Modern Consulting Solutions

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Apr 30, 2010

No. 77509514 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 30, 2010)

Mailed:
April 30, 2010

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
________

In re Modern Consulting Solutions
________

Serial No. 77509514
_______

Jason Gambert, pro se for Modern Consulting Solutions.

Midge Butler, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 107
(J. Leslie Bishop, Managing Attorney).
_______

Before Hairston, Kuhlke and Walsh, Administrative Trademark
Judges.

Opinion by Kuhlke, Administrative Trademark Judge:

Modern Consulting Solutions, a sole proprietorship
composed of Jason Gambert, has filed an application to
register SEARCH ENGINE OPTIMIZATION in standard characters
on the Principal Register for services ultimately
identified as “providing advertising, marketing and
promotional services, namely development of advertising
THIS DISPOSITION IS NOT
CITABLE AS PRECEDENT OF
THE TTAB
Ser No. 77509514
2
campaigns for use on computers and related consulting” in
International Class 35.1
The examining attorney has refused registration under
Section 2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1052(e),
on the ground that applicant’s proposed mark is merely
descriptive of applicant’s services.
In addition, the examining attorney has refused
registration under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15
U.S.C. §1052(d), on the ground that applicant’s proposed
mark SEARCH ENGINE OPTIMIZATION, when used in connection
with its recited services so resembles the registered mark
SEARCH ENGINE OPTIMIZATION ENGINE (SEARCH ENGINE
disclaimed) for “providing on-line non-downloadable
computer search engine software” in International Class 42,2
as to be likely to cause confusion, mistake or deception.
Finally, the examining attorney has refused
registration under Sections 1 and 45 of the Trademark Act,
15 U.S.C. §§1051, 1127, on the ground that the specimen of

1 Application Serial No. 77509514, filed June 27, 2008, alleging
July 26, 1997 as the date of first use and first use in commerce,
under Section 1(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1051(a).

2 Supplemental Registration No. 3518607, issued on October 14,
2008.

Ser No. 77509514
3
use does not show use of the mark in the sale or
advertising of the services.3
The appeal has been fully briefed. We affirm the
refusals to register.
Refusal Based on Mere Descriptiveness Under Section 2(e)(1)
“A mark is merely descriptive if it ‘consist[s] merely
of words descriptive of the qualities, ingredients or
characteristics of’ the goods or services related to the
mark.” In re Oppendahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 71
USPQ2d 1370, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004), quoting, Estate of P.D.
Beckwith, Inc. v. Commissioner, 252 U.S. 538, 543 (1920).
See also In re MBNA America Bank N.A., 340 F.3d 1328, 67
USPQ2d 1778, 1780 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The test for
determining whether a mark is merely descriptive is whether
it immediately conveys information concerning a quality,
characteristic, function, ingredient, attribute or feature
of the product or service in connection with which it is
used, or intended to be used. In re Engineering Systems

3 The examining attorney also issued a final refusal based on her
requirement that applicant amend the identification of services
because it was indefinite. In the request for reconsideration,
applicant expressly adopted the examining attorney’s suggested
amendment and did not present it as an alternative, while
reserving the right to argue that the applicant’s identification
was acceptable. Once an identification has been limited, it
cannot be expanded later. See In re Swen Sonic Corp., 21 USPQ2d
1794 (TTAB 1991); In re M.V Et Associes, 21 USPQ2d 1628 (Comm’r
Pats. 1991). Therefore, we have not considered applicant’s
arguments regarding the earlier identification of services.
Ser No. 77509514
4
Corp., 2 USPQ2d 1075 (TTAB 1986); In re Bright-Crest, Ltd.,
204 USPQ 591 (TTAB 1979). It is not necessary, in order to
find a mark merely descriptive, that the mark describe each
feature of the goods or services, only that it describe a
single, significant quality, feature, etc. In re Gyulay,
820 F.2d 1216, 3 USPQ2d 1009 (Fed. Cir. 1987); and In re
Venture Lending Associates, 226 USPQ 285 (TTAB 1985).
Further, it is well-established that the determination of
mere descriptiveness must be made not in the abstract or on
the basis of guesswork, but in relation to the goods or
services for which registration is sought, the context in
which the mark is used, and the impact that it is likely to
make on the average purchaser of such goods or services.
In re Abcor Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 200 USPQ 215, 218
(CCPA 1978).
The examining attorney argues that SEARCH ENGINE
OPTIMIZATION “is a specialized process that involves
analyzing a website’s underlying code, architecture,
visible content, and link popularity and making
enhancements so that the site returns more prominently in
the search results of relevancy-based, algorithm-driven
search engines...[and] works to improve the volume and
quality of traffic to a web site from search engines via
search results and can also target different kinds of
Ser No. 77509514
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searches.” Br. p. 7. The examining attorney observes that
applicant’s “substitute specimen demonstrates that the
purpose and function of applicant’s marketing service is to
provide its customers with the benefits of search engine
optimization...[and] it is clear that the purpose and
function of the applicant’s advertising, marketing, and
promoting services involves providing search engine
optimization for its customers and to provide them with a
means of ensuring that their webpage is accessible to
search engines and that they are focused in specific ways
that will help improve their chance of being
discovered...[i]n other words, the applicant develops
advertising campaigns for use on computers by utilizing the
process of search engine optimization.” Br. pp. 8-9.
In support of her position, the examining attorney
provided printouts from various websites wherein “search
engine optimization” is used as the generic name of a
process that improves the volume and quality of traffic to
a web site. A few excerpted examples are set forth below:
Search engine optimization (SEO) is the process
of improving the volume of and quality of traffic
to a web site from search engines via “natural”
(“organic” or “algorithmic”) search results.
Usually, the earlier a site is presented in the
search results, or the higher it “ranks,” the
more searchers will visit that site. SEO can
also target different kinds of searches,
including image search, local search, and
Ser No. 77509514
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industry-specific vertical search engines. As an
Internet marketing strategy, SEO considers how
search engines work and what people search for.
Optimizing a website primarily involves editing
its content and HTML coding to both increase its
relevance to specific keywords and to remove
barriers to the indexing activities of search
engines...The acronym “SEO” can also refer to
“search engine optimizers,” a term adopted by an
industry of consultants who carry out
optimization projects on behalf of clients and by
employees who perform SEO services in-house.
Search engine optimizers may offer SEO as a
stand-alone service or as a part of a broader
marketing campaign. (en.wikipeida.org);

Welcome to the second part of a two-part article
that strives to give an overview of search engine
optimization for beginners...If you’re new to the
world of search engine optimization, you may not
know where to start. You may be fascinated with
the idea of doing business around the world, but
the reality is that you have to be seen before
you can sell. (seochat.com);

Intro to Search Engine Optimization ... Search
engine optimization means ensuring that your Web
pages are accessible to search engines and are
focused in ways that help improve the chances
they will be found. (searchenginewatch.com);

What is Search Engine Optimization ... Search
engine optimization means a lot of things to a
lot of people but really what is search engine
optimization? First off it’s not search engine
marketing or sem. Search engine marketing is the
ability for advertisers, ad agencies, marketing
firms and the like to pay for a sponsored listing
in cpc (cost per click) search engines like
Overture and via Google AdWords Programs. Search
engine marketing is the quick fix to driving
targeted traffic to a web site but it’s also the
most expensive to get search engine traffic. SEO
on the other hand is the technique employed by
web site owners to make their web site more
search engine friendly. ... A good search
engine optimization firm can get you to the top
Ser No. 77509514
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of the search engines and will keep you there.
(Globalpromoter.com); and

Search Engine Optimization ... More people use
organic (natural) search results to locate
information, products, and services on the Web
than any other means. Search Engine Optimization
SEO has grown into a billion dollar industry,
with companies working to increase their organic
search engine rankings and increase Web exposure.
(vizioninteractive.com).

In addition, the examining attorney has submitted the
following identification of services listed in the USPTO
Manual of Acceptable Identifications of Goods and Services:
Computer services, namely, search engine
optimization; and

Consultation services in the field of search
engine optimization.

Finally, she relies on applicant’s specimens of use
which appear to consist of emails and excerpts from its web
page set forth below.

Ser No. 77509514
8

We also take judicial notice of the following
definition of the term Search Engine Optimization:4

4 University of Notre Dame du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports
Co., 213 USPQ 594, 596 (TTAB 1982), aff’d, 703 F.2d 1372, 217
USPQ 505 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
Ser No. 77509514
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Designing a Web site so that search engines
easily find the pages and index them. The goal
is to have your page be in the [first] 10 results
of a search. Optimization includes the choice of
words used in the text paragraphs and the
placement of those words on the page, both
visible and hidden inside meta tags. Search
engines use different criteria for indexing, and
those criteria may change. Thus, it becomes
increasingly difficult to satisfy every one
equally. Yahoo! And other directory-oriented
search sites manually index a Web site, which may
provide the best results for the user.

McGraw Hill Computer Desktop Encyclopedia 977 (9th ed.
2001).
When we consider the dictionary definition of the term
“search engine optimization,” the use of “search engine
optimization” in the third-party websites, and the example
of applicant’s own descriptive use of that phrase, we find
that SEARCH ENGINE OPTIMIZATION is, at a minimum,
descriptive of a significant feature of applicant’s
services, namely, that applicant offers advertising
services that include the provision of or consulting on
search engine optimization.
Moreover, the combination of the terms “search”
“engine” and “optimization” does not create any double
entendre, incongruity, or any other basis upon which we can
find the composite any more registrable than its separate
elements. In re Microsoft Corp., 68 USPQ2d 1195 (TTAB
Ser No. 77509514
10
2003); see also In re Martin Container Inc., 65 USPQ2d 1058
(TTAB 2002).
Applicant argues that it is the first to use this
term. Even if that were the case in 1997, the mere fact
that someone is the first to use a term or combination of
words does not mean that the term or phrase is not
descriptive. In re National Shooting Sports Foundation
Inc., 219 USPQ 1018 (TTAB 1983). Moreover, the evidence of
record establishes that, now, eleven years later it is
widely used by third parties and defined, since at least
2001, as a method of drawing more traffic to a website.
Applicant does not seem to dispute that search engine
optimization is the name of a “process” but argues that:
As attached in the refusal were printouts from
various websites demonstrating, the term “search
engine optimization” and being used to describe
the process. Applicant emphasizes here at the
significant point of interest being the known
user defined definition that exists for “search
engine optimization,” currently as a process not
a service. When the reviewing attorney is
considering the proposed mark in relation to the
goods, it is clear the applicant’s services
differ in every characteristic to the “goods,” or
“process,” of any aspect of “search engine
optimization” as currently being understood.
Respectfully, the reviewing attorney incorrectly
defines applicants marketing services as “A means
of ensuring that a business webpage is accessible
to search engines and is focused in ways that
help improve the chance they will be discovered.”
The reviewing attorney in other words states,
“The proposed mark describes both the use and
function of the applicant’s marketing services.”
Ser No. 77509514
11
The applicant again brings to the attention the
correct service definition of the mark “search
engine optimization,” as; “Marketing Services in
the Field of Computers in the Nature of Providing
Marketing Services for the Benefit of others by
compiling advertising campaigns, promotional
services, and consulting for customers.” This
definition of the mark differs drastically from
the assumed service definition of the reviewing
attorney...Search Engine Optimization as
currently understood to the general public as
being a process…The difference between a service
and a process is the distinguishing factor when
reviewing Applicants application.

App. Br. p. 4.

Applicant seems to argue that because its
identification is for services and not a process SEARCH
ENGINE OPTIMIZATION is not descriptive in that context.
This argument is unpersuasive. It is appropriate for an
examining attorney to review applicant’s specimen of use
“to inform [her] understanding of the term.” In re Reed
Elsevier Properties Inc., 482 F.3d 1376, 82 USPQ2d 1378,
1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007), citing, In re Steelbuilding.com, 415
F.3d 1293, 75 USPQ2d 1420 (Fed. Cir. 2005). In the case
before us, the examining attorney used the specimen of use
submitted by applicant to inform her understanding of
applicant’s services. As is clear from the specimen of
use, a significant feature of applicant’s advertising
services is the provision of or consulting about this
process called search engine optimization.
Ser No. 77509514
12
Applicant’s argument is similar to arguments presented
in In re DNI Holdings Ltd., 77 USPQ2d 1435 (TTAB 2005)
(SPORTS BETTING.COM held to be generic for “provision of
casino games on and through a global computer network
wherein there are no actual monetary wagers; provision of
contests and sweepstakes on and through a global computer
network; providing a web site on and through a global
computer network featuring information in the fields of
gaming, athletic competition and entertainment”). In DNI
Holdings, the Board characterized the applicant’s argument
as follows:
Applicant argues that even if it is true that
applicant is providing services through its
website wherein consumers are actually able to
wager money on sports, applicant is not seeking
registration for these services. In fact, it
specifically limited the claimed services so as
to exclude monetary wagering. As a result,
applicant argues that the Trademark Examining
Attorney’s refusal to register its mark, based
upon genericness for services not claimed by
applicant, cannot stand.
DNI Holdings, 77 USPQ2d at 1437.
In response to this argument the Board stated, “[I]t
is clear that the analytical focus on the recitation of
services is based on the premise that the recitation
accurately reflects actual conditions of use of the
involved term.” Id. at 1438. Finally, the Board noted
that even if it were “constrained to ignore the realities
Ser No. 77509514
13
of use actually made by applicant because applicant has
purposely drafted a description omitting that use ...
applicant’s recitation of services includes the providing
of a website ‘featuring information in the fields of
gaming, athletic competition and entertainment’...[and this
recitation] still clearly includes that of providing
information regarding sports and betting.” Id. at 1438.
Similarly, here, as noted above, even without looking
at applicant’s actual use, the broadly defined services in
the identification, “development of advertising campaigns
for use on computers and related consulting,” encompass the
uses for which the wording SEARCH ENGINE OPTIMIZATION is
descriptive, i.e., providing or consulting on search engine
optimization. Applicant is correct in its statement of the
law that our determination must be made in relation to the
goods or services for which registration is sought, not in
the abstract. We add that an application for registration
must be made in relation to the goods or services which
applicant uses or has a bona fide intent to use, not in the
abstract.
We are persuaded that SEARCH ENGINE OPTIMIZATION when
used in connection with the recited services would
immediately inform the potential customers of a significant
aspect of those services, i.e., that by using “what
Ser No. 77509514
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[applicant] call[s] Search Engine Optimization” applicant
will optimize the customer’s “web site to make the search
engine(s) think [the customer’s] web site is one of the
most relevant web sites in its index for the relevant key
word(s)” by using its “State Of The Art technology to
convince the large search engines… to place web sites for
[its] customers in the first 10 listings.” See Applicant’s
Specimen of Use. Nothing requires the exercise of
imagination, cogitation, mental processing or gathering of
further information in order for prospective customers of
applicant’s advertising services to perceive readily the
merely descriptive significance of the term SEARCH ENGINE
OPTIMIZATION as it pertains to applicant’s services. In
view thereof, we find that SEARCH ENGINE OPTIMIZATION is
merely descriptive.5
Refusal Based on Likelihood of Confusion Under Section 2(d)
Although we have found applicant’s mark to be merely
descriptive and therefore unregistrable, we will, in order
to render a decision on all the issues before us, now turn

5 Applicant’s arguments based on its co-pending application for
SEO which was approved for publication do not persuade us of a
different result. First, the subject matter of that application,
SEO, is different from the proposed mark in this application,
SEARCH ENGINE OPTIMIZATION. Second, decisions made by examining
attorneys in prior applications are not binding on the Board. In
re Nett Designs Inc., 236 F.3d 1339, 57 USPQ2d 1564, 1566 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (“the Board...must assess each mark on the record of
public perception submitted with the application.”)
Ser No. 77509514
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to a consideration of the refusal based on the ground of
likelihood of confusion.
Our determination of the issue of likelihood of
confusion is based on an analysis of all of the probative
facts in evidence that are relevant to the factors set
forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d
1357, 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973). See also, In re Majestic
Distilling Co., Inc., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201
(Fed. Cir. 2003). In any likelihood of confusion analysis,
two key considerations are the similarities between the
marks and the similarities between the goods and/or
services. See Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper
Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24 (CCPA 1976). See also, In
re Dixie Restaurants Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 41 USPQ2d 1531
(Fed. Cir. 1997).
We analyze the similarity or dissimilarity of marks in
terms of their appearance, sound, connotation and
commercial impression. It is well settled that the proper
test in determining likelihood of confusion is not on a
side-by-side comparison of the marks, rather, the
determination must be based on the recollection of the
average purchasers, who normally retain a general rather
than specific impression of the many trademarks
encountered. See Spoons Restaurants Inc. v. Morrison,
Ser No. 77509514
16
Inc., 23 USPQ2d 1735 (TTAB 1991). Applicant’s proposed
mark SEARCH ENGINE OPTIMIZATION is nearly identical in
appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression to
registrant’s mark SEARCH ENGINE OPTIMIZATION ENGINE. The
presence of the disclaimer in registrant’s mark does not
remove that matter for purposes of evaluating the
similarity of the marks. See In re National Data Corp.,
753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“The
technicality of a disclaimer in National’s application to
register its mark has no legal effect on the issue of
likelihood of confusion. The public is unaware of what
words have been disclaimed during prosecution of the
trademark application at the PTO.”) The addition of ENGINE
at the end of registrant’s mark is not sufficient to
distinguish the otherwise identical marks. Therefore, the
factor of the similarity of the marks favors a finding of
likelihood of confusion.
We also find the services to be sufficiently related
that, if identified by similar marks, consumers would
mistakenly believe the services emanate from the same
source. It is well settled that goods or services need not
be similar or competitive in nature to support a finding of
likelihood of confusion. The question is not whether
purchasers can differentiate the goods or services
Ser No. 77509514
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themselves, but rather whether purchasers are likely to
confuse the source of the goods or services. See Helene
Curtis Industries Inc. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 13 USPQ2d 1618
(TTAB 1989). Further, we must consider the cited
registrant’s goods or services as they are described in the
registration and we cannot read limitations into those
goods or services. See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard
Press Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 62 USPQ2d 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2002);
and Octocom Systems Inc. v. Houston Computers Services
Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 16 USPQ2d 1783 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
Both applicant’s services “providing advertising,
marketing and promotional services, namely development of
advertising campaigns for use on computers and related
consulting” and registrant’s services “providing on-line
non-downloadable computer search engine software” involve
search engine optimization. As shown on the registrant’s
website, a significant feature of registrant’s non-
downloadable software is to provide search engine
optimization. October 20, 2008 Office Action. As the
examining attorney explains “[t]he services of the
respective parties are thereby related since they both
involve a means of providing a search engine marketing
technique that seeks to promote websites by increasing
their visibility and effectiveness.” Br. p. 6.
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If the cited registration describes goods or services
broadly, and there is no limitation as to the nature, type,
channels of trade or class of purchasers, it is presumed
that the registration encompasses all goods or services of
the type described, that they move in all channels of trade
normal for these goods or services, and that they are
available to all classes of purchasers for the described
goods or services. See In re Linkvest S.A., 24 USPQ2d 1716
(TTAB 1992). Inasmuch as the recitations of services in
the application and registration are not limited to any
specific channels of trade, we presume an overlap in trade
channels and that the services would be offered to all
normal classes of purchasers.
In view of the above, the du Pont factors of the
similarity of the services and the channels of trade favor
a finding of likelihood of confusion as to the cited
registration.
As to the du Pont factor of the strength of the mark,
while the fact that the cited registration is on the
Supplemental Register does not constitute an admission that
the mark has not acquired distinctiveness, 15 U.S.C. §1095,
it is an implied admission that the registered term was
descriptive at least at the time of the registrant’s first
use of the term. Perma Ceram Enterprises Inc. v. Preco
Ser No. 77509514
19
Industries, Ltd., 23 USPQ2d 1134 n.11 (TTAB 1992). See
also In re Rosemount Inc., 86 USPQ2d 1436, 1439 (TTAB
2008). That being said, weak marks are entitled to
protection against registration by a subsequent applicant
of the same or similar mark for the same or closely related
goods or services. King Candy Co. v. Eunice King’s
Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 182 USPQ 108, 109 (CCPA
1974); and Hollister Inc. v. IdentAPet, Inc., 193 USPQ 439
(TTAB 1976). Due to the highly similar nature of the marks
and closely related services, the record in this case
supports a finding of likelihood of confusion.
Applicant’s argument that it has priority over the
registrant is misplaced. In the context of an ex parte
refusal, priority is not an issue. In re Calgon Corp., 168
USPQ 278, 280 (CCPA 1971) (Section 2(d) “proscribes
registration of a trademark which so resembles, inter alia,
a mark registered in the Patent Office ... that portion of
§2(d) does not speak of priority but of a ‘mark
registered’”). This applies equally to Supplemental
Registrations. Section 23(a) explicitly makes Section 2(d)
applicable to Supplemental Registrations:
All marks capable of distinguishing applicant’s
goods or services and not registrable on the
principal register herein provided, except those
declared to be unregistrable under subsections
(a), (b), (c), (d), and (e)(3) of section 1052 of
Ser No. 77509514
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this title, which are in lawful use in
commerce...may be registered on the supplemental
register...”

15 U.S.C. §1091. See also In re The Clorox Company,
198 USPQ 337, 339-340 (CCPA 1978) (in discussing a
prior version of Section 23 the court stated:
“Section 2(d)’s absence from the enumeration of
statutory provisions made inapplicable to the
Supplemental Register establishes unequivocally its
applicability to ‘registrations on the supplemental
register.’”).
Applicant’s recourse is the filing of a petition to
cancel the registration; the Board may not cancel a
registration in an ex parte proceeding.
In conclusion, we hold that because the marks are
highly similar, the services are closely related, and the
channels of trade are the same or overlapping, confusion is
likely between applicant’s mark and the mark in the cited
registration.
Specimen Does Not Show Use of the Mark Under Section 45
Section 1 of the Trademark Act requires that the
subject matter presented for registration be a trademark or
service mark. Section 45 defines a service mark as “any
word...used...to identify and distinguish the services of
one person...” 15 U.S.C. §1127. Thus, subject matter
Ser No. 77509514
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that due to its inherent nature or the manner in which it
is used, does not function as a mark to identify and
distinguish the applicant’s services cannot be registered.
“While a service mark does not have to be displayed in any
particular size or degree of prominence, it must be used in
a way that makes a commercial impression separate and apart
from the other elements of the advertising matter or other
material upon which it is used, such that the designation
will be recognized by prospective purchasers as a source
identifier.” TMEP §1301.02 (6th ed. 2009). See also In re
Universal Oil Products CO., 476 F.2d 653, 177 USPQ 456
(CCPA 1973) (a term that identifies only a process does not
function as a service mark).
As the examining attorney states, a “specimen must
show use of the mark in a manner that would be perceived by
potential purchasers as identifying the applicant’s
services and indicating their source.” The examining
attorney takes the position that the term SEARCH ENGINE
OPTIMIZATION “is buried in the text of the email to such a
degree that the impression made by the term on the
purchasing public is simply that of an informational or
descriptive statement about the function or purpose of
applicant’s services and thus, it would not be perceived as
an indicator of source. Moreover, there is no
Ser No. 77509514
22
distinguishing feature between this designation and the
other facts outlined in the message. In other words, there
is nothing that sets this particular entry apart from the
remaining text which would lead a consumer to thin[k] that
the wording serves as a source identifier for the
particular services offered by applicant.” Br. pp. 10-11.
We discern no error in the examining attorney’s
analysis as to the email specimens. In addition, the
proposed mark appears in the website specimen of use as
part of a list of generic names for various services,
including web design, website marketing, e-commerce and
search engine optimization. Upon review of the various
specimens of use, we find that they do not serve to
identify and distinguish the services of one person, and,
as such, do not show use of SEARCH ENGINE OPTIMIZATION as a
service mark.
Decision: The refusals to register under Sections
2(e)(1), 2(d), 1 and 45 of the Trademark Act are affirmed.6

6 In addition, to the extent applicant’s arguments regarding the
requirement for an amended identification served to preserve this
issue for appeal, the requirement to amend the identification of
services is also affirmed.