Miriam E. Burton, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 26, 2008
0120081895 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 26, 2008)

0120081895

08-26-2008

Miriam E. Burton, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Miriam E. Burton,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120081895

Agency No. 6K-000-0006-07

DECISION

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405, the Commission accepts complainant's

appeal from the agency's February 11, 2008 final decision concerning

her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging discrimination

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),

as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., Section 501 of the Rehabilitation

Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq.,

and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended,

29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq.

During the period at issue, complainant was employed as a Facilities

Contract Specialist, EAS-18, at the agency's Eastern Facilities Service

Office in Greensboro, North Carolina.

On June 22, 2007, complainant filed the instant formal complaint.

Therein, complainant alleged that the agency discriminated against

her on the bases of disability (diabetes, high blood pressure and high

cholesterol), age (57), and in reprisal for prior EEO activity when:

(1) on March 13, 2007, she became aware that one of her high profile

projects had been reassigned to a younger employee;

(2) on March 23, 2007, she was denied her request for a stand-alone

printer;

(3) on June 5, 2007, she was informed that she would receive a training

overview rather than one-on-one training; and

(4) on June 6, 2007, she was taken from work to the hospital by ambulance

due to an anxiety attack, and she is still unable to work.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with

a copy of the report of the investigation and notice of the right to

request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge or a final decision

within thirty days of receipt of the correspondence. Complainant did

not respond. On February 11, 2008, the agency issued the instant final

decision.

In its February 11, 2008 final decision, the agency found that complainant

did not establish a prima facie case of disability, age and reprisal

discrimination.1 The agency further found that assuming, arguendo,

complainant established a prima facie case, management articulated

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions which complainant

failed to show were a pretext.

Complainant's supervisor (S1) stated that in regard to claim (1), he

assigned one of complainant's projects (Dulles FSS) to an identified

employee for training purposes. S1 stated that he did not consider

the Dulles FSS "a high profile project - it was just another project

that this office had to process." S1 stated that he had a discussion

with complainant on March 9 and 13, 2007 to address her concerns and

"I explained why the project was assigned to someone else - I reassigned

the Dulles project to her."

Regarding claim (2), S1 stated that he denied complainant's request for

a stand-alone printer because she "had several other printers available

very nearby and she did not print out as much as another individual."

The Manager (M1) stated that the employee identified by complainant

had a stand-alone printer because she "is responsible for all the work

orders and payments for a company we use called FKC. This year alone

she processed over 10,000 invoices. To do this she must print out the

invoice, the back up documentation and the work order." M1 stated that

all employees in the contracting unit were given the opportunity to do

the work orders and that the identified employee was "the only person

who volunteered. [Complainant] declined to do it." M1 stated that the

other employees "that are doing work similar to [Complainant] also share

printers and do not have a printer in the cubicle."

Regarding claim (3), S1 stated that he made a determination that

complainant would receive a training overview rather than an one-on-one

training because "it would make more efficient and better [sic] for the

office if all the Contract Specialists attended the training together."

S1 further stated that the training overview was "identical" to the

one-on-one training.

Regarding claim (4), M1 stated that on June 6, 2007, he was having a

private conversation with S1 in his office when complainant came in; he

told complainant that he was having a private conversation and that he

would be out in a minute, but complainant refused to leave. M1 stated

that complainant wanted him to postpone their meeting from 10:00 a.m. to

10:30 a.m. so her union representative could be present. M1 stated that

he told complainant that she did not need a representative there "because

this is not a big issue and I just wanted to clarify a few things and

we would not postpone the meeting." M1 stated that complainant asked

him if he was refusing to allow her to have a representative and "she

then said if she dropped dead of a heart attack on this job, my children

will know what to do." M1 stated that after he told complainant that he

would postponed the meeting until 10:30 a.m., complainant "stormed out

of the office. She then turned right around and said I am going home I

am sick. I said fine, take the rest of the day off." M1 stated that

complainant got "heated, aggravated and looking for a confrontation."

M1 stated "I did not raise my voice or 'do battle with her' because I was

suffering from a severe cold at the time, I was totally lethargic and not

even wanting to be at work." M1 stated that during the relevant time,

he was not aware that complainant was suffering from an anxiety attack.

M1 stated that he was later informed by his staff that complainant was

sick in the bathroom and "that she was going home sick and her daughter

was coming to pick her up."

S1 stated that he was meeting with M1 in his office when complainant came

in requesting that the meeting with him and the Manager be postponed

for 30 minutes until a representative could be present. S1 further

stated that complainant raised her voice while the Manager "did not -

I did not say anything." S1 stated that during the conversation with

complainant, he "did not observe any difficulties - did not think any

action was necessary."

A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-party analysis

first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). For complainant to prevail, he must first establish a prima facie

of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably

give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited

consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. See

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,

438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Texas

Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).

Once the agency has met its burden, the complainant bears the ultimate

responsibility to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the

evidence that the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason.

See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the

first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima

facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel

action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third

step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether

complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the

agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. See U.S. Postal

Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);

Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159

(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,

EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of

the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

In the instant case, we find that the agency articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions which complainant did not

prove were a pretext for discrimination, and that complainant has not

demonstrated that these reasons were a pretext for discrimination.

After a review of the record in its entirety, including consideration

of all statements on appeal, it is the decision of the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission to AFFIRM the agency's final decision because

the preponderance of the evidence of record does not establish that

discrimination occurred.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0408)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0408)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time in

which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must

be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right

to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

August 26, 2008

Date

1 The Commission presumes, for purpose of analysis only and without so

finding, that complainant is an individual with a disability.

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0120081895

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P. O. Box 19848

Washington, D.C. 20036

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0120081895