
•Registration No. 5313295 for the mark BEADSMONSTER for, inter alia, on-
line retail gift shops;83
● five third-party MONSTER registrations in Class 38 (Applicant’s Exhibits 276-
281);84
● 85 third-party MONSTER registrations in Class 41 (Applicant’s Exhibits 282-
367).85 The following registrations are illustrative:
•Registration No. 3607649 for the mark GREEN MONSTER for, inter alia,
providing information in the field of sports, entertainment and related topics,
and providing for informational messages relating thereto;86
•Registration No. 4580772 for the mark HENRY HUGGLEMONSTER for,
inter alia, presentation and distribution of television programs, provision of
entertainment news and entertainment information via communication and
computer networks and presentation sound and visual recordings;87 and

82 58 TTABVUE 254.
83 58 TTABVUE 259.
84 58 TTABVUE 348-369. Four of the registrations are for related services. The description of
goods in Registration No. 5118877 for the mark MONSTERCLOUD, voice over internet
protocol (VOIP) services, is too far afield to be relevant. (58 TTABVUE 360).
85 58 TTABVUE 371-746. We did not consider Registration Nos. 3771432, 4375738, 4179507,
4929082, or 5586900 because they do not include the word “monster.” (58 TTABVUE 748-
764).
86 58 TTABVUE 432.
87 58 TTABVUE 446.
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•Registration No. 4101431 for the mark MICHIGAN ICE MONSTER for
performing in motor sports events.88
In Plus Prods. v. Natural Organics, Inc., 204 USPQ 773 (TTAB 1979), which
involved an opposition to the registration of NATURE ’S PLUS for vitamins by the
owner of the mark PLUS, also for vitamins, the applicant made of record eight third-
party registrations that issued prior to opposer’s registration and seven registrations
that issued after, all for marks containing the word PLUS and all for goods that are
the same or closely related to vitamins. The Board drew the following inferences from
the co-existence of these registrations:
1. Opposer was satisfied to register PLUS side-by-side with eight existing
registrations.
2. The USPTO has historically registered PLUS marks for vitamins to different
parties so long as there has been some difference, not necessarily created by a
distinctive word, between the marks as a whole, e.g., VITAMINS PLUS and
IRON PLUS.
3. A number of different trademark owners have believed, over a long interval
of time that various PLUS marks can be used and registered side by side
without causing confusion provided there are minimal differences between the
marks.
Id. at 779. See also In re Hartz Hotel Servs., Inc., 102 USPQ2d 1150, 1153 (TTAB
2012) (applying the same inferences); Jerrold Elec. Corp. v. The Magnavox Co.,

88 58 TTABVUE 464.
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199 USPQ 751, 758 (TTAB 1978) (third-party registrations “reflect a belief, at least
by the registrants, who would be most concerned about avoiding confusion and
mistake, that various ‘STAR’ marks can coexist provided that there is a difference.”);
In re Sien Equip. Co., 189 USPQ 586, 588 (TTAB 1975) (the suggestive meaning of
the word “Brute” explains the numerous third-party registrations incorporating that
word with other wording or material no matter how little additional significance they
may add to the word “Brute” per se).
We find that Applicant’s “Monster” registrations and the third -party “Monster”
registrations show that the word “Monster” is highly suggestive for all identified
goods and services other than beverages and, therefore, it falls on the inherently or
conceptually weaker side of the spectrum for those goods and services. Opposer
argues to the contrary. Opposer contends that because “Applicant provides no
evidence that these third party marks are registered for goods or services which
overlap with Opposer’s or Applicant’s goods or services,”89 Opposer’s MONSTER
marks are not weak. While we acknowledge that not every third-party registration is
relevant, the preceding review of Applicant’s other registrations and third -party
registrations disprove Opposer’s argument. In this regard, Opposer simply argued
that the goods or services are not related but did not identify even one irrelevant
registration as an example. Accordingly, Opposer fails to persuade us that its
MONSTER marks are anything other than inherently/conceptually highly suggestive
with respect to the goods and services in Classes 9, 14, 16, 25, 28, 35, 38, and 41.

89 Opposer’s Reply Brief, p. 8 (67 TTABVUE 14).
Opposition No. 91240680

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On the other hand, with respect with beverages, because there are no third-party
MONSTER marks, we find that Opposer’s MONSTER mark is arbitrary and,
therefore, an inherently or conceptually strong mark.
2. The commercial strength of Opposer’s MONSTER marks.
We find that Opposer’s MONSTER mark for beverages is commercially strong, if
not famous. There is no need to recount the evidence of the commercial strength of
Opposer’s MONSTER mark in connection with beverages inasmuch as the evidence
is persuasive and Applicant does not contest the commercial strength of Opposer’s
marks for beverages.
Applicant, in its brief, argues that “fame in one category of goods or services does
not necessarily extend to other categories,” implying that because Opposer’s
MONSTER marks are famous for beverages does not mean that Opposer’s
MONSTER marks are famous for apparel, promoting sporting events for others, etc.90
Applicant continues asserting “[w]hile Opposer has built a successful energy drink
business under its MONSTER ENERGY and MONSTER-formative marks, these
rights do not preclude Applicant from registering its Team Logo in connection with
professional hockey services and related team merchandise.”91
Consequently, although Opposer’s MONSTER-formative marks
may be well-known for energy drinks, they are not “famous” for
the goods and services covered by Applicant’s pending Team
Logo applications.92

90 Applicant’s Brief, p. 23 (66 TTABVUE 30).
91 Id.
92 Id. at p. 24 (66 TTABVUE 31).
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It is common knowledge that owners of famous marks frequently use those marks
on collateral or merchandising products such as clothing, mugs and other consumer
goods.
We agree with the board that appellee’s evidence
establishes that appellee has built up an enormous
goodwill in the mark MONOPOLY, which has been used
since 1935 for a board game and that MONOPOLY may
properly be termed a “famous” mark. We also find no error
in the board’s conclusion that it is a matter of common
knowledge that famous marks are frequently used on items
such as clothing, glassware, and trash cans and that
appellee’s licensing of its mark for use on certain novelty
items supports this conclusion.
Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 648 F.2d 1335, 200 USPQ 986, 988
(CCPA 1981).
Likewise, as the Board found in Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Pierce Foods Corp.,
231 USPQ 857, 863 (TTAB 1986):
That the mark HARLEY-HOG used on pork products is
likely to be associated as to source with opposer is also
corroborated by the fact that opposer’s uses of HARLEY
and HOG in relation to its collateral goods frequently have
been whimsical in character (e.g., HOG piggy banks, T-
shirts bearing the phrase, “I LOVE MY HOG HARLEY,”
“the HOG Tales” publication, etc.). Because of these uses,
a person having knowledge of them would not be surprised
to see HARLEY-HOG used in connection with hot dogs or
similar products, and the association with opposer of the
mark so used would also be not at all surprising.
We find that Opposer’s MONSTER marks are inherently or conceptually strong,
as well as commercially very strong, if not famous, in connection with beverages, and,
therefore, entitled to a broad scope of protection in connection with these goods.
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However, because Opposer’s MONSTER marks are highly suggestive , they are
entitled to a more narrow scope of protection with respect to other goods and services.
It seems both logical and obvious to us that where a party
chooses a trademark which is inherently weak, he will not
enjoy the wide latitude of protection afforded the owners of
strong trademarks. Where a party uses a weak mark, his
competitors may come closer to his mark than would be the
case with a strong mark without violating his rights. The
essence of all we have said is that in the former case there
is not the possibility of confusion that exists in the latter
case.
Sure-Fit Prods. Co. v. Saltzson Drapery Co., 254 F.2d 158, 117 USPQ 295, 297 (CCPA
1958). See also Hartz Hotel Servs., 102 USPQ2d at 1154. Under these circumstances,
we will accord Opposer’s marks comprising the term “Monster” for goods or services
other than beverages a narrow scope of protection.
B. The length of time during and conditions under which there has been
concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion.
Neither Opposer, nor Applicant, is aware of any reported instances of actual
confusion.93 The absence of any reported instances of confusion is meaningful only if
the record indicates appreciable and continuous use by the parties of their marks for
a significant length of time in the same markets. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank
Grp., Inc., 94 USPQ2d 1645, 1660 (TTAB 2010), aff’d, 637 F.3d 1344, 98 USPQ2d
1253 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Gillette Canada Inc. v. Ranir Corp., 23 USPQ2d 1768, 1774
(TTAB 1992). In other words, for the absence of actual confusion to be probative, there

93 Applicant’s response to Opposer’s interrogatory Nos. 36 and 38 (19 TTABVUE 158-59);
Ostrowski Testimony Decl.¶27 (55 TTABVUE 11-12); Opposer’s admission to Applicant’s
request for admission Nos. 14-16 (59 TTABVUE 450-52); Opposer’s response to Applicant’s
interrogatory No. 10 (59 TTABVUE 465-66).
Opposition No. 91240680

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must have been a reasonable opportunity for confusion to occur. Barbara’s Bakery
Inc. v. Landesman, 82 USPQ2d 1283, 1287 (TTAB 2007) (the probative value of the
absence of actual confusion depends upon there being a significant opportunity for
actual confusion to have occurred); Red Carpet Corp. v. Johnstown Am. Enters. Inc.,
7 USPQ2d 1404, 1406-1407 (TTAB 1988); Central Soya Co., Inc. v. N. Am. Plant
Breeders, 212 USPQ 37, 48 (TTAB 1981) (“[T]he absence of actual confusion over a
reasonable period of time might well suggest that the likelihood of confusion is only
a remote possibility with little probability of occurring.”).
According to Opposer’s witness, Rodney Sacks, in April 2002, Opposer launched
its MONSTER ENERGY drink.94 Since its launch, Opposer’s MONSTER ENERGY
drink has grown into an industry leader.95
By 2003, [Opposer’s] beverages were being sold in all 50
states in gas stations, convenience stores, gyms, health
food stores, independent stores, grocery stores, mass
merchandisers such as Costco, Wal-Mart, and Target, and
drug stores such as CVS and Walgreens. Monster’s
MONSTER™ line of drinks are now sold by well over
300,000 retail stores all over the country. Monster’s
MONSTER™ line of drinks are also sold by on-premise
retailers such as bars, restaurants, coffees shops, sports
venues, theme parks and cinemas, including, but not
limited to Anaheim’s Angel Stadium and the Honda
Center, New Jersey’s Devil’s Arena, Boston’s TD Garden,
Carl’s Jr., Hardee’s, Dunkin Donuts, Disney theme parks,
and Cinemark theaters. Monster’s MONSTERTM line of
drinks are also sold online, including on amazon.com,
walmart.com, and monsterarmy.com.96

94 Sacks Testimony Decl. ¶7 (42 TTABVUE 5).
95 Sacks Testimony Decl. ¶¶4 and 13 (42 TTABVUE 3 and 7); 23-24 TTABVUE (printed
publications reporting, inter alia, on Opposer’s growth).
96 Sacks Testimony Decl. ¶11 (42 TTABVUE 6).
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Since the launch of its MONSTER ENERGY drink in 2002, Opposer “has allocated
a significant portion of its marketing, advertising, and promotional budget on athlete
endorsements and sponsoring athletic competitions and other events,” including
hockey.97
In addition to the actual contractual amounts paid to
sponsor athletes and racing teams, [Opposer] expends
substantial amounts in supporting the sponsored athletes,
teams, and sports through point of sale materials,
sweepstakes and give-a-ways, wrapping/branding the
athletes’ vehicles, paying for the athletes travel expenses
and by providing them with MONSTER-branded apparel,
free products for sampling stations, and action sports gear
bearing the MONSTER Marks. Further, Monster hires
employees and outside companies to attend events to
support and monitor the sponsored athletes and teams at
every event and to provide hospitality and sampling of
products to consumers.98
“The sponsored athletes, teams, and musicians create enormous public exposure
and awareness of the MONSTER Marks.”99
Monster-sponsored athletes have been the focus of
hundreds of action sports magazines and articles, which
feature the athletes’ gear and accessories that prominently
display the MONSTER Marks. Monster-sponsored athletes
are routinely featured promoting the MONSTER Marks
through their clothing, accessories and/or equipment in
national magazines such as People, Men’s Fitness, Cycle
News, Dirt Rider, Racer X Illustrated, Transworld
Motocross, Dirt, and Modified Mag.100

97 Sacks Testimony Decl. ¶¶14 and 18 (42 TTABVUE 7-9). See also Sacks Testimony Decl.
¶¶24-31 (42 TTABVUE 11-13) (providing detailed testimony regarding Opposer’s hockey
sponsorships).
98 Sacks Testimony Decl. ¶14 (42 TTABVUE 8).
99 Sacks Testimony Decl. ¶19 (42 TTABVUE 10).
100 Sacks Testimony Decl. ¶115 (42 TTABVUE 42).
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Rodney Sacks testified about Opposer’s extensive social media presence consisting
of its MONSTER ENERGY website (monsterenergy.com) and MONSTER ARMY
website (monsterarmy.com), Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and YouTube.101
98. … The www.monsterenergy.com website hosted over
1.7 million unique visitors in 2008 alone. In May 2011, the
website was viewed over 479,000 times. …
99. [Opposer’s] Facebook page is among the most “liked”
Facebook pages. [Opposer’s] Facebook page currently has
more than 26 million “likes.” The page features Monster
sponsored athletes, sports, and events, from all over the
world and prominently displays the MONSTER Marks.
Attached hereto as Exhibit 42 are true and correct copies
from [Opposer’s] Facebook page dated April 1, 2014. At
that time, [Opposer] had over 24 million “likes.
100. … Monster was the 14th most followed brand on
Facebook in 2010. At that time, Monster had over 7 million
followers. As of August 2019, Monster had become the 8th
most popular brand on Facebook according to
Socialbakers.102
101. [Opposer’s] Twitter account … has over 3.1 million
followers. …
102. [Opposer’s] Instagram account … has approximately
5.7 million followers …
103. … [Opposer’s] YouTube channel had over 1.6 million
subscribers [as of July 25, 2018].103
In addition to selling beverages, Opposer uses and licenses its MONSTER marks
on a wide range of other products, including, but not limited, to clothing, protective

101 Sacks Testimony Decl. ¶¶89-93 and 97-105 (42 TTABVUE 34-36 and 37-39).
102 Socialbakers tracks brand popularity on Facebook. Sacks Testimony Decl. ¶100 (42
TTABVUE 37).
103 Sacks Testimony Decl. ¶¶98-103 (42 TTABVUE 37-38).
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gear, helmets, stickers, and jewelry.104 Opposer’s “accessories, clothing, and beverage
products bearing its MONSTER Marks are sold and given away at sporting events,
music festivals, concerts, and other events or public locations”105 “to consumers in all
50 states.”106
In 2003, Opposer sponsored the MONSTER train, the first multi-car train on the
Las Vegas monorail. The train prominently features the MONSTER marks and
exposes the MONSTER marks “to a large number of consumers.”107
Opposer and video game publishers have entered partnerships to have MONSTER
branding appear in video games. “These cross promotions create exposure for the
MONSTER marks and maintain [Opposer’s] connection with the video game
community.”108
According to Applicant’s witness, Mike Ostrowski, the CLEVELAND MONSTERS
is a professional hockey team playing in the American Hockey League (AHL).109 The
CLEVELAND MONSTERS play its home games in Rocket Mortgage Fieldhouse in
Cleveland, Ohio, and its road games in 31 cities throughout the country with AHL
teams, including Syracuse, New York, Chicago, Illinois, Grand Rapids, Michigan, and
Milwaukee, Wisconsin.110

104 Sacks Testimony Decl. ¶106 (42 TTABVUE 39-40).
105 Sacks Testimony Decl. ¶111 (42 TTAVUE 41).
106 Sacks Testimony Decl. ¶113 (42 TTABVUE 41).
107 Sacks Testimony Decl. ¶117 (42 TABVUE 43-42).
108 Sacks Testimony Decl. ¶121 (42 TTABVUE 45).
109 Ostrowski Testimony Decl. ¶5 (55 TTABVUE 4).
110 Ostrowski Testimony Decl. ¶6 (55 TTABVUE 4-5).
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The original name of the CLEVELAND MONSTERS was the LAKE ERIE
MONSTERS. The LAKE ERIE MONSTERS began playing in the AHL in the 2007-
08 hockey season. The LAKE ERIE MONSTERS used the logo reproduced below:111

In 2016, the team announced the name change to the CLEVELAND MONSTERS
as part of plan to identify the team with the city of Cleveland, Ohio, where it plays
its home games.112
As noted above, Applicant used the CLEVELAND MONSTERS and design mark
at issue for the goods and services at issue since July 31, 2016. Applicant has used
the LAKE ERIE MONSTERS and design mark in connection with paper pennants
and clothing since January 2007 and continues to use the mark in connection with
those goods.113

111 Ostrowksi Testimony Decl. ¶14 (TTABVUE 8); Ostrowski Discovery Dep., p. 43 (33
TTABVUE 41).
112 Ostrowski Testimony Decl. ¶¶15-17 (55 TTABVUE 9); Ostrowski Discovery Dep., pp. 43,
45, and 50 (33 TTABVUE 41, 43, and 48); Applicant’s response to Opposer’s interrogatory
No. 3 (19 TTABVUE 149-150).
113 Ostrowski Testimony Decl. ¶¶9 and 10 (55 TTABVUE 5-7); Applicant’s response to
Opposer’s interrogatory Nos. 10 and 11 (19 TTABVUE 151).
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Applicant promotes its CLEVELAND MONSTERS hockey game services and the
related goods and services through its website and social media platforms (i.e.,
Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram).114
We also have a Monsters members, like our season tickets
members' page on Facebook. Our dance teams and
mascots, I know they have Twitter accounts. I believe
Facebook, too.115
Applicant sells its CLEVELAND MONSTERS and design brand merchandise at
the arena where it plays its home games, at away arenas, online team store, through
a mobile trailer at team events, through licensing agreements managed by the
AHL.116 Applicant does not sell CLEVELAND MONSTERS merchandise through big
box retailers such as Costco or Wal-Mart or through local convenience stores.117
The goods and services Applicant offers its CLEVELAND MONSTERS and design
brand goods and services to the general consuming public, including but not limited
to hockey fans.118 Mike Ostrowski provided additional details about Applicant’s goods
and services:
Q. So let’s talk about the target market for Cleveland
Monsters. Is there a typical Cleveland Monsters fan?

114 Ostrowski Testimony Decl. ¶12 (55 TTABVUE 8); Ostrowski Discovery Dep., p. 142 (33
TTABVUE 103); Applicant’s response to Opposer’s interrogatory No. 26 (19 TTABVUE 155-
156).
115 Ostrowski Discovery Dep., p. 142 (33 TTABVUE 103).
116 Ostrowksi Testimony Decl. ¶11 (55 TTABVUE 8); Ostrowski Discovery Dep., pp. 115-116
(33 TTABVUE 79-80); Applicant’s response to Opposer’s interrogatory No. 20 (19 TTABVUE
154).
117 Ostrowski Discovery Dep., pp. 119-120 (33 TTABVUE 83-84).
118 Applicant’s response to Opposer’s interrogatory No. 24 (19 TTABVUE 155).
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A. So, you know, kids are a big target of ours, families.
Kids and families are very, you know, central to the
product that we put on. Each game, hockey fans, we ’re
targeting them, but we’re also targeting people that like
to have a good time. So you don’t have to be, you know,
a hockey fan to come to our games to have fun. We know
we’ll have hockey fans so we do target them and provide
them pieces of information, but definitely more kid and
family focused would be what you’ll see at our games
generally.
Q. And do Cleveland Monsters fans typically reside locally
here in Cleveland or is there a wider reach?
A. Typically in northeast Ohio, within probably a seven to
10 county radius, but you could have some fans coming
from a little further out, but generally it’s northeast
Ohio.119
Applicant targets businesses and higher net worth individuals for premium season
ticket programs, as well as casual buyers who would not be interested in multiple
games.120
In 2008, Opposer’s predecessor-in-interest, and Applicant’s parent company
entered into a marketing and promotional sponsorship agreement with Walgreens.
“Opposer’s MONSTER ENERGY drinks were featured in co -branded displays at
certain Walgreen’s [sic] stores in Ohio. The co-branded displays promoted MONSTER
ENERGY, the LAKE ERIE MONSTERS, and the affiliated CLEVELAND
CAVALIERS NBA franchise.”121

119 Ostrowski Discovery Dep., p. 150-151 (33 TTABVUE 107-108).
120 Ostrowski Discovery Dep., pp. 154-155 (33 TTABVUE 111-112).
121 Ostrowski Testimony Decl. ¶22 (56 TTBVUE 10-11) (confidential). “The Board may treat
as not confidential that material which cannot reasonably be considered confidential,
notwithstanding a designation as such by a party.” Trademark Rule 2.116(g), 37 C.F.R. §
2.116(g).
Opposition No. 91240680

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The Walgreens Agreement provided customers
opportunities to win tickets to Cleveland Cavaliers
professional NBA basketball games, Lake Erie Monsters
minor league hockey games, or Quicken Loans Arena
concert events by purchasing Monster products from the
aforementioned newly acquired shelf space.122
Mr. Sacks testified that there were no reported instances of confusion during the co-
promotion event (2008-2014).123
Finally, both parties agree that they offer their goods and services in the same
channels of trade to the same classes of consumers.124 Applicant admits that the same
classes of consumers may encounter both Applicant’s mark and Opposer’s marks.125
Likewise, Opposer contends the facts listed below prove the parties offer their goods
and services to the same classes of consumers:126
● Both parties promote entertainment services related to sporting activities,
including hockey;127
● Both parties sell their products at sporting events, including hockey and on the
Internet;128

122 Sacks Rebuttal Testimony Decl. ¶3 (62 TTABVUE 3). Despite the opportunity for
MONSTER ENERGY drink consumers to win tickets to LAKE ERIE MONSTERS hockey
games, Mr. Sacks contends that consumers did not see the two marks together. Id. at ¶5 (62
TTABVUE 3-4).
123 Ostrowski Testimony Decl. ¶27 (56 TTABVUE 12) (confidential).
124 We discuss established, likely-to-continue channels of trade in a separate section below.
125 Applicant’s admission to Opposer’s request for admission No. 3 (19 TTABVUE 169).
126 Opposer’s Brief, pp. 39-40 (64 TTABVUE 46-47).
127 Sacks Decl. ¶¶24-35, 110-113 (42 TTABVUE 11-14 and 41-42); Applicant’s response to
Opposer’s interrogatory No. 20 (19 TTABVUE 154).
128 Id.
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● Both parties market and promote their products and services on the Internet,
including through their social media accounts;129
● Both parties have televised and broadcast their sporting events over the radio
and internet;130
● Both parties have promoted their products through giveaways, such as product
giveaways;131 and
● Applicant’s target market comprising “the general consuming public, including
but not limited to fans of professional hockey” overlaps with Opposer’s primary target
market comprising adult males, ages 18 to 34.132
In view of the simultaneous use of Opposer’s MONSTER marks in connection with
beverages and associated collateral merchandising products and promoting and
sponsoring of sporting events, including hockey, and Applicant’s LAKE ERIE
MONSTERS and design mark since 2007 and Applicant’s CLEVELAND MONSTERS
and design mark since 2016 in connection with hockey and associated collateral
merchandise, there has been a reasonable opportunity for actual confusion. This is
especially persuasive inasmuch as the parties agree that they have offered their goods
and services in the same channels of trade and to the same classes of consumers.

129 Sacks Decl. ¶¶97-105 (43 TTABVUE 37-39); Ostrowski Discovery Dep., pp. 141-43 (33
TABVUE 102-104); Applicant’s responses to Opposer’s interrogatory Nos. 20 and 26 (19
TTABVUE 154-56); Applicant’s admissions to Opposer’s requests for admission Nos. 20-24
(19 TTABVUE 174-75).
130 Sacks Decl. ¶¶16, 18, 37-40, and 45 (42 TTABVUE 8-10, 15-18).
131 Sacks Decl. ¶¶21 and 72 (42 TTABVUE 10 and 27-28); Ostrowski Discovery Dep., pp.
132-133 (33 TTABVUE 98-99).
132 Applicant’s responses to Opposer’s interrogatory Nos. 24 and 25 (19 TTABVUE 155); Sacks
Decl. ¶15 (42 TTABVUE 8).
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While LAKE ERIE MONSTERS and design and CLEVELAND MONSTERS and
design are not identical, they differ only in the geographic designations “Lake Erie”
and “Cleveland.” Notably, it is Applicant’s use and registration of the word
“Monsters” to which Opposer objects. In view of the similarity of Applicant’s marks,
reproduced below, Opposer’s argument that the lack of confusion between LAKE
ERIE MONSTERS and design and Opposer’s MONSTER marks is irre levant lacks
credulity.133

Furthermore, Opposer’s renown extends nationwide across almost all channels of
trade and classes of consumers. In fact, the evidence shows that Opposer’s MONSTER
marks have been commercially strong, if not famous, since prior to Applicant’s first
use of LAKE ERIE MONSTERS and design. Opposer contends that because
Applicant’s promotion and use of its marks has been geographically limited to
northeastern Ohio, the lack of any reported instances of confusion is neutral.134 There
are several problems with Opposer ’s contention. First, as noted above, Opposer’s
renown is nationwide and extends into Applicant’s primary marketing area. Second,
although Applicant is located in Cleveland, Ohio, it is part of the AHL and plays
throughout the country. Finally, Applicant and Opposer were involved in a co-

133 Opposer’s Reply Brief, p. 8 (67 TTABVUE 12).
134 Opposer’s Brief, p. 46 (64 TTABVUE 53).
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branding promotional program from 2008 through 2014 that generated no reported
instances of confusion because of the use of Opposer’s MONSTER marks and
Applicant’s LAKE ERIE MONSTERS mark.
Based on this evidence, we find there has been a reasonable opportunity for
confusion to occur and that the lack of any reported instances of confusion weighs
against finding that there is a likelihood of confusion. See Citigroup Inc. v. Capital
City Bank Grp., Inc., 98 USPQ2d at 1259-61 (finding substantial evidence supports
there was a reasonable opportunity for confusion to occur with no reported instances
of actual confusion, thus, favoring finding no likelihood of confusion).
C. The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks.
We now turn to the DuPont factor focusing on the similarity or dissimilarity of the
marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial
impression. DuPont, 177 USPQ at 567. “Similarity in any one of these elements may
be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126
USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (quoting In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812
(TTAB 2014), aff’d mem., 777 F. App’x 516 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 13, 2019)); accord Krim-
Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 390 F.2d 728, 156 USPQ 523, 526 (CCPA 1968)
(“It is sufficient if the similarity in either form, spelling or sound alone is likely to
cause confusion.”) (citation omitted).
In comparing the marks, we are mindful that “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-
side comparison of the marks, but instead ‘whether the marks are sufficiently similar
in terms of their commercial impression’ such that persons who encounter the marks
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would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong,
127 USPQ2d at 1801 (quoting Coach Servs., 101 USPQ2d at 1721.
The marks are similar to the extent that Opposer’s marks consist of the word
“Monster” and Applicant’s mark includes the word “Monsters.” In contrast, the marks
have different meanings and engender different commercial impressions. In
Opposer’s case, the word “Monster” means and engenders the commercial impression
of enormous or huge energy. On the other hand, Applicant’s CLEVELAND
MONSTERS and design, reproduced below, engenders the commercial impression of
a huge animal representing a powerful hockey team from Cleveland.135

Mike Ostrowski testified that Applicant originally adopted and used LAKE ERIE
MONSTERS as a play on a mythical monster in Lake Erie.
The original team name, LAKE ERIE MONSTERS, was a
humorous play on local folklore claiming that a serpent
akin to the Loch Ness Monster lived in Lake Erie off the
shores of Cleveland, Ohio, where the team is based. As part
of its marketing efforts, the team has always sought to
develop and convey a family-friendly and welcoming image.
Consequently, Applicant was attracted to an interesting

135 While the commercial impression of the parties marks are of an aggressive and intense
demeanor, as noted by Opposer, the commercial impressions are different when applied to
the primary goods and services of the parties. Opposer’s Brief, p. 39 (64 TTABVUE 46).
Opposition No. 91240680

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and humorous play on the local legend surrounding the
mythical monster.136
Opposer asserts that because its MONSTER marks are famous, “even a minimal
level of similarity would cause a likelihood of confusion.”137 Fame alone is not
sufficient to prove likelihood of confusion. If that were the case, having a famous mark
would entitle the owner to a right in gross, and that is against the principles of
trademark law. See Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac v. J. C. Gourmet Food Imp. Co., Inc.,
703 F.2d 1372, 217 USPQ 505, 507 (Fed. Cir. 1983):
The fame of the [plaintiff’s] name is insufficient in itself to
establish likelihood of confusion under 2(d). “Likely * * * to
cause confusion” means more than the likelihood that the
public will recall a famous mark on seeing the same mark
used by another. It must also be established that there is a
reasonable basis for the public to attribute the particular
product or service of another to the source of the goods or
services associated with the famous mark. To hold
otherwise would result in recognizing a right in gross,
which is contrary to principles of trademark law and to
concepts embodied in 15 USC 1052(d).
See also Recot, 54 USPQ2d at 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“fame alone cannot overwhelm
the other du Pont factors as a matter of law”).
In this case, we find the different commercial impressions engendered by the
parties’ respective marks, the highly suggestive inherent or conceptual nature of the
word “Monster” in connection with goods and services in Classes 9, 14, 16, 25, 28, 35,

136 Ostrowski Testimony Decl. ¶16 (55 TTABVUE 9). See also Bessie (lake monster),
Wikipedia.org (60 TTABVUE 10) (“In Michigan folklore, Bessie is a name given to a lake
monster in Lake Erie, also known as South Bay Bessie.”); Legend of Lake Erie Monster Rises
Again, Los Angeles Times (September 30, 1990) (60 TTABVUE 16).
137 Opposer’s Brief, p. 36 (64 TTABVUE 43).
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38, and 41, and the lack of any reported instances of confusion, even though the
identified goods and services move through the same channels of trade and are offered
to the same classes of customers, are significant countervailing factors in determining
whether the marks are similar. See Blue Man Prods. Inc. v. Tarmann, 75 USPQ2d
1811, 1819-1820 (TTAB 2005), rev'd on other grounds, Civil Action No. 05-2037
(D.D.C. April 3, 2008); Burns Philp Food Inc. v. Modern Prods. Inc., 24 USPQ2d 1157,
1160 (TTAB 1992), aff’d mem., 1 F.3d 1252, 28 USPQ2d 1687 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“while
we recognize that the fame of a mark is entitled to substantial weight in our
deliberation (internal citation omitted), the differences in connotation and in trade
dress on the labels are significant countervailing factors.”).
Opposer contends that the word “Monster” is the dominant part of Applicant’s
mark and, therefore, Applicant’s mark is similar to Opposer’s MONSTER marks.138
As noted above, Applicant’s mark CLEVELAND MONSTERS and design and
Opposer’s MONSTER marks are similar because they share the root word “Monster.”
However, the other elements in Applicant’s mark, particularly the inclusion of the
geographic location Cleveland, distinguish the marks by engendering different
commercial impressions. See Coach Servs., 96 USPQ2d at 1609 (applicant’s mark
COACH for educational materials for preparing for standardized tests engenders a
different commercial impression than Opposer’s mark COACH for fashion accessories
such as handbags and leather goods); Viacom Int’l Inc. v. Komm, 46 USPQ2d 1233,

138 Opposer’s Brief, pp. 37-38 (64 TTABVUE 44-45).
Opposition No. 91240680

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1238 (TTAB 1998) (the word “mouse” has different meanings when applied to a
computer peripheral and a cartoon superhero).
Opposer further contends that Applicant’s fans refer to the CLEVELAND
MONSTERS as “the Monsters,” thus, emphasizing the similarity of the marks.139 We
acknowledge again that the marks are similar because they share the root word
“Monster.” However, because Applicant’s mark identifies a sports team, consumers
encountering both marks will distinguish Applicant’s mark from Opposer’s marks
despite some fans referring to the CLEVELAND MONSTERS as “The Monsters.”
This situation is analogous to sports fans distinguishing teams with the same name
(e.g., Auburn Tigers, Missouri Tigers, Princeton Tigers, Clemson Tigers, Detroit
Tigers, etc.).
We find that the marks are more dissimilar than they are similar, and that this
DuPont factor weighs against finding a likelihood of confusion.
D. The similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods and services.
1. International Class 9

Applicant seeks to register its CLEVELAND MONSTERS and design mark for
the goods set forth below in International Class 9:
Computer programs for viewing statistics or trivia about
hockey; computer software, namely, screen savers
featuring hockey themes, computer software to access and
view computer wallpaper, computer browsers, computer
skins and computer cursors; computer game software;
magnets; credit cards magnetically encoded; downloadable
video-stream recordings in the field of hockey provided over

139 Opposer’s Brief, p. 37 (64 TTABVUE 44). Mike Ostrowski testified that fans refer to the
team as “The Monsters.” Ostrowski Discovery Dep., pp. 62 and 64 (33 TTABVUE 60-61).
Opposition No. 91240680

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the Internet; downloadable computer software for viewing
databases of information, statistical information, trivia,
polling information, and interactive polling in the field of
hockey provided over the Internet; downloadable computer
game software; downloadable interactive video games and
trivia game software provided over the Internet;
downloadable computer software for use as screensavers,
wallpaper, browsers, skins and cursors over the Internet;
downloadable electronic publications in the nature of
magazines, newsletters and game schedules all in the field
of hockey provided over the Internet. (Emphasis added).
Opposer has licensed its marks for use in connection with video games, partners
with video game publishers to promote the release of new video games, and sponsors
several competitive video gaming events.140 Specifically, Opposer agreed “to have
MONSTER™ branding appear in video games.”141 For example, MONSTER
sponsored characters appear in the SKATE, SKATE 3, DIRT 2, DIRT 3, and DIRT
SHOWDOWN video games.142 In addition, Opposer collaborated with the publisher
of the CALL OF DUTY video game to have the CALL OF DUTY trademark appear
on Opposer’s MONSTER ENERGY beverages.143
As best we understand Opposer’s position, CLEVELAND MONSTERS and design
computer game software is related to Opposer’s famous MONSTER ENERGY

140 Sacks Testimony Decl. ¶¶70 and 121-131.
Opposer registered M MONSTER ENERGY and design for “sports helmets,” in International
Class 9 (Registration No. 3914828). Opposer did not argue that any of the products Applicant
identified in its Class 9 description of goods are related to sports helmets.
141 Id. at ¶121.
142 Id. at ¶¶122-124.
143 Id. at ¶125.
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beverages because Opposer sponsors and promotes video games.144 There is a twofold
problem with Opposer’s contention. First, there is no evidence that video games and
beverages emanate from the same source or that consumers perceive beverages and
video games as related products despite Opposer’s sponsorship of video games and
video game events. Second, if sponsoring products and events makes the goods or
services of the sponsor related to the goods or services of the sponsored product, then
virtually all goods and services are related. For example, if through a sponsorship
agreement COCA-COLA becomes of the official soft drink of the U.S. Olympic team,
according to Opposer, soft drinks are related to Olympic competitions for purposes of
analyzing likelihood of confusion.
Opposer failed to prove that beverages are related to computer game software or
any of the other products listed in Applicant’s application in International Class 9.
2. International Class 14

Applicant seeks to register its CLEVELAND MONSTERS and design mark for
“costume jewelry; earrings; jewelry and imitation jewelry; pendants; rings; watches,”
in International Class 14.
Opposer has registered M MONSTER ENERGY and design reproduced below, for
“silicone wrist bands; silicone bracelets; jewelry, namely, bracelets and wristbands,”
in International Class 14.145

144 If our understanding is incorrect, then Opposer failed to clearly articulate how and why
its MONSTER ENERGY beverages are related to computer game software. See Opposer’s
Brief, p. 42 (64 TTABVUE 49).
145 Registration No. 4332062.
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We must consider Opposer’s and Applicant’s descriptions of goods to include all
goods of the type identified. See, e.g., Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch
Trading Co., 719 F.3d 1367, 107 USPQ2d 1167, 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Applicant’s
broadly worded identifications of “costume jewelry” and “jewelry and imitation
jewelry” are broad enough to encompass Opposer’s silicone wrist brands and bracelets
and “jewelry, namely bracelets and wristbands.” See Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled,
Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015) (where the services in an application or
registration are broadly described, they are deemed to encompass all the goods of the
nature and type described therein), quoted in In re Country Oven, Inc., 2019 USPQ2d
443903, * 4 (TTAB 2019) and cited in In re AC Webconnecting Holding B.V., 2020
USPQ2d 11048, *11-12 (TTAB 2020).
The Class 14 products include legally identical items.
3. International Class 16

Applicant seeks to register its CLEVELAND MONSTERS and design mark for
the products set forth below in International Class 16:
Publications and printed matter, namely, stickers,
decals, memo pads, note pads, ballpoint pens, pencils,
paper banners and flags, stationery folders, wire-bound
notebooks, portfolio notebooks, unmounted and mounted
photographs, calendars, bumper stickers, statistical books,
guide books, and reference books in the field of hockey;
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magazines in the field of hockey; catalogs featuring hockey;
commemorative game and souvenir programs in the field
of hockey; paper pennants, stationery and printed
certificates in the field of hockey; entertainment printed
certificates for fans; statistical information sheets for
hockey topics; newsletters, brochures, pamphlets and game
schedules in the field of hockey; bank checks; credit cards
not magnetically coded. (Emphasis added).
Opposer has registered M MONSTER ENERGY and design reproduced below, for
“stickers; sticker kits comprising stickers and decals; decals,” in International Class
16.146

Because the International Class 16 descriptions of goods in Opposer’s pleaded
registration and Applicant’s application both include stickers and decals, the
description of goods are in part identical. Under this DuPont factor, Opposer need not
prove, and we need not find, similarity as to each product listed in the description of
goods. It is sufficient to find the products related if we find any item encompassed by
the description of goods in a particular class in the application and registration
related. Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 648 F.2d 1335, 209 USPQ 986,
988 (CCPA 1981); In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1409 (TTAB 2015), aff’d

146 Registration No. 3908600.
Opposition No. 91240680

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866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC,
110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014).
4. International Class 25

Applicant seeks to register its CLEVELAND MONSTERS and design mark for
“athletic pants; caps being headwear; coats; gloves; gym pants; hats; jackets; jogging
pants; pants; polo shirts; scarves; shirts; sports pants; sports shirts; sweat pants;
sweat shirts; t-shirts; tops as clothing; warm-up suits; wind resistant jackets,” in
International Class 25.
Opposer has registered M MONSTER ENERGY and design, reproduced below, for
“clothing, namely, t-shirts, hooded shirts and hooded sweatshirts, sweat shirts,
jackets, pants, bandanas, sweat bands and gloves; headgear, namely, hats and
beanies,” in International Class 25.147

Because Applicant’s description of goods and Opposer’s description of goods
include t-shirts, sweatshirts, jackets, pants, and hats, the description of goods are in

147 Registration No. 3908601.
Opposition No. 91240680

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part identical. See Tuxedo Monopoly, 209 USPQ at 988; In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116
USPQ2d at 1409; Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d at 1745.
5. International Class 28

Applicant seeks to register its CLEVELAND MONSTERS and design mark for
“toys, games and sporting goods, namely, hockey pucks and hockey sticks; hockey kits
comprised of hockey pucks, hockey sticks and hockey goalie pads; bobblehead action
figures; stuffed toys,” in International Class 28.
As noted above, Opposer has registered its M MONSTER ENERGY and design
mark, reproduced below, for “sports helmets,” in International Class 9.148

Opposer also licenses its MONSTER marks on headgear and protective gear.149

Opposer, in its brief, did not explain how any of the goods or services in connection
with which it registered or uses its MONSTER marks are related to the goods in
Applicant’s International Class 28 description of goods.150 Because Opposer’s use in
connection with protective gear is based on common law use and it is not registered,

148 Registration No. 3914828.
149 Sacks Testimony Decl. ¶106 (42 TTABVUE 39).
150 Opposer’s Brief, pp. 40-45 (42 TTABVUE 47-52).
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there are no presumptions accorded to Opposer’s use of its MONSTER marks in
connection with protective gear. See Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Defibrator
Fiberboard Aktiebolag, 208 USPQ 954, 959 (TTAB 1980) (when relying upon common
law use, likelihood of confusion analysis is confined to specific goods on which mark
has been used as well as specific trade channels and actual purchasers or potential
purchasers, as disclosed by evidence, without benefit of those presumptions
ordinarily allowed registration).
Opposer, as plaintiff in the opposition, bears the burden of proving by a
preponderance of evidence its asserted ground of likelihood of confusion. See Bose
Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods. Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 63 USPQ2d 1303, 1305 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (“[t]he burden of proof rests with the opposer ... to produce sufficient evidence
to support the ultimate conclusion of [priority of use] and likelihood of confusion”);
Hoover Co. v. Royal Appliance Mfg. Co., 238 F.3d 1357, 57 USPQ2d 1720, 1722 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (“[i]n opposition proceedings, the opposer bears the burden of establishing
that the applicant does not have the right to register its mark”); Cerveceria
Centroamericana, S.A. v. Cerveceria India Inc., 892 F.2d 1021, 13 USPQ2d 1307, 1309
(Fed. Cir. 1989) (petitioner bears the burden of proof).
Inasmuch as Opposer did not introduce any evidence to prove, or make any
arguments that, Applicant’s products in International Class 28 are related to any of
Opposer’s goods or services, Opposer did not meet its burden of proof with respect to
proving that Applicant’s products in International Class 28 are related to any of
Opposer’s goods or services.
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6. International Class 35

Applicant seeks to register its CLEVELAND MONSTERS and design mark for
the activities listed below in International Class 35:
Computerized on-line retail store, ordering, retail store
services, electronic retail store services and mail-order
catalog services featuring an array of hockey-themed
merchandise; promoting the goods and services of
others by allowing sponsors to affiliate these goods
and services with a hockey program; promoting the
sale of goods and services of others through the
distribution of promotional contests provided over
the Internet; conducting public opinion poll surveys and
public opinion poll surveys in the field of hockey for
business and non-business and marketing and non-
marketing purposes over the Internet; conducting
interactive public opinion polls in the field of hockey.
(Emphasis added).
Opposer registered MONSTER ENERGY, in standard character form, for the
activities listed below in International Class 35.
Promoting goods and services in the sports, motorsports,
electronic sports, and music industries through the
distribution of printed, audio and visual promotional
materials; promoting sports and music events and
competitions for others.
In analyzing the Class 35 activities, we must consider the activities as the parties
describe them in the descriptions of services in their respective application and
registration. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 110
USPQ2d 1157, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Octocom Sys, Inc. v. Houston Comput. Servs.
Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The authority is legion
that the question of registrability of an applicant’s mark must be decided on the basis
of the identification of goods set forth in the application regardless of what the record
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may reveal as to the particular nature of an applicant’s goods, the particular channels
of trade or the class of purchasers to which the sales of goods are directed.”); Paula
Payne Prods. v. Johnson Publ’g Co., 473 F.2d 901, 177 USPQ 76, 77 (CCPA 1973)
(“Trademark cases involving the issue of likelihood of confusion must be decided on
the basis of the respective descriptions of goods”).
We also do not read limitations into the identification of services based upon
actual marketplace use. In re i.am.symbolic, LLC, 123 USPQ2d at 1748; Squirtco v.
Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 216 USPQ 937, 940 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“There is no specific
limitation and nothing in the inherent nature of Squirtco’s mark or goods that
restricts the usage of SQUIRT for balloons to promotion of soft drinks. The Board,
thus, improperly read limitations into the registration”); In re Thor Tech Inc., 90
USPQ2d 1634, 1638 (TTAB 2009) (“We have no authority to read any restrictions or
limitations into the registrant’s description of goods.”).
Where, as here, the parties broadly identify their services, “we must presume that
the services encompass all services of the type identified.” Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v.
Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d at 1025 (where the services in an application or
registration are broadly described, they are deemed to encompass all the activities of
the nature and type described therein). See also In re Solid State Design Inc., 125
USPQ2d 1409, 1413-14 (TTAB 2018) (where the goods in an application or
registration are broadly described, they are deemed to encompass all the goods of the
nature and type described therein); In re Hughes Furniture Indus., Inc., 114 USPQ2d
1134, 1137 (TTAB 2015) (“Applicant’s broadly wordedidentification of ‘furniture’
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necessarily encompasses Registrant’s narrowly identified ‘residential and
commercial furniture.’”); Venture Out Props. LLC v. Wynn Resorts Holdings, LLC, 81
USPQ2d 1887, 1893 (TTAB 2007).
We must presume that Opposer’s “promoting sports and music events and
competitions for others” includes all types of promotional activities, including the
distribution of promotional contests over the Internet. Likewise, Applicant’s
“promoting the sale of goods and services of others through the distribution of
promotional contests over the Internet” includes all types of goods and services,
including sports and music events and competitions for others.
We find that the descriptions of services in International Class 35 are in part
legally identical. See Tuxedo Monopoly, 209 USPQ at 988; In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116
USPQ2d at 1409; Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d at 1745.
7. International Class 38

Applicant seeks to register its CLEVELAND MONSTERS and design mark for
the activities listed below in International Class 38.
Audio broadcasting; cable television broadcasting; radio
broadcasting; subscription television broadcasting;
television broadcasting; video broadcasting; webcasting
services in the nature of providing on-line chat rooms and
on-line interactive chat rooms with guests for transmission
of messages among computer users concerning the field of
hockey; broadcasting programs over the Internet;
providing on-line electronic bulletin boards for
transmission of messages among computer users
concerning the field of hockey; providing access to
databases featuring interactive polling in the field of
hockey.
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Opposer does not have a registration for services in International Class 38, nor
does Opposer assert common law use of a MONSTER mark for services in
International Class 38. Instead, Opposer argues that because it Opposer sponsors
events displaying its MONSTER marks broadcast on radio, television and the
Internet, consumers will perceive the broadcast services and the event as emanating
from the same source.
The MONSTER Marks have been widely used in the
promotion of the many MONSTER-sponsored events which
have been regularly broadcast over TV, radio, and the
internet, including TV networks such as ABC, NBC, CBS,
ESPN, the SPEED network. For example, the Monster
Energy Supercross has been broadcasted in 181 countries.
In 2014, Monster became the presenting sponsor of the
Winter and Summer X Games, where a commercial free
portion of the events were brought to viewers by Monster,
and the MONSTER Marks were integrated throughout the
event’s TV and internet broadcasts. The 2014 X Games
were televised in more than 215 countries and territories
and viewed in more than 410 million homes. Additionally,
as described above with respect to Class 9, Monster is
involved with the sponsorship and promotion of video
games which integrate and are highly-related to online
chat rooms and bulletin boards.151 (Internal citations
omitted).
Applying Opposer’s argument to an analogous situation, because the National
Football League sponsors professional football games aired on CBS and Fox
television, consumers believe that football games and broadcasting services emanate
from the same albeit anonymous source.

151 Opposer’s Brief, pp. 43 (64 TTABVUE 50).
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There is no evidence supporting Opposer’s contention that consumers perceive
sponsors of events and communication services as emanating from the same source.
We find, therefore, that Opposer failed to meet its burden of showing that Applicant’s
activities in International Class 38 are related to any of Opposer’s goods or services.
8. International Class 41

Applicant seeks to register its CLEVELAND MONSTERS and design mark for
the following activities listed below in International Class 41:
Entertainment services, namely, sporting activities
involving the performance by a hockey team in the nature
of live performances by a hockey team; entertainment and
educational services in the nature of on-going television
and radio programs in the field of hockey and rendering
live hockey games and hockey exhibitions; the production
and distribution of radio and television broadcasts of
hockey games, hockey events and programs in the field of
hockey; conducting and arranging hockey clinics and
coaches’ clinics and hockey events; entertainment services
in the nature of personal appearances by a costumed
mascot at hockey games and exhibitions, clinics,
promotions, and other hockey-related events, special
events and parties; fan-club services; entertainment
services, namely, providing a website featuring the
following content - non-downloadable videos in the field of
television highlights, interactive television highlights,
radio programs, radio highlights, and audio recordings in
the field of hockey, and hockey news in the nature of
information, statistics and trivia about hockey; on-line
computer games; providing non-downloadable on-line
magazines, newsletters, and game schedules in the field of
hockey over the Internet.
Opposer contends that Applicant’s Class 41 services overlap with the services set
forth in Opposer’s Registration No. 4721433 for the mark MONSTER ENERGY, in
standard character form, for “promoting goods and services in the sports,
motorsports, electronic sports, and music industries through the distribution of
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printed, audio and visual promotional materials; promoting sports and music events
and competitions for others,” in International Class 35.152 Specifically, Opposer
argues, “promoting the goods and services in the sports [hockey] … through the
distribution of printed, audio and visual promotional materials; promoting sports
[hockey] … for others” encompasses “the performance by a hockey team.”153
The following criteria have evolved for determining what constitutes a
service: (1) a service must be a real activity; (2) a service must be performed to the
order of, or for the benefit of, someone other than the applicant; and (3) the activity
performed must be qualitatively different from anything necessarily done in
connection with the sale of the applicant’s goods or the performance of another
service. In re Canadian Pac. Ltd., 754 F.2d 992, 224 USPQ 971, 973 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(approving the definition of a service as the performance of labor for the benefit
another). See also In re Adver. & Mktg. Dev., Inc., 821 F.2d 614, 2 USPQ2d 2010,
2014) (Fed. Cir. 1987) (same).
Applying the above-noted criteria, we construe Opposer’s registered services as
“promoting goods and services [of others] in [hockey] … through the distribution of
printed, audio and visual promotional materials.” Opposer must be distributing
materials in hockey games to promote the goods and services of others. Consumers

152 Opposer’s Brief, p. 41 (64 TTABVUE 48). Opposer also refers to Registration No. 4721432
for the stylized letter “M,” reproduced below, for the same services.

153 Id.
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may perceive “the performance by a hockey team in the nature of live performances
by a hockey team” and distributing materials in hockey games to promote the goods
and services of others as emanating from the same source. An advertiser would expect
a sports team to advertise the goods and services of others at its sporting event to
generate revenues. Accordingly, we find Applicant’s services in Class 41 are related
in part to Opposer’s services in Class 35.
9. Summary
● Opposer failed to prove that beverages are related to computer game software
or any of the other products listed in Applicant’s application in International Class 9.
● Applicant’s Class 14 products are legally identical to Opposer’s Class 14
products.
● Applicant’s Class 16 products and Opposer’s Class 16 products are in part
identical.
● Applicant’s Class 25 products and Opposer’s Class 25 products are in part
identical.
● Opposer did not prove that Applicant’s Class 28 products are related to any of
Opposer’s goods or services.
● Applicant’s Class 35 services and Opposer’s Class 35 services are in part legally
identical.
● Opposer failed to prove that Applicant’s Class 38 services are related to any of
Opposer’s goods or services.
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● Applicant’s services in Class 41 are related in part to and Opposer’s services in
Class 35.
E. Established, likely-to-continue channels of trade and classes of consumers.
Because Applicant’s goods in Classes 14, 16 and 25 and services in Class 35 are
identical in whole or in part with Opposer’s goods and services in those classes, we
presume that the channels of trade and classes of purchasers are the same. See
Viterra, 101 USPQ2d at 1908 (identical goods are presumed to travel in same
channels of trade to same class of purchasers) (cited in Cai, 127 USPQ2d at 1801
(“With respect to similarity of the established trade channels through which the goods
reach customers, the TTAB properly followed our case law and ‘presume[d] that the
identical goods move in the same channels of trade and are available to the same
classes of customers for such goods….’”)); In re Yawata Iron & Steel Co., 403 F.2d 752,
159 USPQ 721, 723 (CCPA 1968) (where there are legally identical goods, the
channels of trade and classes of purchasers are considered to be the same); United
Glob. Media Grp., Inc. v. Tseng, 112 USPQ2d 1039, 1049 (TTAB 2014); Am. Lebanese
Syrian Associated Charities Inc. v. Child Health Research Inst., 101 USPQ2d 1022,
1028 (TTAB 2011).
With respect to the remaining goods and services in Classes 9, 28, 38 and 41
Opposer does not specifically address the description of goods or services for which
Applicant seeks to register its mark. Rather, Opposer merely proffers that Applicant
offers its goods and services in the same channels of trade and to the same classes of
consumers as Opposer’s goods and services as noted in the discussion regarding the
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lack of any reported instances of confusion. In addition, Applicant admits that the
same classes of consumers may encounter both Applicant’s mark and Opposer’s
marks.154 In view of the foregoing and on our review of the record, we find that the
parties offer their goods and services in Classes 9, 28, 38 and 41 in some of the
channels of trade to some of the same classes of consumers.
F. The variety of goods and services on which a mark is or is not used.
Opposer contends that because it uses its MONSTER marks on a wide range of
products, consumers are more likely to be confused by Applicant’s “similar mark,”
citing Uncle Ben’s, Inc. v. Stubenberg Int’l, Inc., 47 USPQ2d 1310, 1313 (TTAB
1998).155 In Uncle Ben’s, unlike here, the fact that Opposer applied its mark to a wide
variety of products was significant, in part, because there was no evidence regarding
the opportunity for confusion to occur, the products at issue were inexpensive food
products meaning the average purchaser exercised less care in the purchasing
decision, and the marks were similar. Because, in this proceeding, there have been
no reported instances of actual confusion despite the opportunity for confusion to
occur, especially considering the variety of goods on which and services in connection
with Opposer uses its MONSTER marks and the overlapping channels of trade, as
discussed above, we find this DuPont factor to be neutral.
G. Any other established fact probative of the effect of use – Applicant’s bad faith
intent in seeking to register CLEVELAND MONSTERS and design.

Opposer argues that Applicant intends to create a likelihood of confusion with

154 Applicant’s admission to Opposer’s request for admission No. 3 (19 TTABVUE 169).
155 Opposer’s Brief, p. 45 (64 TTABVUE 52).
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Opposer’s MONSTER marks pointing to Applicant’s admissions listed below:
● Applicant admitted that it was familiar with Opposer and its MONSTER marks
before it selected and began using Applicant’s CLEVELAND MONSTERS and design
mark;
● Applicant admitted that, before Applicant began using the CLEVELAND
MONSTERS Mark, it was aware of Opposer’s use of the MONSTER marks in
connection with sporting, music, and entertainment events; and
● Applicant admitted it was aware Opposer displayed its MONSTER marks at
sporting events, and on clothing, stickers, decals, and sporting goods.156
We do not infer that Applicant intended to create a likelihood of confusion with
Opposer’s MONSTER marks simply because Applicant was aware of Opposer’s
MONSTER marks. The facts listed below dispel any inference that Applicant acted
in bad faith when it filed its applications at issue in this proceeding:
● Walgreen’s co-sponsorship agreement between the parties discussed above in
the lack of any reported instances of actual confusion section;
● The number of Applicant’s registrations and third-party registrations
incorporating the word MONSTER or MONSTERS;
● Applicant’s prior registrations for LAKE ERIE MONSTER and design and
CLEVELAND MONSTER marks to which Opposer did not object;157 and
● The overall dissimilarity of the marks.

156 Opposer’s Brief, pp. 45-46 (64 TTABVUE 52-53).
157 See the analysis of the prior registration defense below.
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Accordingly, Applicant’s intentions in filing the subject applications are not a
significant factor in our likelihood of confusion analysis.
H. Conclusion
The factors that favor finding a likelihood of confusion include the commercial
strength of Opposer’s MONSTER marks in connection with beverages, the
relatedness of the goods and services in International Classes 14, 16, 25, 35 and 41,
and the similarity in the channels of trade and classes of consumers. The
countervailing factors that weigh against finding a likelihood of confusion are the
conceptual or inherent weakness of Opposer’s MONSTER marks, the lack of any
reported instances of actual confusion despite the opportunity for confusion to occur
and the dissimilarity of the marks. The lack of any reported instances of confusion
and the dissimilarity of the marks carry greater weight in our analysis. See Citigroup,
98 USPQ2d at 1261 (varying weights may be assigned to each DuPont factor
depending on the evidence presented); In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 26 USPQ2d
1687, 1688 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[T]he various evidentiary factors may play more or less
weighty roles in any particular determination.”). We find, therefore, that Applicant’s
mark CLEVELAND MONSTERS and design for the applied for goods and services is
not likely to cause confusion with Opposer’s MONSTER, MONSTER ENERGY, and
M MONSTER ENERGY and design marks for the goods and services in connection
which Opposer has registered and uses those marks.
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In the event Opposer appeals this decision and a reviewing court reverses our
finding that there is no likelihood of confusion, we turn to Applicant’s affirmative
defenses. The affirmative defenses assume a finding of likelihood of confusion.
VI. Prior Registration Defense
As its first affirmative defense, Applicant pleaded the prior registration defense
based on its ownership of the registrations listed below:158

The prior registration or Morehouse defense is an equitable defense, to the effect
that if the opposer cannot be further injured because there already exists an injurious

158 Amended Answer to Opposer’s Notice of Opposition ¶¶39 (11 TTABVUE 27-28).
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registration, the opposer cannot object to an additional registration that does not add
to the injury. In Morehouse Mfg. Corp. v. J. Strickland & Co., 407 F.2d 881, 160 USPQ
715 (CCPA 1969), the court explained the principle as follows:
[A]s a matter of law, the opposer cannot be damaged,
within the meaning of section 13 of the statute, by the
issuance to the applicant of a second registration where
applicant already has an existing registration of the same
mark for the same goods. Implicit in this are corollaries
that if opposer cannot procure the cancellation of the
existing registration it cannot prevent the granting of the
second registration; that there is no added damage from
the second registration of the same mark if the goods
named in it are in fact the same, and that if there is no
added damage there is no ground for sustaining the
opposition.
160 USPQ at 717.
The prior registration defense requires that the prior registered mark and the
mark sought to be registered be essentially the same and for the same or substantially
identical goods or services. O-M Bread, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 65 F.3d 933, 36
USPQ2d 1041, 1045-46 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Citigroup, 94 USPQ2d at 1651-53; James
River Petroleum Inc. v. Petro Stopping Centers L.P., 50 USPQ2d 1702, 1703; TBC
Corp. v. Grand Prix Ltd., 12 USPQ2d 1311, 1314 (TTAB 1989).
In certain circumstances, the prior registration defense may apply even if there
are clear differences in the defendant’s marks. See Place for Vision, Inc. v. Pearle
Vision Center, Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q. 1022, 1023 (TTAB 1983). In Place for Vision, the
Board held that, as a matter of law, there could be no likelihood of confusion because,
despite the clear differences in the previously registered mark (VISION CENTER)
and the contested mark (PEARLE VISON CENTER and design), said differences
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were irrelevant to the harm alleged by plaintiff. That is, opposer’s claim of damage
related solely to the VISION CENTER portion of the mark, not the term PEARLE or
the design element.
Likewise, in the case before us, Opposer’s claim of damage refers to Applicant’s
use of the word “Monsters,” not the names “Cleveland” or “Lake Erie” or the design
element. The differences in Applicant’s marks is not a basis for denying the prior
registration defense.
We now analyze the descriptions of goods and services.
1. Registration No. 5482815 for the mark CLEVELAND MONSTERS, in
standard character form, for “toys, games, and sporting goods, namely, hockey
pucks and hockey sticks; bobblehead action figures; stuffed toys,” in Class 28.
Application Serial No. 87548887 is for “toys, games and sporting goods,
namely, hockey pucks and hockey sticks; hockey kits comprised of hockey
pucks, hockey sticks and hockey goalie pads; bobblehead action figures;
stuffed toys,” in Class 28. (Emphasis added). Because the goods are different,
the prior registration defense does not apply.
2. Registration No. 5482814 for the mark CLEVELAND MONSTERS, in
standard character form, for “paper banners and flags, unmounted
photographs, paper pennants, game schedules in the field of hockey,” in Class
16. Application Serial No. 87547252 is for “publications and printed matter,
namely, stickers, decals, memo pads, note pads, ballpoint pens, pencils, paper
banners and flags, stationery folders, wire-bound notebooks, portfolio
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notebooks, unmounted and mounted photographs, calendars, bumper stickers,
statistical books, guide books, and reference books in the field of hockey;
magazines in the field of hockey; catalogs featuring hockey; commemorative
game and souvenir programs in the field of hockey; paper pennants, stationery
and printed certificates in the field of hockey; entertainment printed
certificates for fans; statistical information sheets for hockey topics;
newsletters, brochures, pamphlets and game schedules in the field of hockey;
bank checks; credit cards not magnetically coded,” in International Class 16.
Because the goods are different, the prior registration defense does not apply.
3. Registration No. 5482813 for the mark CLEVELAND MONSTERS, in
standard character form, for “computerized on-line retail store, ordering, retail
store services, electronic retail store services and mail-order catalog services
featuring an array of hockey-themed merchandise,” in International Class 35.
Application Serial No. 87548901 is for “computerized on-line retail store,
ordering, retail store services, electronic retail store services and mail -order
catalog services featuring an array of hockey-themed merchandise; promoting
the goods and services of others by allowing sponsors to affiliate these goods
and services with a hockey program; promoting the sale of goods and services
of others through the distribution of promotional contests provided over the
Internet; conducting public opinion poll surveys and public opinion poll surveys
in the field of hockey for business and non-business and marketing and non-
marketing purposes over the Internet; conducting interactive public opinion
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polls in the field of hockey,” in International Class 35. Because the services are
different, the prior registration defense does not apply.
4. Registration No. 5460834 for the mark CLEVELAND MONSTERS, in
standard character form, is “for earrings; jewelry; jewelry and imitation
jewelry; costume jewelry; rings,” in International Class 14. Application Serial
No. 87546801 is for “costume jewelry; earrings; jewelry and imitation jewelry;
pendants; rings; watches,” in International Class 14. (Emphasis added).
Because the goods are different, the prior registration defense does not apply.
5. Registration No. 3980431 is for the mark LAKE ERIE MONSTERS and design
for “paper pennants,” in International Class 16, and “t-shirts, shirts, polo
shirts, sweatshirts” and “jerseys,” “hats, caps,” and “jackets,” in International
Class 25. Application Serial No. 87547252 for goods in International Class 16,
discussed in No. 2, identifies far more than “paper pennants.” Application
Serial No. 87547147 is for “athletic pants; caps being headwear; coats;
gloves; gym pants; hats; jackets; jogging pants; pants; polo shirts; scarves;
shirts; sports pants; sports shirts; sweat pants; sweat shirts; t-shirts; tops
as clothing; warm-up suits; wind resistant jackets,” in International Class
25. (Emphasis added). Because the goods are different, the prior registration
defense does not apply.
6. Registration No. 3897555 for the mark LAKE ERIE MONSTERS, in standard
character form, is for “t-shirts, shirts,” and “jerseys, hats, caps,” in
International Class 25. Application Serial No. 87547147 discussed
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immediately above identifies far more products than in the prior registration.
Because the goods are different, the prior registration defense does not apply.
In sum, because the goods and services in the applications at issue differ from the
goods and services in Applicant’s prior registrations, the prior registration defense
does not apply.
VII. Laches, estoppel, acquiescence and waiver.
A. Laches

Applicant argues that laches applies because Opposer failed to object to
Applicant’s above-noted prior registrations for LAKE ERIE MONSTERS and design
and CLEVELAND MONSTERS.159 However, in an opposition, laches cannot begin to
run prior to when the mark was published for opposition. Nat’l Cable Tele. Ass’n v.
Am. Cinema Editors, Inc., 937 F.2d 1572, 19 USPQ2d 1424, 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
Accordingly, Applicant’s laches affirmative defense is inapplicable here.
B. Acquiescence

Acquiescence is a type of estoppel that is based upon the plaintiff's conduct that
expressly or by clear implication consents to, encourages, or furthers the activities of
the defendant, to which plaintiff has not objected. Christian Broadcasting Network,
Inc. v. ABS-CBN Int’l, 84 USPQ2d 1560, 1573 (TTAB 2007); Hitachi Metals Int’l v.
Yamakyu Chain Kabushiki, 209 USPQ 1057, 1067 (TTAB 1981); CBS, Inc. v. Man's
Day Publ’g Co., Inc., 205 USPQ 470, 473-74 (TTAB 1980). A plaintiff will not be

159 Applicant’s Brief, p. 31 (66 TTABVUE 38).
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permitted to stop conduct that it fostered or tolerated, where the result would be
prejudicial to the defendant. Id.
Applicant argues that Opposer’s likelihood of confusion claim is barred by
acquiescence based on the 2008 Walgreens promotional agreement discussed in the
section of this decision on the lack of any reported instances of actual confusion.160
Applicant explains that the parties entered into a business agreement whereby the
parties’ MONSTER marks appeared together in displays promoting the parties goods
and services. Opposer’s Chairman and Chief Executive Officer testified , “[t]he
Walgreens Agreement provided customers opportunities to win tickets to Cleveland
Cavaliers professional NBA basketball games, Lake Erie Monsters minor league
hockey games, or Quicken Loans Arena concert events by purchasing Monster
products from the aforementioned newly acquired shelf space.”161
Nevertheless, Opposer argued that it did not acquiesce to Applicant’s use of the
CLEVELAND MONSTER marks because the “primary purpose of the Walgreens
Agreement was to secure and protect shelf space for MONSTER beverages at
Walgreens locations,162 the agreement “had little impact on Opposer’s goal of securing
desired shelf space,”163 Applicant provided no evidence of co-branding,164 and “the

160 Applicant’s Brief, p. 28 (66 TTABVUE 35).
161 Sacks Rebuttal Testimony Decl. ¶3 (62 TTABVUE 3).
162 Opposer’s Rebuttal Brief, p. 11 (67 TTABVUE 17).
163 Opposer’s Rebuttal Brief, p. 12 (67 TTABVUE 18).
164 Id.
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Walgreens Agreement is not evidence of consent by Monster to use of any trademarks,
let alone all “MONSTER-formative” trademarks.”165
Based on the record in this case, Opposer had full knowledge of Applicant’s
activities by virtue of having entered into an agreement with Applicant to provide
MONSTER ENERGY beverage customers a chance to win LAKE ERIE MONSTERS
hockey tickets. Opposer did not express, at any time, any concern that Applicant was
using or had registered the word “Monsters” as part of the name of its hockey team.
Under these circumstances, Opposer’s silence as to Applicant’s use and registration
of the word “Monsters” as part of the mark LAKE ERIE MONSTERS constitutes
acquiescence regarding Applicant’s use and registration of the word “Monsters” as
part of its CLEVELAND MONSTERS mark.
C. Confusion is not inevitable
Our finding that Opposer’s silence regarding Applicant’s use and registration of
the word “Monsters” as a part of its mark constitutes acquiescence leads to the
question of whether the likelihood of confusion arising from the registration of
Applicant’s mark is inevitable. In cases where an application has pleaded and proved
an equitable defense, it is necessary to decide whether likelihood of confusion is
inevitable or reasonably debatable because the equitable defenses of laches and
acquiescence are barred if confusion is inevitable. Ultra-White Co., Inc. v. Johnson
Chem. Indus., Inc., 465 F.2d 891, 175 USPQ 166, 167 (CCPA 1972); Christian
Broadcasting Network, Inc. v. ABS-CBN Int’l, 84 USPQ2d at 1573; Reflange Inc. v.

165 Id.
Opposition No. 91240680

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R-Con Int’l, 17 USPQ2d 1125, 1141 (TTAB 1990); Hitachi Metals Int’l v. Yamakyu
Chain Kabushiki, 209 USPQ 1057,1069 (TTAB 1981). This is so because any injury
to Applicant caused by Opposer is outweighed by the public’s interest in preventing
confusion. Christian Broadcasting Network, Inc. v. ABS-CBN Int’l, 84 USPQ2d at
1573-74; Turner v. Hops Grill & Bar, Inc., 52 USPQ2d 1310, 1313 (TTAB 1999), citing
Coach House Rest. Inc. v. Coach and Six Rests., Inc., 934 F.2d 1551, 19 USPQ2d 1401,
1409 (11th Cir. 1991).
The simultaneous use of Opposer’s MONSTER marks in connection with
beverages and associated collateral merchandising products and promoting and
sponsoring of sporting events, including hockey, and Applicant’s LAKE ERIE
MONSTERS and design mark since 2007 and Applicant’s CLEVELAND MONSTERS
and design mark since 2016 in connection with hockey and associated collateral
merchandise, proves, not only that there has been a reasonable opportunity for actual
confusion, but that confusion is not inevitable.
Decision: The opposition is dismissed.