Miron Vranjes et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 26, 2019

13863369 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 26, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/863,369 04/15/2013 Miron Vranjes 338635-US-NP 5138
69316 7590 07/26/2019
MICROSOFT CORPORATION
ONE MICROSOFT WAY
REDMOND, WA 98052
EXAMINER
LEE, JUSTIN S
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2177
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/26/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
chriochs@microsoft.com
usdocket@microsoft.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________
Ex parte MIRON VRANJES, JESSE CLAY SATTERFIELD,
MATTHEW ISAAC WORLEY, CHAITANYA SAREEN,
NILS ANDERS SUNDELIN, ABHISHEK MALANI,
ALICE STEINGLASS, BELLEVUE, and ROBERT JAMES JARRETT
____________
Appeal 2017-011063
Application 13/863,3691
Technology Center 2100
____________

Before MAHSHID D. SAADAT, ERIC B. CHEN, and
CARL L. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges.

SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1–23, which are the only claims pending. An Oral
Hearing was held on June 25, 2019. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 Appellants identified Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC as the real
party in interest. App. Br. 2.

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The invention relates to an application window control for window
management. Abstract, Spec. ¶¶ 1, 2, and Fig. 5. Claim 1, reproduced
below, is exemplary of the subject matter on appeal (emphasis added):
1. A method comprising:
presenting an application window divider control
shared by a first application window of a first application
and a second application window of a second different
application in a user interface; and
snapping the application window divider control to a
snapping point selected from a range of points along an
axis of the user interface responsive to a received
directional instruction applied to the application window
divider control that moves the application window
divider control along the axis to an end point, the
snapping point selected based on the end point.
App. Br. 5 (Claims App.).

THE REJECTIONS
Claims 1–6, 9–13, and 21–23 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as being unpatentable over Brooks (US 6,008,809; iss. Dec. 28, 1999)
in view of Flores et al. (US 2008/0126989A1; pub. May 29, 2008)
(“Flores”). Final Act. 3–10.
Claims 7, 8, and 14–16 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Brooks, Flores, and Beykpour et al. (US
2012/0054674 A1; pub. Mar. 1, 2012) (“Beykpour”). Final Act. 11–13.
Claims 17–19 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Brooks, Flores and Dorcey (US 2013/0254708 A1; pub.
Sept. 26, 2013). Final Act. 13–16.
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Claim 20 is rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Brooks, Dorcey, Flores, and Beykpour. Final Act. 16.
ANALYSIS
Appellants argue the Examiner errs in finding the combination of
Brooks and Flores teaches claim 1. App. Br. 6–11; Reply Br. 2–4. In
particular, Appellants argue the combination does not teach the limitation
“snapping the application window divider control window control to a
snapping point.” (also referred to as “disputed limitation”). Id. (emphasis
omitted).
In the Final Action, the Examiner finds Brooks teaches “an
application window divider control shared by a first application window of a
first application and a second application window of a second different
application in a user interface.” Final Act. 3–4 (citing Brooks, 2:1–22, and
Figs. 5, 12) (emphasis omitted). The Examiner finds Brooks’ vertical
splitter (524) movement teaches the claimed “application window divider
control” and teaches “received directional instruction applied to the
application window divider control that moves the application window
divider control along the axis to an end point.” Id. at 3–4 (citing Brooks
Figs. 12–14) (emphasis omitted). The Examiner refers to Flores to teach the
disputed “snapping” limitation:
Flores further teaches, snapping the . . . control to a snapping
point selected from a range of points along an axis of the user
interface responsive to a received directional instruction applied to the
. . . control that moves the . . . control along the axis to an end point,
the snapping point selected based on the end point (See Flores figs. 3,
steps 320-370, 5A-5B and paragraph 41, snapping the control (e.g.
slider) to a snapping point (e.g. closest interval) selected from a range
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of points along an axis of the user interface (e.g. evenly distributed
time intervals) responsive to a received directional instruction applied
to the control that moves the control along the axis to an end point
(e.g. fig. 3, step 300, step 340: NO). The snapping point is selected
based on the end point (e.g. "if a slider is dragged to a position
corresponding to 8:02 PM on the time scale axis, the application may
reposition and snap the slider to 8:00 PM[.]" Also see fig. 3, step 370,
"slider repositioned and snapped to closest determined interval
position").
Id. at 4.
Appellants argue the Examiner interprets “application window divider
control” unreasonably broadly to include a slider control and Flores does not
disclose an “application window divider control” nor does Flores disclose
“snapping the application window divider control to a snapping point.”
App. Br. 6–10. According to Appellants, Flores discloses a slider control
and this is not a window divider control. Id. at 8–9 (citing Flores ¶¶ 38, 39;
Fig. 4). Appellants argue “Flores discloses a ‘slider’ that functions similar
to a scrollable cursor commonly used in an application sidebar to alter
content displayed in an application window” and “[b]ecause Flores' slider is
not a window divider control, ‘snapping’ of the slider does not provide the
same result and/or benefits as the ‘snapping of the window divider control’
recited in claim 1. For example, snapping the slider to a position
representing time (e.g., 8:02 PM) along the axis in Flores’ FIG. 4 does not
provide the effect of easily resizing multiple windows based on snapping
points.” Id. at 8.
In the Answer, the Examiner reiterates that Brooks is relied upon for
the “application window divider control” and Flores is relied upon for the
disputed snapping limitation. Ans. 2–7. The Examiner finds that the
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“application window divider control” is a "control" that can encompass both
industrial known terms such as “divider” and “slider” and “[o]ne of ordinary
skill[] in the art would have viewed ‘application window divider control’ of
appellant's invention as a slider that performs generic functions of a slider
known by [one] skilled in the art.” Id. at 4. Regarding “resizing”
application windows in response to snapping based on snapping points, the
Examiner notes that claim 1 does not recite this feature. Id. at 6.
In the Reply Brief, Appellants argue “[t]he ‘slider’” control of Flores
cannot reasonably be interpreted as the recited “‘application divider control’
because it is not shared by two application windows, let alone, shared by two
application windows of two different applications.” Reply Br. 2 (emphasis
omitted). Appellants argue that “the modification of Brooks to include the
snapping control taught by Flores would merely result in (1) a moveable
divider that lacks snapping functionality (as in Brooks) further including (2)
a slider in a sidebar of one of the application windows that facilitates
scrolling to alter content displayed in that window.” Id. at 4 (emphasis
omitted).
As discussed below, we are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments
and agree, instead, with the Examiner’s claim interpretation, findings, and
conclusions. Appellants’ arguments are based on an unreasonably narrow
teaching of Brooks and Flores that would be understood by one of ordinary
skill in the art in an obviousness inquiry; an unreasonably narrow
interpretation of the claims; and an overly demanding requirement for
obviousness. Additionally, Appellants present conclusory attorney
arguments and provide insufficient support for arguments.
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We do not agree with Appellants’ interpretation of “application
window divider control” to exclude the Brooks dynamic splitter and its
dragging (sliding) control. Here, the term “application window divider
control” includes the slider control of Brooks as Brooks divides the two
applications through movement of the vertical splitter 524. See Brooks Figs.
12–14. In particular, the claims recite “divider” and Brooks teaches dividing
the applications through a dragging (sliding) movement. See id. The
Specification, paragraph 17, cited by Appellants, does not exclude the use of
a splitter and dragging or sliding control. Additionally, we agree with the
Examiner’s finding that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that
the claimed control may be a divider as well as a slider. During prosecution,
claims must be given their broadest reasonable interpretation when reading
claim language in light of the Specification as it would be interpreted by one
of ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d
1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Under a broad and reasonable interpretation, Brooks teaches the claim
limitation “an application window divider control shared by.” See Brooks
Figs. 12–14; 21–22. Flores teaches the use of snapping to more easily move
a sliding operation to a desired location. See Flores ¶ 41, and Fig. 3. We
agree with the Examiner that one skilled in the art would utilize the Flores’
teaching to more easily move the splitter switch position in Brooks.
Appellants argue an unreasonably narrow interpretation of the cited
references and an overly demanding standard of obviousness. The test for
obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be
bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference; nor is it that
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the claimed invention must be expressly suggested in any one or all of the
references. Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references
would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art. In re Keller, 642
F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981).
Here, the Examiner provides sufficient evidence as required for a
prima facie case of obviousness. As stated by the Supreme Court, the
Examiner’s obviousness rejection must be based on:
“[S]ome articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning
to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” . . . .
[H]owever, the analysis need not seek out precise teachings
directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim,
for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps
that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (quoting In re Kahn,
441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
In view of the above, we sustain the rejection of claim 1, and
dependent claims 2, 4–8, and 21–23 as these claims are not argued
separately. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Regarding independent claims 9 and 17, Appellants rely on claim 1
arguments discussed supra and, for independent claim 17, argue that the
additionally cited Dorcey reference does not cure the deficiency of Brooks
and Flores. App. Br. 12–15. We are not persuaded by Appellants’
arguments because, as discussed supra, we agree with the Examiner’s
findings and conclusions regarding claim 1, and there is no deficiency.
Therefore, we sustain the rejection of independent claim 9 and 17, and
dependent claims 10–13 and 18–20 as these claims are not argued
separately.
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Claim 3 recites “[t]he method of claim 2 wherein the first application
window is removed from the user interface with an animation that pushes
the first application out of the user interface in the direction of the
directional instruction” and claim 2 recites “[t]he method of claim 1 wherein
a minimum size condition is associated with the first application window
and further comprising: removing the first application window from the user
interface when the adjusting operation decreases the placement of the first
application window to satisfy the minimum size condition.”
The Examiner finds the combination of Brooks and Dorcey teaches
claim 3 because Brooks teaches selecting, dragging, and dropping an
application window (dynamic window 212) based on user’s input direction,
and dragging includes animation. Final Act. 6 (citing Brooks 12:11–21,
Figs. 7, 9, and 11).
Appellants argue the cited portions of Brooks teaches drag and drop to
a location outside of the dynamic window 212, but this does not teach that
the moved application window is pushed “out of the user interface in the
direction of the directional instruction.” App. Br. 11–12 (citing Brooks
12:11–21, and Fig. 4).2 According to Appellants, “[f]or example, the above
description is consistent with the situation where a user drops the application
window at a position adjacent to the dynamic window 212 such that the
dynamic window 212 and the repositioned application window are both
separate from one another and simultaneously displayed on the user
interface. In such case, the moved application window is not pushed “out of
the user interface.” Id. at 12.

2 Appellants refer to Fig. 4 of Brooks, but the context indicates Appellants
intend to refer to Fig. 14. See Brooks, 12:11–20, Figs. 4, and 14.
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In the Answer, the Examiner finds Brooks teaches that a “user can
drag any application window from dynamic window 212 (e.g. user interface)
by simply selecting and dragging and dropping the application window
outside of dynamic window 212 (e.g. user interface).” Ans. 8 (citing Brooks
12:11–21). According to the Examiner, “[l]ooking at fig. 12 of Brooks, one
may interpret ‘Dynamic window’ area containing three application windows
as first user interface and rest of the area comprising Walt's computer can be
interpreted as second user interface” and “[d]ragging one window out of
‘Dynamic Window’ or first user interface, is ‘wherein the first application
window is removed from the user interface[,]’ where application window is
removed from the dynamic window.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
In the Reply Brief, Appellants argue that “dragging and dropping” a
window outside of another window does not disclose or suggest “an
animation that pushes the first application window out of the user interface.”
Reply Br. 5 (citing Brooks Fig. 12).
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments and agree, instead,
that the Examiner’s explanation of removing the window by dragging is
equivalent to pushing the window out of the user interface. Additionally, we
note that Appellants do not rebut this explanation in their Reply Brief.
Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 3.

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DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–23.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).

AFFIRMED