Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 30, 2020

2019005903 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 30, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/177,817 06/09/2016 George Ringer 359287-US-NP 3382
69316 7590 09/30/2020
MICROSOFT CORPORATION
ONE MICROSOFT WAY
REDMOND, WA 98052
EXAMINER
LE, CANH
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2439
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/30/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
chriochs@microsoft.com
usdocket@microsoft.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte GEORGE RINGER, JEROMY SCOTT STATIA, and DAYNE
ALLEN THOMPSON
Appeal 2019-005903
Application 15/177,817
Technology Center 2400
Before MAHSHID D. SAADAT, MARC S. HOFF, and
IRVIN E. BRANCH, Administrative Patent Judges.
BRANCH, Administrative Patent Judge.
Appeal 2019-005903
Application 15/177,817
2
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant2 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20, which are all of the pending
claims. See Final Act. 1. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant’s disclosure is directed to “providing secure remote desktop
session host experience to a user for a selected application while controlling
the user’s access to non-core functionalities of the selected application.”
Spec. ¶ 2.
Claim 1, reproduced below with disputed limitations emphasized in
italics, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A physical article of manufacture including one or more
tangible computer-readable storage media, encoding computer-
executable instructions for executing on a computer system a
computer process, the computer process comprising:
flagging one or more of executable files, shared object
library files, and registration keys necessary for a non-core
functionality of an application; and

1 We refer to the Specification, filed June 9, 2016 (“Spec.”); Final Office
Action, mailed June 21, 2019 (“Final Act.”); Appeal Brief, filed April 19,
2019 (“Appeal Br.”); Examiner’s Answer, mailed May 30, 2019 (“Ans.”);
and Reply Brief, filed July 30, 2019 (“Reply Br.”).

2 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Microsoft
Technology Licensing, LLC. Appeal Br. 3.
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disabling the application's access to the flagged executable
files, the flagged shared object library files, and the flagged
registration keys.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Srinivasan
Vertes
Xavier
Aikawa
MATSUSAKA
Bursell
Berk
Vissamsetty
Lu
Harris
Walker
Guidry
Thomas3
US 2003/0101245 A1
US 2004/0111720 A1
US 2007/0044149 A1
US 2010/0085150 A1
US 2011/0292432 A1
US 2014/0258446 A1
US 2015/0135167 A1
US 2015/0326588 A1
US 2016/0197730 A1
US 2016/0224373 A1
US 2016/0283198 A1
US 2016/0357958 A1
Windows Server
2008 R2 SECRETS,
2011, John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., pages 1-
556
May 29, 2003
June 10, 2004
Feb. 22, 2007
Apr. 8, 2010
Dec. 1, 2011
Sep. 11, 2014
May 14, 2015
Nov. 12, 2015
July 7, 2016
Aug. 4, 2016
Sep. 29, 2016
Dec. 8, 2016

REJECTIONS
Claims 1–6, 10, and 16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 8–11.4
Claim 1 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) as anticipated by Lu.
Final Act. 11–12.

3 We use “Thomas” herein in place of the use of “Orin” in the Record.
4 The Examiner withdrew claims 7–9, 11–15, and 17–20 from the 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 rejection. Ans. 3.
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Claim 2 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Lu and Bursell. Final Act. 12–13
Claim 3 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Lu, Bursell, and Vissamsetty. Final Act. 13–14.
Claim 4 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Lu, Bursell, and Srinivasan. Final Act. 14–15
Claim 5 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Lu and Thomas. Final Act. 15–16.
Claim 6 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Lu, Thomas, Xavier, and Matsusaka. Final Act. 16–18
Claim 7 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Lu, Berk, and Vertes. Final Act. 18–19.
Claims 8 and 9 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Lu, Thomas, Berk, and Aikawa. Final Act. 19–22.
Claim 10 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Thomas and Lu. Final Act. 23–24.
Claim 11 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Thomas, Lu, and Walker. Final Act. 24–24.
Claim 12 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Thomas, Walker, and Harris. Final Act. 25–26.
Claim 13 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Thomas, Lu, Walker, Harris, and Guidry. Final Act. 27–27.
Claim 14 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Thomas and Lu. Final Act. 28–29.
Claim 15 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Thomas, Lu, and Vissamsetty. Final Act. 29–30.
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Claims 16–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Thomas and Lu. Final Act. 30–32.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s
arguments. We have considered in this Decision only those arguments
Appellant actually raised in the Briefs. Any other arguments Appellant
could have made but chose not to make in the Briefs are deemed to be
waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
To the extent consistent with our analysis herein, we adopt as our own
the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in (1) the action from
which this appeal is taken (Final Act. 8–32) and (2) the Examiner’s Answer
in response to Appellant’s Appeal Brief (Ans. 3–20) and concur with the
conclusions reached by the Examiner. We highlight the following for
emphasis.
35 U.S.C. § 101 REJECTION
Appellant’s contentions are unpersuasive with regard to the rejection
of claims 1–6, 10, and 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Section 101 defines
patentable subject matter: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The U.S.
Supreme Court, however, has “long held that this provision contains an
important implicit exception” that “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas are not patentable.” Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012) (quotation omitted). “Eligibility under
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35 U.S.C. § 101 is a question of law, based on underlying facts.” SAP Am.,
Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1166 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
To determine patentable subject matter, we undertake a two-part test.
“First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those
patent-ineligible concepts” of “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas.” Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217 (2014).
“The inquiry often is whether the claims are directed to ‘a specific means or
method’ for improving technology or whether they are simply directed to an
abstract end-result.” RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322,
1326 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). A court must be cognizant that “all
inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of
nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas” (Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71), and
“describing the claims at . . . a high level of abstraction and untethered from
the language of the claims all but ensures that the exceptions to § 101
swallow the rule.” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1337
(Fed. Cir. 2016). Instead, “the claims are considered in their entirety to
ascertain whether their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject
matter.” Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343,
1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
If the claims are directed to an abstract idea or other ineligible
concept, then we continue to the second step and “consider the elements of
each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine
whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a
patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S.
at 79, 78). The Court describes the second step as a search for “an
‘inventive concept’—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is
‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more
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Application 15/177,817
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than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566
U.S. at 72–73).
The Office published revised guidance on the application of § 101.
USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Revised Guidance”); see also USPTO, October
2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility, available at https://www.
uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf (Oct. 17,
2019) (“Oct. 2019 Guidance”). Under the Revised Guidance, we look to
whether the claim recites
(1) a judicial exception, such as a law of nature or any of the
following groupings of abstract ideas:
(a) mathematical concepts, such as mathematical formulas;
(b) certain methods of organizing human activity, such as a
fundamental economic practice; or
(c) mental processes, such as an observation or evaluation
performed in the human mind;
(2) any additional limitations that integrate the judicial exception
into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h));
and
(3) any additional limitations beyond the judicial exception that,
alone or in combination, were not “well-understood, routine,
conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)).
See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52, 55, 56. Under the Revised
Guidance, if the claim does not recite a judicial exception, then it is eligible
under § 101, and no further analysis is necessary. Id. at 54. Similarly, under
the guidance, “if the claim as a whole integrates the recited judicial
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exception into a practical application of that exception,” then no further
analysis is necessary. Id. at 53, 54.
USPTO Revised Guidance Step 2A, Prong 1
The Examiner determines claim 1’s “flagging” and “disabling” steps
are mental processes which can be performed in the human mind (including
an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion).” Ans. 4. Appellant argues
“the Examiner has not shown how a user can mentally disable an
application’s access to the flagged executable files, the flagged shared object
library files, and the flagged registration keys.” Reply Br. 4.
“Whether a claim is drawn to patent-eligible subject matter is an issue
of law that we review de novo.” SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
601 F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Here, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites an abstract idea,
namely a mental process. Claim 1 recites “flagging one or more of
executable files, shared object library files, and registration keys necessary
for a non-core functionality of an application” and “disabling the
application’s access to the flagged executable files, the flagged shared object
library files, and the flagged registration keys.” A human can mentally flag
a file and can decide to refrain from some action that would otherwise result
in a file having ongoing access, thereby disabling access.” Thus, claim 1
recites a judicial exception.
USPTO Revised Guidance Step 2A, Prong 2
We are unpersuaded the claims integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application. Aside from the abstract idea identified above, claim 1
recites “computer-readable storage media, encoding computer-executable
instructions for executing on a computer system a computer process.” The
Examiner determines, and we agree, that “[t]he recitation of generic
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computer component (i.e. [a computer-readable medium with instructions])
in the claim does necessarily [remove] that claim from reciting an abstract
idea. Ans. 4.
Appellant argues as follows:
the combination of ‘flagging one or more of executable files,
shared object library files, and registration keys necessary for a
non-core functionality of an application’ and ‘disabling the
application’s access to the flagged executable files, the flagged
shared object library files, and the flagged registration keys" is a
practical application because it results in preventing the
application's access to flagged executable files, the flagged
shared object library files, and the flagged registration keys for a
non-core functionality.
Reply Br. 5–6. The limitations Appellant refers to, however, are the abstract
idea and are not the additional elements that could integrate the abstract idea
into a practical application. Moreover, Appellant’s specification describes
the additional elements in nothing more than generic terms. Spec. ¶ 58.
Accordingly, Appellant has failed to identify any additional
recitations that implement the underlying abstract idea with, or use the
underlying abstract idea in conjunction with, “a particular machine or
manufacture that is integral” to claim 1, or that effect “a transformation or
reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing,” or that apply or
use the underlying abstract idea “in some other meaningful way beyond
generally linking the use of the [underlying abstract idea] to a particular
technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception.” 2019 Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
Thus, claim 1 does not integrate the judicial exception into a practical
application.
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USPTO Step 2B
Because claim 1 recites a judicial exception and does not integrate
that exception into a practical application, we reach the issue of whether the
claim adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field. Revised Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 56.
The Examiner finds the claim recites generic computer components
(i.e. a computer-readable medium with instructions). Ans. 4
We agree with the Examiner. Appellant has not identified any
specific limitation of claim 1 that is not “well-understood, routine,
conventional” in the field as per MPEP § 2106.05(d).
Furthermore, the functionalities recited by claim 1 are recited at a high
level of generality that do not set forth limited rules for implementing the
functionalities sufficient to confer patent eligibility.
Therefore, we conclude that claim 1, viewed “both individually and as
an ordered combination,” does not recite significantly more than the judicial
exception to transform the claim into patent-eligible subject matter. See
Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S.
at 79).
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed, claim 1 is directed to mental
processes identified as abstract ideas. Furthermore, the claims do not recite
limitations that amount to significantly more than the abstract idea itself.
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of independent claim 1 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 and of claims 2–6, 10, and 16, which are not argued
separately with sufficient particularity.
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35 U.S.C. § 102 REJECTION
With respect to the anticipation rejection of independent claim 1,
Appellant contends that “the Examiner has not shown how it necessarily
follows that a particular executable file that is not a ‘known good’ file is
necessarily an executable file ‘necessary for a non-core functionality of an
application’ as required in independent claim 1. Reply Br. 7. The crux of
Appellant’s argument is that “flagging one or more of executable files,
shared object library files, and registration keys necessary for a non-core
functionality of an application” should be interpreted such that each of
“executable files” and “shared object library files” are modified by
“necessary for a non-core functionality of an application.” Because
Appellant does not persuasively explain why the “executable files” must be
“necessary for a non-core functionality of an application,” we are
unpersuaded of error.
Appellant also argues that the Examiner has not established that Lu
describes “flagging of shared object library files necessary for a non-core
functionality of an application or registration keys necessary for a non-core
functionality of an application.” Appeal Br. 9. Appellant contends that “Lu
does not even disclose any shared object library files or registration keys, let
alone shared object library files and registration keys necessary for a non-
core functionality of an application.” Id. Appellant does not persuasively
establish that “flagging one or more of…” requires flagging a file from each
of the three subgroups.
Appellant also argues that “blocking installation” of an executable file
as admittedly taught by Lu does not anticipate “disabling the application’s
access to the flagged executable files” because “while as per Lu, the flagged
executable file is not installed, as per the claimed limitation, the flagged
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executable file may be installed, but an application’s access to the flagged
executable file is disabled.” Appeal Br. 10. This argument is unpersuasive
because it does not persuasively rebut the Examiner’s finding that Lu’s
description of disabling access of a flagged executable file occurs by
blocking installation of the file. Ans. 6–7 (citing Lu Fig. 1 and ¶ 37 (upon
determination that “the bit pattern is not a member of the database of ‘known
good’ executable files, [the system] flags the file [and, after a determination
that the file is ‘bad’] may send an instruction to block the installation of the
now ‘known bad’ executable file.”)).
Accordingly, we are unpersuaded of error in the rejection of claim 1.
35 U.S.C. § 103 REJECTION
Principles of Law
To overcome a rejection based on obviousness, it is not enough for an
Appellant to show that references have differences. See In re Beattie, 974
F.2d 1309, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Minor differences between the prior
art and a claimed device may be a matter of design choice absent evidence to
the contrary. See In re Rice, 341 F.2d 309, 314 (CCPA 1965). The
obviousness analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the
specific subject matter of the challenged claim, as the analysis can take
account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in
the art would employ. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418
(2007). This follows, in part, from the fact that the person of ordinary skill
in the art is a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton. Id. at 418.
Accordingly, inventions that the law deems obvious are those modest,
routine, every day, incremental improvements of an existing product or
process that do not involve sufficient inventiveness to merit patent
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protection. See Ritchie v. Vast Resources, Inc., 563 F.3d 1334, 1337 (Fed.
Cir. 2009).
Analysis
Claim 2 recites “determining the non-core functionality of the
application by determining functionalities that access a server configuration
file as a non-core functionality.” With respect to the obviousness rejection
of independent claim 2, Appellant contends that Bursell does not cure the
deficiencies of Lu. Appeal Br. 10. Appellant also argues as follows:
“determining virtual machine and virtualization server
configurations” has nothing to do with “determining
functionalities that access a server configuration.” Furthermore,
there is no discussion in Bursell of identifying “functionalities
that access a server configuration” as “noncore functionalities.”
In fact, Bursell does not even mention anything about any non-
core functionality and it therefore cannot disclose or suggest
“determining the non-core functionality of the application by
determining functionalities that access a server configuration file
as a noncore functionality” as recited in claim 2.
Id. at 11.
The Examiner finds as follows:
Bursell discloses dynamic configuration in cloud computing
environments, wherein the computer process further comprising
determining the non-core functionality of the application by
determining functionalities that access a server configuration file
as a non-core functionality (Bursell: 0101, other types of usage
data corresponding to usage amounts or statistics for any of the
cloud physical resources discussed herein may be received and
analyzed to determine virtual machine and virtualization server
configurations in step 704).
Ans. 7–8.
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Based on the record before us, we cannot sustain the rejection of
claim 2. The Examiner does not adequately explain how the recited
limitation reads on Bursell’s disclosure at paragraph 101. We also cannot
sustain the rejections of claims 3 and 4, which depend therefrom.
Claim 5 depends from claim 1 and, although rejected as obvious,
Appellant argues claim 5 based on deficiencies with respect to the
anticipation rejection of claim 1. As we do not agree that such deficiencies
exist, we sustain the rejection of claim 5.
Claim 6 recites that “disabling the application’s access to the
common dialog based functionality further comprises disabling the
application’s access to the registration keys necessary to execute the
common dialog based functionality.”
Appellant argues that “Xavier and Matsusaka do not remedy any of
the deficiencies of Lu and Orin in relation to independent claim 1.” Appeal
Br. 12. Appellant also presents several arguments alleging that Matsusaka
does not disclose certain claimed elements. Appellant argues, for instance
that Matsusaka’s registration key on a keyboard is different from claim 6’s
registration key stored in memory that can be flagged. Id. Appellant also
argues “the cited sections do not disclose anything about ‘disabling the
application’s access to the registration keys’” because “storing ‘the period of
time during which the displaying of the disabled key is performed’ in
response to pressing of the registration key has nothing to do with
‘disabling the application's access to the registration keys,’ let alone
‘disabling the application's access to the registration keys necessary to
execute the common dialog based functionality.’” Id. at 12–13.
Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive. For instance, Appellant
provides insufficient persuasive argument or evidence that “[Matsusaka]’s
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registration key on a keyboard is different from claim 6’s registration key
stored in memory that can be flagged.” Id. at 12. Nor does Appellant
provide sufficient persuasive argument or evidence that Matsusaka’s
“storing ‘the period of time during which the displaying of the disabled key
is performed’ in response to pressing of the registration key has nothing to
do with ‘disabling the application's access to the registration keys’” or
“disabling the application's access to the registration keys necessary to
execute the common dialog based functionality.” In addition to being
persuasively supported, it fails to account for the teachings of the other
references.
The Examiner rejects claim 6 over the combined teachings of Lu,
Thomas, and Xavier, and Matsusaka. Final Act. 16–18. In particular, the
Examiner finds as follows:
Xavier discloses anti-phishing protection. In one
embodiment, Xavier disclose disabled link is accessed a warning
dialog is presented (Xavier: fig. 6, par. 0038).
Matsusaka discloses image forming apparatus and display
method for display portion of an image forming apparatus. In
one embodiment, Matsusaka discloses when a registration key
has been pressed, the control portion 6 causes, for example, the
memory 18 or the storage device 63 to store the period of time
during which the displaying of the disabled keys is performed
(Matsusaka: pars. 0103, 0109).
Ans. 10.
Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive because the Examiner relies
on, for example, Xavier, not Matsusaka, for teaching presenting a warning
dialog when a disabled link is selected. Appellant’s arguments do not take
this teaching into account. Appeal Br. 12–13; Reply Br. 9–10. Each
reference cited by the Examiner must be read, not in isolation, but for what it
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fairly teaches in combination with the prior art as a whole. In re Merck &
Co. Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see also In re Keller, 642
F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981) (explaining that when the rejection is based on
a combination of references, one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking
references individually). The relevant inquiry is whether the claimed subject
matter would have been obvious to ordinarily skilled artisans in light of the
combined teachings of the references.
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 6.
Claim 7 depends from claim 1 and, although rejected as obvious,
Appellant argues claim 7 based on deficiencies with respect to the
anticipation rejection of claim 1, which we do not find. Accordingly, we
sustain the rejection of claim 7.
Claim 8 recites “wherein the computer process further comprising
generating a scheduled task with group policy preferences specifying the
application’s access permissions to the flagged executable files . . . .” Note
that the Examiner’s construction of claim 1—with which we agree—requires
flagging only one file, disabling the applications access to the flagged file, if
the flagged file is an executable file, then it need not be “necessary for a
non-core functionality of an application.” See infra. Here, one proper
construction of claim 8 is the truncated portion of the claim quoted above.
Hence, Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive that the rejection of claim 8 is
in error because Thomas does “not disclose or even suggest access
permissions to any . . . registration keys that have been flagged as being
necessary for a non-core functionality of an application as required by claim
8’s dependence from independent claim 1.” Appeal Br. 13–1; Reply Br. 11.
We are also unpersuaded of error in the rejection of claim 9 because
Appellant does not persuasively explain why Thomas’s admitted disclosure
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of “enforcing group policies in an ‘on’ or ‘off' manner” fails to render
obvious “running a scheduled task on a periodic basis to enforce such group
policy preferences” as required by claim 9. Appeal Br. 14; Reply Br. 11–12.
The ability to turn enforcement on and off suggests doing so at least suggests
doing so periodically. We are mindful that the skilled artisan is “a person of
ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550
U.S. 398, 420, 421 (2007).
Regarding claim 10, Appellant again unpersuasively argues references
in isolation. Appeal Br. 14; Reply Br. 12–13; see Merck 800 F.2d 1097.
Accordingly, we adopt the examiner’s findings and conclusion regarding the
rejection of claim 10. Final Act. 23–24; Ans. 13–14. We also adopt the
Examiner’s findings and conclusion that claims 11–15 are unpatentable.
Final Act. 24–30; Ans. 14–17. We sustain the rejection of claim 10–15. We
also sustain the rejection of claims 16–20, which Appellant argues on the
same basis as claim 10. Appeal Br. 16 (“claims 16–20 are allowable over
Orin and Lu for reasons discussed previously herein”).
CONCLUSION
We sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–6, 10, and 16 as
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter
We sustain the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of claim 1.
We do not sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claim 2,
but we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claim 3–20.
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DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–6, 10, 16 101 Patent-Ineligible Subject
Matter
1–6, 10,
16

1 102 Lu 1
2 103 Lu, Bursell 2
3 103 Lu, Bursell, Vissamsetty 3
4 103 Lu, Bursell, Srinivasan 4
5 103 Lu, Thomas 5
6 103 Lu, Thomas, Xavier,
Matsusaka
6
7 103 Lu, Berk, Vertes 7
8, 9 103 Lu, Thomas, Berk,
Aikawa
8, 9
10 103 Thomas, Lu 10
11 103 Thomas, Lu, Walker 11
12 103 Thomas, Walker, Harris 12
13 103 Thomas, Lu, Walker,
Harris, Guidry
13
14 103 Thomas, Lu 14
15 103 Thomas, Lu,
Vissamsetty
15
16–20 103 Thomas, Lu 16–20
Overall
Outcome:
1–20
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED