Milwaukee Electric Tool Corporation

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 22, 2021

2020000477 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 22, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/378,455 08/13/2014 Scott Schneider 066042-8442-US01 1317
60840 7590 01/22/2021
MICHAEL, BEST & FRIEDRICH LLP (MT)
790 N WATER ST
SUITE 2500
MILWAUKEE, WI 53202
EXAMINER
MCDANIEL, TYNESE V
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2859
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/22/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
MKEIPDOCKET@MICHAELBEST.COM
milwaukeeip@milwaukeetool.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte SCOTT SCHNEIDER, JAMES S. HULL,
JAY ROSENBECKER, and COLE A. CONRAD

Appeal 2020-000477
Application 14/378,455
Technology Center 2800
____________

Before TERRY J. OWENS, N. WHITNEY WILSON, and
MICHAEL G. McMANUS, Administrative Patent Judges.

McMANUS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 seeks review of the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 3, 5–9, 11–17, 19, 21–23, and 25–27.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm in part.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as
Milwaukee Electric Tool Corporation. Appeal Brief dated April 15, 2019
(“Appeal Br.”) 2.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER

The present application generally relates to a battery charger that
includes multiple charging ports. Specification dated Aug. 13, 2014
(“Spec.”) ¶¶ 2–3. Figure 1 of the Drawings is reproduced below.

Figure 1 depicts “a multi-bay battery charger 10 that is configured to support
and charge multiple battery packs.” Id. ¶ 20.

The charger may include a skip switch operable to skip a battery pack
being charged and advance to another battery pack. Id. ¶ 4. The skip switch
includes a manual actuator that allows a user to advance to the next battery
pack in line. Id. ¶ 32.
Claims 1 and 13 are illustrative of the subject matter on appeal and are
reproduced below with certain limitations bolded for emphasis:
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1. A battery charger comprising:
a housing;
a plurality of charging ports coupled to the housing, each
charging port configured to connect a battery pack to the battery
charger;
a charging circuit positioned within the housing and
electrically coupled to the plurality of charging ports, the
charging circuit operable to charge the battery packs connected
to the plurality of charging ports in series; and
a skip switch coupled to the charging circuit, the skip
switch including a manual actuator, the skip switch being
operable to select which battery pack is to be charged,
wherein the charging circuit is operable to skip a
battery pack currently being charged before charging is
complete and advance to another battery pack connected to
the battery charger in response to the skip switch being
actuated.

13. A battery charger comprising:
a housing including an upper surface and a handle to
facilitate lifting and carrying the battery charger, the handle
extending from and positioned above the upper surface;
a plurality of charging ports coupled to the housing, each
charging port configured to connect a battery pack to the battery
charger;
a charging circuit positioned within the housing and
electrically coupled to the plurality of charging ports, the
charging circuit operable to charge the battery packs connected
to the plurality of charging ports; and
an indicator light coupled to the charging circuit and
associated with one of the plurality of charging ports, the
indicator light being supported on the upper surface
beneath the handle and within a footprint defined by a
perimeter of the handle;
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wherein the plurality of charging ports is spaced apart on
the housing such that, when a battery pack is connected to each
charging port, the battery charger is balanced around the
handle.
Appeal Br. 26, 27 (Claims App.) (emphasis added).
REFERENCES
The Examiner relies upon the following prior art:
Name Reference Date
Lear US 3,507,501 April 21, 1970
Lavan US 5,357,624 Oct. 18, 1994
Shum US 6,710,577 Bl Mar. 23, 2004
Stava et al. (“Stava”) US 6,818,860 Bl Nov.16, 2004
Crowell US 2005/0275372 Al Dec. 15, 2005
Bublitz et al. US 2006/0113956 Al Jun. 1, 2006
Krieger et al. (“Krieger”) US 2007/0285049 Al Dec. 13, 2007
Boyles et al. (“Boyles”) US 2010/0060232 Al Mar. 11, 2010
Zhou US 2013/0050926 Al Feb. 28, 2013
Sony Battery Charger BC-L160 Operation Manual, 1st ed. (2008) (“Sony
Manual” or “the Sony Manual”)

REJECTIONS
The Examiner maintains the following rejections:
1. Claims 1, 3, 5, and 7–9, 11, and 12 are rejected under pre-AIA
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Boyles in view
of Lear. Final Action dated August 22, 2019 (“Final Act.”)
3–13.
2. Claim 6 is rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Boyles in view of Lear and further in view
of Stava. Id. at 13–15.
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3. Claims 13–16, and 19 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over the Sony Manual in view
of Kreiger. Id. at 15–18.
4. Claim 17 is rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over the Sony Manual in view of Kreiger
and further in view of Shum. Id. at 18–19.
5. Claim 21 is rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over the Sony Manual in view of Kreiger and
further in view of Shum and Boyles. Id. at 19–20.
6. Claims 22 and 23 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. §
103(a) as being unpatentable over Boyles in view of Zhou and
Lavan. Id. at 20–22.
7. Claim 25 is rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Boyles in view of Zhou and further
in view of Lavan and Crowell. Id. at 22–23.
8. Claim 26 is rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Boyles in view of Zhou and further
in view of Lavan and Shum. Id. at 23–24.
9. Claim 27 is rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Boyles in view of the Sony Manual
and further in view of Bublitz, Zhou, Lavan, and Lear. Id. at
24–32.

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DISCUSSION
Rejection 1. The Examiner rejects claims 1, 3, 5, and 7–9, 11, and 12
as obvious over Boyles in view of Lear. Id. at 3–13. In support of the
rejection, the Examiner finds that Boyles teaches a skip switch. Id. at 6.
The Examiner cites to Boyles’ teaching regarding skipping from a battery
undergoing a maintenance charge to a battery pack requiring a fast charge.
Id. Boyles teaches as follows:
While performing the maintenance charge, the battery
charger 20 continuously checks for the insertion of a new
battery pack (step 190). If a new battery pack is inserted into a
charging port 25, the battery charger 20 returns to step 110,
shown in FIG. 4, and begins cycling through the charging ports
25 to determine if any of the battery packs inserted into the
charging ports 25 require fast-charging.

Boyles ¶ 46.
The Examiner concedes, however, that Boyles does not teach that the
skip switch includes a manual actuator. Final Act. 7. The Examiner relies on
Lear as teaching a manual actuator allowing a user to over-ride a current
function and to select a desired function. Id. Lear teaches a magnetic tape
player that includes a manual track selector capable of overriding the automatic
end-of-track shifting, resulting in a track shifting step by the cam that permits
rapid scanning or selection of recorded material. Lear col. 5:12–18.
The Examiner finds that a person of ordinary skill in the art would
have had reason to incorporate the manual actuator of Lear with the battery
charger of Boyles in order to allow operator to select the desired battery pack
to charge and over-ride a current battery charging function. Final Act. 8.
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Appellant argues that the rejection is in error. Appeal Br. 8–14.
Appellant argues that Boyles’ switching module 60 is activated by the
controller 50 in response to an insertion of a battery pack or the completion
of a fast charge. Id. at 9. As a result, Appellant argues, “Boyles fails to
teach or suggest a skip switch that is operable to select which battery is to be
charged, let alone that is operable to skip a battery pack currently being
charged before charging is complete in response to the skip switch being
activated.” Id.
This is not persuasive. Claim 1 requires “the charging circuit is
operable to skip a battery pack currently being charged before charging is
complete and advance to another battery pack connected to the battery
charger in response to the skip switch being actuated.” Appeal Br. 26
(Claims App.). The “battery pack currently being charged” limitation reads
on Boyles’ battery pack undergoing a maintenance charge, Boyles ¶ 46. The
“advance to another battery pack” limitation reads on Boyles’ teaching to
halt the maintenance charge and begin a fast charge on a different battery
pack, id. The “skip switch being activated” reads on Boyles’ teaching that
insertion of a new battery pack causes the battery to return to step 110 of
Figure 4 and begin “cycling through the charging ports 25 to determine if
any of the battery packs inserted into the charging ports 25 require fast-
charging,” id. Insertion of a battery pack that requires fast-charging
“activates” the skip switch. Accordingly, we do not find Appellant’s
argument outlined above persuasive of error.
Appellant further argues that the manual actuator mechanism of Lear
“is entirely different from and not applicable to battery charging.” Appeal
Br. 9. Appellant asserts that Lear does not teach how a person of ordinary
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skill in the art would skip a battery being charged based on an audio cassette
track selector. Id.
In the Answer, the Examiner asserts that the rejection does not rely on
Lear to teach an actuator for skipping batteries being charged. Examiner’s
Answer dated August 22, 2019 (“Ans.”) 13. Rather, the rejection relies on
Lear’s teaching of “the skip switch including a manual actuator.” Id. at 13,
14.
Appellant’s argument is not persuasive of error. “It is well-established
that a determination of obviousness based on teachings from multiple
references does not require an actual, physical substitution of elements. . . .
Rather, the test for obviousness is what the combined teachings of the
references would have suggested to those having ordinary skill in the art.” In
re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1332–33 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Here, the Examiner
finds that use of a manual actuator to override a current function in favor of a
desired function “is old and well known.” Final Act. 7. The Examiner cites
Lear as an example and finds that the combined teachings of Boyles and Lear
would have suggested manual actuation of the skip switch. The Examiner’s
finding that one of skill in the art would have been able to implement a
manual actuator in a battery charger is consistent with precedent. See KSR
Int’l v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007) (“if a technique has been used
to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would
recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the
technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.”).
Appellant additionally argues that the Examiner has not stated an
adequate reason why one of ordinary skill in the art would have modified
Boyles based on the teachings of Lear to achieve the claimed invention.
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Appeal Br. 9–10. Appellant argues that Lear’s teachings pertain to cassette
players and that “the Examiner has merely provided an arbitrary rationale to
support the combination.” Id. at 10. Appellant asserts that “the Examiner
has gleaned information from the Appellant’s own specification in order to
supply a conclusory rationale for combining Boyles and Lear.” Id.
Appellant seems to argue that the stated reason to combine, to permit
a user to select the battery to be charged (Final Act. 8), is derived from the
Specification. This is insufficient to show error. Precedent teaches that
[a]ny judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a
reconstruction based upon hindsight reasoning, but so long as it
takes into account only knowledge which was within the level
of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made
and does not include knowledge gleaned only from applicant's
disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper.

In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1313–14 (CCPA 1971). Here, the
Examiner has adequately shown that the manual actuator is taught by the
prior art – not “gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure.” Accordingly, we
determine that Appellant has not shown reversible error with regard to the
rejection of claim 1.
Appellant relies on these arguments, or substantially identical
arguments, in asserting that the rejection of claims 3, 5, 7–9, 11, and 12 is
erroneous. Appeal Br. 10–14. As we find such arguments not to be
persuasive, we determine that Appellant has not shown reversible error in
regard to the rejection of claims 1, 3, 5, 7–9, 11, and 12.

Rejection 2. The Examiner rejects claim 6 as obvious over Boyles in
view of Lear and further in view of Stava. Final Act. 13–15. Appellant
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relies on the same arguments advanced in regard to claim 1 in arguing that
the rejection of claim 6 should be reversed. Appeal Br. 11. As we find such
arguments not to be persuasive, we determine that Appellant has not shown
reversible error in regard to the rejection of claim 6.

Rejection 3. The Examiner rejects claims 13–16 and 19 as obvious
over the Sony Manual in view of Kreiger. Final Act. 15–18. The Examiner
finds that the Sony Manual teaches a battery charger having a housing with
an upper surface and a handle positioned above the upper surface. Id. at 15.
The Examiner further finds that the Sony Manual teaches that the battery
charger includes charge indicator lights. Id. at 16. The Examiner finds,
however, that the Sony Manual does not teach that the indicator lights are
“supported on the upper surface beneath the handle and within a footprint
defined by a perimeter of the handle” as required by claim 1. Id. at 17.
The Examiner finds that Figure 1 of Krieger teaches a charger with
indicator lights supported on the upper surface beneath, and within the
footprint of, the handle. Id. Figure 1 of Krieger is reproduced below.
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Figure 1 is a perspective view of an embodiment of a portable jump starter.
Krieger ¶ 9. Figure 1 depicts charging port 19 (id. ¶ 14), receptacle 26 (id. ¶
15), and indicator lights 64 “to show the status of the . . . portable batteries
being charged” (id. ¶ 24).
Appellant argues that Krieger “does not explicitly show or describe
the positioning of the set of indicator light 64.” Appeal Br. 16. Rather,
Appellant argues, “Krieger merely discloses indicator lights 64 positioned
on an angled surface, but fails to mention or suggest the indicator light being
positioned within a footprint defined by a perimeter of the handle.” Id.
In the Answer, the Examiner reiterates that Figure 1 of Krieger
“shows indicator light 64 being supported on the upper surface beneath the
handle and within a footprint defined by a perimeter of the handle.” Ans.
21.
In its Reply Brief, Appellant argues that Krieger is silent as to whether
the indicator lights are within the footprint of the handle. Reply Brief dated
Oct. 22, 2019 (“Reply Br.”) 5.
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As persons of scientific competence in the fields in which they work,
examiners are responsible for making findings, informed by their scientific
knowledge, as to the meaning of prior art references to persons of ordinary
skill in the art. In re Berg, 320 F.3d 1310, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Absent
legal error or contrary factual evidence, those findings can establish a prima
facie case of obviousness. Id. Here, the Examiner finds that Krieger’s
indicator lights are located within the footprint of the perimeter of the
handle. This finding is reasonably supported by Krieger’s Figure 1, supra.
Appellant has not shown error in such finding. Accordingly, we determine
that Appellant has not shown reversible error with respect to the rejection of
claims 13–16 and 19.

Rejection 4. The Examiner rejects claim 17 as obvious over the Sony
Manual in view of Krieger and further in view of Shum. Final Act. 18–19.
Claim 17 depends from claim 13 and further requires that “the
housing includes four side surfaces arranged in a generally rectangular
pattern, and wherein at least one charging port is positioned on each side
surface.” Appeal Br. 28 (Claims App.).
In support of the rejection, the Examiner finds that the Sony Manual
teaches a battery charger where the housing has four side surfaces arranged
in a generally rectangular pattern. Final Act. 18. The Examiner further
finds that Shum teaches a battery charger where at least one charging port is
positioned on each side surface. Id. (citing Shum, Figure 1). Figure 1 of
Shum is reproduced below.
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Figure 1 of Shum depicts battery charger 10 including means for
individually mounting four rechargeable batteries within recesses 36, 38, 40,
and 42. Shum col. 3:22–23, 3:45–47.
The Examiner determines that one of ordinary skill in the art would
have been led to modify the Sony battery charger to include at least one
charging port positioned on each side surface in order to permit the even
spacing of the battery packs and thereby promote cooling. Id. at 19. In
support of such reasoning, the Examiner cites to Shum’s teaching that “[t]he
pairs of contacts 86 and 88 of which there may be, for example four pairs,
are evenly spaced . . . . Thus the batteries 90 are substantially exposed and
spaced apart for cooling whilst being charged.” Id. (citing Shum col. 4:8–
14).
Appellant argues that “Shum discloses a base for four rechargeable
batteries including recesses (36, 38, 40, and 42) open to a top surface 22 and
to a respective side surface (24, 26, 28, and 30) of the base 11.” Appeal Br.
16 (emphasis in original). Appellant appears to argue against Shum
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individually rather than against the Examiner’s proposed combination. The
test for obviousness, however, is whether the combination of references,
taken as a whole, would have suggested the patentee’s invention to a person
having ordinary skill in the art. In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091,
1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Accordingly, Appellant has not shown reversible
error in the rejection.

Rejection 5. The Examiner rejects claim 21 as obvious over the Sony
Manual in view of Krieger and further in view of Shum and Boyles. Final
Act. 19–20.
Claim 21 depends from claim 17 and further requires “the plurality of
charging ports includes six charging ports, wherein two of the four side
surfaces each support two charging ports, and wherein two of the four side
surfaces each support one charging port.” Appeal Br. 28 (Claims App.).
In support of the rejection, the Examiner finds as follows regarding
Boyles’ disclosure:
the plurality of charging ports includes six charging ports
([0008] of Boyles where embodiments of the invention provide
a multiport battery charger having, for example, six, four, or
two charging port), wherein two of the four side surfaces each
support two charging ports (See Fig.1 where each of the two
sides support two charging ports identified below), and wherein
two of the four side surfaces each support one charging port
(See Fig.1 where each of the two sides support one charging
ports identified below).

Final Act. 19.
Appellant argues that the rejection should be reversed. Appeal Br.
17–18. In reference to Boyles’ Figure 1, Appellant argues that Boyles
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teaches six charging ports on a top surface of a charger, not a side surface.
Id. at 17. Appellant further argues that, even if one reads Boyles as teaching
three ports on opposing side surfaces of Boyles’ charger, it still “fails to
teach or suggest that two of the four side surfaces support two charging ports
and wherein two of the four side surfaces each support one charging port.”
Id.
In the Answer, the Examiner produces an annotated version of
Boyles’ Figure 1, reproduced below, that purports to identify “two of four
sides.”

Ans. 25. The annotated figure does not identify “two of the four side
surfaces each support two charging ports, and wherein two of the four side
surfaces each support one charging port” as claimed.
We find Appellant’s argument to be persuasive of reversible error. At
most, Boyles teaches two sides with multiple charging ports. This is
insufficient to teach the full range of the claim. The Examiner has not
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provided a reasoned explanation why a person of ordinary skill in the art
would have modified Boyles’ arrangement of the charging ports so as to
satisfy the claimed arrangement.

Rejection 6. The Examiner rejects claims 22 and 23 as obvious over
Boyles in view of Zhou and further in view of Lavan. Final Act. 20–22.
Claim 22 is an independent claim that requires a charging circuit that
includes “a first circuit board and a second circuit board, the first and second
circuit boards being mounted in parallel within the housing and being
oriented such that a face of each of the first and second circuit boards is
generally perpendicular to the upper surface.” Appeal Br. 29 (Claims App.).
The Examiner relies on Boyles as teaching a battery charger including
a housing, charging ports, and a charging circuit. Final Act. 20. The
Examiner finds, however, that Boyles does not teach a charger with two
circuit boards oriented as claimed. Id. at 21. The Examiner looks to Zhou
as teaching the claimed circuit boards. Id.
The Examiner determines that one of ordinary skill in the art would
have had reason to combine the charging circuit of Zhou with the battery
charger of Boyles in order to “minimize and efficiently use housing space.”
Id. at 21. The Examiner relies on Lavan to evidence circuit boards installed
at “an approximately perpendicular orientation” so as to reduce the use of
space on a motherboard. Id. at 21–22; Lavan col. 1:55–68.
Appellant argues that the Examiner has not provided an adequate
rationale to combine the teachings of Boyles and Zhou. Appeal Br. 18–20.
Appellant argues that the cited art does not teach more efficient use of the
space within Boyles’ housing. Id. at 19. Appellant specifically argues that
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Zhou does not teach space saving and that one of skill in the art would not
recognize any space saving advantage from its teachings. Id. Appellant
argues that Lavan’s teachings are limited to the use of DRAM chips on a
perpendicular circuit board. Id. at 20.
Appellant’s arguments are persuasive of reversible error. An
Examiner must provide more than conclusory statements to support an
obviousness argument – “there must be some articulated reasoning with
some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (quoting In re Kahn, 441
F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Here, Zhou and Lavan concern the
conservation of space on a printed circuit board. Claim 22 requires that the
circuit boards be mounted perpendicular to the upper surface of the charger’s
housing. An upper surface of a housing differs from a surface of a printed
circuit board. The Examiner has not shown any rationale why one would
seek to minimize the footprint of the charging circuit on the upper housing.
Accordingly, the Examiner has not supplied an adequate rationale why a
person of ordinary skill in the art would have been led to mount the circuit
boards of the charging circuit perpendicular to the upper surface of the
housing.
As claim 23 depends from claim 22, this determination is applicable
thereto.

Rejections 7 and 8. The Examiner rejects claims 25 and 26 as
obvious over Boyles in view of Zhou, Lavan, and certain additional
references. Final Act. 22–24. Claims 25 and 26 each depend from claim 22.
As we have determined that the Appellant has shown error in the rejection of
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claim 22, and such deficiency is not ameliorated by the teachings of any
additional reference, we determine that the rejections of claims 25 and 26 are
reversibly erroneous.

Rejection 9. The Examiner rejects claim 27 as obvious over Boyles
in view of the Sony Manual, Bublitz, Zhou, Lavan, and Lear. Final Act. 24–
32. Claim 27 includes the “skip switch” limitation discussed in regard to
claim 1. See Appeal Br. 30 (Claims App.). The Examiner makes findings
regarding the “skip switch” limitation similar to those made in regard to
claim 1. Compare Final Act. 25–26 with id. 6–7. Appellant reiterates its
arguments regarding the “skip switch” limitation (compare Appeal Br. 8–9
with id. at 21–22) and regarding the Examiner’s stated reason to combine the
teachings of Boyles and Lear (compare id. at 9–10 with id. at 23–24).
As we have not found such arguments to be persuasive, supra, we
determine that Appellant has not shown reversible error with regard to the
rejection of claim 27.

CONCLUSION

The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1, 3, 5–9, 11–17, 19, and 27 are
affirmed. The Examiner’s rejections of claims 21–23, 25, and 26 are
reversed.

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In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 3, 5, 7–9,
11, 12
103(a) Boyles, Lear 1, 3, 5, 7–9,
11, 12

6 103(a) Boyles, Lear, Stava 6
13–16, 19 103(a) Sony Manual,
Krieger
13–16, 19
17 103(a) Sony Manual,
Krieger, Shum
17
21 103(a) Sony Manual,
Krieger, Shum,
Boyles
21
22, 23 103(a) Boyles, Zhou,
Lavan
22, 23
25 103(a) Boyles, Zhou,
Lavan, Crowell
25
26 103(a) Boyles, Zhou,
Lavan, Shum
26
27 Boyles, Sony
Manual, Bublitz,
Zhou, Lavan, Lear
27
Overall
Outcome
1, 3, 5–9,
11–17, 19,
27
21–23, 25,
26

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).

AFFIRMED IN PART