Minkyong Kim et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 21, 2020

14697810 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jan. 21, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/697,810 04/28/2015 Minkyong Kim YOR920150138US1 1991
118492 7590 01/21/2020
Law Office of Jim Boice
3839 Bee Cave Road
Suite 201
West Lake Hills, TX 78746
EXAMINER
YOON, ERIC
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2143
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/21/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Jim@BoiceIP.com
jennifer@boiceip.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte MINKYONG KIM, JAMES R. KOZLOSKI,
CLIFFORD A. PICKOVER and MAJA VUKOVIC
____________________

Appeal 2018-008127
Application 14/697,810
Technology Center 2100
____________________

Before ALLEN MacDONALD, MICHAEL ENGLE, and
IFTIKHAR AHMED, Administrative Patent Judges.

MacDONALD, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM-IN-PART.

1 Appellant identifies the real party in interest as International Business
Machines Corporation. Appeal Br. 2.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Claims 1, 4, 5, and 9 are illustrative of the claimed subject matter
(emphasis, formatting, and bracketed material added):
1. A method of controlling icon movement behavior on a graphical
user interface, the method comprising:
[A.] displaying, on a graphical user interface (GUI), a file
hosting icon, wherein the file hosting icon represents a file
hosting service;
[B.] displaying, on the GUI, a data file icon, wherein the data
file icon represents data, and wherein the data file icon is
capable of movement towards the file hosting icon on the
GUI to initiate storage of the data by the file hosting
service; and
[C.] adjusting, by one or more processors, a behavior of the
movement of the data file icon according to a position of
the data file icon relative to a position of the file hosting
icon on the GUI and according to predefined features of the
data relative to predefined features of the file hosting
service.
4. The method of claim 1, wherein said adjusting the behavior of the
movement of the data file icon on the GUI results in a change in
viscosity of an emulated medium through which the data file icon
travels on the GUI.
5. The method of claim 4, further comprising:
adjusting, by one or more processors, the viscosity of the
emulated medium based on a level of sensitivity of the data.
9. The method of claim 4, further comprising:
adjusting, by one or more processors, the viscosity of the
emulated medium based on a history of security incidents
involving the file hosting service.
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REFERENCES2
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Becker US 6,392,675 B1 May 21, 2002
Kinawi US 6,545,669 B1 Apr. 8, 2003
LaBine US 2009/0292999 A1 Nov. 26, 2009
Ledet US 2012/0084689 Al Apr. 5, 2012
Icho US 2013/0097542 A1 Apr. 18, 2013
Ording US 2013/0145325 A1 June 6, 2013
Guthrie US 2013/0212432 A1 Aug. 15, 2013
Sharma US 2013/0297662 A1 Nov. 7, 2013
REJECTIONS3
A.
The Examiner rejects claims 1–9, 13, 14, and 18–20 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as being unpatentable over the combination of Guthrie and Becker.
Final Act. 3–10.
Appellant separately argues claims 1, 3, 5, 7–9, and 13. App. Br. 16–
25, 27–29. Appellant does not present separate arguments for claims 2, 4, 6,
14, and 18–20. Thus, the rejections of these claims turn on our decisions as
to claim 1 (with which claims 2, 4, 6, 14, and 18–20 are grouped). Except
for our ultimate decision, we do not discuss the § 103 rejection of claims 2,
4, 6, 14, and 18–20 further herein.

2 All citations herein to these references are by reference to the first named
inventor only.
3 The Examiner has withdrawn (Ans. 19) the rejection of claims 1–20 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to a judicial exception without
significantly more (Final Act. 2–3).
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B.
The Examiner rejects claim 10 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over the combination of Guthrie, Becker, and Ledet. Final Act.
11–12.
C.
The Examiner rejects claim 11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over the combination of Guthrie, Becker, and Ording. Final
Act. 12–13.
D.
The Examiner rejects claim 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over the combination of Guthrie, Becker, and Sharma. Final
Act. 14–16.
E.
The Examiner rejects claim 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over the combination of Guthrie, Becker, and LaBine. Final
Act. 18–19.
F.
The Examiner rejects claim 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over the combination of Guthrie, Becker, and Kinawi. Final
Act. 13–14.
Appellant does not present arguments for claim 12. Thus, the
rejections of this claim turn on our decision as to claim 1. Except for our
ultimate decision, we do not discuss the § 103 rejection of claim 12
further herein.
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G.
The Examiner rejects claim 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over the combination of Guthrie, Becker, and Icho. Final
Act. 16–18.
Appellant does not present arguments for claim 16. Thus, the
rejections of this claim turn on our decision as to claim 1. Except for our
ultimate decision, we do not discuss the § 103 rejection of claim 16
further herein.
OPINION
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s
Appeal Brief arguments that the Examiner has erred.
A.1.
Appellant raises the following argument in contending that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
[T]he final Office Action takes the position that since Guthrie
teaches that a data file can be moved to a remote storage location
by dragging the data icon to the remote storage location icon (see
FIG. 5 and paragraph [0053] of Guthrie), and since Becker
teaches that an icon can be slowed down when it reaches a certain
area on a GUI, then this is the same as slowing down the
movement of a first icon towards a second icon.
First, the movement of the data file icon in the present
invention depends upon its movement relative to a file hosting
icon, not just some predefined area on a GUI (as in Becker).
Second, the movement of the data file icon in the present
invention depends upon the predefined features of the data
relative to the predefined features of the file hosting service.
The modification to the movement of the icon (slowing it down)
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in Becker depends on whether or not 1) the icon is in the right
place on the GUI, and 2) there is no other icon in that spot.
Appeal Br. 19 (emphasis added).
We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s argument. First, we disagree with
Appellant’s assertion that the Office Action takes a “this is the same as”
position. Rather, the Office Action takes a position that “[i]t would have
been obvious to . . . have incorporated adjusting . . . a behavior of the
movement of the . . . icon according to the position of the . . . icon relative to
the position of [another] icon . . . as suggested in Becker into Guthrie.”
Final Act. 5.
Second, Appellant overlooks key words when presenting the assertion
that “the movement of the data file icon in the present invention depends
upon its movement relative to a file hosting icon, not just some predefined
area on a GUI (as in Becker).” Appeal Br. 19. In particular, the claim
recites “according to a position of the data file icon relative to a position of
the file hosting icon.” Our review of the record determines that the present
invention depends upon the position of the data file icon relative to a
position of file hosting icon (Spec. ¶ 3), and Becker depends upon the
location of the cursor being within (i.e., at a location relative to) a
predefined area on a GUI (Becker, col. 6, lines 14–18). Contrary to
Appellant’s assertion, we determine that there is no meaningful difference
between these.
Third, the Examiner does not cite Becker alone for the argued
“predefined features of the data relative to the predefined features of the file
hosting service” limitation. Rather, the Examiner cites Guthrie (¶ 81) and
Becker (col. 6, lines 25–52). Final Act. 4–5. Appellant does not address the
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full reasoning of the Examiner’s rejection. Instead, Appellant attacks the
Becker reference singly for lacking a teaching that the Examiner relied on a
combination of references to show. It is well-established that one cannot
show non-obviousness by attacking references individually where the
rejections are based on a combination of references. See In re Keller, 642
F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097
(Fed. Cir. 1986). References must be read, not in isolation, but for what they
fairly teach in combination with the prior art as a whole. Merck, 800 F.2d at
1097.
A.2.
Appellant raises the following argument in contending that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claim 3 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
With regard to dependent Claim 3, a combination of the cited
prior art does not teach or suggest "wherein said adjusting the
behavior of the movement of the data file icon on the GUI results
in an emulation on the GUI of a repulsive force between the data
file icon and the file hosting icon", as supported by paragraph
[0045] of the present specification as originally filed. The final
Office Action cites col. 4, lines 39-54 and col. 6, lines 20-53 of
Becker as teaching this feature. However, col. 4, lines 39-54 of
Becker, like previously discussed col. 6, lines 20-53 of Becker,
teach slowing down the rate of movement of a cursor. There is
never any teaching/suggestion of emulating “a repulsive force
between the data file icon and the file hosting icon”, as claimed
in dependent Claim 3.
Appeal Br. 20 (emphasis added).
[I]n Becker the cursor slows down when it is where it should be,
and in the present invention the cursor slows down when it is
where it should not be (and thus there is a “repulsive force
between the data file icon and the file hosting icon”).
Appeal Br. 21 (emphasis added).
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We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s argument. First, Appellant
asserts “in the present invention the cursor slows down when it is where it
should not be.” Appeal Br. 21 (emphasis added). However, this argument
is not commensurate with the scope of the claim language. The structure of
claim 3 is not explicitly so limited to “where it should not be,” nor does
Appellant explain how claim 3 would be inherently so limited, nor do we
find alternative language that would similarly mandate the argued limitation.
Second, Appellant describes that as the emulated repulsion field gets
stronger, movement is made more difficult (i.e., slower). Spec. ¶ 45.
Therefore, based on Appellant’s description, we agree with the
Examiner that Becker’s teaching of slower cursor movement equates to the
claimed repulsive force.
A.3.
Appellant raises the following argument in contending that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claim 5 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
First, paragraph [0043] of the present specification is clear
with regard to what is meant by “sensitive” when referring to
data. Thus, using a definition from a dictionary is contrary to
Section 2111.01 (III) of the MPEP.
Second, Claim 5 is not directed to the “sensitivity” of the
icon (as suggested by the final Office Action), but rather the
“sensitivity” of the data (“based on a level of sensitivity of the
data”).
Appeal Br. 22 (emphasis added).
We agree with Appellant’s first point (that the Specification provides
the meaning of “sensitive”). However, we are unpersuaded by Appellant’s
overall argument that the cited art does not teach or suggest the sensitivity
limitation. Appeal Br. 22. Appellant points to paragraph 43 of the
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Specification which states: “[f]ile sensitivity may be estimated based on
various factors including any of: a topic analysis of text in a document . . .; a
file name . . .; a file type . . .; file metadata . . .; etc.” Spec. ¶ 43 (emphasis
added). As the Examiner stated, “[Guthrie] [0081] indicates that the system
determines the file type and may ascertain that particular file types are not
allowed.” Final Act. 4 (emphasis added).
Therefore, based on Appellant’s description, we determine that
Guthrie’s behavior based on file type equates to the claimed sensitivity.
A.4.
Appellant raises the following argument in contending that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
Paragraph [0082] of Guthrie teaches that only authorized
users may upload a file.
Col. 6, lines 25-53 of Becker teaches that a cursor/icon will
“slow down” when it gets to its final drop-off area on the GUI.
First, neither Guthrie nor Becker mention the presently
claimed concept of “viscosity of the emulated medium”.
Second, there is no motivation to make a user’s profile
determine the movement of an icon (“adjusting ... the viscosity
of the emulated medium”). That is, Becker (which modifies how
icons move) only teaches that the movement of the icon is based
on when the icon is located on the GUI. There is no motivation
to make this movement based on the profile of the user of the
GUI.
Appeal Br. 23.
We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s argument. First, like Appellant’s
“repulsive force,” Appellant describes that for “viscosity of the emulated
medium,” movement is made more difficult “(e.g. slow[ed] down as if
dragging through a viscous fluid).” Spec. ¶ 37. Therefore, based on
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Appellant’s description, we agree with the Examiner that Becker’s teaching
of slower cursor movement equates to the claimed viscosity.
Second, Appellant is essentially asserting that it is unobvious “to
make a user’s profile determine the movement of an icon.” We disagree.
We agree with the Examiner that “Becker col. 6, lines 25-53 indicates that it
may adjust the speed of the cursor/dragged icon depending on whether a
target area is valid or invalid.” Final Act. 8. Further, we agree with the
Examiner that it would be obvious to have a validity/invalidity
determination in Becker be based on a user profile (i.e., is the user valid)
because “Guthrie [0082] indicates that a user may be allowed to upload only
if he/she has proper authority to transfer data using the object area i.e., based
on a user profile.” Id.
A.5.
Appellant raises the following argument in contending that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claim 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
With regard to Claim 8, a combination of the cited prior
art does not teach or suggest the feature supported by paragraph
[0062] of the present specification of “adjusting . . . the viscosity
of the emulated medium based on a predefined level of
trustworthiness of the file hosting service”.
First, trustworthiness of a file hosting service is never
mentioned by Guthrie or Becker. Rather, the movement of data
to a remote location in Guthrie is only dependent upon whether
that remote location is dedicated to storing that type of data, not
whether the remote location is trustworthy or not. (See
paragraph [0081] and [0094] of Guthrie.)
Second, the “validity” of a target area in Becker has
nothing to do with the features of the file hosting service. Rather,
the “validity” of the target area in Becker is simply based on its
position on the GUI.
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Appeal Br. 24 (emphasis added).
We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s argument. Appellant points to
paragraph 62 of the Specification which states: “a predefined level of
trustworthiness of the file hosting service (i.e., if the file hosting service is
not protected by proper password protection, firewalls, etc., then the
emulated viscosity is high, giving the user feedback indicating that it is
inadvisable to drop sensitive data into such an unprotected environment).”
Spec. ¶ 62 (emphasis added). As Appellant uses “etc.” to describe
“trustworthiness,” we determine that Guthrie/Becker’s validity of the file
type is sufficient. Further, even if we were to adopt a more limited
definition of trustworthiness, Guthrie at paragraph 82 shows that such is a
known concern in the art (“a user may be allowed to upload only if he has
the appropriate authority”).
Therefore, based on Appellant’s description, we determine that
validity of the file type equates to the claimed sensitivity.
A.6.
Appellant raises the following argument in contending that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claim 9 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
First, a “history of security incidents involving the file
hosting service” is never mentioned by Guthrie or Becker.
Rather, the movement of data to a remote location in Guthrie is
only dependent upon whether that remote location is dedicated
to storing that type of data, not whether the remote location is
trustworthy or not. (See paragraph [0081] and [0094] of
Guthrie.)
Second, cited paragraph [0084] of Guthrie teaches that
only an authorized user can upload data to a remote location.
This has nothing to do with security incidents involving the file
hosting service.
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Appeal Br. 25.
We agree with Appellant’s argument. We are persuaded there is
insufficient articulated reasoning to support the Examiner’s determination
that Guthrie and Becker render obvious “adjusting . . . medium based on a
history of security incidents involving the file hosting service” (emphasis
added) as required by claim 9. The Examiner determines that “the claimed
‘history of security incidents involving the file hosting service’ can include
one or more past grants of authorization/security status provided to the
user.” Final Act. 9. However, the Examiner does not indicate how such
“history” (or “past grants”) is taught, suggested, or otherwise rendered
obvious by Guthrie and Becker.
Therefore, we conclude that there is insufficient articulated reasoning
to support the Examiner’s final conclusion that claim 9 would have been
obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of Appellant’s
invention.
A.7.
Appellant acknowledges that Guthrie states:
[A] user may be prompted and/or required to submit certain types
of information about a file, such as author’s name, company
name, sender’s name, filename, destination folder or path (e.g.,
in a file management system), category, creation date, tags,
location, GPS, camera type, photography settings, creating
application, password protection status, etc. Metadata
information may be used, for example, for organizing
information in a file management system and/or for facilitating
searches of a file management system based on the metadata. In
some embodiments, as described in this disclosure, metadata
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information may be received from a user via a user interface
(e.g., a metadata entry screen).
Appeal Br. 28 (quoting Guthrie ¶ 46).
Appellant then raises the following argument in contending that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claim 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
[P]aragraph [0046] of Guthrie teaches that metadata that is
appended to a file may describe a password protection status of
the file. However, merely password protecting a file does not
indicate that the file is confidential. More specifically, this
passage does not teach or suggest “a description of a predefined
confidentiality level of the data represented by the data file icon”.
Appeal Br. 29 (emphasis added).
We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s argument. We disagree with
Appellant’s assertion that “password protecting a file does not indicate that
the file is confidential.” Id. We conclude that password protection restricts
access to the file, and that restricting access indicates the file is confidential.
B.
Appellant raises the following argument in contending that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claim 10 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
Paragraph [0006] of Ledet teaches that an item representation can
change its appearance when it moves over a drop zone.
Paragraph [0082] of Ledet teaches that a folder icon can change
its appearance when an icon slows down over the folder icon.
However, none of these appearance changes are “based on the
predefined features of the data being represented by the data file
icon”.
Appeal Br. 26.
We agree with Appellant’s argument. We are persuaded there is
insufficient articulated reasoning to support the Examiner’s finding that
“Ledet teaches adjusting, by one or more processors, a color of the data file
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icon as the data file icon is moving relative to the file hosting icon, wherein
the color of the data file icon is adjusted based on the predefined features of
the data being represented by the data file icon.” Final Act. 11. Therefore,
we further conclude that there is insufficient articulated reasoning to support
the Examiner’s final conclusion that claim 10 would have been obvious to
one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of Appellant’s invention.
C.
Appellant raises the following argument in contending that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claim 11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
On page 31, the Examiner’s Answer states that changing
an icon from a trash can icon to a file ejection icon (Ording) is
equivalent to changing a color of a file hosting icon as the data
file icon approaches it (present Claim 11). Appellant disagrees.
More specifically, the only shading/color changes to icons in
cited FIGs. 3A-3C and 6A-6C of Ording occurs when a user
clicks on the icon. This is unrelated to changing a color of an
icon as it approaches another icon.
Reply Br. 6.
We agree with Appellant’s argument. We are persuaded there is
insufficient articulated reasoning to support the Examiner’s finding that
“Ording teaches adjusting, by one or more processors, a color of the file
hosting icon as the data file icon is moving relative to the file hosting icon,
wherein the color of the file hosting icon is adjusted based on the predefined
features of the file hosting service represented by the file hosting icon.”
Final Act. 12. Therefore, we further conclude that there is insufficient
articulated reasoning to support the Examiner’s final conclusion that claim
11 would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of
Appellant’s invention.
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D.
Appellant raises the following argument in contending that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claim 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
Thus, paragraph [0127] of Sharma teaches that even though a
document is downloaded and cached on user’s device, user can
not access [it] outside the office locations. That is, paragraph
[0127] of Sharma is directed to which files a user can
open/display/access in a particular location, even if the files are
already on his/her computer. This is unrelated to adjusting the
behavior of the movement of the data file icon (“further adjusting
. . . the behavior of the movement of the data file icon according
to the real-time location of the electronic device”).
Appeal Br. 30–31.
We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s argument. The Examiner does
not cite Sharma for the argued “adjusting the behavior of the movement of
the data file icon” limitation. Rather, the Examiner cites Guthrie and
Becker. Final Act. 15.
Thus, Appellant does not address the actual reasoning of the
Examiner’s rejection. Instead, Appellant attacks the Sharma reference
singly for lacking a teaching that the Examiner relied on a combination of
references to show. Again, it is well-established that one cannot show non-
obviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are
based on a combination of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d at 425; In
re Merck, 800 F.2d at 1097.

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E.
Appellant raises the following argument in contending that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claim 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
The final Office Action also cites paragraphs [0002] - [0004] of
LaBine against Claim 17. However, these passages merely
describe the ability of networked computers to display shared
displayed information. There is no teaching/suggestion in any
combination of the cited prior art that such sharing of displayed
information will affect “the behavior of the movement of the data
file icon on the GUI on the first computer”, particularly
“according to the profile for the user of the second computer”.
Appeal Br. 32 (emphasis added).
We agree with Appellant’s argument. We are persuaded there is
insufficient articulated reasoning to support the Examiner’s determination
that Guthrie, Becker, and LaBine render obvious “adjusting . . . the first
computer according to the profile for the user of the second computer”
(emphasis added) as required by claim 17. Therefore, we further conclude
that there is insufficient articulated reasoning to support the Examiner’s final
conclusion that claim 17 would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in
the art at the time of Appellant’s invention.

CONCLUSION
The Examiner has not erred in rejecting claims 1–8, 12–16, and 18–20
as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
Appellant has established that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims
9–11 and 17 as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
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The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–8, 12–16, and 18–20 and as
being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 are affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 9–11 and 17 as being
unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 are reversed.

DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § References/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–9, 13, 14,
18–20
103 Guthrie, Becker 1–8, 13,
14, 18–
20
9
10 103 Guthrie, Becker, Ledet 10
11 103 Guthrie, Becker, Ording 11
12 103 Guthrie, Becker, Kinawi 12
15 103 Guthrie, Becker, Sharma 15
16 103 Guthrie, Becker, Icho 16
17 103 Guthrie, Becker, LaBine 17
Overall
Outcome

1–8, 12–
16, 18–
20
9–11, 17

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART