Ming Lei et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 31, 2019

14132097 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Oct. 31, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/132,097 12/18/2013 Ming LEI 2011-0330US01 8294
74739 7590 10/31/2019
Potomac Law Group, PLLC (Oracle International)
8229 Boone Boulevard
Suite 430
Vienna, VA 22182
EXAMINER
DELICH, STEPHANIE ZAGARELLA
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3623
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/31/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
bgoldsmith@potomaclaw.com
eofficeaction@appcoll.com
patents@potomaclaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte MING LEI and CATALIN POPESCU
____________

Appeal 2018-006563
Application 14/132,097
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before ELENI MANTIS MERCADER, DAVID C. McKONE, and
JOHN P. PINKERTON, Administrative Patent Judges.

McKONE, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
final rejection of claims 1–20 which constitute all the claims pending in this
application. Final Act. 1; Appeal Br. 3.2 We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Oracle
International Corporation. Appeal Br. 2.
2 In this Decision, we refer to the April 14, 2017, Final Action, the
October 13, 2017, Appeal Brief, the April 3, 2018, Examiner’s Answer, and
the May 30, 2018, Reply.
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THE INVENTION
Appellant’s invention is directed to a computer system that determines
retail assortment planning, which the Specification describes as
“encompass[ing] selecting an assortment of products to offer for sale that
would maximize a selected performance metric.” Spec. ¶¶ 1–2. According
to the Specification, “[k]nown approaches for determining these metrics for
a new item typically include determining a similar or ‘like item’, and using
the metrics from that item for the new item.” Id. ¶ 8. “Embodiments [of the
invention] compare the new item’s attributes with attributes of related items,
and derives the necessary metrics based on them.” Id. ¶ 10.
Table 1 of the Specification is reproduced below:

Table 1 is a table listing rate of sale metrics and attributes (A–B) for items
1–4. The system determines average values of each rate of sale metric by
attribute for the active attributes (an “X” in the column for an attribute for an
item row). Id. ¶ 19. “For example, for attribute A, it is active for item 1,
item 3, and item 4. Therefore, the average of the rate of sale metric for
attribute A is (4+4+5)/3 = 4.33 units.” Id. Then, to get a rate of sale metric
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for the new item, the system generates a geometric mean of the attributes
assigned to the new item (here, A, C, and D, as shown by each “X” in the
“item new” row). Id. ¶ 20. In this example:

Id. ¶ 21.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the invention:
1. A non-transitory computer-readable medium having
instructions stored thereon that, when executed by a processor,
cause the processor to determine metrics for a new item, the
determining comprising:
receiving a plurality of new individual active attributes
that are assigned to the new item that is not included in a
current assortment of products carried by a retailer;
receiving, for each of a plurality of previous items that
are included in the current assortment of products, one or more
metric values for each previous item, and one or more previous
individual active attributes for each previous item;
determining an average metric value for each previous
individual active attribute of the previous items; and
for each of the new individual active attributes of the new
item, determining a geometric mean of the average metric
values for corresponding previous individual active attributes
that matches the new individual active attributes, wherein the
geometric mean of the average metric values is assigned to the
new item as the new item metric value.

REJECTION
Claims 1–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to
patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 4–8.

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ANALYSIS
I. Principles of Law
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted § 101 to include implicit
exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are
not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Alice
and Mayo. See id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with
that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.”
Id. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
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252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). The
Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that
formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws,
. . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use
of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citing Benson
and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application
of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process
may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. “A claim that recites an
abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’”
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely
requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
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The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101. See USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”).3 Under that
guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activities such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed.
Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.

II. The Examiner’s Rejection
The Examiner finds that the claims are “directed to the abstract idea
for determining metrics for a new item by receiving attributes and metric

3 We note that the Guidance was not available to the Examiner and
Appellant during the prosecution of the instant Application.
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values and determining averages and a geometric mean.” Final Act. 5. The
Examiner characterizes this as “performing mathematic functions to
manipulate received data.” Id. The Examiner further finds that “[t]he
claims do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to
significantly more than the judicial exception.” Id. at 7. Specifically, the
Examiner finds, “[t]here is no indication that the combination of elements
improves the functioning of the computer or improves any other technology.
Their collective functions merely provide conventional computer
implementation.” Id.
Appellant argues that the claims are eligible because they are novel
and nonobvious (and thus not conventional). Appeal Br. 7–9 (citing McRO,
Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
Appellant further argues that the invention improves computer-related
technology by allowing computer performance of a function not previously
performable by a computer. Id. at 9–10. Finally, Appellant argues that the
claims do not preempt an abstract idea. Id. at 11.
The Examiner groups independent claims 1, 8, and 15 together in the
rejection. Final Act. 4–8. Likewise, Appellant does not distinguish among
the independent claims. Appeal Br. 3–11. Claim 8 recites a method, claim 1
recites a computer-readable medium with instructions that perform functions
corresponding to the steps of claim 8, and claim 15 recites a system with
modules that perform functions corresponding to the steps of claim 8. For
purposes of our analysis, we treat claim 1 as representative.

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III. Judicial Exception (Step 2A,4 Prong 1)
Viewing the Examiner’s rejection through the lens of the Guidance,
we first consider whether the claim recites a judicial exception. Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 51. The PTO has synthesized the key concepts identified by
the courts as abstract ideas into three primary subject-matter groupings:
mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activities (e.g.,
a fundamental economic practice), and mental processes. Id. at 52. As
explained below, claim 1 recites mathematical concepts and mental
processes, which are identified by the Guidance as abstract ideas. Id.
Claim 1 recites (1) receiving new individual active attributes assigned
to a new item, (2) receiving metric values and active attributes for previous
items, (3) determining an average metric value for the previous individual
active attributes of the previous items, (4) determining, for the new
individual active attributes, a geometric mean of matching average metric
values of the previous individual active attributes, and (5) assigning the
geometric mean to the new item as the new item’s metric value. The
Examiner finds that “[d]etermining average metric values for each active
attribute of previous items and for each new attribute determining a
geometric mean of the average metric values for corresponding active
matching attributes as well as calculating a geometric mean of the average
values illustrate performing mathematic functions to manipulate received

4 The Guidance refers to “Step One” as determining whether the claimed
subject matter falls within the four statutory categories identified by
35 U.S.C. § 101: process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.
This step is not at issue here, as Appellant’s claims recite systems
(machines), methods (processes), and non-transitory, computer-readable
media (articles of manufacture).
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data.” Final Act. 5. The Examiner finds that, in this regard, the claims are
similar to those in Digitech Image Technologies, LLC v. Electronics for
Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2014), and Benson. Id. at 6.
Appellant argues that the Examiner overgeneralizes and has not
identified the abstract idea as it is recited in the claim or explained why it
corresponds to a concept that the courts have identified as an abstract idea.
Appeal Br. 5–6. The Examiner, however, identified the average and
geometric means calculations as the abstract idea and compared claim 1 to
the claims determined to be ineligible in Digitech, Benson, and several other
cases. Final Act. 5–7.
We agree with the Examiner. As the Examiner finds, “calculating
averages and geometric means are commonly accepted mathematical
functions.” Final Act. 3. For example, the Specification states:
The geometric mean is a type of mean or average which
indicates the central tendency or typical value of a set of
numbers by using the product of their values (as opposed to the
arithmetic mean which uses their sum). The geometric mean is
defined as the nth root (where n is the count of numbers) of the
product of the numbers.
Spec. ¶ 20. As reproduced above, the Specification represents the geometric
mean as a mathematical equation. Id. ¶ 21. Claim 1 is similar to those in
Digitech in that it “claims an abstract idea because it describes a process of
organizing information through mathematical correlations and is not tied to a
specific structure or machine.” 758 F.3d at 1350–51 (claim to “a process of
taking two data sets and combining them into a single data set, the device
profile,” wherein “[t]he two data sets are generated by taking existing
information—i.e., measured chromatic stimuli, spatial stimuli, and device
response characteristic functions—and organizing this information into a
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new form.”). In that case, the Federal Circuit held that “[w]ithout additional
limitations, a process that employs mathematical algorithms to manipulate
existing information to generate additional information is not patent
eligible.” Id. at 1351. Here, claim 1 recites mathematical concepts
(calculations for determining averages and geometric means), which the
Guidance identifies as abstract ideas. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
The Examiner further finds that “[t]he mathematical ‘determining’
functions are merely applied by a generic computer acting as a tool for
implementing the functions that could be performed the same way
manually.” Final Act. 4; accord Ans. 6 (“The attribute based comparison
could still be done the same way by a person analyzing the data with this
methodology, the computer merely acts as a tool to perform the functions the
same way that they could be done manually.”). We agree with the
Examiner. The Specification illustrates a simple example, consistent with
claim 1, that could be calculated in one’s head, or with pencil and paper.
Spec. ¶¶ 17–21. This is an example of a mental process, which the
Guidance identifies as an abstract idea. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
See also CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1373
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (“It is clear that unpatentable mental processes are the
subject matter of claim 3. All of claim 3’s method steps can be performed in
the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper.”); Benson, 409 U.S.
at 67 (“The mathematical procedures can be carried out in existing
computers long in use, no new machinery being necessary. And, as noted,
they can also be performed without a computer.”).
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Accordingly, we find that claim 1 recites abstract ideas, namely
mathematical concepts and mental processes. For the same reasons, claims
8 and 15 recite abstract ideas.

IV. “Directed to” the Judicial Exception (Step 2A, Prong 2)
Because the claims recite an abstract idea, we now proceed to
determine whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51. Specifically, we look to
“whether the claim recites additional elements that integrate the exception
into a practical application of that exception.” Id. at 54. Limitations that are
indicative of integration into a practical application include additional
elements that reflect an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an
improvement to other technology or technical field. Id. at 55. When a claim
recites a judicial exception and fails to integrate the exception into a
practical application, the claim is “directed to” the judicial exception. Id. at
51.
As to the additional limitations of claim 1, the Examiner finds that
“[r]eceiving attributes or metric values merely illustrates receiving data
inputs and can also be interpreted as insignificant pre-solution activity
because it merely gathers data and thus could be performed by any computer
implementation.” Final Act. 6. According to the Examiner, “[t]he
additional elements are recited at a high level of generality and are recited as
performing generic receiving functions, such as storing and receiving,
routinely used in computer applications or merely apply the abstract idea.”
Id. at 7. The Guidance notes that courts have found judicial exceptions not
integrated into practical applications when a claim “merely includes
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instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely uses a
computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea,” when “an additional element
adds insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception,” and when
“an additional element does no more than generally link the use of a judicial
exception to a particular technological environment or field of use.”
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
Appellant argues that “the present claims are allowable over the prior
art, so there is no evidence that the claimed process was previously used
either manually, or using a computer.” Appeal Br. 7. Appellant cites
McRO, for the proposition that implementing a novel and nonobvious
algorithm on a general purpose computer is patent eligible. Id. at 7–8.
According to Appellant, the claimed “solution is a completely different set
of algorithms and rules and technology that are not known in the prior art (as
indicated by the prior art rejections being overcome during prosecution),
similar to as in McRO.” Id. at 8. Appellant cites the Specification, which
states that an attribute-based approach “is more accurate and allows for a
high degree of automation in comparison to the known ‘like item’ approach”
because “[i]n order to manage these new items, a retailer needs to evaluate
what like item is appropriate for each of the new items using known
methods” which “is a very long and tedious process, and it is very easy to
get it wrong.” Spec. ¶ 27.
In McRO, the Federal Circuit determined that claims to automatic lip
synchronization and facial expression animation were directed to an
improvement in computer-related technology and not to an abstract idea.
837 F.3d at 1315. In that case, “[t]he claimed process use[d] a combined
order of specific rules that renders information into a specific format that is
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then used and applied to create desired results: a sequence of synchronized,
animated characters.” Id. at 1315. The Federal Circuit determined that
those claims were “directed to a patentable, technological improvement over
the existing, manual 3–D animation techniques” because “[t]he claim uses
the limited rules in a process specifically designed to achieve an improved
technological result in conventional industry practice.” Id.
In response, the Examiner finds that “[t]he mathematical process
being new or improved does not illustrate an improvement that is sufficient
to amount to significantly more,” and that, in Appellant’s claims, “[t]he
mathematical ‘determining’ functions are merely applied by a generic
computer acting as a tool for implementing the functions that could be
performed the same way manually.” Ans. 4. The Examiner finds that the
purported improvement is due to automation of data gathering and
calculations, rather than due to improvements to the computer elements or
functioning of the technology. Id. at 4–5. According to the Examiner,
“[u]nlike McRo, the claims and specification do not illustrate, realize or
assert an improvement in a computer function, such as the animation in
McRo. Instead the computer merely acts as a tool used to implement a set of
rules, thus allowing for the automation of further tasks.” Id. at 5.
We agree with the Examiner. The Federal Circuit has held that
merely using computers to speed up a process by performing calculations
more quickly is not sufficient to integrate an abstract idea into a practical
application. See Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada
(U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he use of a computer in an
otherwise patent-ineligible process for no more than its most basic
function—making calculations or computations—fails to circumvent the
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prohibition against patenting abstract ideas and mental processes. . . . [T]he
fact that the required calculations could be performed more efficiently via a
computer does not materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed
subject matter.”). Likewise, the Federal Circuit has found using a computer
to perform data gathering to be insignificant pre-solution activity. See
Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(“Indeed, the steps of consulting and updating an activity log represent
insignificant ‘data-gathering steps,’ CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions,
Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011), and thus add nothing of practical
significance to the underlying abstract idea.”).
Claim 1 merely recites a generic “processor” that receives data and
performs calculations (“average metric value” and “geometric mean”
determinations). Consistent with claim 1, the Specification describes a
processor generically, noting that it “may be any type of general or specific
purpose processor,” that the memory on which its instructions are stored
may be “any [] type of computer readable media” and that a user may
interface with the system via any method. Spec. ¶ 12. Claim 1 simply
recites abstract ideas (e.g., mathematical concepts of average values and
geometric means) performed on generic computer equipment (a “processor”)
used to speed up calculations. The functions of receiving data are
insignificant pre-solution activity. See Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 716.
Appellant does not persuasively explain how the invention is an
improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to a
technology or technical field.
As to Appellant’s arguments that the claimed attribute-based set of
algorithms and rules were not known in the prior art (Appeal Br. 8), the
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Federal Circuit has “previously explained that merely reciting an abstract
idea by itself in a claim—even if the idea is novel and non-obvious—is not
enough to save it from ineligibility.” Solutran, Inc. v. Elavon, Inc., Appeal
No. 2019-1345, 2019 WL 3418471, *2, *6 (Fed. Cir. July 30, 2019); see
also Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 716 (“That some of the eleven steps were not
previously employed in this art is not enough—standing alone—to confer
patent eligibility upon the claims at issue.”); Two-Way Media Ltd. v.
Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(“Eligibility and novelty are separate inquiries.”). For example, in Credit
Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Services, the Federal Circuit determined that
an allegedly non-obvious arrangement of components, namely, an
“invention’s ‘communication between previously unconnected systems—the
dealer’s inventory database, a user credit information input terminal, and
creditor underwriting servers,’ . . . does not amount to an improvement in
computer technology.” 859 F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (internal
citation omitted). The Federal Circuit considered this to be using generic
computers to automate a previously manual processing of loan applications
and distinguished it from the improvements to computers claimed in McRO
and Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Id.
Even assuming that Appellant’s attribute-based technique is novel and non-
obvious, it is merely a set of mathematical calculations performed on a
generic processor, rather than an improvement to the way the processor
operates. Thus, claim 1 merely recites a processor that functions as a tool to
carry out the abstract idea.
Appellant argues that “[t]he present claims do not preempt all systems
and methods for retail assortment planning, as indicated by the cited prior art
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during prosecution that generally performs this same function, albeit using
different functionality/algorithms as compared to the present claims.”
Appeal Br. 11 (citing McRO, 837 F.3d at 1316). The Federal Circuit has
counseled, however, that “[a] narrow claim directed to an abstract idea,
however, is not necessarily patent-eligible, for ‘[w]hile preemption may
signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption
does not demonstrate patent eligibility.’” Intellectual Ventures I LLC v.
Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Ariosa
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).
As to preemption, the McRO court “look[ed] to whether the claims in these
patents focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant
technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the
abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery.” 837
F.3d at 1314 (citing Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1336). As explained above, claim 1
is directed to mathematical concepts and mental processes and merely
invokes a generic processor to perform the mathematical calculations. Thus,
even if claim 1 does not preempt all methods for retail assortment planning,
it nevertheless is directed to an abstract idea.
The Guidance also discusses other ways that additional elements can
integrate the judicial exception into a practical application—e.g., a particular
machine or manufacture, a particular transformation, and a particular
treatment of a disease. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. Claim 1 also lacks
such features.
Accordingly, claim 1 does not integrate the recited abstract ideas into
a practical application. For the same reasons, claims 8 and 15 do not
integrate the abstract ideas into a practical application.
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V. Inventive Concept (Step 2B)
To determine whether a claim provides an inventive concept, the
additional elements are considered—individually and in combination—to
determine whether they (1) add a specific limitation beyond the judicial
exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field or
(2) simply append well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to
the judicial exception. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Also, we reevaluate
our conclusions about the additional elements discussed in the previous step.
Id.
The Examiner finds that “the additional computer elements, which are
recited at a high level of generality, provide conventional computer
functions that do not add meaningful limits to practicing the abstract idea.”
Final Act. 5. The Examiner further finds that “[t]he ability to receive data is
considered well-understood, routine and conventional,” and that “[t]he
mathematical ‘determining’ functions are merely applied by a generic
computer acting as a tool for implementing the functions that could be
performed the same way manually.” Ans. 4. According to the Examiner,
“[t]he additional elements are recited at a high level of generality and are
recited as performing generic receiving functions, such as storing and
receiving, routinely used in computer applications or merely apply the
abstract idea.” Final Act. 7.
Appellant argues that “the Examiner did not consider the
nonconventional and non-generic arrangement of the present claims.”
Appeal Br. 9. Appellant contends that the claims improve computer-related
technology because they allow computer performance not previously
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performable by a computer. Id. Instead, Appellant argues, they “recite a
series of mathematical relationships and rules to determine metrics for a new
product added to an existing product assortment,” which the Specification
“indicates [are] improvements in comparison to prior art solutions through
the use of a computer.” Id. at 9–10 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 27–28). According to
Appellant, “[t]he detailed present claims, all of which include a detailed
algorithm as well as specific steps, and all of which are not subject to any
prior art rejections, cannot be considered the mere claiming of a solution or
outcome.” Id. at 10. In the Reply, Appellant argues that “[t]he use of
individual active attributes to determine the metrics, as opposed to
aggregate attributes, is not conventional functionality, and no evidence has
been provided to support an allegation of conventionality.” Reply 3.
Appellant argues that this distinction was the reason that claims were
determined to be non-obvious over prior art. Id. at 4.
We agree with the Examiner. The Federal Circuit has held that
implementing an abstract idea using routine, conventional activities is
insufficient to transform the abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter,
even if the abstract idea was not previously employed in the art to which the
claims are directed. See Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 716. The Specification
describes the invention as implemented using generic, conventional
computing equipment, such as “a processor 22 coupled to bus 12 for
processing information,” which “may be any type of general or specific
purpose processor,” “a memory 14 for storing information and instructions
to be executed by processor 22,” which may be RAM, ROM, or “any other
type of computer readable media,” “a communication device 20, such as a
network interface card,” and “a display 24, such as a Liquid Crystal Display
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(‘LCD’).” Spec. ¶¶ 11–14. The Specification describes the conventional
components as performing conventional functions. Id. ¶ 15 (“memory 14
stores software modules that provide functionality when executed by
processor 22”). We find that the additional elements (processor and
instructions for receiving data and performing calculations), when
considered individually or as part of the claim as a whole, do not recite an
inventive concept.
In sum, the limitations of claim 1, considered individually and in
combination, do not provide an inventive concept. For the same reasons, the
limitations of claims 8 and 15 do not provide an inventive concept.

VI. Dependent Claims 2–7, 9–14, and 16–20
The Examiner finds that “[t]he additional claims describe the types of
attributes and metric values, define the mean function, determine forecasts,
transmit or provide the means and describe the new and previous items,” and
merely “narrow the above identified judicial exception and do not transform
the claims into a patent eligible invention.” Final Act. 8. Appellant does not
provide separate arguments for the dependent claims.
We agree with the Examiner. The dependent claims merely refine the
attributes, metric values, and items (claims 2, 3, 7, 9, 10, 14, 16, 17); refine
the mathematical equations (claims 4, 5, 11, 12, 18, 19); and provide output
to a retail planning system (claims 6, 13, 20). None of these additional
limitations integrates the abstract ideas into a practical application or
provides an inventive concept.

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VII. Conclusion
We sustain the rejection of claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

CONCLUSION
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § References(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–20 101 Eligibility 1–20

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED