Mineola Ford Sales

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 30, 1981

258 N.L.R.B. 406 (N.L.R.B. 1981)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Mineola Ford Sales, Ltd. and Local 810, Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America. Cases
29-CA-7716 and 29-CA-8117
September 30, 1981
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND
ZIMMERMAN
On December 19, 1980, Administrative Law
Judge D. Barry Morris issued the attached Deci-
sion in this proceeding. Thereafter, the General
Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief,
and Respondent filed cross-exceptions and a sup-
porting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find-
ings,I and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge only to the extent consistent herewith and to
adopt his recommended Order as modified herein.
1. Respondent has excepted to the Administra-
tive Law Judge's finding that it unlawfully interro-
gated Bernard Africk in violation of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act by requesting Africk to supply it with
information concerning his interim employment
without providing the protections mandated by
Johnnie's Poultry Co.2 We agree with Respondent
that its conduct did not violate the Act for the rea-
sons set forth below.
Africk was discharged by Respondent on De-
cember 28, 1979. On February 29, 1980, the Gener-
al Counsel issued a complaint against Respondent
alleging, inter alia, that Africk's discharge violated
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.3 On May 28, 1980, Re-
spondent's counsel sent Africk a letter requesting
that he submit information to Respondent each
week concerning his efforts to obtain new employ-
ment. In this regard, Respondent sought informa-
tion as to the dates of job applications, names of
firms to which applications were made, details of
the positions applied for, methods by which job
'The General Counsel has excepted to certain credibility findings
made by the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established
policy not to overrule an administrative law judge's resolutions with re-
spect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant
evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry
Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir.
1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for re-
versing his findings.
2 Johnnie's Poultry Co. and John Bishop Poultry Co., Successor, 146
NLRB 770 (1964).
' We adopt the Administrative Law Judge's finding that Africk's dis-
charge was not unlawful.
258 NLRB No. 52
leads were obtained, names and addresses of em-
ployers, hours worked, and amounts of earnings.
The letter further advised Africk:
In the event that you should fail to comply
with this request, your failure to do so will be
brought to the attention of the Administrative
Law Judge handling any possible backpay pro-
ceeding and a demand will be made at that
time for you to produce this information.
Africk did not respond to the letter.
The Administrative Law Judge concluded that
Respondent failed to observe the principles of
Johnnie's Poultry in that Respondent did not advise
Africk that his participation in furnishing this infor-
mation was on a voluntary basis. He also noted
that the letter contained no assurances against re-
prisals and that the inquiry was not made in a con-
text free of employer hostility to union organiza-
tion.
Contrary to the Administrative Law Judge, we
find that Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(1)
in this instance. Africk was "interrogated" not
about his union or other concerted protected activ-
ities, but rather about matters of legitimate concern
to Respondent in connection with its possible back-
pay liability. Of course Africk may not have been
under any obligation to comply with the request, at
least until the backpay stage of the proceeding-as-
suming the case progressed to such a proceeding.
Nevertheless the lack of any obligation to comply,
under the circumstances here, is not sufficient to
make the request for information violative of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act. In reaching this conclusion,
we note that the instant case is distinguishable from
our recent decision in W. W Grainger, Inc., 255
NLRB 1106 (1981). There we concluded that the
interrogation of an alleged discriminatee by a re-
spondent's attorney after the discharge and filing of
charges clearly related to the former employee's
union activity while working for the company. In
the instant case, Respondent's alleged unlawful in-
terrogation did not pertain to Africk's involvement
in conduct protected by Section 7 of the Act. Ac-
cordingly, we shall dismiss this allegation of the
complaint. 4
2. Additionally, the Administrative Law Judge
found that in late October 1979 Joseph Vavaro,
Respondent's general manager, accused then-em-
ployee Africk of "bad mouthing" the Company.
Africk replied that he was not "bad mouthing" Re-
spondent and then asked what owner David Rapp
' Member Zimmerman concurs in this result for the reasons stated in
his dissent in W W Grainger, Inc.. supra.
406
MINEOLA FORD SALES
had against him. Vavaro responded: "It's your as-
sociation with the Union."
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed this
8(a)(1) allegation, apparently because he concluded
Vavaro's remark did not constitute a sufficiently
explicit threat. Contrary to the Administrative Law
Judge, we find that Vavaro's remark violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act. It is clear from the record
that the reference to Africk's "association with the
Union" related to his activities in serving as shop
steward and as a member of the Union's negotiat-
ing team. Only 3 weeks prior to this incident,
Africk had refused Respondent's request that he
cross the picket line established by another bargain-
ing unit of Respondent's employees who also are
represented by the Union. In the circumstances
present here, we find that Vavaro's statement clear-
ly indicated that Africk was in disfavor with man-
agement because of his union activity, and that
management would "hold it against" Africk. Ac-
cordingly, we conclude the remark constituted a
veiled threat of reprisal for Africk's involvement in
union activities. 5
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Substitute the following for Conclusion of Law
3:
"3. By threatening employees with reprisals for
their involvement in union activities, Respondent
has interfered with restrained, and coerced its em-
ployees in violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act."
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modi-
fied below, and hereby orders that the Respondent,
Mineola Ford Sales, Ltd., Mineola, New York, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take
the action set forth in the said recommended
Order, as so modified:
1. Substitute the following for paragraph l(a):
"(a) Threatening employees with reprisals for
their involvement in union activities."
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
' See, e.g., Inter-Polymer Industries, Inc., 196 NLRB 729, 735-736
(1972).
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all sides had an opportu-
nity to present evidence and state their positions,
the National Labor Relations Board found that we
have violated the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, and has ordered us to post this notice.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with re-
prisals for their involvement in union activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act.
MINEOLA FORD SALES, LTD.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
D. BARRY MORRIS, Administrative Law Judge: This
case was heard in Brooklyn, New York, on July 31 and
August 1, 1980. Charges were filed on January 18 and
June 26, 1980, and a complaint was issued on February
29 and amended July 18, 1980, alleging that Mineola
Ford Sales, Ltd. (Respondent), violated Section 8(a)(1)
and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended
(the Act). Respondent filed an answer denying the com-
mission of the alleged unfair labor practices.
The parties were given full opportunity to participate,
produce evidence, examine and cross-examine witnesses,
argue orally, and file briefs. Briefs were filed by the
General Counsel and Respondent.'
Upon the entire record of the case, including my ob-
servation of the witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Respondent, a New York corporation, with its princi-
pal office and place of business in Mineola, New York, is
engaged in the retail sale and distribution of new and
used automobiles and related products and services.
During the 12 months preceding issuance of the com-
plaint, Respondent's gross revenues were in excess of
$500,000. During the same period, Respondent purchased
goods valued in excess of 50,000 from points outside
New York for sale at its facility in Mineola. Respondent
admits that it is engaged in commerce within the mean-
ing of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act, and I so find.
'The General Counsel attached as Appendix A to his brief a copy of a
decertification petition in Case 29-RD-328. Respondent filed a motion to
strike Appendix A and the General Counsel filed an opposition. Upon
due consideration, Respondent's motion to strike is hereby denied
407
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Local 810, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America (the
Union), is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Issues
The amended complaint alleges that Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by depriving cer-
tain employees of commission wages for union activities,
by threatening to discharge and discharging an employee
for union activities, and by demanding that an employee
furnish Respondent with information concerning his ef-
forts to obtain employment following his discharge. Re-
spondent denied the allegations. The issues thus are: (1)
were certain employees deprived of commission wages
because of union activities; (2) was an employee threat-
ened to be discharged and discriminatorily discharged
for having engaged in union activities; and (3) was a re-
quest for information concerning the discharged employ-
ee's efforts to obtain employment a violation of the Act.
B. Discussion
1. Background
On or about April 2, 1979, David Rapp purchased the
assets of an automobile dealership, Mineola Ford, Inc.,
and changed the name of the company to Mineola Ford
Sales, Ltd. As president of Respondent, Rapp continued
to employ the former Mineola Ford employees. Among
the salesmen on the payroll on April 22 were Bernard
Africk and Charles Schlessinger. Africk and Schlessinger
were both used-car salesmen and Africk was shop ste-
ward.
Prior to Rapp's purchase of the dealership, the sales-
men and shop employees were covered under collective-
bargaining agreements with the Union. Rapp agreed to
honor both collective-bargaining agreements then in
effect.
On or about October 1, when the collective-bargaining
agreements expired, the shop employees went out on
strike for approximately 3 days. Africk and Schlessinger
refused to cross the picket line.
On December 29, without stating a reason, Respond-
ent's sales manager orally discharged Africk. Thereafter,
on May 28, 1980, counsel for Respondent sent a letter to
Africk requesting detailed information concerning his ef-
forts to locate employment. Africk did not respond to
the letter.
2. Commission wages
The complaint alleges that Respondent deprived
Africk and Schlessinger of commission wages to which
they were entitled by referring customers to other sales-
men. The complaint further alleges that this was done
because Africk was the shop steward for the Union, be-
2 Unless otherwise specified dates refer to 1979.
cause Africk and Schlessinger joined in a strike in Octo-
ber, and because they joined and assisted the Union.
The testimony indicates that certain changes occurred
when Rapp took over the dealership. Thus, Schlessinger
testified that after April he was not able to determine the
amount of his commission in all cases because he was not
told what the "car came in for." Similarly, Africk testi-
fied that after Rapp took over the dealership he was not
able to compute the amount of his commission because
he was not told what the car cost. Rapp testified that it
was his policy not to disclose the cost of the used car to
the salesmen. He explained this policy as follows:
There is a very good reason for that, and it's
how I always work it all my years of doing busi-
ness.
What happens, if the salesman knows the com-
mission on one car is going to be less than the other
car, naturally he's going to sell the more-the car
he can get the more-the most commission, and
you wind up with all stale inventory.
And, by the time you are done, you are finished
because . . . they will not sell the cars with the low
commissions.
Africk also testified that after April telephone inquiries
concerning purchases of automobiles were handled on a
different basis. He stated that "after Mr. Rapp took over,
calls for used cars . . . were few and far between, there
could have been days that we never received an in-
quiry."
In addition, Africk testified that he complained to
Rapp that the latter's brother, Jonathan Rapp, a new-car
salesman, was permitted to sell used cars. Africk testified
that he told Rapp that he was unable to make a living
with Rapp's brother selling used cars. Rapp replied that
"it was his business and he would do what he wanted."
Another complaint was that Rapp changed the proce-
dures followed by Mineola Ford, Inc., by permitting an
outside salesman to sell cars. Rapp testified that the out-
side salesman, known in the industry as a "bird dog,"
was Randy Renchaw, whom Rapp had been doing busi-
ness with since 1972 or 1973. Renchaw brought custom-
ers to the dealership from outside the dealer's normal
selling territory.
In support of the allegation, the General Counsel states
that Africk and Schlessinger were the only salesmen to
honor the shop employees' strike and were both mem-
bers of the union contract negotiating team which met at
the beginning of October. The General Counsel further
states that, by reducing the number of customers referred
to Africk and Schlessinger, Respondent "in effect re-
duced their earnings in reprisal for their support of the
Union."
The General Counsel has not shown that the changes
which took place were in "reprisal" for Africk's and
Schlessinger's support of the Union or indeed in any way
related to their union activities. The changes which took
place were instituted long before the strike or negotiating
session in October. Thus, as previously discussed, the
change in disclosing costs occurred in April, after Rapp
purchased the dealership. Similarly, changes with respect
408
MINEOLA FORD SALES
to telephone inquiries, outside salesmen, and sales of used
cars by new-car salesmen were changes in policy effect-
ed by Rapp after he took over the dealership. There is
no evidence that these changes were instituted to ad-
versely affect only Africk and Schlessinger. On the con-
trary, the evidence is that these were companywide
changes in policy, affecting all salesmen alike, which
took place upon Rapp's purchase of the dealership.
As detailed above, the evidence does not sustain the
allegation that Africk and Schlessinger were deprived of
commission wages because Africk was shop steward, be-
cause Africk and Schlessinger refused to cross the picket
line in October, and because they joined and assisted the
Union. Accordingly, the allegation is dismissed.
3. Discharge of Africk
The complaint alleges that on or about December 28
Respondent discharged Africk because he was the shop
steward for the Union, because he joined in a strike in
October, and because he joined and assisted the Union.
Respondent contends, on the other hand, that Africk was
discharged because of his uncooperative attitude, his be-
havior towards customers, and his poor sales perform-
ance.
The Board has recently restated the test to be applied
in so-called "mixed motive" cases. Wright Line, a Divi-
sion of Wright Line, Inc., 251 NLRB 1083 (1980). The
Board requires that the General Counsel make a prima
facie showing sufficient to support the inference that pro-
tected conduct was a motivating factor in the employer's
decision. Once this is established, the burden shifts to the
employer to demonstrate that the "same action would
have taken place even in the absence of the protected
conduct."
It is necessary to examine certain established elements
to determine whether the General Counsel has made a
prima facie showing that Africk's union activity was a
motivating factor in his discharge. These elements are
knowledge of union activity, animus, timing, and the va-
lidity of the reasons for the discharge.
Respondent clearly knew of Africk's union activity-
Africk was the shop steward and he was a member of
the contract negotiating team. With respect to Respond-
ent's attitude toward the Union, I credit Schlessinger's
testimony that Rapp stated "he didn't have any use for
the Union, he didn't care what they had to say." Africk
testified in a similar vein.
Concerning "timing," the nexus between Africk's dis-
charge and his union activities becomes more difficult.
Africk was shop steward as early as April and his union
activities commenced at that time, yet he was not dis-
charged until December 28. Similarly, Africk's refusal to
cross the picket line occurred almost 3 months prior to
his discharge.
The main area of disagreement between the parties re-
lates to the reasons for the discharge. The General Coun-
sel contends that Africk was discharged for his union ac-
tivities. Thus, Africk credibly testified that during the
strike Rapp "asked me to go back to work." The testi-
mony continued:
Q. What did you respond?
A. My response was that I was a union man and
I would not cross the picket line.
Q. What happened then?
A. At that point he told me to turn in my demon-
strator.
Q. What is a demonstrator?
A. A demonstrator is an automobile that's part of
the salesman's tools.
Q. What did you respond?
A. My response was I didn't have the automobile
with me at the time and I couldn't turn it in.
Q. What happened after that?
A. There was no other conversation.
Africk further testified that, approximately 3 weeks
after the strike, Vavaro, the sales manager, asked Africk
why he was "bad mouthing" Mineola Ford. Africk re-
sponded that he was not "bad mouthing" Mineola Ford
and asked what Rapp had "against" him. Africk testified
that Vavaro stated, "It's your association with the
Union."
Respondent argues that Africk was discharged because
of his uncooperative attitude, his behavior towards cus-
tomers, and his poor sales performance. Thus, Vavaro
testified that Africk was continually "bad mouthing" Re-
spondent. He stated:
I would hear from many, many sources; they would
come to me, because I was the manager, that he
was trying to discourage them, saying such things
as "this place won't last another week," "this place
won't last another month," "this place is too big,"
"other people have not been able to make it suc-
cessful," words to that effect.
Vavaro further testified, and I credit his testimony,
that he constantly had to remind Africk to put the lights
on and often had to remind Africk to wait on customers.
Rapp testified that Africk had a negative attitude and
was uncooperative with respect to moving cars on the
lot. Indeed, Africk corroborated this testimony, stating
that he "refused the order" to detail automobiles, clean
trunks, clean up tires and move cars.
Finally, Rapp credibly testified that he decided to dis-
charge Africk because of losses in his business and be-
cause of Africk's low sales performance. Rapp testified
as follows:
Q. At the time you terminated Mr. Africk, had
you decided to reduce the staff in the used car lot?
A. I had to reduce my overhead, and my losses
were quite heavy up to this point, and I just had to
do something to-for my own survival.
Q. Did you reduce the salesmen?
A. Yes. I reduced it from two to one.
Rapp further testified:
Q. Can you explain once again why you fired
Mr. Africk?
A. It's a combination of things; low sales per-
formance mainly.
409
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Based on the record, I find that the General Counsel
has not made a prima facie showing that protected con-
duct was a motivating factor in Respondent's decision to
discharge Africk. Respondent had been aware of Africk's
union activities for many months prior to his discharge.
Africk had been involved in union activities and was
shop steward for 9 months prior to his discharge and his
refusal to cross the picket line occurred approximately 3
months prior to his discharge.
Concerning Africk's role as shop steward, his activities
were minimal. From April until Africk's discharge no
grievances were brought by Africk nor were any re-
quests for arbitration filed.
While Africk testified that Rapp asked him to go back
to work during the strike, no adverse action was taken
when Africk refused to cross the picket line. Thus, even
though Rapp requested that Africk turn in his demon-
strator, when Africk failed to do so, no further steps
were taken by Rapp.3
Rather than Africk's union activity being a motivating
factor in Africk's discharge, I find that the motivating
factors in Africk's discharge were his uncooperative atti-
tude, his low sales performance, and Respondent's heavy
losses and requirement to reduce overhead.4 It follows
that the General Counsel has not sustained his burden of
proving that Africk's discharge was violative of the Act.
Accordingly, such allegation is dismissed.5
4. Request for information
On May 28, 1980, Respondent's counsel wrote to
Africk concerning the instant proceeding. The letter
stated that as a result of this proceeding "there may be a
claim for backpay on your behalf." The letter requested
that Africk file information, on a weekly basis, relating
to his efforts to obtain employment. The information re-
quested included dates of job applications, names of firms
to which applications were made, details of positions ap-
plied for, methods by which "leads" were obtained,
names and addresses of employers, hours worked, and
amount of earnings. The letter further advised Africk:
In the event that you should fail to comply with
this request, your failure to do so will be brought to
the attention of the Administrative Law Judge han-
dling any possible backpay proceeding and a
a As noted previously, in a meeting between Africk and Vavaro in Oc-
tober, Africk asked what Rapp "has against me." The response was "it's
your association with the Union." Rapp's attitude towards the Union was
clear. In August he had told Schlessinger that "he didn't have any use
for the Union." Yet, Africk was not discharged until December 28. 1 find
that the General Counsel has not made a showing that Respondent's dis-
like for the Union was a motivating factor in Africk's discharge.
I Even were it argued that the General Counsel has made a prima facie
showing that protected activity was a motivating factor in Africk's dis-
charge, I find that because of the factors discussed above. viz, Africk's
attitude, sales performance, and Respondent's requirement to reduce
overhead, the discharge would have taken place "even in the absence of
the protected conduct." Wright Line, Inc., supra, 251 NLRB 1083.
s The complaint also alleges that Respondent threatened its employees
with discharge and other reprisals if they became or remained union
members, and if they gave any assistance and support to it. The only evi-
dence cited by the General Counsel to support this allegation is Vavaro's
response to Africk, referred to above, "It's your association with the
Union." I find no evidence of threats to discharge or other reprisals in
the record. Accordingly, the allegation is dismissed.
demand will be made at that time for you to pro-
duce this information.
While an employer may have a legitimate interest in
securing information concerning an alleged discrimina-
tee's interim employment efforts to defend itself in a
backpay proceeding, the employer is not privileged to
seek such information in a manner which may tend to re-
strain or coerce employees from participating in Board
procecdings as alleged discriminatees.
Although the Board permits interrogation under cer-
tain circumstances, the Board has established specific
safeguards to minimize the coercive impact of such em-
ployer interrogation. These safeguards were spelled out
in Johnnie's Poultry Co., 146 NLRB 770, 775 (1964), en-
forcement denied on other grounds 334 F.2d 617 (8th
Cir. 1965): 6
[T]he employer must communicate to the em-
ployee the purpose of the questioning, assure him
that no reprisal will take place, and obtain his par-
ticipation on a voluntary basis; the questioning must
occur in a context free from employer hostility to
union organization and must not be itself coercive
in nature; and the questions must not exceed the ne-
cessities of the legitimate purpose by prying into
other union matters, eliciting information concern-
ing an employee's subjective state of mind, or other-
wise interfering with the statutory rights of employ-
ees. When an employer transgresses the boundaries
of these safeguards, he loses the benefits of the
privilege.
Respondent did not observe all of the safeguards.
Thus, Respondent failed to advise Africk that his partici-
pation in furnishing the information was on a voluntary
basis. To the contrary, Respondent's warning that
Africk's failure to comply "will be brought to the atten-
tion of the Administrative Law Judge" would seem to
imply that Africk was required to supply the information
and that possible sanctions would accrue for failure to
comply. 7
Accordingly, because the request for information was
made without observing all of the safeguards established
by the Board, I find that the request for information was
coercive and conclude that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(l) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the
Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By interrogating an employee without providing the
necessary safeguards, Respondent has engaged in an
6 See also Tamper, Inc., 207 NLRB 907, 936-937 (1973), enfd. 522 F.2d
781 (4th Cir. 1975).
7 In addition, the letter contained no assurances against reprisals, and,
in view of Respondent's attitude towards the Union, did not "occur in a
context free of employer hostility to union organization."
410
MINEOLA FORD SALES
unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practice affects commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
5. Respondent did not violate the Act in any other
manner alleged in the complaint.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in an
unfair labor practice, I find it necessary to order Re-
spondent to cease and desist therefrom and to take cer-
tain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies
of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER 8
The Respondent, Mineola Ford Sales, Ltd., Mineola,
New York, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
"In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the find-
ings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in
Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto
shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
(a) Interrogating its employees in a manner interfering
with the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them under Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its facility in Mineola, New York, copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix." 9 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 29, after being duly signed by Respondent's au-
thorized representative, shall be posted by Respondent
immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by
it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by Respondent to insure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 29, in
writing, within 20 days of the date of this Order, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that those allegations of the
complaint as to which no violations have been found are
hereby dismissed.
9 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
411