Micron Technology, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 15, 2020

2019004627 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 15, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/203,692 07/06/2016 Ed A. Schrock 010829-9181.US00 7554
46844 7590 07/15/2020
PERKINS COIE LLP - Micron
PATENT-SEA
PO BOX 1247
SEATTLE, WA 98111-1247
EXAMINER
JEFFERSON, QUOVAUNDA
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2899
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/15/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patentprocurement@perkinscoie.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte ED A. SCHROCK
____________

Appeal 2019-004627
Application 15/203,692
Technology Center 2800
____________

Before KAREN M. HASTINGS, JULIA HEANEY, and
MICHAEL G. McMANUS, Administrative Patent Judges.

HASTINGS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 requests our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–20.
We have jurisdiction over the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). “Micron Technology, Inc.” is identified as the real party in interest
(Appeal Br. 2).

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Application 15/203,692

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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Claim 1 is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal (emphasis added
to highlight key disputed limitations):
1. A semiconductor die assembly, comprising:
a support substrate;
a first semiconductor die on the support substrate;
a plurality of second semiconductor dies arranged in a stack on
the first semiconductor die;
a molded wall made from a molded material, wherein the
molded wall has vertical surfaces defining a cavity spaced
apart from the stack of second semiconductor dies and a portion
of the molded wall is on the support substrate spaced laterally
apart from the first semiconductor die; and
a thermal transfer structure (TTS) attached to the molded wall

(Appeal Br., Claims Appendix 13).

Independent claim 7 is directed to a “semiconductor die assembly”
similar to that of claim 1 (Claims Appendix 14). Independent claim 15 is
directed to a method of manufacturing a semiconductor die assembly
(Claims Appendix 15).
REJECTIONS
The Examiner maintains the following rejections.
Claims 1 and 3–5 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as being
anticipated by Yoshida (US 2010/0258932 A1, published Oct. 14, 2010).
Claim 2 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over
Yoshida and Nagamori (US 2001/0043130 A1, published Nov. 22, 2001).
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Claim 6 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over
Yoshida, Nagamori, and Haba (US 6,376,904 B1, issued Apr. 23, 2002).
Claims 7–10 and 13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Yoshida.
Claims 11 and 14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Yoshida and Haba.
Claim 12 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over
Yoshida, Nagamori, and Haba.
Claims 15–192 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Sheppard (US 6,284,569 B1, issued Sept. 4, 2001),
Yoshida, and Kelly (US 2014/0134804 A1, published May 15, 2014).
Claim 20 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over
Sheppard, Yoshida, Kelly, and Haba.

OPINION
Upon consideration of the evidence of record and each of Appellant’s
contentions as set forth in the Appeal Brief, we determine that Appellant has
not identified reversible error in the Examiner’s rejections (See generally
Ans. mailed Aug. 29, 2018). In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365–66 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (explaining the Board’s long-held practice of requiring Appellant(s) to
identify the alleged error in the Examiner’s rejection). We sustain the

2 While the summary paragraph on page 12 of the Final Action only lists
claim 15, the detailed description in the rejection section addresses claims
16-19 as well.
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rejections for the reasons expressed by the Examiner in the Final Office
Action and the Answer.
We add the following primarily for emphasis.
Appellant relies upon the same arguments for claims 1 and 7 (Appeal
Br. 5, 6, 9, 10). Appellant separately argues the rejection of claim 15
(Appeal Br. 10, 11).
With respect to both the § 102 rejection of claim 1 and the § 103
rejection of claim 7, Appellant argues that the claim phrase “the molded wall
has vertical surfaces defining a cavity spaced apart from the stack of second
semiconductor dies” does not encompass Yoshida’s semiconductor device as
relied upon by the Examiner, because Yoshida’s molded wall 26c is an
inclined surface and does not define a cavity (See Appeal Br. 6 (claim 1);
Appeal Br. 9 (claim 7)).
These arguments are not persuasive of reversible error for reasons
explained by the Examiner (Ans. 4–6 (Answer filed Aug. 29, 2018)).
It is well established that “the PTO must give claims their broadest
reasonable construction consistent with the specification. . . . Therefore, we
look to the specification to see if it provides a definition for claim terms, but
otherwise apply a broad interpretation.” In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.,
496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[A]s applicants may amend claims
to narrow their scope, a broad construction during prosecution creates no
unfairness to the applicant or patentee.”)
Here, the language of claim 1 (as well as claim 7) clearly
encompasses the inclined vertical surfaces of Yoshida (See Ans. 4).
Appellant’s Specification lacks any limiting definition. Indeed, the
Specification describes that the term “vertical” should be “construed
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broadly” to encompass “inclined orientations” (Spec. ¶ 17, Ans. 4).
Furthermore, as pointed out by the Examiner, Appellant’s cavity may be
filled with other material such as layer 117 (Ans. 5; Spec. ¶ 35).
Accordingly, Appellant has not shown reversible error in the Examiner’s
finding of anticipation of claim 1, or determination of obviousness of claim
7, based on Yoshida.
Appellant makes no further arguments regarding the Examiner’s
rejections of any of the claims dependent on claims 1 and 7.
Finally, with respect to method claim 15, Appellant contends there is
no disclosure or suggestion of “molding a material onto a support substrate”
because the carrier ring of Sheppard may be a high temperature plastic or a
metallic material (Appeal Br. 10, 11).
It has been established that “the [obviousness] analysis need not seek
out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged
claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a
person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex
Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007); see also In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1264–
65 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (a reference stands for all of the specific teachings
thereof as well as the inferences one of ordinary skill in the art would have
reasonably been expected to draw therefrom).
Appellant’s argument fails to consider the breadth of the claim
language (which, for example, encompasses any molding/shaping process),
the applied prior art as a whole, and the inferences that one of ordinary skill
would have made. As the Examiner points out, it is generally known that
plastic is a moldable material (Ans. 6). Accordingly, one of ordinary skill
would have readily inferred that the plastic carrier ring of Sheppard may be
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molded for predictable results (generally Ans.). Appellant has not
sufficiently explained why the claimed subject matter is “more than the
predictable use of prior art elements [or steps] according to their established
functions.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417; Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc.
v. Ltd. Brands, Inc., 555 F.3d 984, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (under the flexible
inquiry set forth by the Supreme Court, the PTO must take account of the
“inferences and creative steps,” or even routine steps, that an ordinary
artisan would employ).
Appellant makes no further arguments regarding the Examiner’s
rejections of any of the claims dependent on claim 15.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 15–20.
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CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 3–5 102 Yoshida 1, 3–5
2 103 Yoshida, Nagamori 2
6 103 Yoshida,
Nagamori, Haba
6
7–10, 13 103 Yoshida 7–10, 13
11, 14 103 Yoshida, Haba 11, 14
12 103 Yoshida,
Nagamori, Haba
12
15–19 103 Sheppard,
Yoshida, Kelly
15–19
20 103 Sheppard,
Yoshida, Kelly,
Haba
20
Overall
Outcome
1–20

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED