Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 2, 2020

14959938 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 2, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/959,938 12/04/2015 Jie Liu 335963.03 3352
69316 7590 07/02/2020
MICROSOFT CORPORATION
ONE MICROSOFT WAY
REDMOND, WA 98052
EXAMINER
CAO, PHUONG THAO
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2164
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/02/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
chriochs@microsoft.com
usdocket@microsoft.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte JIE LIU, SUMAN KUMAR NATH, JITENDRA D. PADHYE, and
LENIN RAVINDRANATH SIVALINGAM

Appeal 2019-006289
Application 14/959,938
Technology Center 2100

Before CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR., DAVID M. KOHUT, and
IRVIN E. BRANCH, Administrative Patent Judges.

PUR CURIAM, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–3, 5–14, 16–18, and 21–24.2 We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use “Appellant” to reference the applicant as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as “Microsoft
Technology Licensing, LLC.” Appeal Br. 2.
2 Claims 4, 15, 19, and 20 were previously cancelled.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s Invention
Appellant’s invention relates to a “deep application crawling
technique [that] crawls one or more applications, commonly referred to as
‘apps’, in order to extract information inside of them.” Spec., Abst.
Independent claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of argued subject
matter.
1. A computing system comprising:
at least one processor; and
memory that comprises instructions that, when executed by the
at least one processor, cause the at least one processor to
perform acts comprising:
responsive to receipt of a query from a mobile computing
device, executing a search over indexed data for content related
to the query, the indexed data that is searched over comprises
data extracted from within an application, the application is
available for download from a marketplace of applications,
wherein the data extracted from within the application
comprises at least one of:
data extracted from binary code of the application; or
data retrieved by the application from a web page when
the application was previously executed; and
based upon the search, providing search results to the mobile
computing device, the search results comprise the data
extracted from the application.
Appeal Br. 17 (Claims Appendix).
Independent claim 21, reproduced below, is also illustrative of argued
subject matter.
21. A mobile computing device comprising:
a processor; and
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memory storing instructions that, when executed by the
processor, cause the processor to perform acts comprising:
receiving a search query;
invoking a search by a search engine based on the
received search query, the search being over indexed data
for generating search results, wherein the indexed data
comprises data retrieved by the application from a web
page when the application was previously executed, the
application is configured to be executed on the mobile
computing device, the application available for download
from a marketplace of applications, and wherein the data
extracted from within the application is identified during
the search as being relevant to the query;
receiving the search results; and
responsive to receiving the search results, displaying an
indication that a search result in the search results
corresponds to the application when the application is
installed on the mobile computing device and a link to
download the application from the marketplace of
applications when the mobile computing device fails to
have the application installed thereon.
Appeal Br. 20 (Claims Appendix).
Rejections
Claims 1–3, 5, 8, 9, 11–14, and 18 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Macbeth (US 2012/0124062 A1;
May 17, 2012) and Wyatt (US 2012/0240236 A1; Sept. 20, 2012).
Final Act. 7–14.3

3 The statement of rejection (Final Act. 7) incorrectly lists claims 21–24 for
this rejection. Claims 21–24 are not addressed by the body of this rejection.
Final Act. 7–14. Claims 21–24 are addressed by the statement and body of
another rejection. Final Act. 19–23.
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Claims 6, 7, and 17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Macbeth, Wyatt, and Tuttle. Final Act. 14–17.
Claims 10 and 16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Macbeth, Wyatt, and Tullis (US 2012/0124028 A1;
May 17, 2012). Final Act. 17–19.
Claims 21–24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Macbeth and Tuttle (US 7,584,194 B2; Sept. 1, 2009). Final Act. 19–
23.
OPINION
Claims 1–3, 5, 9, 11–14, and 18; Representative Claim 1
Appellant argues claims 1–3, 5, 9, 11–14, and 18 with reference to
claim 1. Appeal Br. 7–11 (addressing claim 1), 12 (contending claim 11 is
allowable because its “features are similar to those recited in claim 1”), 14
(contending claims 2, 3, 5, 9, 12–14, and 18 “are allowable [because] of
their dependency” from claims 1 and 11). We agree claim 1 is
representative. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). For the following reasons,
we are unpersuaded of error in the rejection of claim 1 and accordingly
sustain the rejections of claims 1–3, 5, 9, 11–14, and 18.
Appellant contends the applied prior art does not teach or suggest the
following claim limitations:
executing a search over indexed data for content related to the
query, the indexed data that is searched over comprises data
extracted from within an application, the application is
available for download from a marketplace of applications,
wherein the data extracted from within the application
comprises at least one of data extracted from binary code of the
application; or data retrieved by the application from a web
page when the application was previously executed;

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Appeal Br. 7 (identifying the limitations), 10–13 (addressing Macbeth).
Appellant characterizes the above limitations as follows (strikethrough
added):
The features of claim 1 highlight that data in the index that is
searched over is extracted from within an application, wherein
the application is available for download from a marketplace of
applications, and further wherein the data extracted from within
the application includes at least one of: 1) data extracted from
binary code of the application; or 2) data retrieved by the
application from a web page when the application was
previously executed.
Appeal Br. 8.
In asserting all the above features against the rejection of claim 1 (as
“highlighted features . . . not suggested by the cited references of record”
(id. at 7–8)), Appellant argues the first italicized limitation against a
reference (Tuttle)4 unapplied in the rejection and neglects the second
italicized limitation is an alternative feature (see Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure § 2173.05(h), “Alternative Limitations”) unaddressed
by the rejection. We accordingly consider only the non-italicized limitation
in our analysis for claim 1.

4 The Final Action states, in the “Response to Arguments” section, that the
first struck-through feature (and, specifically, the above block-quoted
limitations (supra 4)) “will be rejected under new ground of rejection, i.e.,
103 rejection by the combination of Macbeth with EITHER Wyatt OR
Tuttle.” Final Act. 3. However, the actual new ground of rejection (i.e., the
presently standing rejection) does not list Tuttle in the statement of rejection
or address Tuttle in the body of the rejection. Id. at 7–9 (present rejection).
The actual new ground of rejection, which changes the rejection’s statutory
basis from 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) to § 103(a), applies only Macbeth and Wyatt.
Id.; see also Non-Final Act. (Dec. 12, 2017) at 4 (rejecting claim 1
under § 102(a)). Claim 1 is not rejected over Tuttle.
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With respect to the at-issue claim limitations (i.e., above non-
italicized limitations), Appellant contends the rejection relies on paragraphs
of Macbeth that do not teach or suggest the limitations in two respects.
Appeal Br. 8–9. Appellant first contends “paragraphs [30–31] of Macbeth
disclose that the index includes titles of applications and metadata describing
the applications[,] but [are] silent as to the index including any content
extracted from within the applications.” Appeal Br. 9. Appellant secondly
contends
[p]aragraph [69] of Macbeth [discloses that] . . . the index
searched over to identify apps is limited to including metadata
about the application, such as data that the developer of the app
has set forth to describe the application and/or title of the
application[;] Macbeth makes no reference to an ability to crawl
an application itself.
Id. Appellant additionally contends the Examiner’s proposed combination
of Macbeth’s and Wyatt’s teachings does not cure Macbeth’s above-alleged
deficiencies because:
Macbeth describes the conventional approach, where
author-generated metadata (a title of the application and/or
descriptive metadata assigned to the application) is used to
index the application. . . . Wyatt describes detecting that an app
may include malware based upon a comparison between a
binary file for the app and a binary file for a known “safe” app.
. . . .[Thus, t]here is nothing in either Macbeth or Wyatt that
suggests . . . part of [a] binary file of [an] app . . . can be used to
index such app.
Id. at 10.
We are unpersuaded of error because the Examiner relies on
additional disclosures of Macbeth and Wyatt that are not addressed by
Appellant and suggest the at-issue claim features (above non-italicized
limitations). Final Act. 2–6 (Macbeth ¶¶ 25, 28, 31, 50, 54–56, 60, 69–70;
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Wyatt ¶¶ 242, 262), 7–9 (Macbeth ¶¶ 28, 30–31, 35, 38, 39, 47, 69;
Wyatt ¶¶ 242, 262); Ans. 4–6 (Macbeth ¶¶ 2, 28, 31, 40, 50; Wyatt ¶¶ 255–
56, 262). Specifically, cited paragraphs disclose an application
crawler/indexer that extracts and indexes information embedded within
applications. Macbeth ¶¶ 28, 40, 50; Wyatt ¶¶ 255–56, 262. The paragraphs
disclose the embedded information (i.e., extracted and indexed) may be
parameters such as functions and content for performing tasks.
Macbeth ¶¶ 3, 28. The paragraphs disclose the functions and content may be
embedded in the application’s binary data, e.g., as embedded permissions.
Wyatt ¶ 255, 262. The paragraph further discloses indexed parameters may
be query-searched and returned. Macbeth ¶¶ 3, 31, 40, 50; Wyatt ¶ 255–56.
We agree with the Examiner that this combination yields the at-issue claim
limitations.
In the Reply Brief, Appellant contends the Examiner presents an
unreasonable claim interpretation: “Th[e] overly broad interpretation of
‘data extracted from within an application’, which would encompass
metadata assigned to an application by a developer (in contrast to data
within the application itself), is inconsistent with the specification.”
Reply Br. 3. We are unpersuaded of error because, even assuming the
Examiner’s claim interpretation is unreasonable, the above combination of
Macbeth and Wyatt discloses the disputed claim limitations.
In the Reply Brief, Appellant also contends: “From a fair reading of
Macbeth, in the application index 610, the applications are not indexed by
features/content, in contrast to the statement of the Examiner.” Id. at 5.
Appellant further contends:
Macbeth notes that Fig. 6 depicts an example call to a specific
feature level within an application. . . . [T]he app search service
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124 can identify that the intent of the searcher is to read reviews
for the restaurant . . . and can ascertain that an application
(Yelp®) has a reviews section due to . . . parameters set forth
by the developer[, which] . . . cannot fairly be characterized as
being extracted from within an application. In other words,
Macbeth does not contemplate that the Yelp® application is
crawled to identify the “reviews” section, but instead teaches
that the developer identifies the reviews section in the
parameters.
Id. at 6.
We are unpersuaded of error. Appellant does not explain why the
above Yelp® reviews would not be understood as an extracted and indexed
“parameter” of the Yelp® application. See Reply Br. 6. As discussed,
Macbeth teaches that parameters are crawled and thereby extracted/indexed.
See Reply Br. 7. Macbeth teaches that these “[p]arameters . . . within an app
include . . . functions to perform a task.” Macbeth ¶ 28. Macbeth discloses
the Yelp® reviews are such parameters (objects) by stating: “[T]he ranking
has identified Yelp® . . . Reviews as the inferred task the user desires to
access.” Macbeth ¶ 58.
Claims 8 and 13; Representative Claim 8
Appellant argues claims 8 and 13 with reference to claim 8.
Appeal Br. 13–14. We agree claim 8 is representative. For the following
reasons, we are unpersuaded of error in the rejection of claim 8 and
accordingly sustain the rejections of claims 8 and 13.
Claim 8 depends from claim 1 and adds that “the data extracted from
within the application, when included in the search results, is indicated as
corresponding to the application.” Appeal Br. 18 (Claims Appendix).
Appellant contends Macbeth’s cited disclosures do not suggest these
limitations because (bracketed numerals added):
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Figs. 5–6 of Macbeth illustrate a list of search results using the
Bing® search engine app[.] . . . Macbeth provides an example
where . . . [:] the Bing® search application can indicate that
Yelp® is the better app to use in (in a particular instance )[;
and, t]he architecture . . . uses the query 604, the contextual
information 606, and the inferred tasks 608 to rank applications
and direct the user to a specific feature level within the chosen
application as a result of the search. . . . There is no discussion
. . . , however, of [1] any search results including content
extracted from within applications, [2] much less content
extracted . . . being indicated as belonging to the application.
Appeal Br. 13.
We are unpersuaded because argued limitation “1” is suggested by the
above combination of Macbeth and Wyatt. See Final Act. 7. Specifically,
the feature is suggested because Macbeth’s “indexer 306 accumulates the
information from the crawler 302 . . . into a format . . . that provides a useful
result in response to a submitted query.” Macbeth ¶ 50. Thus, the
combination’s indexer extracts information from within applications,
indexes the information into a format for providing query results, and
accordingly provides query results that include information extracted (and
indexed) from within applications. See also Final Act. 7 (described
combination).
Further, claim limitations “1” and “2” are suggested by Macbeth’s
cited Figures 5–6. Specifically, the searched index of extracted data is
shown as including reviews extracted from the Yelp® application. Macbeth
Fig. 6 (showing an “I Love Sushi” query returns Yelp® reviews from the
application index). The returned results (i.e., reviews) are also shown, to the
user, as corresponding to Yelp®. Id. at Fig. 5 (showing Yelp® “I Love
Sushi” review).
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Claims 6, 7, 10, 16, and 17
Dependent claims 6, 7, 10, 16, and 17 are not separately argued.
Appeal Br. 14. We are not persuaded of error in the rejections of their base
and intervening claims. We accordingly sustain the rejections of claims 6, 7,
10, 16, and 17.
Claims 21–24; Representative Claim 21
Appellant argues claims 21–24 with reference to claim 21.
Appeal Br. 15. For the following reasons, we are unpersuaded of error in
the rejection of claim 21 and accordingly sustain the rejections of claims 21–
24.
Independent claim 21 is similar to claim 1, but differs inasmuch that
claim 21’s scope is restricted to alternative limitation “2” of claim 1; i.e.,
that is, claim 21 recites limitation “2” of claim 1 instead of reciting “1” and
“2” of claim 1 (which are alternative limitations). Claim 21 recites: “the
indexed data comprises data retrieved by the application from a web page
when the application was previously executed.”
Addressing the above limitation, Appellant contends:
[This feature is] directed towards when an application, when
executing, retrieves content from a web page. For instance, a
weather application, when executed by a mobile telephone, may
retrieve weather information from a web page. . . . Tuttle
describes a web crawler that crawls a web page[, but does] not
suggest crawling a web page . . . retrieved by an application.
Appeal Br. 15.
We are unpersuaded of error because the argument neglects the
combination of the references. Macbeth is cited as teaching an application
crawler that indexes “any kind of information associate[d with]
applications.” Final Act. 5. Tuttle is cited to show that, at the time of
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Appellant’s invention, application crawlers had the capability to instantiate
and crawl a webpage. Id. at 5–6. The combination of Macbeth and Tuttle
thereby suggests an application crawler that instantiates and crawls an
associated webpage to index its information. Id.; see also Final Act. 21–22.
We add that Macbeth’s indexed parameters include “[c]ontent 114 . . . such
as a map” (Macbeth ¶ 28), which is indicative of webpage content.
Appellant also argues the following “marketplace” limitation of claim
21: “the application available for download from a marketplace of
applications.” Appeal Br. 15; see also supra n.3 (“first italicized” limitation
of claim 1). Specifically, Appellant contends:
[T]he Examiner cites Macbeth as suggesting indexed data, and
asserts that one would modify the indexed data of Macbeth to
include data extracted from a web page by the web crawler of
Tuttle. . . . The crawler of Tuttle, however, is not described as
being capable of crawling an app that is available in an app
store[.]
Id.
We are unpersuaded of Examiner error.
Appellant’s argument is premised upon the unsupported assertion that
“[c]onventional Web crawlers (like the crawler of Tuttle) are unable to crawl
apps that are available by way of application marketplaces[] because such
applications are configured to prevent crawling (e.g., the applications are
‘walled gardens’).” Appeal Br. 11. Such mere attorney argument is not
persuasive. See In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“An
assertion of what seems to follow from common experience is just attorney
argument and not the kind of factual evidence that is required to rebut a
prima facie case of obviousness.”).
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OVERALL CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–3, 5–14, 16–18,
and 21–24.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § References Affirmed Reversed
1–3, 5, 8, 9,
11–15, 18,
21–24
103 Macbeth, Wyatt
1–3, 5, 8, 9,
11–14, 18,
21–24

21–24 103 Macbeth, Tuttle 21–24
6, 7, 17 103 Macbeth, Wyatt, Tuttle 6, 7, 17
10, 16 103 Macbeth, Wyatt, Tullis 10, 16
Overall
Outcome
1–3, 5–14,
16–18, 21–24
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this Appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See
37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED